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Abstract 
The thesis at hand presents a critical analysis of the writings of the 
contemporary, 20th century Muslim scholar, theologian and exegete Said 
Nursi (1876-1960) of Turkey. Special reference is given in this thesis to his 
views and writings on theodicy and the problem of evil from the perspective 
of Islām.  
This thesis is an attempt to discover the Qur‟anic narrative of evil (sharr) as 
deviating from the human perception of evil in this world; to analyze Nursi‟s 
magnum opus on the definition of sharr and its correspondence to the 
Qur‟anic definition thereof; and to challenge Nursi‟s works with the thoughts 
and views of his predecessors and contemporaries in order to try to filter 
new insights and offer possible solutions to theodicy and the problem of evil 
through Nursi‟s Risale-i Nur Collection.  
The methodology that has been used in this study follows Izutsu‟s example 
as seen in Ethico-Religious Concepts of the Qur‟an and God and Man in the 
Koran: namely to conduct an inductive investigation of the term sharr in the 
Qur‟ān and Nursi‟s Risale-i Nur Collection. 
There are several issues that can be considered to be the main findings of 
this study: 1) human perception of evil in this world to a great extent at 
odds with the Qur‟anic definition of sharr, 2) new theological concept called 
„negative worship‟, establishing a relation between sharr and worship, 3) 
relationship between theodicy and the Divine Names of God, 4) link between 
the human „I‟ (ana) and, if misused, its encouragement for all kinds of 
ashrār (pl. sharr), 5) original interpretation to the Qur‟anic verse [2:30], 6) 
sharr, ana and free choice (juz‟ī ikhtiyār) consist of the same nature and 
finally 7) suffering of on-human beings part of the field of theodicy.  
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Transliteration 
Said Nursi‟s writings were originally written in Ottoman (Arabic letters) and 
later in his lifetime translated into Turkish (Latin alphabet). However, the 
current Turkish version of the Risale-i Nur is in fact a combination of 
Ottoman and Farsi words. After the 1980‟s, the works started to be 
translated into English and thereafter, gradually into many other major 
languages.  
Any Arabic or Farsi words have been written in italics. Words such as „Qur‟ān‟ 
or „Islām‟ which have been integrated into common English usage have been 
used in that agreed form without special marking. 
The Arabic-to-English list of transliteration employed in this thesis follows 
Neil Robinson‟s Discovering the Qur‟an: A Contemporary Approach to a 
Veiled Text.1 
ء ‟ س s ل l 
ب b ش sh م m 
ت t ص ṣ ن n 
ث th ض ḍ ه h 
ج j ط ṭ و w 
ح ḥ ظ ẓ ي y 
خ kh ع „ ة ah; at (construct state) 
د d غ gh لا (article) al- and ‟l  
ذ dh ف f   
ر r ق q   
ز z ك k   
Long vowels: 
ā, ū, ī 
    
                                        
1  Neal Robinson. Discovering the Qur‟an: A Contemporary Approach to a Veiled Text 
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1996). 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Context to this Study 
The problem of evil is not a contemporary one. It has been a dilemma 
throughout history. During the time of the Greeks, it was first discussed by 
Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), and later quoted by Lactantius (A.D. 260-340) as 
follows:  
God either wishes to take away evils but is unable; or He is able, and is 
unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If 
He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the 
character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally 
at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and 
feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which is alone 
suitable to God, from what source then are evils? Or why does He not remove 
them?2  
This question and dilemma of God being omnipotent and at the same time 
infinitely good, is not old, forgotten and solved. It is still fresh in the minds 
of people, and arises anew ever since a natural evil occurs or a moral evil is 
committed.  
Two poles of thought have been developed regarding theodicy: monism and 
dualism. Monism3 suggests that the universe forms an ultimate, harmonious 
unity; evil is only apparent and would be recognized as good if it can be 
seen in its full cosmic context.4 In other words, there might be partial evil; 
however from a universal context it is good. The main ideas introduced are 
                                        
2 On the Anger of God, chap. 13, trans. By William Fletcher in The Writings of the Ante-
Nicene Fathers (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdman), Vol. vii, 1951. 
3 The founder of Monism in western thought is the Dutch philosopher Spinoza (1632-1677) 
who espoused the pantheistic system. For further information see Spinoza‟s Ethics, trans. by 
R. H. M. Elves (London: George Bell & Sons, 1891). 
4 Evil and the God of Love, 15. 
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first of all that everything that comes from God is perfect. Hence, since God 
is the infinite perfect One, every creation makes its own contribution to that 
infinite perfection. Furthermore, good and evil are not objective realities. 
Both are formed by comparing one to the other. And evil is therefore just an 
illusion of our finite perspective and can be seen as a “lesser good.”5 Every 
creation necessarily is determined by divine perfect nature and they act in a 
certain manner. They are therefore not free, since the only free is the 
perfect Determiner.  
When talking about moral evil, namely the sin of a person, this is, according 
to the thought of Monism, due to lack of complete truth, a privation of virtue. 
The answer to the following question, how lacks can occur within an 
infinitely perfect reality, is given through the „principle of plenitude.‟6 Hence, 
in order to show the huge range of diversity in God‟s creation and the 
infinite creativity of God, a sinner must exist just like a saint. The weakness 
of Monism, as stated by Hick, is that even if one accepts the idea that evil is 
just illusory, it is still very real for it can be felt, it hurts and it is experienced 
painfully by human beings. Therefore, evil should not be thought of as 
similar to a dream, a hallucination or a mirage. Hick states further that the 
pain suffered by human beings does not all of a sudden become bearable, if 
one knows that evil is an absolute universal necessity. For a reconciliation to 
take place, one must be able to show that either evil is to be justly deserved 
or that it is a means to a good end.7 
                                        
5 Ibid., 20. 
6 Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. (Harvard University Press, 1936). The „principle 
of plenitude‟ means that a universe which contains as many different beings as possible, 
lower and higher, is more perfect than a universe which would contain only the highest and 
most perfect beings. 
7 Evil and the God of Love, 23. 
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Dualism8, on the other hand, rejects this harmony in the world and suggests 
that good and evil are completely opposed to one another. Their duality can 
be overcome only by one destroying the other. The basic idea of this pole is 
the acceptance of two entities, namely good and evil, or mind and matter. 
This excludes the belief in a perfectly good and infinitely powerful Creator. 
The argumentation is that every design in this world is a means to an end. If 
the Designer has tied everything to certain means, this would mean that His 
power is limited and He therefore is dependent on means, for he could also 
come to the end by a single word.9 Internal dualism suggests that God is 
good and evil, and that those two constantly oppose each other. In other 
words, God is infinitely good but at the same time He is the source of surd 
evil. E. S. Brightman calls the solution for evil „theistic finitism.‟ It 
understands God as „an eternal, conscious spirit, whose will is unfailingly 
good.‟ But at the same time „there is something in the universe not created 
by God and not a result of voluntary divine self-limitation, which God finds 
as either obstacle or instrument to his will.‟ This „obstacle‟ lies within God‟s 
own nature.10 Moral evil occurs through the malfunctioning of system which 
is designed for the preservation and enhancement of life. 
This very gerenalized background forms just a partial basis for what is to 
come in this study: besides taking into consiederation most of the theories 
                                        
8 The thought of dualism was developed before Christianity and traces back to the ancient 
Zoroastrian religion (618-541 B.C.) The notion of dualism has been applied to theodicy by a 
more „contemporary‟ western scholar, namely Plato (428/427-348/347 B.C.) and was later 
carried on by J. S. Mill (1806-73) and E. S. Brightman (1884-1953). For further information 
see Cf. Francis M. Cornford, Plato‟s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato translated with a 
running commentary, 1937 (New York: The Liberal Arts Library, 1957); J. S. Mill, Three 
Essays on Religion (London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 1875); E. S. Brightman, A 
Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940). 
9 Evil and the God of Love, 28, see also J. S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion (London: 
Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 1875), 176-7. 
10 Evil and the God of Love, 31, see also E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940), 314. 
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that have been developed in the field of theodicy, this study broadens the 
field by offering a semantic analysis of the term sharr in the Qur‟ān and by 
looking into Said Nursi‟s views on theodicy by means of his contemporary 
work the Risale-i Nur Collection. 
1.2 Aims of this Study 
This study aims to examine new and unique ideas to the debates 
surrounding theodicy and the problem of evil, the evil nature of man, 
predestination and its compatibility with free will, „Divine Trust‟, the human „I‟ 
(ana) and its nature and function, the perfect paradisal state of Adam and 
his wife, the reasons for the creation of Satan, and the concept of „natural‟ 
and „moral evil‟. This will be made comparable to those studies already 
undertaken on theodicy and the problem of evil, and so will greatly enhance 
the possibility for a lively and fruitful discourse. 
Previous work has been concentrated mainly on the general human 
perception of evil in this world, dividing it into two main categories, namely 
„natural‟ and „moral‟ evil. Following this division, possible answers, solutions 
and theories have been developed. It seems however unlikely that much 
further work can be undertaken with this type of divisions. This study aims 
to highlight the potential to develop research into the definition of sharr 
from the perspective of Divine Scripture and to look further into the ethico-
moral aspect of evil and its connection with ana as one major aspect of the 
„Divine Trust‟ given to humankind, as well as its link with divine determining 
and free will. It is strongly believed that Said Nursi‟s works can contribute in 
this respect in a major way.  
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1.3 Motivation 
The starting point of this endeavor was to write a comparative work on 
Divine Justice. However, after reading texts such as Ruth Scoralick‟s Das 
Drama der Barmherzigkeit Gottes: Studien zur biblischen Gottesrede und 
ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte in Judentum und Christentum (Stuttgart: Verlag 
Katholisches Bibelwerk GmbH, 1999), Rolf Baumann‟s “Gottes Gerechtigkeit” 
– Verheiβung und Herausforderung für die Welt (Freiburg: Herder 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989) and Lempp and Thaidigsmann‟s Gottes 
Gerechtigkeit in der Dialektik der Aufklärung (München: Kaiser Verlag, 1990), 
a much bigger, unsolved problem seemed to be the discussion about putting 
God on trial – in other words, the question around why God did not interfere 
to prevent injustices. This directly led to the problem of evil, arguably the 
biggest challenge of traditional theism which comprises arguments against 
God‟s existence. Starting a comparative work would have been far beyond 
the scope of this thesis, hence the study has been confined to Muslim 
thought. Comparative work may thus be conducted in form of articles after 
the completion of this work. 
1.4 Contribution of the Study to the Field 
This study contributes to the field of theodicy and the problem of evil in 
many different ways: it explores the concept in view of Said Nursi‟s Risale-i 
Nur Collection, thus adding another contemporary viewpoint to the discourse. 
It identifies the Qur‟anic understanding of sharr as being at odds with the 
human perception of evil and provides a definition for the nature of sharr in 
the view of Nursi. It shows that the notion of „natural evil‟ is not conform to 
the Qur‟anic definitions. Furthermore, Nursi establishes a relation between 
sharr and worhip, creating a new theological concept that he calls „negative 
worship‟, comprising illnesses and calamities. These, according to Nursi, 
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make man realize his impotence and weakness, leading him to take refuge 
in God. Nursi also provides a link between theodicy and the Divine Names of 
God, claiming that God‟s Beauteous (jamālī) and Glorious (jalālī) Names 
together in unity form a „Divine Mosaic‟, pointing to their Creator. Another 
novelty is Nursi‟s link between ana and, if misused, its encouragement for all 
kinds of ashrār. Nursi is thus arguably the first scholar to suggest ana to be 
one meaning of the Qur‟anic Divine Trust. Another contribution to the field is 
Nursi‟s original interpretation of the Qur‟anic verse [2:30] stating that the 
angels‟ questioning and doubts were not related to human beings‟ creation 
(khāliqun) but rather in regards to them being placed on earth (jā‟ilun). For 
anything God creates is pure good (khayr al-mahdh). Yet another 
contribution is Nursi‟s claim that sharr, ana and free choice (juz‟ī ikhtiyār) all 
consist of the same nature. All of them have no external existence serving as 
a unit of measurement; and in order for them to exist, there is no need for 
all causes to gather. Thus, all of the above, namely sharr, ana and free will 
can easily be attributed to man, making him responsible for his actions. And 
finally, Nursi adds the suffering of non-human beings into the field of 
theodicy asking how their short life, annihilation and their being killed 
without exception can be reconciled with God‟s compassion and kindness. 
1.5 Methodology 
In order to build a profound basis for the concept of sharr, it is important to 
have an idea of the semantic structure of the term sharr in the Qur‟ān and 
to make a semantic analysis of key concepts and terms. To define the 
methodology that will be used for this study, Izutsu‟s Ethico-Religious 
Concepts in the Qur‟an11  and God and Man in the Koran12 will be consulted 
                                        
11Toshihiko Izutsu. Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān (Montreal&Kingston: McGill-
Queen‟s University Press, 2007). 
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as main reference. The author of this study is aware of the fact that the 
methodology of Izutsu concentrates merely on the semantic analysis of key 
concepts and terms in the Qur‟ān – nevertheless, this very same 
methodology will also be used to define the term sharr in the Risale-i Nur 
Collection (henceforward referred to as Risale) which is our main reference 
point in the second part of this study, especially covering chapters six and 
seven. How this methodology has been ultimately applied to the Risale will 
be explained at the end of this section.  
The aim will be to do an inductive investigation of ethical terms in the Qur‟ān 
that will be “as little prejudiced as possible by any theoretical position or 
moral philosophy.” 13 The best way of doing this, according to Izutsu, is to 
place oneself in the position of a child who is trying to learn its mother 
tongue; in other words, to try to find all defining attributes for a single term 
and reach the basic meaning of that term before it goes through the filter of 
that language community.14 For according to Izutsu, the analytical study of 
key terms in a language which he calls „semantics‟ is a whole 
Weltanschauung – not only of the people who use that language as a tool to 
speak and think, but more importantly for those who use it to conceptualize 
and interpret the world that surrounds them.15  
                                                                                                               
12 Toshihiko Izutsu. God and Man in the Koran (New Hampshire: Ayer Company Publishers, 
Inc., 1987). 
13 Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 13. 
14 Ibid., 14. 
15 God and Man in the Koran, 11. Izutsu thereby makes use of the writings of Johann Leo 
Weisgerber, who was influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt‟s view of language as a mirror of 
its speakers‟ vision of the world (Weltansicht) and pointed out the importance of language 
as an intellectual process of world-shaping (Weltanschauung). For further reading, see 
Johann Leo Weisgerber, Vom Weltbild der deutschen Sprache (Düsseldorf: Schwann Verlag, 
1950) and also his Grundformen sprachlicher Weltgestaltung (Köln und Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1963); furthermore Wilhelm von Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit 
des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des 
Menschengeschlechts (Berlin: F. Dummler, 1836). 
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Izutsu suggests three main ethical concepts to be found in the Qur‟an. The 
first he calls „Divine Ethics,‟16 which can be established by studying the 
names and divine attributes of God and which aims to describe God‟s ethical 
nature. The second is called „Human Ethics‟17 and deals with absolute trust 
in God (islām and īmān) on the one hand, and with pious fear of God 
(taqwā) on the other. Those two form an ethico-religious concept, which is a 
response to God‟s ethical actions and describes the different facets of the 
fundamental attitude of man towards God, his Creator. In other words, 
according to Izutsu, it is a reflection of „Divine Ethics.‟ Izutsu calls the third 
concept also „Human Ethics,‟ with the difference that this concept refers to 
the principles and rules of conduct regulating ethical relations among 
individuals of the same religious community. This is covered mainly by 
Islamic jurisprudence.18 For the establishment of his semantic analysis of the 
ethico-religious concepts in the Qur‟an, Izutsu concentrates mainly on the 
second concept, the human response to the ethical actions of God. 
One aspect, according to Izutsu, is to distinguish between „descriptive‟ words 
on the one hand which he explains as the primary level of ethical discourse, 
and „evaluative‟ words on the other, which are defined by Izutsu as words of 
the secondary level moral discourse.19 To give an example for this, Izutsu 
writes: 
Thus, in the essentially nonreligious context of Jāhilīyah, „humility‟ and „self-
surrender‟ were considered something disgraceful, a manifestation of weak 
and ignoble character, whilst „haughtiness‟ and „refusal to obey‟ were, in the 
eyes of pre-Islamic Arabs, marks of noble nature. With the advent of Islam, 
the balance was completely overturned. Now, in the purely monotheistic 
context of Islam, „humility‟ in the presence of God and total „self-surrender‟ to 
                                        
16 Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, p. 17. 
17 Ibid., 17. 
18 Ibid., 18. 
19 Ibid., 19-22. 
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Him became the highest virtues, and „haughtiness‟ and „refusal to obey‟ the 
marks of irreligiousness. In other words, the term denoting these personal 
properties completely changed their value. Whilst the descriptive layer of their 
meaning remained the same, their evaluative force changed from negative to 
positive or from positive to negative.20 
This is a clear example of how to distinguish the purely descriptive meaning 
of a term from its evaluative meaning, keeping in mind that the evaluative 
layer might change completely whereas the descriptive layer remains the 
same. According to Izutsu, words such as „good‟ and „bad‟ belong to the 
secondary level moral discourse for they do not describe precisely what is 
meant by them. Whereas in actual life, man‟s moral evaluations are mainly 
made on the primary level of discourse by using words such as „pious‟, 
„hypocrite‟, „stingy‟, „humble‟, „generous‟, etc. instead of using a rather 
general classification like „good‟ or „bad.‟21 In relation to this study, the term 
sharr, if merely translated as „bad‟ or „evil‟ is rather a secondary level, 
evaluative term.  Therefore it will be important to study other related words 
in the Qur‟ān, which will serve as primary level terms that define and 
describe what is meant by sharr.  
In order to establish such a healthy body of definitions, Izutsu draws the 
reader‟s attention to different methods of analysis of a single ethical term in 
the Qur‟ān and its application. According to Izutsu, one of the simplest, 
however not very reliable methods, is to give the equivalent meaning of that 
term in one‟s own language. This method, he states, has proven itself to be 
frequently misleading rather than enlightening.22 He gives the example of 
the word ẓālim, which is mostly translated as „evil-doer‟ or the word kāfir 
that is usually equated with „disbeliever‟ or „unbeliever‟. These translations, 
although they might be helpful as a first step in language learning, are 
                                        
20 Ibid., 22. 
21 Ibid., 19-20. 
22 Ibid., 24. 
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according to Izutsu by no means satisfying. In order to grasp the semantic 
category of these words, one needs to “inquire what sort of man, what type 
of character, what kind of acts are actually designated by this name in Old 
Arabic – in this specific case, in the Qur‟ān.”23   
Izutsu believes that the Qur‟ān itself defines many words of its own in 
different places within the Qur‟ān; this is known as „exegesis of the Qur‟an 
by the Qur‟an‟ (tafsīr Qur‟ān bi‟l Qur‟ān). Hence, gathering those verses 
where the same word is used in one place and comparing them with one 
another might help to find out the original definition of that Arabic word.24 
Izutsu further points out a danger in defining the semantic category of a 
word in the Qur‟ān: namely the tendency of a word being strongly 
influenced by the neighboring words belonging to the same meaning field – 
in many cases by its antonym.25 To give the example of the word kāfir again, 
it can have the meaning of „ingrate‟ when used as the antonym of shākir 
„one who is thankful‟ or the meaning of „unbeliever‟ when used as the 
contrary of mu‟min. However, the former important semantic element, which 
is the original meaning of the word kāfir, can be completely lost, if the word 
is being interpreted solely in terms of „belief.‟26 
According to Izutsu, there is a strong interconnection between a particular 
word and the culture it is used in. The stronger that connection, the more 
difficult it is to transpose that word into a different language. This kind of 
words can be found within the henotheistic nomadic Arabia; words, that are 
typical of the life and manners of that particular culture and hence which are 
                                        
23 Ibid., 25. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 26 
26 Ibid. 
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untranslatable.27  The reason is that the semantic category of this kind of 
words has a long cultural history behind it.28  
Another important method Izutsu introduces is called „contextual 
interpretation‟29 and the practical rules for such an interpretation he quotes 
from Professor J. Marouzeau as to “bring together, compare and put in 
relation all the terms that resemble, oppose and correspond with each 
other.”30 
For the method of semantic analysis, Izutsu introduces seven cases in which 
any passage assumes a strategic importance: 1) contextual definition, 2) 
value of synonyms, 3) elucidation by contrast, 4) clarification by its negative 
form, 5) semantic field, 6) parallelism and 7) secular aspects of the term.31 
Firstly, a passage is semantically relevant and the strategy is called 
„contextual definition‟ when the exact meaning of a term is defined by 
means of verbal description.32 
Secondly, synonyms can be of value especially if one word is substituted for 
another word within the same passage or in precisely the same kind of 
verbal context.33  
As for the third method of analysis, the semantic structure of a term is 
elucidated by contrast. If there are two words that are very close to each 
other in meaning, for instance khayr and ḥasanah, one may look at their 
                                        
27 Ibid., 27. 
28 For further information and examples of the words hamāsah, murūwah and jahl, see 
Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 27 ff. 
29 Ibid., 36. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 37-41.  
32 Ibid., 37, see the word birr in the Qur‟ān, 2:172,177 as example. 
33 Ibid., see the Qur‟ān, 7:92-93;94-95 as example. 
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oppositions used in the Qur‟ān. If one becomes sure about the meaning of 
one of the terms, says Izutsu, the other three terms will be easier to 
define.34  
The fourth method of analysis is to define the semantic structure of a vague 
word (X) in terms of its negative (not-X). Although this might be very 
difficult to do in other areas, since not-X could be anything else but X, Izutsu 
states that in the area of moral evaluation, defining a word X through its 
negative can be very useful.35  
The challenge of the fifth method of analysis is to disentangle the different 
semantic groupings of different words. It will be better to quote Izutsu at 
this point as follows:  
[…] in the Qur‟ān the verb iftara („to invent‟, „to forge‟) most frequently takes 
as its grammatical „object‟ the noun kadhib (a ‟lie‟), thus forming a well-nigh 
inseparable group. To join this group comes the word ẓālim. In fact the 
expression „Who does more wrong, or who is more unjust (aẓlam) than he 
who forges (iftara) against God a lie (kadhib)?‟ is one of the set phrases of 
our Scripture. This makes it clear that the three words iftara-kadhib-ẓālim 
form in the Qur‟ān a peculiar group or combination, a semantic field in the 
sense just explained.36 
The sixth method Izutsu calls the “rhetorical device of parallelism”. Although 
this method is more common in the Biblical Hebrew and in Classical Chinese, 
he states, parallelism in poetic style can be found to some extend also in the 
Qur‟ān.37 Izutsu gives a few small examples of which one is in Sūrah 29:47 
and 49: 
And none denies Our signs save the kāfir. 
                                        
34 Ibid., 38-39. 
35 Ibid., 39, see the word istakbara in the Qur‟ān [32:15] as example. 
36 Ibid., 40. 
37 Ibid., 40-41, see the Qur‟ān, verses 5:48/44,49/45,51/47 as example. 
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And none denies Our signs save the ẓālim. 
In this example one is able to see, states Izutsu that these two words are 
semantic equals in terms of refusing to believe in divine signs.38 
The last and seventh method is the non-religious aspect of a term 
mentioned in the Qur‟ān. As an example Izutsu gives Pharaoh‟s dialogue 
with Moses, where Pharaoh says: “And thou didst a deed of thine which 
thou didst, and thou art an ungrateful (kāfirīn)!” [26:19] The term is used in 
a non-religious context in this verse, for it is Pharaoh who speaks to Moses 
and who uses the term kāfir to accuse Moses of being ungrateful. According 
to Izutsu, this method is of particular importance since it provides the 
semanticist with very valuable information regarding the structure of the 
word concerned.39 
Izutsu rightly states that morality in Islām developed exclusively within its 
eschatological framework.40 Hence, the Qur‟anic outlook on good and bad is 
accordingly deeply connected with ākhirah; man‟s ultimate destiny. One can 
see in his chapter „Good and Bad‟, that there are a lot of terms which fall 
under this semantic field.41 Words like ṣāliḥ, birr, fasād, ma„ruf and munkar, 
ḥ-s-n and s-w‟ are just a few. Relevant to this study is Izutsu‟s brief section 
on khayr and sharr.42 These two are mainly used as antonyms in the Qur‟ān. 
Khayr, according to Izutsu, has a very comprehensive meaning, which 
comprises everything that could be considered as valuable, beneficial, useful 
                                        
38 Ibid., 41. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 203. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 217. 
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and desirable. And semantically it covers the worldly and religious spheres 
alike.43  
Izutsu makes the distinction between „worldly‟ and „religious‟ in the sense 
that he divides the verses in the Qur‟ān about khayr according to their 
context. In this respect, the „worldly‟ meaning of the word khayr is to be 
found in verses like [38:32] and [2:180; 215; 272; 274]. In these verses, 
khayr behaves as synonym of māl (wealth).44 On the other hand, the 
„religious‟ sphere of the term khayr, according to Izutsu, is to be found in 
verses where God‟s bounty is explained [3:26; 73-74] or where God‟s special 
favor is addressed [2:105; 269 and 16:30], where it is explained that God 
knows every khayr in people‟s hearts [8:70], where God talks about the 
positive effects of faith [6:158], about pious work [2:110, 5:48, 21:90] and 
makes the description of an excellent believer [38:47], etc.45 
Although it might be helpful to make this kind of a distinction for certain 
terms so it helps the reader to understand what God considers to be good 
from a worldly perspective (in this case, it would be māl being something 
good); nonetheless every action of a Muslim should ultimately be related on 
one or another aspect with the divine or religious sphere. An example for 
this can be seen in one of the verses quoted by Izutsu as „worldly‟ aspect:  
Whatever of good (khayr) ye give benefits your own souls, and ye shall only 
do so seeking the „face‟ of Allah. Whatever good (khayr) ye give, shall be 
rendered back to you. And ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. [2:272] Those 
who spend of their goods (amwāl, pl. of māl) by night and by day, in secret 
and in public, have their reward with their Lord: [2:274] 
                                        
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 217-8. 
45 Ibid., 219-20. 
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This verse, rather than talking about khayr merely as a „worldly‟ affair, 
suggests khayr (be it an action or māl) to be done or treated merely for the 
sake of God and to please only Him. From this perspective, the term ceases 
to be only a „worldly‟ affair and becomes maybe both in one: „worldly‟ and 
„religious‟, inseparable from each other. 
This raises the question whether such a distinction between „worldly‟ and 
„religious‟ terms or actions, as made by Izutsu, is appropriate. One might ask, 
whether the term „worldly‟ really exists. When Solomon says that he has 
loved the love of good things (khayr) better than the remembrance of his 
Lord,46 does this imply that „good things‟ is a „worldly‟ term? If Solomon was 
admiring his horses by remembering and praising his Lord‟s bounties 
(tafakkur), this term would hardly be classified as „worldly‟. It is also worth 
mentioning that the Qur‟an translation used by Izutsu does not seem to be 
correct. According to other translations,47 Solomon says: “Verily, I have 
come to love the love of all that is good (ḥubb al-khayri) in order to bear my 
Sustainer in mind (‟an dhikri Rabbī).”48 This is profoundly different from 
saying that Solomon loved things more than the remembrance of his Lord 
and is closer to the idea of tafakkur mentioned before. Likewise, wealth 
being used interchangeably with khayr49 does not exclude it from being a 
„religious‟ affair, for being thankful for that wealth and spending it for the 
sake of God would be sufficient to count as „religious‟.  
To give another simple example: many people would agree to think that a 
rope is a „worldly‟ thing. However, a rope is neither a „worldly‟, nor a 
„religious‟ thing. It simply is a thing that serves humans. However, the action 
                                        
46 Ibid., 217, ref to Qur‟an, 38:32 
47 Qur‟ān translations by Asad, M., Davudoğlu, A.; Eliaçık, I. 
48 Ahmed Davudoğlu. Kur‟an-ı Kerim ve Izahlı Meali (Istanbul: Çelik Yayın-Dağıtım, 1981), 
[38:32] 
49 Qur‟ān, 2:180; 215; 272; 274. 
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that is performed with that rope, for instance saving a person‟s life or 
strangling someone, might be sacred or profane, respectively. Furthermore, 
while for many people, going to the mosque is a „religious‟ act, going there 
so that others think of that person as pious would turn that action into a 
„worldly‟ matter. In this regard making such distinctions as „worldly‟ or 
„religious‟ can be very misleading in two ways: the term itself does not 
change, khayr is good in any case, no matter in which context it is used. To 
differ between worldly and religious implies that the worldly is something 
bad, something that should not be desired, something that should not be 
loved compared to the religious. However, this is deceptive for the world 
should be loved as God‟s creation, as the reflections of God‟s most beautiful 
attributes and names, as God‟s beauty and bounty. 
The impact such a distinction might have on Izutsu‟s methodology is 
manifold. By making a distinction between worldly goods and religious 
goods; and by dividing the word good (khayr) in the field of religious 
matters into two, namely the good the source of which lies in God, and the 
good produced by man, Izutsu opens the doors to several critiques.  
First of all this kind of distinction implies that only religious khayr is a bounty 
from God, whereas the worldly khayr is not. However the whole chapter 55, 
sūrah al-Raḥmān in the Qur‟an talks about God‟s favors on earth and by 
counting each of them asks over and over, which of these favors man would 
deny.  
Secondly, to state that there is one sort of khayr the source of which lies in 
God and another produced by man50 entails that man is the creator of his 
own actions and that man is able to create his own khayr. However, this 
                                        
50 Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 220. 
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goes against the verse “whatever good (ḥasana) happens to thee is from 
God and whatever evil (sayyiah) befalls thee is from thyself.”51  
Sharr, on the other hand, functions as the opposite of khayr in all 
respects.52 Quite interesting is Izutsu‟s comment on the following verses in 
the Qur‟ān:  
Fighting is prescribed upon you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye 
dislike a thing which is good (khayr) for you, and that ye love a thing which is 
bad (sharr) for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not.53 and  
[…] On the contrary live with them on a footing of kindness and equity. If ye 
take a dislike to them, it may be that ye dislike a thing, and Allah brings 
about through it a great deal of good (khayr).54 
Although these verses are mainly explained simply in the sense that the 
goodness or badness of a thing depends on the ultimate end to which it 
leads and has nothing to do with man liking or disliking it, Izutsu adds 
another aspect to it which comes close to what will be discussed later in this 
study: Izutsu writes that taken from the reverse side, this verse would imply 
that “the problem of whether a thing is khayr or sharr tends to be made 
dependent [by the Qur‟an] on man‟s natural subjective reaction to it, that is, 
whether he likes it or hates it.”55 This might lead to the assumption that 
what man calls sharr is in fact his own subjective view and has nothing to do 
with God‟s view on the same matter. This will be discussed in more detail 
after chapter three.  
                                        
51 The Qur‟an, 4:79. 
52 Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 220. 
53 Qur‟ān, 2:216. 
54 Qur‟ān, 4:19. 
55 Ibid. 
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There is one more aspect that needs attention in Izutsu‟s work, and that is 
his analysis of the term sayyi‟ah. This term might have, according to Izutsu, 
two different meanings: it may mean an unfavorable and disagreeable turn 
of affairs in human life, all unpleasant circumstances and misfortune that 
befall a man; or it may mean the „evil‟ work a man does against God‟s will, 
often called disobedience (ma„ṣiyah).56 This is of particular importance since 
it is related to the difficult theological discussions between the Ash‟ariyya 
and the Mu‟tazila and Qadariyya57. At this point, Izutsu quotes the Maturidī 
theologian al-Bayyāḍī as follows:  
The Mu‟tazilī al-Jubbā‟ī asserts: it is an established fact that the word sayyi‟ah 
is sometimes used in the sense of „calamity‟ (balīyah) and „trial‟ (miḥnah), and 
sometimes in the sense of „sin‟ (dhanb) and „disobedience‟ (ma„ṣiyah). It is 
also certain that God attributes sayyi‟ah to Himself in the verse “Say: 
everything comes from God”, and that in the following verse He attributes it 
to man: “And every sayyi‟ah that befalls thee comes from thyself.” Obviously 
something must be done here to establish harmony between the two 
statements so that they may not contradict each other. In reality, there is no 
contradiction because when sayyi‟ah is attributed to God it is to be 
understood as „adversity‟ and „misfortune‟, while the same word means 
„disobedience‟ when it is attributed to man.58  
There is no need to say, states Izutsu, that al-Bayyāḍī, as a Maturidī 
theologian, will deny any kind of distinction and therefore states that 
everything comes from God, be it īman or kufr.59 This study will nevertheless 
concentrate on the term sharr, since sayyi‟ah after all is closer in meaning to 
disobedience and is used as such. 
As has been previously noted, the same methodology introduced by Izutsu 
above will also be applied to the Risale-i Nur Collection, comprising mainly 
                                        
56 Ibid., 226-227. 
57 For more information regarding the ahl al-sunnah, Mu‟tazila and Qadariyya, and their 
theological discussions see chapter two. 
58 Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Bayyāḍī. Ishārāt al-Marām min „Ibārāt al Imām (Cairo, 1949), 310. 
59 Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 227. 
 19 
 
the second part of this thesis, namely chapters five, six and seven. In this 
respect, an inductive investigation in form of a semantic analysis of the term 
sharr in the Risale will be conducted. Having located all the passages and 
pages that deal with the notion of sharr, their relation to each other will be 
analysed. This will hopefully help to define Nursi‟s understanding of sharr 
and how far his views on sharr are in line with the Qur‟anic definition thereof.  
One of the challenges in reading Nursi‟s works is the fact that he does not 
employ only one sort of methodology therein. Nursi‟s methodology is 
manigfold: it is reason-based; that is, a logical argumentation of the 
existence and unity of God, of eschatology, prophethood, etc. At this point it 
might be important to note that Nursi frequently employs the term „proof‟ 
when he uses this type of methodology. This might be quite puzzling, given 
the fact that his proofs are not really „proofs‟ at all in the philosophically and 
scientifically accepted sense of the term. Nursi in fact uses faith (īmān) as a 
tool which leads one to read and interpret creation accordingly. Thus, the 
Nursian „proofs‟ should not be seen as irrefutable proofs that will turn 
everyone who reads it immerdiately into a believer – it should rather be 
accepted as a rhetorical emphasis to his rational argumentation for what he 
believes to be the truth.  
Furthermore, Nursi‟s methodology is revelation-based, in other words, 
directly related to the Qur‟ān. Thirdly, it is authority-based, that is, in 
accordance with transmission (hadīth); fourthly, experimental-sensory 
(ḥissī); fifthly, experiential-self-developed (tajrubī/haqq al-yaqīn); and sixthly 
heart-centred (hadsī wa kashfī). Since the last three types of evaluation are 
rather personal, it becomes not an easy task to understand him.   
Since, as stated previously, Nursi makes use of faith as a tool for his 
argumentations, chapter 5 of this study has mainly concentrated on certain, 
 20 
 
rather faith-related aspects to form a prologue and, so to say, a basis for 
Nursi‟s analysis of sharr. For it is clear that Nursi presupposes belief in a 
higher being in order to be able to understand and maybe accept his treatise 
on sharr. The outlines for each chapter will be elaborated in more detail in 
the next section.  
After heaving read all passages and pages related to sharr in the Risale, the 
next step will be to analyse all topics that are in direct or indirect relation 
with the term. The two most important ones are being (wujūd) and non-
being („adam), followed by the reason for the creation of Satan, the notion 
of Divine Trust, the ana, free will and divine determining as well as the 
faculties of humanking and Adam‟s creation and the Fall. The methodology 
that will be employed in analyzing Nursi‟s works in regards to sharr will be, 
besides the guidance of Izutsu‟s methodology mentioned above, mainly 
based on twelve principles that have been derived from the Risale itself, and 
which have been explained in detail in chapter 6. These principles are shortly 
to be mentioned here: 1) Any existence (wujūd) requires an existing cause; 
2) There is no absolute non-existence („adam al-muṭlaq) in the universe; 3) 
existence is pure good (wujūd khayr al-mahdh) whereas non-existence is 
pure sharr („adam sharr al-mahdh); 4) sharr is non-existential in nature and 
arises from non-existence („adam); 5) there is no absolute sharr (sharr al-
muṭlaq) in the universe; 6) abondaning a minor sharr can lead to greater 
sharr; 7) sharr has some sort of external reality or minor existence; 8) 
ashrār are the manifestation of Divine Glory; 9) all good things are the 
manifestation of Divine Beauty; 10) the creation of sharr is not sharr, rather 
the desire for sharr is sharr; 11) free will (juz‟ī irada) has no actual 
existence; and 12) destruction is easy. 
With the methodology based on these principles, chapters 6 and 7 have 
been developed. 
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1.6 Outline of Study 
There is a very extensive range of material on theodicy and the problem of 
evil in the context of Islam. The problem, however, seems to be that in 
many cases, the human conception of evil in this world is taken for granted. 
It is thus the aim of this study to first of all try to find out whether human 
being‟s perception of evil is equal to the definition and understanding of 
sharr (evil) in the Qur‟ān. Furthermore, as a second step, to explore the 
concept of sharr in the writings of Said Nursi; for as of yet, there is no 
intensified academic writing on this topic in regards to Nursi‟s views. In the 
course of this study, Colin Turner‟s The Qur‟an Revealed: A Critical Analysis 
of Said Nursi‟s Epistles of Light (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2013) has been 
published; a solid work, which covers and critically analyses approximately 
eighteen main topics of the Risale. Although this work touches on some 
issues that have been covered in this study, it does not offer an extensive 
analysis of the problem of sharr from Nursi‟s perspective. 
The link between the first and second section of this work is thus to firstly 
introduce Nursi‟s novel ideas and thoughts into the discourse of theodicy and 
the problem of evil through illustrating that Nursi‟s understanding of sharr is 
in line with the definition of sharr in the Qurān; secondly to bring Nursi into 
the discourse of theodicy and to challenge his works with the ideas of his 
predecessors and contemporaries. In this regard, the first section of this 
study covers chapters two and three; chapter four is a bridging chapter and 
the second section of this study covers chapters five, six and seven.       
The second chapter will consist of a semantic analysis of the term sharr in 
Qur‟an and Hadīth, including the study of different exegetes from different 
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centuries. The main objective in this chapter will be to find out whether evil 
as perceived by human beings is the same as the definition of sharr in the 
Qur‟ān. In other words, does man‟s definition of evil correspond with the 
Qur‟ān‟s definition of sharr?  
The third chapter covers the theological and philosophical approach to the 
problem of evil, by looking into the mainstream thoughts in Islamic history 
such as the Ash‟arī, Maturidī, Jabriyya, Qadariyya and Mu‟tazila as well as by 
studying philosophers and theologians like Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes) and al- Ghazālī. The aim here is to provide an overview of the 
main types of solutions offered to the problem of evil in the past and to 
show in which ways they have been objected, criticized and limited. This 
chapter will furthermore serve as a guideline to see in what ways Nursi‟s 
views on evil has been an asset to the hitherto widely discussed topic.  
The next is a bridging chapter that will consist of a brief biography of Said 
Nursi as well as excerpts from his life which will illustrate his own way of 
dealing with apparent ashrār (pl. sharr), calamities, inflicts and injustices 
committed against him. This might shed light on Nursi‟s „Existential Theodicy‟, 
in other words, his way of comforting and overcoming difficulties in practice 
rather than theory. 
The fifth chapter will be a prologue to the problem of sharr in the Risale-i 
Nur. Due to the sensitivity and complexity of the topic at hand and its close 
relation to so many other areas of theology; and for the sake of easing the 
reader‟s way as he embarks towards the journey of understanding sharr 
according to the Risale-i Nur, some aspects of theology such as the Oneness 
of God, faith, being and non-being, and life and its purpose – again from the 
Risale‟s perspective – will be discussed.  
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The sixth chapter, then, will concentrate on the nature of evil according to 
the Risale. The objective in this chapter will be to deal with problems such 
as the existence or non-existence of sharr, the reconciliation of sharr with 
God‟s Omnipotence, the reasons for the creation of Satan, the reasons for 
the existence of dualities in this world, and the relationship between sharr 
and worship. Furthermore, in this chapter, Nursi‟s works will be challenged 
with views such as „bitheism‟, „theistic finitism‟, „anthropodicy‟ as well as the 
well known solutions offered to the problem of evil such as privatio boni, the 
best of all possible worlds, world of dualities, and the principle of plenitude. 
Finally, the seventh chapter, which will form the heart of this study, will 
discuss the moral aspect of sharr from Nursi‟s perspective. Thus, the 
objective will be to analyze the cause and creator of an „evil will‟; how sin 
entered into the perfect paradisal state of Adam and his wife; divine 
determining and its compatibility with free will; God‟s intention to punish 
some and save others; and God‟s wish to create a human being who would 
freely sin. In this regard, the chapter will cover mainly Adam‟s fall, the 
notion of „divine Trust‟, free will and divine determining as well as existential 
theodicy. 
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2 Sharr in Qur’ān, Tafsῑr and Ḥadῑth 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the meaning of sharr in the Qur‟ān, Tafsīr and 
Ḥadīth. The methodology that will be used in approaching the Qur‟anic text 
will be that of Toshihiko Iztusu, which has already been explained in the 
introduction. The application of this sort of semantic analysis hopefully will 
help the reader to distinguish between sharr, as purposed and willed by God 
and evil, as understood by man. Once the difference becomes clear, it will 
be easier to apply this distinction to the rest of this study.  
Three different Qur‟an translations are used in order to see and be aware of 
possible differences in translation: The Meaning of the Holy Qur‟ān 
by ‟Abdullah Yūsuf ‟Alī; An Interpretation of the Qur‟an by Majid Fakhry 
(both English translations); Kur‟an-ı Hakim‟in Açıklamalı Meali by Prof. Dr. 
Suat Yıldırım (Turkish translation) and Der Koran by Adel Theodor Khoury, 
with the assistance of Muhammad Salim Abdullah (German translation).  
As for the interpretation of the Qur‟ān – although to be found only in very 
few instances in the Hadīth collections – the first and foremost is that of the 
Messenger of God, Muhammed. The Qur‟ān itself makes this clear: “… we 
have sent down unto thee the Message; that you may explain clearly to men 
what is sent for them, and that they may give thought”60, “It is He who has 
sent amongst the unlettered a messenger from among themselves, to 
rehearse to them His signs, to sanctify (purify) them, and to instruct them in 
scripture and wisdom…”61 Hence one can say that the Messenger is the 
foremost interpreter of the Qur‟ān. However it is not always easy to know 
                                        
60 Qur‟ān, 16:44. 
61 Ibid., 62:2. 
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which ḥadīth is sahīh (sound)62 and which is not. For this study, those ḥadīth 
have been considered, that are in accordance with the teaching of the 
Qur‟ān.63 One source is the Ḥadīth Encyclopedia Kütüb-i Sitte (Turkish 
Translation and Commentary) by Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Canan. This source has 
been chosen because of several reasons:  
1) It includes the six major ḥadīth collections Sahih Bukhārī (by Imam 
Bukhārī, d. 870); Sahih Muslim (by Muslim bin al Ḥajjāj, d. 875); Sunan al 
Sughra (by al Nasā‟ī, d. 915); Sunan abū Dāwud (by Abu Dāwud, d. 888); 
Jami al Tirmidhī (by al Tirmidhī, d. 892) and Muwaṭṭā‟ (by Mālik bin Anas, d. 
795). 
2) In addition to the above, it also includes as a seventh book the Sunan ibn 
Mājah (by ibn Mājah, d. 887). Although some scholars have accepted the 
Sunan ibn Mājah instead of the Muwaṭṭā‟ as the sixth book of the al-Kutub 
al-Sittah, Canan has chosen to include the Sunan ibn Mājah as seventh book 
into his collection. 
3) The commentary of Ibrahim Canan excludes any ḥadīth repetitions. 
A second source for ḥadīth is the Ḥadīth Institute for Knowledge and 
Education and Methodology, <http://www.hikem.net/index.html> which has 
proven itself to be a very useful site for ḥadīth search, providing its Arabic 
original as well as the necessary sources for each of the narrations. 
                                        
62 John Burton. An Introduction to the Hadith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 
1994), 110-111.  
63 Murtaḍa Mutahhari. Understanding the Uniqueness of the Qur‟ān in Al-Tawhīd, trans. 
Mahliqa Qara‟i, vol. 1, no. 1-3 (1987). According to the Shi‟a, any Ḥadīth narrated from the 
Prophet Muhammed or the twelve infallible Imams should be checked against the Qur‟ān‟s 
teachings. If they do not comply with the Qur‟ān, they should be regarded as false or not 
trustworthy.   For further information, see also Ṭabāṭabā‟ī, ‟Allāmah Sayyid M. Ḥ. Shi‟ite 
Islam, trans. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 
102ff. It should be noted that this method is also to be found in the Sunnī tradition and is 
not unique to the Shi‟ite.  
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Although the aim of this chapter is to understand the Qur‟ān with the help of 
the Qur‟ān itself, the term sharr has also been investigated by considering 
the interpretations of different mufassirūn. The number of exegetes from 
whom one can choose is enormous. Because of the scope of this study, it is 
necessary to find some principle of selection. In order to provide a 
diachronic overview, two classical and two medieval exegetes have been 
chosen. Furthermore four contemporary exegetes have been selected due to 
their different approaches.  The principle of the selection has been to choose 
those mufassirūn whose works are most widely read, who are from different 
school of thoughts and who are highly esteemed by Muslims throughout the 
ages. Additionally, one contemporary exegete, who considers himself to be a 
ḥanīf64 (Ihsan Eliaçık) has been added as well due to his sometimes 
interesting approach to certain topics of the Qur‟ān. The authors and works 
to be considered are as follows: 
Abū Ja‟far Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī (d. 310/923), Jāmi‟ al-bayān ‟an 
ta‟wīl al Qur‟ān; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), Mafātīḥ al-ghayb; Abū 
„Abdullah al Qurṭubī (d. 670/1273), Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī; Isma‟il ibn „Umar abū‟l-
Fidā„ Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373), Tafsīr al-Qur‟ān al-„aẓīm; Muhammed Hamdi 
Yazır (d. 1343/1942), Hak Dini Kur‟an Dili; Syed Abū „l- ‟Alā Mawdūdī (d. 
1380/1979), Tafhīm al-Qur‟ān; Muhammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā‟ī (d. 
1382/1981), Tafsīr al-Mīzān; Ihsan Eliaçık, Yaşayan Kur‟an. This study 
however is not restricted only to these exegetes. Other scholars will be 
brought into the discourse where necessary.  
It is well known that since the time of Muhammed, there have been different 
approaches to the interpretation of the Qur‟ān. This started already in the 
                                        
64 The term ḥanīf refers to those who retained some or all of the tenets of the monotheist 
religion of Abraham , which is Islām in the purest form.   
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first two centuries after hijrah, when the Islamic Empire was expanding and 
the Muslims came into contact with Greek philosophers as well as involved 
themselves in religious discussions with scholars of different religions and 
sects (‟ilm al-kalām).65 Thus, before the second century had come to an end, 
there were disputes over the names and attributes of God and about his 
actions, about heaven and hell, about free will and predestination, about 
reward and punishment and about al-barzakh (the intermediary period 
between death and resurrection).66 To justify their claims, every group 
referred to the Qur‟ān. Hence, one can either explain a verse by freeing 
oneself from any preconceived idea and by going where the Qur‟ān leads; or 
one can interpret the Qur‟ān so it fits one‟s preconceived beliefs by tailoring 
the verses accordingly.67 Obviously and hopefully, the former will be the aim 
and focus when looking at the term sharr in the Qur‟ān within the study at 
hand. 
2.2 Semantic Analysis of the term ‘sharr’ in Qur’ān and Ḥadῑth 
By examining the behavior of the key term sharr in the Qur‟ān, it will be 
important to let the Qur‟anic term explain itself for it has been understood in 
the introduction of this study on the methodology of Izutsu, that to 
understand the meaning of a word it is not sufficient to simply consult 
dictionaries. They can merely be a mediator and help. 
The Arabic root-word for sharr is sh-r-r, occurring thirty one times in the 
Qur‟ān and comprising thirty verses. In one of these verses, it has the 
meaning „sparks of fire‟ (bishararin) and therefore falls outside of the area of 
                                        
65 Mahmood Namazi, Thematic Approach to Qur‟ān Exegesis in Message of Thaqalayn, A 
Quarterly Journal of Islamic Studies, 10/4 (2010), 43. 
66 Ibid., 44. 
67 Ibid., 45. 
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interest68. Eleven of the twenty nine verses are Medinan verses whereas 
eighteen are Meccan69. None of these seem to describe any kind of disaster 
or natural calamities that were defined later by many philosophers and 
theologians as „natural evil‟.70 Rather, any kind of misbehavior by man 
against the will of God is named sharr. Hence, if the term sharr is considered 
to be a secondary level moral term, in other words, forms the evaluative 
rather that descriptive layer of a term71, it is important to build the related 
semantic field of it. However, before proceeding, it will be helpful to 
remember the definitions of descriptive and evaluative terms as explained by 
Izutsu. This part has been explained in more detail in the Introduction of this 
study. 
The descriptive72 form of a term in the Qur‟ān is mainly used in its primary 
level, in other words, where it describes the true characteristics of the moral 
code of a community.73  For example, instead of using the word „good‟ to 
describe a person (which would be a term of the secondary level of moral 
discourse for it does not give a precise description), to say „that pious 
person‟, or „that person is humble‟.74 On the other hand, the evaluative75 
form of a term in the Qur‟ān is mainly used in its secondary level. Here, it is 
used merely as classificatory, in order to classify the primary level terms, 
such as „humility‟ or ‟generosity‟, into a “recognized category of moral 
values.”76 
                                        
68 ‟Abd al-Bāqī, M. F. Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 378. 
69 Uncertainties have been ignored. 
70 See chapter II. 
71 See introduction or Izutsu. Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 19-22. 
72 Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 21. 
73 Ibid., 20. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 21. 
76 Ibid., 20. 
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2.3 The Semantic Field of sharr 
In this case, that recognized secondary level moral term would be sharr. The 
following deeds fall into the semantic field77 of the term sharr and form its 
descriptive layer: 
2.3.1 Parsimony 
The state of extreme stinginess, withholding things in a covetous manner. 
The Arabic root-word used for it in the Qur‟ān is b-kh-l. This word occurs 7 
times in the Qur‟ān78, one time in combination with the term sharr. In each 
of these verses God warns man not to withhold from what He has given man 
out of His grace and God further warns that no property and good in the 
world can protect man from punishment. Hence, whoever shows stinginess 
harms himself and not God, for God is the possessor of all things. Parsimony 
is therefore identified as sharr for piling up possessions instead of spending 
them for the sake of God is sharr, although one might think that it is good:  
And let not those who are niggardly in spending (yabkhalūna) what God has 
given them of His bounty suppose that it is good for them. No, it is sharr; 
they will carry what they stinted around their necks on the Day of 
Resurrection. And to Allah belongs the inheritance of the heavens and the 
earth. Allah is aware of what you do.79 
It is worth mentioning at this point that God touches on man‟s foolishness 
when it comes to distinguish between khayr and sharr. This verse points out 
that if man thinks unwisely that greedily withholding God‟s gifts is good for 
him – he should know that it is not. What he considers to be khayr, in fact is 
                                        
77 The notion of „semantic field‟ has been explained in the Introduction of this study. 
78 ‟Abd al-Bāqī, M. F. Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 115. Also see 
Qur‟ān, 3:180; 4:37; 9:76; 47:37-8; 57:24; 92:8. 
79 The Qur‟an, 3:180. 
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sharr for him. Ultimately, everything is a trust from God, belongs to Him and 
will return to Him. 
2.3.2 Going astray 
To err, to leave the „right path‟ (ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm). The Arabic root-word for 
it is ḍ-l-l. Being a very famous word in the Qur‟ān, it occurs over a hundred 
times80. Preferring unbelief (kufr) over faith (īmān), associating partners with 
God (shirk), sowing discord (nifāq) and transgressing the lines set by God 
(fisq) are the main topics in relation with ḍalla. This term therefore falls into 
the category of sharr, explaining that those people who go astray by 
committing these mistakes will be in an evil plight and worse in rank:  
Those who are mustered on their faces in hell; those are in a worse position 
(sharrun mekānan) and are more wayward (aḍallu).81 
Say: “Shall I tell you something much worse (bi sharri) than this for 
retribution with Allah? Those whom Allah cursed and on whom He poured 
forth His wrath, transformed them into apes and swine, and worshippers of 
the Devil. They are worse off (sharrun makānan) and farther astray 
(aḍallu).”82 
“Say: “Whoever is in error (ḍalālati), let the Compassionate prolong his 
term; so that when they see what they are threatened with, whether it be 
the punishment or the Hour, they will know who is worse in position 
(sharrun makānan) and weaker in supporters.””83 
2.3.3 Rejecting God 
In other words, to choose not to believe in God but in other entities instead, 
to cover the truth and to be ungrateful. The Arabic root-word is k-f-r. This 
                                        
80 Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 421-424. 
81 Qur‟an, 25:34. 
82 Ibid., 5:59-61. 
83 Ibid., 19:75. 
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word, like ḍalla, can be found several hundred times in the Qur‟ān84. 
Analyzing the context shows that God describes man to be very ungrateful 
(kafūrun)85. Furthermore, He states that man worships other things beside 
God for which no authority has been sent down to them and of which they 
have no knowledge.86 Additionally, one can see a denial in the faces of the 
kāfirūn, when the revelation is recited unto them:  
And when Our clear revelations are recited to them, you will recognize in the 
faces of the unbelievers (kafarū) the denial.  They will almost fall upon those 
who recite to them Our revelations. Say: “Shall I tell you about what is worse 
than that (bisharri min dhālikum)? It is the Fire which Allah has promised the 
unbelievers (kafarū); and what a wretched fate!”87 
They go even further and nearly attack with violence those who rehearse 
God‟s signs to them. If one takes a closer look at the descriptions above, he 
will see that it all has to do with wrong actions; to be ungrateful, to worship 
idols instead of God, to ridicule the signs of God by pulling a long face and 
by nearly becoming violent. And worse than all this (bi sharri min dhālikum) 
is ultimately hellfire. If hellfire is worse than all the actions mentioned above, 
this indicates that those actions, all of them, are described to be sharr. 
Therefore k-f-r is a primary level descriptive moral term that falls under the 
semantic field of sharr. 
2.3.4 Idolatry 
To worship anything other than God or to worship things alongside Him. The 
Arabic root-word for it is sh-r-k and means to be a sharer or make a sharer; 
to associate or make companions to God (ashraka). Like ḍ-l-l and k-f-r,     
                                        
84 Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 605-613. 
85 Qur‟ān, 22:66. 
86 Ibid., 22:71. 
87 Ibid., 22:72. 
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sh-r-k occurs very often in the Qur‟ān88, in close relation with the word k-f-r 
in particular, for associating partners with God and to be thankful to other 
entities instead of the true Creator is an expression of ingratitude. God 
reminds the people of previous messengers who have come to guide them 
to the right path and criticizes the people of the book for being divided 
(tafarraqa) after the clear proof came to them89. In the respective verse 
those who cover the truth or do not believe (kafarū) from amongst the 
people of the book and the idolaters (mushrikīn) are addressed: 
The unbelievers (kafarū), among the people of the book and the idolaters 
(mushrikīna), shall be in the Fire of hell, dwelling therein forever. Those are 
the worst of creatures (sharru „l bariyyah).90 
They are described to be the worst of created beings (ūlāika hum sharru „l-
bariyyah). According to this verse, sh-r-k is another descriptive term that can 
be included into the semantic field of sharr. 
2.3.5 Violation of (a covenant or treaty) 
In other words, not to keep one‟s promise. The Arabic root-word for it is n-
q-ḍ. The word occurs nine times in the Qur‟ān. Five times it is used in the 
above meaning and talks about the violation of a promise given to God.91 It 
is used in combination with sharr as follows: 
The worst (sharra) beasts in the sight of Allah are those who reject Him, 
because they will never believe. Those, who each time you make a covenant 
with them, break it (yanquḍūna), and do not fear God.92 
                                        
88 Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 379-381. 
89 Qur‟ān, 98:4. 
90 Ibid., 98:6. 
91 Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 717. See also The Qur‟ān, 2:27; 5:13; 
8:56; 13:20. 
92 Qur‟an, 8:55-56. 
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Although the definition of sharr is not given directly in the same verse, right 
in the following God explains whom He considers to be the worst of beasts, 
namely those who first give a promise to God and later violate or break it. 
2.3.6 Turning away, aversion 
In other words, to turn oneself away from God. This may be even a form of 
disliking God (a‟raḍa). The Arabic root-word is ‟-r-ḍ and occurs seventy nine 
times in the Qur‟ān93. However, the number of occurrences that are of 
interest here are thirty four. In fourteen places the word is used in a positive 
manner, such as turning away from the disbelievers. The rest is used in 
different meanings. The verse that is of concern here is the following: 
The worst (sharra) beasts in Allah‟s sight are the deaf and dumb who do not 
understand. If Allah knew of any good in them He would have made them 
hear; and had He made them hear, they would still have turned away 
(mu‟riḍūn) defiantly.94 
This verse may be explained further with the following other verse: 
And who is more unjust than one who, upon being reminded of His Lord‟s 
revelations, turns away (a‟raḍa) from them, and forgets what his hands have 
done? We have placed coverings upon their hearts lest they understand it 
and, put a deafness in their ears. If you call them to the guidance, they will 
never be guided.95 
As can be seen in chapter [8:22-23], while verse 22 talks about the deaf and 
dumb being the worst of creators, it is explained right after, in verse 23, and 
also in chapter [18:57], that this is metaphorical and what is meant by deaf 
and dumb are those, whose hearts are sealed and whom God knows will not 
understand and will not believe. They intentionally close their ears to the 
truth, do not speak the truth and reject to understand and accept the truth. 
                                        
93 Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 457-8. 
94 Qur‟ān, 8:22-23. 
95 Ibid., 18:57. 
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Furthermore, the following verses are related to the ones above, and talk 
about man‟s remoteness from his Creator.   
And when We are gracious to man, he turns away (a‟raḍa) and withdraws 
haughtily; and if ash-sharru touches him, he is in despair.96 
If we are gracious to man, he slinks away and turns aside (a‟raḍa); and if 
sharr touches him, he is given to constant prayer.97 
Although a‟raḍa is not directly defined as sharr in theses verses, 
nevertheless, it is considered to be a bad attitude that shows man‟s 
arrogance and ingratitude. This is made clear in the following chapters of 
the Qur‟ān:  
And if you are touched by adversity at sea, those you call upon other than He 
will wander away, but when He delivers you to land safely, you turn away 
(a‟raḍtum). Man is ever thankless (kafūran).98 
And if hardship afflicts man, he calls Us lying down, sitting or standing; but 
when We lift his hardship, he passes on as though he never called Us to (lift) 
a hardship that afflicted him. Thus, what the transgressors do seems fair to 
them.99 
Man does not tire of praying for good, but when sharr touches him he 
becomes downcast and despondent.100 
When sharru visits him, he is frightened; but when khayru visits him, he is 
avaricious.101 
In here one can see man‟s subjective view on khayr and sharr. Man asks for 
khayr and God gives it to him. However, out of his biased view, he considers 
that what God has given to him as sharr, immediately loses all hope and falls 
into despair. In other words, man is mostly not wise and judges according to 
appearances. He is happy with apparent khayr, but often distant to God 
                                        
96 Ibid., 17:83. 
97 Ibid., 41:51. 
98 Ibid., 17:67. 
99 Ibid., 10:12. 
100 Ibid., 41:49. 
101 Ibid., 70:20-21. 
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during this time. And when sharr touches him, he again is not wise enough 
to see the khayr behind that sharr and falls into despair. This kind of unwise 
behavior is going to be dealt with in more detail later in this study. 
The term ingratitude (k-f-r) has already been defined as part of the semantic 
field of sharr. Furthermore, one can find the act of shirk in here as well, by 
calling upon other than God. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that this verse 
implies turning away from God to be sharr. In this regard,‟-r-ḍ, by Qur‟anic 
definition, falls under the semantic field of the term sharr. 
2.3.7 Slander 
In other words, defamation. The act of speaking falsely, and thereby 
damaging the reputation and good name of another. The Arabic root-word 
for it is „-f-k. Words that derive from this root appear in the Qur‟ān thirty 
times. However, in the meaning of slander, one is able to find 10 verses102. 
Most of them address those who defame God, His signs (such as the Qur‟ān) 
or His messengers. In the respective verse, the slander is against Aisha, the 
wife of the Prophet Muhammed: 
Those who spread the slander (ifki) are a band of you. Do not reckon it a 
sharra for you; rather it is a good thing (khayrun) for you. Everyone of them 
will be credited with the sin he has earned, and he who bore the brunt of it 
shall have a terrible punishment.103  
The verse goes on with God addressing the believers who have spread the 
slander, instead of bringing forth four witnesses104. Although receiving a lie 
on the tongues and uttering it with the mouth seems to be a simple matter, 
in God‟s sight, it is very grave.105 Hence, God warns the believers to never 
                                        
102 Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 34. 
103 Qur‟an, 24:11. 
104 Ibid., 24:13. 
105 Ibid., 24:15. 
 36 
 
return to a behavior like this again.106 Another example can be found in 
chapter 12 of the Qur‟ān. After all the lies that the brothers of Joseph had 
told to their father Jacob regarding Joseph‟s sudden disappearance, they 
later lie again to Joseph by accusing him of having stolen something: 
They said: “If he has stolen, a brother of his has stolen before.” Joseph kept 
his sorrow to himself and did not reveal it to them. He said: “you are in a 
worse position (sharrun makānan), and Allah knows best (the truth of) what 
you say.”107 
Further in this chapter, the brothers admit their lies and wrong behavior and 
ask their father to pray to God for their forgiveness108. God‟s message 
through Joseph is like a summary of the whole situation:  
…Surely, whoever fears God, forbears and is patient will find that Allah will 
never deprive those who do the good of their reward.109 
Within the context of the respective verse and all the verses that follow, it is 
obvious that slander is considered by God to be something very bad. It is 
interesting to see that verse 11 of chapter 24 makes clear what is 
considered to be sharr and what not. According to this particular incident, 
one could say that Aisha is asked not to see this as sharr for herself, being 
the victim of this slander; on the contrary: the verse states that it is khayr 
(good) for her. The sharr, at this point would be the act of slander, the act 
of accusing someone of something falsely, without having knowledge of it. 
Here one is able to see how man does consider certain events as sharr for 
himself, although in God‟s perspective and wisdom, it is khayr. What is 
recommended therefore is to have patience. Having said this, slander has 
                                        
106 Ibid., 24:17. 
107 Ibid., 12:77. 
108 Ibid., 12:97-98. 
109 Ibid., 12:90. 
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been included into the semantic field of sharr, as being another descriptive, 
primary level moral term. 
2.3.8 Transgression 
To exceed all bounds in wickedness, to be excessively impious and insolent. 
The Arabic root-word is ṭ-gh-y and occurs forty two times in the Qur‟ān. 
Thirty one of these terms fall into the area of interest110. The following 
verses are mentioned in connection with sharr: 
That is that, but the aggressors (liṭṭāghīna) shall have the worst (sharra) 
resort.111 
And were Allah to hasten the sharra for mankind just as they would hasten 
the good for themselves, their term would have been fulfilled. Then We 
would leave those, who do not hope to meet Us in their trespasses 
(ṭughyānihim) wandering aimlessly.112 
While [38:55] points to the place the aggressor will find himself in, [10:11] 
talks about man‟s impatience and his excessive strive for profane pleasure. 
This is further explained in the following verses: 
Man prays for evil (bisharri), just as he prays for good; and man is very 
hasty.113 
Those who do not believe in the Hereafter are deviating from the Path. If we 
show them mercy and lift their affliction, they would persist in their 
arrogance/trespass (ṭughyānihim), wandering aimlessly.114 
Here one is able to see several messages. First of all, God does not like 
those who exceed boundaries set by Him. Secondly, it defines who the 
transgressors are. They are those who do not hope to meet God, hence do 
not believe in a life after death. Thirdly, God, out of His mercy, does not 
                                        
110 Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm , 426-7. 
111 Qur‟ān, 38:55. 
112 Ibid., 10:11. 
113 Ibid., 17:11. 
114 Ibid., 23:74-75. 
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hasten the sharr for mankind which they have earned. While on the other 
hand, man, in his haste and out of his subjectivity, sometimes asks for sharr 
instead of the good. By doing this, man puts his own desires in front of or 
above God‟s wisdom. This verse teaches man to be patient, if he wants to 
really understand what God‟s wisdom behind things is. Having said this, it is 
interesting to note, that haste and the transitory (or this world) have the 
same roots in Arabic. They both derive from ‟-j-l, one being ‟jala (to hasten, 
accelerate) and the other being ‟ājilun (that which hastens away, transitory). 
In the light of the above one might be able to say that out of his haste, man 
asks for everything to be given to him in the transitory world, including 
those God has promised to him for the world to come. Finally, transgression 
will hereby be added to the semantic field of sharr, forming its descriptive 
layer. 
To sum up, the term sharr has been defined as secondary level moral term, 
where it serves as generally recognized category of moral value. The term is 
in its evaluative layer, since sharr, having a very broad meaning and 
covering many wrongful actions and deeds as seen above, can be 
understood differently if not explained in a more precise way. In order to 
develop a sound understanding of the term as intended in the Qur‟ān, it is 
necessary to build an appropriate semantic field for it. This can be achieved 
by finding the descriptive layers of the term sharr, in other words, the 
primary level moral terms that serve as a definition of sharr. The respective 
terms that have been found in the Qur‟an are parsimony (b-kh-l), going 
astray (ḍ-l-l), rejecting God (k-f-r), idolatry (sh-r-k), violating (a covenant or 
treaty) (n-q-ḍ), turning away, aversion from God (‟-r-ḍ), slander („-f-k), and 
transgression (ṭ-gh-y).  
In the discussion on „slander‟, the unwise behavior of man regarding what is 
sharr and what khayr has been briefly touched upon. Due to its importance 
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and because this issue will be dealt with in further detail in the following 
chapters, it will suffice to repeat the example of the next verse which has 
been mentioned in the introduction already: 
You are enjoined to fight, though it is something you dislike. For it may well 
be that you dislike a thing, although it is good (khayrun) for you; or like 
something although it is bad (sharrun) for you. Allah knows and you know 
not.115 
As mentioned before, in this verse God makes man aware of how he is 
created: namely as an unwise, fallible creature with a lot of shortcomings, 
who is likely to confuse sharr with khayr due to his subjective view on things. 
God adds to this the fact that He knows, whereas man does not know.  
And that we do not know whether ill was intended for whoever is on earth, or 
whether their Lord intended rectitude for them;116 
Taberī, Ibn Kathīr and Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır share the opinion that this 
sentence was used by the Jinn who used to listen to the angels‟ 
conversations in heaven to steal information for the soothsayers. However, 
during the time of the Messenger, they saw the heavens filled with stern 
guards and flaming fires. Hence they weren‟t sure whether this was because 
something evil was intended to happen to those on earth or because God 
wanted their goodness and right conduct. 117 What is important to mention 
is that the information the jinns got from the heaven about any possible evil 
that might occur, was evil according to their own view and how they 
understood it. Again from the perspective of God, this might not have been 
sharr for the people on earth, but khayr. Hence, the verse might show a 
                                        
115 Ibid., 2:216. 
116 Ibid., 7:10. 
117 See et-Taberī. Taberī Tefsīri, Vol.8, 448; Elmalı‟lı Hamdi Yazır. Hak Dini Kur‟an Dili, Vol. 8, 
5403; Ibn Kathīr. Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Online Version). 
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state of confusion of the Jinn‟s thought, who could not be sure about what is 
sharr and what is khayr. 
2.4 Verses beyond the Semantic Field of sharr 
While the above mentioned verses form the semantic field of sharr according 
to Izutsu‟s method, there are some verses that cannot be categorized as 
such. At this particular point, where the possible limit of Izutsu‟s method is 
reached, it may help to define the term sharr in the following verses by 
making use of the above semantic key terms and replace them with the 
term sharr. 
2.4.1 Sharr as a Test 
There are verses in the Qur‟ān which clearly state that sharr is a test by God, 
such as  
Every living soul shall taste death, and We test you by sharri and good as a 
temptation and unto Us you shall be returned.118 
If this verse is read in the light of the above semantic field of sharr, as 
defined by the Qur‟ān, it becomes clear that sharr can mean here to go 
astray, to reject God, to be ungrateful, etc. All these can be seen as 
temptations and as trial. Indeed, if the verse is analyzed within its context, 
one is able to see that it talks about idolatry and about those who do not 
see God‟s creation, the earth, the sky, night and day and the sun and 
moon119, on the contrary; who take the messenger as an object of 
mockery.120 Man will be accountable in the life to come for every single sharr 
he has committed in this world.  
                                        
118 Qur‟ān, 21:35. 
119 Ibid., 21:31-33. 
120 Ibid., 21:36. 
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And whoever has done an atom‟s weight of sharra shall find it.121 
In other words, nothing he does is lost – everything is kept safe, the khayr 
as well as the sharr. 
2.4.2 Sharr in Hell (Jahannam) 
Jahannam, is a day that God wants man to fear, the day to come which He 
describes as follows: 
As for the Companions of the Left; and what are the Companions of the Left? 
Amid searing wind and boiling water; and a shadow of thick smoke which is 
neither cool nor bounteous. They lived before that in luxury; and they used to 
insist upon the Great Blasphemy. They used to say:”What? When we are 
dead and turn into dust and bones, shall we be raised from the dead? And 
our forefathers too?” Say: “The first and the last shall be gathered upon an 
appointed, pre-assigned Day. Then you, erring ones and denouncers, shall 
eat from the Tree of Bitterness, filling your bellies therefrom, and drinking on 
top of it boiling water; lapping it like thirsty camels.” That shall be their meal 
on the day of Judgment.122 
Jahannam as a place of humiliating chastisement, a place of no coolness nor 
drink, except boiling water; it is prescribed for those who partly fall under 
the above mentioned semantic key words of the term sharr: the ungrateful 
or unbelievers (kafarū)123, the sinners (tafsuqūna)124, the liars 
(mukaththibūn125; kharrāṣ126), the wrong-doers or evil-doers (ẓālim)127, the 
pride and arrogant (mutakabbir)128, the transgressors (ṭāghīn)129, those who 
                                        
121 Ibid., 99:8. 
122 Ibid., 56:41-56. 
123 Ibid., 67:6. 
124 Ibid., 46:20. 
125 Ibid., 56:51-56; 52:9-16. 
126 Ibid., 51:10-14. 
127 Ibid., 37:62-68. 
128 Ibid., 40:60; 16:29. 
129 Ibid., 78:21-26. 
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act viciously (fājir)130, those who deviate from the right course and act 
wrongfully (qāsiṭ)131, the rebels („āṣī)132, those who, though outwardly a 
pious believer, is in reality a most stubborn disbeliever (munāfiq)133, those 
who mock at Revelation (mustahzī‟)134, and finally those who, having no 
faith, never participate in charity and relief work135. 
Hence, according to these verses, the situation man will find himself in is 
explained in the Qur‟ān as a sharr, that man should fear.  
They perform their vows and fear a Day whose sharr is rampant.136 
Elucidating the term sharr by its contrast137, one is able to see that the word 
sharr is used in most of the cases as the antonym of khayr138. In only one 
case, the term in „amnā (from ni„ma)139, meaning favors, is used, whereas in 
another verse, it is the term naḍratun wa surūran140 (Light of Bounty and a 
blissful Joy): 
 But Allah will deliver them from the sharr of that Day, and will shed over 
them the Light of Bounty and a (blissful) Joy.141  
Therefore, one might think that the opposite of these terms are perceived as 
sharr by human beings. 
                                        
130 Ibid., 82:13-16. 
131 Ibid., 72:14-15. 
132 Ibid., 72:23. 
133 Ibid., 66:9. 
134 Ibid., 18:106. 
135 Ibid., 69:30-37. For a more detailed explanation of the Companions of Hell in the Qur‟ān, 
see Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān, 111-116. 
136 Ibid., 76:7. 
137 Ethico Religious Terms of the Qur‟ān, 38-39. 
138 See Qur‟ān, 2:216; 3:180; 10:11; 17:11; 21:35; 24:11; 41:49. 
139 Ibid., 17:83. 
140 Ibid., 76:11.  
141 Ibid., 76:11. 
 43 
 
2.4.3 Satan or Evil Inclinations 
Chapter 113 and 114 in the Qur‟ān serves as a prayer. Man asks God to 
deliver him from different kinds of sharr. Therefore, one is able to say that 
these two chapters contain different definitions of the term sharr.   
From the sharr of the slinking whisperer,142 
In this verse it says min sharri ‟l waswāsi ‟l khannās; from the sharr of the 
waswās (Satan or the evil inclinations within man‟s own will), that is 
pervasive (khannās), I seek refuge with the Lord. One is able to define sharr 
according to this verse as Satan in person or as the evil inclinations within 
man, or, to put it without any interpretation, any „voice‟ that commands man 
to do bad or just not to perform a duty.143 
In addition to the above mentioned verse, there is one whole chapter 
(sūrah) in the Qur‟ān, which might be seen as the main chapter that merely 
talks about sharr; that is chapter 113: 
 Say: I seek refuge with the Lord of the Daybreak, from the sharr of what He 
has created; and the sharr of the darkness when it gathers; and the sharr of 
those who blow into knotted reeds; and from the sharr of the envious when 
he envies.144 
It will be important to explain what is meant by the sharr of what God has 
created. First of all there is a difference between the “sharr of what God has 
created” and “God actually creating sharr”. While the former suggests that 
God creates khayr from any sharr intention of man, the latter says that God 
creates sharr. Although this issue will be dealt with in more detail in the 
following chapters, a short outline will be given here.  
                                        
142 Ibid., 114:4. 
143 How „not performing one‟s duty‟ can be considered as sharr will be explained in chapter 
6, under “Why Satan has been created”.  
144 The Qur‟ān, 113:1-5. 
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In first sight, it seems odd and difficult to accept that man should seek 
refuge from the sharr of what God has created. However, what is meant in 
this verse is that God creates whatever man inclines. In other words, man 
always has to make choices in life. These choices can differ in the following 
way: He might have to choose between two good. In this case, he will 
choose what he thinks is the better of the two. Or he might have to choose 
between two bad. In this case, he will choose what he thinks is the lesser 
bad. Or he might have to make a choice between good and bad. Then, he 
will decide for the good, rather than the bad. These choices are mostly 
made according to personal profit, and although rarely, sometimes for the 
greater good. Whatever the decision is, before it is put into action, in other 
words, before it is created by God, man inclines towards one of the two 
choices. Hence, if it is accepted that man is not the creator of his own 
actions, than one will accept that through his choices man first inclines 
towards the sharr and God creates the outcome for him. In other words, 
whatever God creates is ultimately khayr, but the intention of man is sharr. 
More about this essential issue will follow in chapter 7. 
Since it has been said before, that man chooses according to his personal 
preferences rather than the greater good, and if this is combined with him 
being unwise, fallible and foolish, it is likely that he will choose sharr thinking 
that it is khayr for him. Therefore, he is advised to seek refuge with the Lord 
from all kinds of sharr intentions, inclinations and seducements, whose 
outcome is then created by God.  
The second āyat talks about the sharr of the darkness (ghāsiqin). It would 
be too simplistic to say that darkness, in other words, the lack of sunshine 
bears sharr in it. Although one might argue that the possibility of bad things 
to happen is higher during night compared to daytime, nowadays, it is rather 
difficult to justify such an argument since many people, including women, 
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have no trouble leaving the house during night time and since in many cities, 
public life does not come to an end during that time.  
Another alternative explanation might be to compare darkness with 
misguidance and light with guidance. It can be said that darkness is the lack 
of light. Hence, when the light of guidance goes because of man‟s own 
weaknesses and sharr inclinations, then he has to guard against the sharr 
which may happen as a result.  
The root-word of ghāsiqin is gh-s-q, which has the meaning „it became dark‟ 
or „intensely dark‟. Therefore one might say that al-ghāsiq indicates „black 
darkness‟ or „the black night‟. Since ghassāq might also mean „intense or icy 
cold‟, the combination of the two meanings would bear the concept of an 
„ice-cold darkness‟. It could be the ice-cold darkness of despair, which would 
then mean that man is to seek refuge by God from the sharr of Jahannam, 
described earlier. 
One final explanation could also be to compare darkness with „non-existence‟, 
which is explained in the following chapters within the Risale-i Nur as pure 
sharr. More about that will follow in chapter 6 under “Principles of the Risale 
regarding khayr and sharr”.  
From the next verse one is able to read that the very old custom of blowing 
into knotted reeds while murmuring some secret incantations can lead to 
some sharr that man should seek refuge from. Whether or not to believe in 
such magic activity can be argued upon. However, what seems to be more 
likely is the possible cooperation of sharr human and sharr jinn with sharr 
intentions to harm someone. Hence, man is asked to seek refuge by God 
from this kind of evil intentions. 
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The last verse is pretty obvious and could actually be included into the 
semantic field of the term sharr: the act of practicing envy. Being an envious 
person and to envy others is considered to be sharr – both from a personal 
moral and a social aspect.  
Until to this point, the semantic analysis of the term sharr in the Qur‟ān has 
been made. Thereby, the semantic field of the respective term has been 
defined in order to try to grasp the true meaning and intended implication of 
sharr according to the Qur‟ān. Meanwhile, small limitations have been 
reached, where it was not possible for some verses to be categorized into 
well defined semantic fields. These have been considered to be verses 
beyond the semantic field of sharr. As a next step, it will be interesting to 
see how the exegetes (mufassirūn) have explained the respective chapters 
and verses. Not every exegete has interpreted every single verse. Some 
verses have not been commented upon. Hence, only those verses where 
comments have been made are included into this study. These verses are: 
And let not those who are niggardly in spending (yabkhalūna) what God has 
given them of His bounty suppose that it is good for them. No, it is sharr; 
they will carry what they stinted around their necks on the Day of 
Resurrection. And to Allah belongs the inheritance of the heavens and the 
earth. Allah is aware of what you do.145 
Say: “Shall I tell you something much worse (bi sharri) than this for 
retribution with Allah? Those whom Allah cursed and on whom He poured 
forth His wrath, transformed them into apes and swine, and worshippers of 
the Devil. They are worse off (sharrun makānan) and farther astray 
(aḍallu).”146 
The worst (sharra) beasts in Allah‟s sight are the deaf and dumb who do not 
understand.147 
                                        
145 Qur‟an, 3:180. 
146 Ibid., 5:60. 
147 Ibid., 8:22. 
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The worst (sharra) beasts in the sight of Allah are those who reject Him, 
because they will never believe.148 
And were Allah to hasten the sharra for mankind just as they would hasten 
the good for themselves, their term would have been fulfilled. Then We 
would leave those, who do not hope to meet Us in their trespasses 
(ṭughyānihim) wandering aimlessly.149 
Man prays for evil (bisharri), just as he prays for good; and man is very 
hasty.150 
And when We are gracious to man, he turns away (a‟raḍa) and withdraws 
haughtily; and if ash-sharru touches him, he is in despair.151 
Every living soul shall taste death, and We test you by sharri and good as a 
temptation and unto Us you shall be returned152 
And we understand not whether sharr was intended to those on earth or 
whether their Lord wanted to guide them to right conduct.153 
Say: I seek refuge with the Lord of the Daybreak, from the sharr of what He 
has created; and the sharr of the darkness when it gathers; and the sharr of 
those who blow into knotted reeds; and from the sharr of the envious when 
he envies.154 
From the sharr of the slinking whisperer155 
2.5 Opinions of Exegetes with regard to the Verses on sharr 
The interpretations of the different exegetes concerning the verses at hand 
show that they did not really concentrate on the term sharr in particular and 
its possible meaning and definition. They rather delivered general 
interpretations about the overall possible meaning of each respective verse 
and what it mainly covers. Above, verses containing terms of the same 
                                        
148 Ibid., 8:55. 
149 Ibid., 10:11. 
150 Ibid., 17:11. 
151 Ibid., 17:83. 
152 Ibid., 21:35. 
153 Ibid., 72:10. 
154 Ibid., 113:1-5. 
155 Ibid., 114:4. 
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semantic field have been mentioned together. Here, this is not possible since 
the mufassirūn concentrate on different aspects in each verse. 
2.5.1 Chapter 3, Verse 180 
Starting with [3:180] in the Qur‟ān, the verse on parsimony (yabkhalūna) 
states the reprehensibility of withholding of what God has given to man. This 
attribute, having been defined as part of the semantic field of sharr, has 
been interpreted by some of the exegetes as follows: 
Ibn Kathīr, Qurtubī and Tabātabā‟ī share the general meaning of this verse 
and state that the miser should not think that collecting money will benefit 
him.156 According to Ibn Kathīr, this kind of behavior will rather harm him in 
his religion and worldly affairs, without thereby giving further explanation of 
how it can harm a person‟s worldly affairs.157 Both support their argument 
with the following ḥadīth recorded from al-Bukhārī and conveyed from Abu 
Hurayrah: 
The Messenger of Allah said: Whoever Allah makes wealthy and he does not 
pay the Zakah due on his wealth, then (on the Day of Resurrection) his 
wealth will be made in the likeness of a bald-headed poisonous male snake 
with two black spots over the eyes. The snake will encircle his neck and bite 
his cheeks and proclaim, `I am your wealth, I am your treasure.' 
The Messenger, after having said this, recited the respective verse (3:180) 
until the end. Ibn Kathīr further states that while this ḥadīth can be found in 
al-Bukhārī, it has not been collected by Muslim.158  
                                        
156 Ibn Kathīr. Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Online English Version); Kurtubī. El-Cemiu li-Ahkāmi‟l Kur‟an 
(Online Turkish Version); Muhammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā‟ī, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Kur‟ān (Online 
Turkish Version). 
157 Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Online English Version). 
158 Ibid. 
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Al-Rāzī, while sharing the above explanation, adds another approach to this 
verse. According to him, this verse does not only address those who act 
niggardly distributing their wealth, but might also address those who keep 
their knowledge (‟ilm) for themselves instead of sharing it with others.159 
Thus, says Al-Rāzī, the Jews were hiding the attributes of the Messenger 
mentioned in the Torah160. Hiding such information, according to Al-Rāzī, is 
stinginess. Having said this, nevertheless, Al-Rāzī states that the first 
interpretation, namely withholding of one‟s wealth, is more likely to be 
relevant in this verse.161 
Mawdūdī emphasizes that nothing belongs to man and that God is the true 
owner of everything. Every human being will ultimately return to God and 
when that time comes, he will take nothing, no possessions and belongings 
which he thought are his, with him. Therefore, according to Mawdūdī, this 
verse states that the clever man is the one who spends his wealth in the 
name of God and the foolish is he who collects and piles it.162 
2.5.2 Chapter 5, Verse 60 
The next verse [5:60] deals with those who go astray (aḍallu): 
Say: “Shall I tell you something much worse (bi sharri) than this for 
retribution with Allah? Those whom Allah cursed and on whom He poured 
forth His wrath, transformed them into apes and swine, and worshippers of 
the Devil. They are worse off (sharrun makānan) and farther astray (aḍallu).” 
According to Tabātabā‟ī, this verse declares that “if our belief in Allah and 
His revealed Books was an evil in your opinion, then I inform you of what is 
more evil than that, and which you should truly hate, and it is the 
                                        
159 Fakhruddīn Er-Rāzī. Tefsīr-i Kebīr Mefātīhu‟l Ghayb (Online Turkish Version) 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Tefhimu‟l Kur‟an, Surah Al-Imran (Online Turkish Version) 
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characteristics, which is found in yourselves.”163 Tabātabā‟ī further points out 
that the demonstrative pronoun „this‟ in „worse than this‟ can either point to 
the entire community of believers, or it can point to the verbal noun, to find 
fault or to hate. According to the former the verse will declare something 
that is worse than the believers and in the latter it will declare something 
that is “worse than this fault-finding and hate of yours in retribution”.164 Al-
Razī is of the opinion that the demonstrative pronoun „this‟ refers not to a 
verbal noun but to the people who are the owners of that noun mentioned 
one verse before: 
Say: “Oh people of the Book, do you believe in Allah and what has been 
revealed to us and what was revealed before, and that most of you are 
transgressors?”165 
In other words, it does not refer to the act of hatred but to those who hate 
or to the act of transgression, but to the transgressors.166 
Mawdūdī, on the other hand, relates this verse merely to the Jews instead of 
interpreting the verse in a more general manner. According to him, the 
verse addresses those Jews who opposed the Muslims. Interestingly enough, 
Mawdūdī seems to take the expression “transformed them into apes and 
swine” literally and states that God turned them into apes and swine 
because they did not fulfil the Sabbath.167 Al-Rāzī also mentions this incident 
by referring to it as “according to some narratives”.168 
                                        
163 Muhammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā‟ī, Tafsīr al-Mīzān, in <http://www.shiasource.com/al-
mizan/> latest access 22 March 2011.  
164 Ibid. 
165 Qur‟ān, 5:59. 
166 Tefsīr-i Kebīr Mefātīhu‟l Ghayb (Online Turkish Version). 
167 Tefhimu‟l Kur‟an, Surah Al-Imran (Online Turkish Version). 
168 Tefsīr-i Kebīr Mefātīhu‟l Ghayb (Online Turkish Version).  
 51 
 
Contrary to Mawdūdī, Ibn Kathīr points out that this transformation should 
not be taken literally, thereby providing the following ḥadīth:  
Sufyan Ath-Thawri narrated that Ibn Mas‟ud said, Allah's Messenger was 
asked if the current monkeys and swine were those whom Allah transformed. 
He said: “Allah never destroyed a people by transforming them and making 
offspring or descendants for them. The monkeys and swine existed before 
that.” This was also recorded by Muslim.169 
As can be seen, what the mufassirūn mainly concentrate on in this verse is 
the meaning of the demonstrative pronoun „this‟ (by discussing who or what 
the addressee is) and the „transformation into apes and swine‟. Qurtubī, in 
difference to the other exegetes, explains the reason for the revelation 
(asbāb nuzūl) of this verse with the following narrative:   
Ibn Abbas said that a group of Jews came to the Messenger of God and 
asked him in which Messengers he believed in. The Messenger replied reciting 
chapter 2, verse 136 of the Qur‟ān: “We believe in God, in what has been 
revealed to us, in what was revealed to Abraham, Isma‟il, […] Moses, Jesus 
and the other Prophets from their Lord, […] and to Him we submit.” But 
when they heard the name Jesus, they denied his Prophethood and said: “By 
God, we do not know of any religious community whose enjoyment (nasīb) in 
this world and in the hereafter is less. And we do not know of any religion 
worse than yours.” Thereafter, the respective verse has been revealed.170   
 Hence, Qurtubī believes that the expression “Shall I tell you something 
much worse (bi sharri) than this” is an answer to the Jews‟ statement about 
the Messenger‟s religious community. 
2.5.3 Chapter 8, Verses 22 and 55 
According to Ibn Kathīr, verse 22 and 55 of chapter 8 refers to the 
munafiqūn and the disbelievers respectively. Verse 22 talks about the deaf 
and dumb, the hypocrites who say that they heard but act as if they have 
not and they say they understood, but act as if they have no knowledge at 
                                        
169 Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Online English Version) 
170 El-Cemiu li-Ahkāmi‟l Kur‟an (Online Turkish Version). 
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all. Whereas verse 55, states Ibn Kathīr, addresses the unbelievers who 
break their promises whenever they make a covenant, even when they vow 
to keep them.171  
While Al-Rāzī shares the opinion of Ibn Kathīr, he also explains that there 
are different views of different scholars about what beast (dawāb) might 
mean. Some say that because of their ignorance and because their own 
words did not benefit them in any way, they were compared with dawāb. 
That is why God described them as „deaf‟ and „dumb‟ and „those who are not 
capable of using their intellect‟. They are from amongst the beasts because 
dawāb is the name of a creature living on earth.172 
Qurtubī does not refer verse 22 only to the munafiqūn or to the unbelievers. 
In his opinion, everyone, who does not apply his knowledge in life and act 
upon it, falls under the warning of the „deaf‟ and „dumb‟; for how can one 
say that he has heard and understood, if he does not put his knowledge into 
action?173 
 Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır explains that the reason why in verse 22 the deaf and 
dumb are defined as the „worst (sharra) of beasts‟ is because those who 
have ears but don‟t hear the truth or do not want to hear the truth, who 
have a tongue but do not say the truth or do not want to say the truth, and 
those who have a mind but do not think about the truth or do not want to 
think about the truth are the most sharr for themselves and for others and 
worse than any other living being on earth.174 
                                        
171 Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Online English Version). 
172 Tefsīr-i Kebīr Mefātīhu‟l Ghayb (Online Turkish Version) 
173 El-Cemiu li-Ahkāmi‟l Kur‟an (Online Turkish Version). 
174 Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır. Hak Dini Kur‟an Dili, Vol.4, p. 2383-4. 
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2.5.4 Chapter 10, Verse 11 
It has been said previously that man is very hasty in nature and hence 
sometimes asks God for sharr thinking that it is good for him. One of the 
verses mentioned in this regard is to be found in chapter 10, verse 11: 
And were Allah to hasten the sharra for mankind just as they would hasten 
the good for themselves, their term would have been fulfilled. Then We 
would leave those, who do not hope to meet Us in their trespasses 
(ṭughyānihim) wandering aimlessly. 
Al-Rāzī provides additional verses for reference.175 The ungrateful do not 
believe in the Messenger and the warning-messages sent by their Lord. 
Hence they ask God to hasten and to make His warnings real, if it is right 
what the Messenger states. But God does not hasten the sharr for it might 
be that some of them will repent or there will be believers amongst their 
offspring.176 Rāzī further comments on the term sharr. He states that God 
calls chastisement sharr in this verse for chastisement is perceived by the 
recipient as being malign. 
Those who do not expect to meet with God challenge Him in their 
foolishness by asking Him to send down punishment on them. Taberī and 
Ibn Kathīr explain it differently: they refer to the bad attitude of imprecation. 
If Allah were to hasten in accepting the unjust imprecations men do to each 
other, then their respite would be settled at once. According to them, God 
shows mercy by granting the believer (mu‟min) a possibility of repentance 
                                        
175 Tefsīr-i Kebīr Mefātīhu‟l Ghayb (Online Turkish Version), mentions the following verses: 
[43:18], [10:49-51], [13:6]. 
176 Ibid. 
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and giving the ungrateful/unbeliever (kāfir) a certain time.177 Hence in this 
case, sharr is defined as unjust imprecation. 
2.5.5 Chapter 17, Verses 11 and 83 
The next two verses in chapter 17 are similar to the one mentioned above in 
chapter 10, verse 11: 
Man prays for evil (bisharri), just as he prays for good; and man is very 
hasty.178 
And when We are gracious to man, he turns away (a‟raḍa) and withdraws 
haughtily; and if ash-sharru touches him, he is in despair.179 
Mawdūdī first explains the asbāb nuzūl of the first verse above. In there he 
states that the unbelievers of Mecca, in their foolishness, wanted the 
Messenger to ask God for their immediate punishment, whereupon verse 11 
was revealed. However, Mawdūdī also points to another more general 
aspect, which serves as a hidden warning to the believers.  That is, not to 
ask God to destroy the unbelievers for their torture and suppression. For 
amongst their descendants, there might become strong and firm believers 
and representatives of God‟s religion.180 Hence, the Muslim is asked not to 
hasten and not to ask for things by thinking narrowly and self-centered. 
Mawdūdī does not touch on the term sharr in any way. Ibn Kathīr relates 
this verse to [10:11] and connects it also with unjust imprecation, as 
explained before.181  
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Al-Rāzī, on the other hand, explains his own view about the meaning of 
verse 11 as man being very likely to confuse khayr with sharr out of his lack 
of wisdom.182 This matter has been discussed earlier. 
Yazır adds to the above that man always prefers the advance to the credit. 
In other words, he tends to ask for the beauty of the hereafter in this world, 
hence gives up the hereafter and turns to the world (dunya). By doing this, 
he does not mind the big merit of the hereafter but does also not think of 
the punishment and hence, thinking that what he asks for is good for him, 
invites the sharr out of his haste.183   
Ihsan Eliaçık has a quite different approach to verse 11 of chapter 17. 
According to his interpretation, man commits sharr by saying over and over 
again that what he does is good. For example does man invade other 
countries and sheds blood in the name of justice, human rights, democracy, 
freedom, etc. When one hears them speak, one might think they are angels 
and it is as if they have been given the divine duty to civilize the world. 
Eliaçık gives another example about those who tend to say “those who are 
against us are against shari‟a. How can they oppose us while we recite 
verses from the Qur‟ān and read ḥadīth? So it must be the Qur‟ān and the 
ḥadīth they are opposing. Since those, who are against Qur‟ān and ḥadīth 
are considered to be apostate, it will be a reward to kill them. We are doing 
all of this for the sake of Allah”. Hence, they twist the truth and think that 
what they do is khayr, although it is nothing else but sharr.184 
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2.5.6 Chapter 21, Verse 35 
The verse “every living soul shall taste death, and We test you by sharri and 
good as a temptation and unto Us you shall be returned”185 has been 
mentioned previously under the category „Sharr as a Test‟. There, sharr has 
been defined in relation with its semantic field. It is however interesting to 
see that er-Rāzī, for instance, defines sharr as poverty, grief and any other 
afflictions and worldly harms and/or losses with which God tests human‟s 
faith and patience.186 In other words, er-Rāzī seems to accept worldly 
afflictions to be sharr, just as Mawdūdī does187. Ibn Kathīr adds to the 
definition of sharr sin and misguidance, thereby referring to Ali bin Abu 
Talhah, who apparently reported from Ibn Abbas188. Similarly does Qurtubī 
mention poverty and harām in relation with sharr.189 
2.5.7 Chapter 72, Verse 10 
In chapter 72 verse 10 it was the jinn who did  
understand not whether sharr was intended to those on earth or whether 
their Lord wanted to guide them to right conduct.  
Taberī, Ibn Kathīr and Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır share the opinion that this 
sentence was used by the Jinn who used to listen to the angels‟ 
conversations in heaven to steal information for the soothsayers. However, 
during the time of the Messenger, they saw the heavens filled with stern 
guards and flaming fires. Hence they were not sure whether this was 
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because something evil was intended to happen to those on earth or 
because God wanted their goodness and right conduct.190 
2.5.8 Chapter 113, Verses 1 to 5 
The chapter the exegetes did comment the most on is chapter [113:1-5]: 
Say: I seek refuge with the Lord of the Daybreak, from the sharr of what He 
has created; and the sharr of the darkness when it gathers; and the sharr of 
those who blow into knotted reeds; and from the sharr of the envious when 
he envies. 
Many commentators give similar explanations to the first verse that asks the 
reader to seek refuge with the Lord from the Daybreak (al-falaq). However, 
Tabātabā‟ī‟s interpretation of the first verse is highly interesting.  
After he provides the meaning of falaq, being an adjective in the meaning of 
an object (i.e. something that breaks through or cleaves), he says: “… the 
reason of this expression is to seek refuge from evil that hides the good and 
conceals what is manifest”191. This explanation is very important for it 
provides another hint to what is later going to be discussed in more detail: 
namely human‟s perspective of sharr that covers or hides all khayr that is 
behind it and man‟s judgment of situations according to the apparent, for 
sharr conceals only what is manifest. Hence, Tabātabā‟ī states that “within 
the world of creation lies a crack which leads to the realm of obliviousness – 
an opening which exposes the evil into existence.”192 
According to this verse, one should seek refuge by God from the following 
ashrār (pl. of sharr): 
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2.5.8.1 What he created (khalaq) 
Yūsuf „Alī describes this as “a) physical dangers, typified by darkness, b) 
psychical dangers within us, typified by Secret Arts, and c) psychical dangers 
from without us, resulting from a perverted will, which seeks to destroy any 
good that we enjoy.”193  
Hamdi Yazır‟s opinion is that “the sharr of created things” can cover anything 
that is material (maddī) or immaterial (mānewī), worldly (dunyawī) or 
otherworldly (ukhrawī); or anything that belongs to the outer (afākī) or the 
inner (enfusī); or anything that is natural (tabiī) or at will (ikhtiyarī).194 
Hence, according to Yazır, this āyat covers any sharr that comes about from 
man and jinn, from the shayātīn (pl. of shaytān, devil), from vermin and 
germs, poisons and fire (nār), sins (dhunūb) and covetousness (hewā); from 
the lower self (nafs), from actions, etc.195 This explanation of Yazır suggests 
that sharr can be seen in any created thing.  
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī counts similar things amongst the ashrār like Yazır does: 
One should seek refuge from the sharr of a) the shayṭān, b) hellfire, c) from 
vermin and germs and any harmful animals, and d) from the sharr of 
illnesses and calamities.196 He mentions objections saying that illnesses and 
calamities cannot be defined as sharr since this would mean that man is 
supposed to take refuge in the causer of sharr and that would be a 
contradiction in itself.197 But Rāzī does not see any contradiction therein and 
says that there is nothing wrong to take refuge in God from God. For the 
Messenger of God himself used to say “My Lord! I seek refuge in You from 
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You.” 198 To any other objection about taking refuge from qadar, in other 
words, about why God would ask someone to seek refuge in Him for 
something He willed to happen, Rāzī confines himself saying that God 
cannot be taken into account for anything He does.199   
While Qurtubī just shortly states that taking refuge from created things 
means taking refuge from Iblīs and hell and all beings God has created and 
has given the ability to cause harm,200 Mawdūdi chooses to give a more 
detailed explanation about this āyat. He states that first of all sharr in this 
āyat is not related to God, but to created beings. It does not say „I seek 
refuge in God from ashrār created by God‟, but rather „I seek refuge in God 
from the ashrār of created things‟.201 While this statement keeps the door 
open for the discussion of whether God is the Creator of sharr or not, this 
shows according to Mawdūdī, that God has not created anything for sharr 
but has created certain things with certain features in order to complete the 
wisdom of creation. Secondly, says Mawdūdī, the best way for man to 
protect himself from the ashrār of created things is by seeking refuge in God, 
who is the Creator of things. For God is always dominating creation and 
knows best about ashrār that are unknown to man.202  Hence, by finding 
refuge in God, man finds refuge from any ashrār of creation that is known or 
unknown to him; from sharr in this world and in the hereafter.203 
Furthermore it is important to state that according to Mawdūdī, the term 
sharr can be used for any loss, deficiency, and anguish. Having said this, he 
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states that illnesses, hunger, being hurt during war, to burn in fire, to be 
hurt by a scorpion or to grief out of the loss of one‟s child can be counted 
amongst ashrār of first grade. On the other hand, ungratefulness, 
polytheism, and any kind of sin and injustice is of second grade for it does 
not cause direct harm and does not hurt like those of first grade.204 Finally 
he states that the sharr that one seeks refuge from in God does cover these 
two types. 
Tabātabā‟ī makes clear that every created thing, be it humans, jinns, 
animals or else, can bear evil and one should not be preoccupied about it.205 
However, he does not give any further explanation about what he means by 
not being preoccupied by it. One suggestion for the meaning may be that 
one should not be too anxious about this kind of evil and one should be 
aware that God stands above and is much more powerful than all evils. 
2.5.8.2 Darkness when it gathers 
This, according to Yūsuf „Alī is the description of physical danger, for 
everyone is afraid of physical darkness, injuries, accidents and calamities.206 
It is well known that man mostly depicts all kinds of physical dangers with 
darkness.  
Rāzī, Mawdūdī, Qurtubī, Yazır and Tabātabā‟ī more or less share the opinion 
that dangers increase during darkness and that anyone with bad intentions 
get into action after sunset. Therefore, the verse advises to seek refuge in 
God from darkness as it overspreads. Ihsan Eliaçık translates this verse 
differently. According to him, the translation should be as follows: “I seek 
refuge in You, oh Lord (Rabb), from the appearance of all repressed and 
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hidden stimulations that flow in my veins and from their seducement of 
me.”207 Eliaçık, similar to the other mentioned exegetes, translates the word 
ghāsiq as „thoroughly filling up‟, „covering‟208 and the word waqab as „to 
completely enter something else and be out of sight‟209. However, he 
translates it differently. This interpretation of Eliaçık reduces the amount of 
questions that might be raised regarding the association of bad actions 
directly with darkness. Furthermore it concentrates more on the intrinsic 
aspect of man. This draws the attention from other beings to oneself. 
Instead of seeing sharr in others, in darkness or in other people doing bad 
things when it is dark, one seeks refuge in God from one‟s own inner 
seducements. According to Eliaçık, the next verse is in close relationship with 
this one. 
2.5.8.3 Those who blow into knotted reeds 
This, according to Yūsuf „Alī, causes psychological terror210 which can, 
however, also lead to physical dangers, for the outcome of these plots may 
be the destruction of family bounds, the sickness or madness of people, etc.  
Yazır and Eliaçık‟s interpretation of this verse is similar and they state that 
they are in line with Abū Muslim in that one meaning of this verse may be 
„women who blow on knots‟ or „women who seduce and provoke‟211. 
Tabātabā‟ī is also one of those who believe that women favor witchcraft 
more than men and additionally refers to chapter 2, verse 102 of the Qur‟ān 
to emphasize the truth of the act of witchcraft:  
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[…] but the devils did, teaching the people witchcraft and that which was 
revealed in Babylon to the two angels, Harut and Marut. Yet those two angels 
did not teach anybody without saying: “We are a temptation. So do not 
disbelieve.” Those [who wished] learned from them what would sow discord 
between man and wife, but could not harm anybody with it, except with 
Allah‟s permission. […] 
Although it is well known and widely accepted, states Eliaçık, that women 
have the ability to seduce men and to make them their slaves, it would be 
wrong to restrict this verse only to women. Therefore it might be 
appropriate to translate this verse as follows: “As a human being, I seek 
refuge, oh Lord (Rabb) in You from the sharr of becoming a slave of 
provoked desires and lustful addictions, and from temptations and all kinds 
of blowing that evoke these feelings.”212 Accordingly, naffāthāti fi ‟l „uqad 
covers everything and every feeling, be it avidity, desires or anything that 
enslaves humans, that enchains and captivates them, that blinds them and 
that makes them commit all kinds of evil.213 Although it is man who has free 
will and the ability to choose to do right or wrong, he is asked to seek refuge 
in his Lord from being defeated by his desires and from being enslaved, in 
other words to ask his Lord for help in making the right decisions. 
In comparison with Yazır and Rāzī, one can see that Yazır, in this verse, is 
very much influenced by Rāzī, but Rāzī adds the view of the Mu‟tazilites 
regarding this verse, which is worth noting: The Mu‟tazilites do not believe 
that secret arts can affect or influence anyone. They state three possible 
meanings for this verse. One, to seek refuge from the sin of performing 
secret arts; second, to seek refuge from the mischief (fitna) within society as 
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the result of secret arts214; three, to seek refuge from their plots, such as 
making people eat poisonous food that leads to death or madness215.    
In comparison, Sayyid Qutb believes that secret arts can highly influence 
people‟s senses and feelings.216 It can frighten, divert and burden people 
and therefore one need to seek refuge in God from this kind of evil.217 
Contrary to those who believe that prophet Muhammed was affected by 
secret arts performed by some others, and that that was the reason for the 
last two chapters in the Qur‟ān to be revealed, Qutb believes in the 
weakness of this account. The Qur‟ān, according to Qutb, states that the 
Prophet was never bewitched.218 
2.5.8.4 The envious when he envies 
Malignant envy, put into action, states Yūsuf „Alī, seeks to destroy the 
happiness or the material or spiritual good enjoyed by other people.219 
Yazır‟s explanation of the term ḥasad is akin with that of Yūsuf „Alī. He draws 
a line between ghibṭa (envy without malice) and ḥasad 220(jealousy) and 
states that while there is nothing wrong with showing ghibṭa towards 
another person, it is evil to show ḥasad.221 The former is to desire or long 
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for someone else‟s belonging, attitude, character or beauty without 
destroying it, whereas the latter is the same, but with the bad intention of 
wishing that person to cease having that belonging, attitude, character or 
beauty.222 Furthermore, Yazır says that this chapter of the Qur‟ān addresses 
external (āfāqī) ashrār, such as the darkness, secret arts and envy. Yazır 
continues that although envy as an attribute can also harm the envious one 
himself and hence become an internal (anfusī) sharr, this part is addressed 
in the chapter that follows sūra al-Falaq, which is sūra al-Nās223.   
According to Mawdūdī, one should seek refuge in God as soon as the envy 
(ḥasad) of a person is put into practice.224 Furthermore, one should take 
precautions from the sharr of the envious one (ḥāsid). One of these 
precautions is to show total submission to God and to firmly believe that no 
one can harm one without God allowing it. Secondly, one should show 
patience to the actions of the ḥāsid and should not lower oneself by being 
like him.225 Thirdly, no matter what the ḥāsid does, one should keep being 
pious (taqwa). Fourthly, one should not think too much about the ḥāsid, for 
thinking too much will be the beginning of one‟s defeat.  The fifth precaution 
is, according to Mawdūdī, not to treat the ḥāsid in a bad way; by contrast, to 
show kindness and be generous towards him. And lastly, one should be 
persistent in the doctrine of the oneness of God (tawhīd). If the doctrine of 
tawhīd is rooted in one‟s heart, he will never be afraid of anyone, 
anywhere.226 
                                        
222 Ibid., 6404-6405. 
223 Ibid., 6408. 
224 Tefhimu‟l Kur‟an, Surah Falaq (Soft Copy). 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
 65 
 
2.5.9 Chapter 114, Verse 4 
The last verse in the Qur‟ān with the term sharr can be found in surah an-
Nās and reads as follows:  
From the sharr of the slinking whisperer,227 
All exegetes that are mentioned in this study agree that the word waswās 
can mean to whisper or a covert voice. Mawdūdī adds that the word waswās 
signifies a repetition, such as to whisper again and again228. Yazır discusses 
two verses from the Qur‟ān, where the term waswās is mentioned to explain 
its possible meaning in this case. One is “It was We Who created man, and 
We know what dark suggestions (waswisu) his soul (nafs) makes to him:”229 
and the other is “But Satan whispered (waswasa) (evil) to him (Adam):”230 
In the light of these two verses, Yazır suggests that the waswās in [114:4] is 
either the nafs or nafs ammārah (the self that commands sharr) to be more 
precise, or it is Satan (shayṭān).231 As mentioned before, Yazır considers the 
kind of waswasa that comes from one‟s own nafs ammārah or shayṭān to be 
internal (enfusī) sharr232, which harms the one that shelters it.  
Mawdūdī does not consider waswās to be only the nafs or the shayṭān. 
According to him it can also be from among the „jinn shayṭān‟ and human 
beings (ins shayṭān)233.  
In the light of all these commentaries, the term sharr seems to frame itself 
in form of physical and psychological calamities, which originate from the 
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distorted will of man rather than from any kind of natural disasters or 
external calamities. However it should be noted that none of the exegetes 
give precise descriptions or definitions of what the term sharr might mean, 
how its meaning should be approached and what God might have meant 
when mentioning it in the Scripture. The only commentator from the ones 
mentioned in this study, who has written the most about sharr in more detail, 
is Ihsan Eliaçık. Compared to the other mufassirūn, Eliaçık is unconventional 
and not very traditional. In other words, he prefers not to restrict himself on 
the different schools of thought (madhāhib). What he has to say about sharr 
is not very different from what will be mentioned in the next chapter about 
the different philosopher‟s and theologian‟s view on evil and what has 
already been said in the introduction about the „west‟s‟ approach to the topic. 
In other words, he gives an outline about what has already been said234. He 
does not provide any solution however to the problem of evil.  
This chapter will come to an end after analyzing the term sharr in ḥadīth, 
the sayings of the Prophet Muhammed. 
2.6 Semantic Analysis of the term sharr in Ḥadῑth 
Different approaches have been tried to identify the aḥādith (pl. ḥadīth) 
which include the term sharr. One of them was to look at those that stand in 
relation with, or are mentioned together with the Qur‟anic verses on sharr.  
However, this approach was unsuccessful. None of the aḥādith mentioned 
together with the respective verses of the Qur‟ān did include the term sharr 
in any way. Neither did they explain or define the term.  
The second approach was to use an online search engine. The search engine 
provided by the Institute for Knowledge and Education and Methodology has 
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proven itself to be very useful. From this engine, thirty three Traditions have 
been picked. Not all of the aḥādith that contain the term sharr have been 
considered due to some of them being prayers of the same kind that the 
Prophet used to do. These prayers are mainly in form of seeking refuge by 
the Lord from any kind of ashrār; the respective term thereby not being 
closer defined. 
In here, the narrators of the Traditions will not all be mentioned, rather the 
concentration will be on the saying of the Prophet only. Whoever is 
interested in knowing the chains of narration can always look into any ḥadīth 
collection. Furthermore, those aḥādith have been chosen which are in close 
relation with the study at hand; in other words, any ḥadīth that describes 
the term sharr in one, or another way. 
Hence, in the following ḥadīth, sharr is defined as any kind of misbehavior 
that may occur through one‟s perverted will: 
A man approached the Messenger and asked: “Which of the human beings 
are amongst the better ones?” He replied: “Those who struggle for the sake 
of Allah with their wealth and their life.” The man asked: “And who next?” He 
replied: “That mu‟min who prays to his Lord in secret and who protects 
others from his own sharr.”235 
 The Messenger‟s advice for everyone is to protect their environment from 
their own mischief that can result in sharr. The better ones are those who 
act responsibly and make the right choices in life. Another supporting ḥadīth 
in this regard might be the following: 
Abdullah said: We were together with the Messenger in a cave. The sūrah 
Mursalāt had been revealed to him and we were listening to it. All of a 
sudden, a snake approached us. The Messenger said: “Kill it.” So we 
prepared to kill the snake but it was faster and disappeared. Thereupon the 
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Messenger replied: “Just as God protected you from the snake‟s sharr, He 
protected the snake from your sharr.”236  
In another ḥadīth, the Messenger is quoted as having said 
Oh son of Adam! To give away the excess of your wealth as sadaqa (charity) 
is khayr for you. To keep and pile it is sharr for you. However, you will not be 
taken into account for keeping as much as you need for your own living. Start 
with giving sadaqa to those who are under your maintenance (nafaqa). The 
higher hand is better that the lower hand.237 
In the analysis of the Qur‟ān, it has been said before in this chapter that 
parsimony, the state of extreme stinginess, falls under the semantic field of 
sharr. This ḥadīth supports the respective verse [3:180]. While God says in 
the Qur‟ān that “those who are niggardly in spending what God has given 
them out of His bounty should not think that it is good for them. No, it is 
sharr; …” the Messenger clearly states that piling up wealth instead of 
sharing it with the needy is a sharr act. 
The next ḥadīth seems to be related to the verses [8:22-23] and [18:57] 
where God talks about the deaf and the dumb, those who turn away, whose 
hearts are sealed and who will not believe. 
No doubt some people are like keys towards khayr acts and like deadbolts 
towards sharr acts. And some other people are like keys towards sharr acts 
and like deadbolts towards khayr acts. How blessed is the one whom Allah 
has given the keys of goodness (khayr) into his hands. And pity to those 
whom Allah has given the keys of sharr into their hands.238  
The rejection of understanding and accepting the truth that was mentioned 
before in this chapter stands in close relation with this ḥadīth. It is worth 
noting, however, that having the keys for khayr or sharr in one‟s hands still 
requires making use of them. In other words, before man has decided to use 
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that key, God will neither create khayr, nor sharr for him. This issue will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapters to come. 
The next ḥadīth might be referring to the act of idolatry and hence might 
support verse [98:6]: 
Aisha said: When the Messenger was ill, some of his wives talked about a 
church they saw in Abyssinia. The church was called Māriya. Later, one of the 
wives of the Prophet, Ummu Salama and Ummu Habība went to the area of 
Abyssinia. They talked about the beauty of the church and about its pictures 
and figures. Thereupon the Messenger raised his head and said: “When a 
good person of them dies, they build a masjid (place of worship) on his grave 
and paint that place with these pictures and figures. In the sight of Allah, 
those are the most sharr of living beings.”239 
This ḥadīth might be referring to the wrongness of turning a person‟s grave 
into a place of worship, since this can be seen as a sign of associating 
partners with the Lord.  
It has been discussed previously in this chapter that man should seek refuge 
by the Lord from created things. Although the discussion was more about 
what God creates according to the inclinations of man, this ḥadīth seems to 
describe that there can also be other kinds of ashrār that man should seek 
refuge from: 
Abdullah bin „Amr said: When the Messenger travelled and it was dark, he 
used to pray as follows: “Oh earth, my Lord and your Lord is Allah. From your 
sharr, and the sharr that you have, from the sharr that is created on you, and 
from the creature‟s sharr that walk on you, I seek refuge by my Lord. From 
the sharr of the lion, from the sharr of the scorpion and snake, from the 
creature‟s sharr that sit on this earth, from the sharr of those who give birth 
and from the sharr of what they have given birth to, I seek refuge by my 
Lord.”240 
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Hence this seems to show that sharr can be created from all sorts of created 
beings and that one should seek refuge by the Lord from any kind of harm 
that might inflict oneself.  
The next ḥadīth describes sharr as failing to apply the message of the 
Qur‟ān in one‟s life: 
Abu Said al-Hudrī narrated: The Messenger leaned his back to his camel and 
said to the people: “Shall I tell you about the most khayr and most sharr of 
mankind? The most khayr is he who strives all his life (until death) for the 
sake of Allah, be it on the back of his horse or camel or by foot. The most 
sharr is he who reads the book of his Lord but does not apply it to his life.” 241 
If elaborated upon, this ḥadīth might explain the importance of having the 
good characteristics described in the Qur‟ān and keeping away from the 
characteristics that have been described as sharr, or that fall under the 
semantic field of sharr.  
Another very open description of sharr is to be found in the following saying 
of the Messenger: 
No one can lead astray  a person God has guided and no one can guide a 
person whom God has led astray. The most righteous of words is the Book of 
the Lord. The most beautiful of ways is Muhammed‟s path. The most sharr of 
actions is that which is fabricated later on. Anything that is fabricated later on 
is bid‟a. Any bid‟a is heresy. […]242 
This ḥadīth might be in relation with slander, with telling lies. For bid‟a is 
mostly about inventing things and saying that it is part of Islām or part of a 
religious practice. Hence, it is in a way the act of telling lies about God. 
The next ḥadīth describes sharr to be hypocrisy: 
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The most sharr of humans are those hypocrites; they approach these with 
one face, and those with another face.243 
Cruelty and injustice are another two attributes associated with sharr: 
[…] as long as one does not totally submit with his tongue and his heart, one 
will not be a true muslim, as long as one‟s neighbor is not safe from one‟s 
sharr actions, one has no true īmān.” They asked: “Oh Messenger of God! 
What are those sharr actions?” He replied: “It is cruelty and injustice. […]244 
Other than the aḥādith mentioned above, there are others the Messenger 
used to utter in form of prayers. These are similar to the one narrated by 
Aisha: The Prophet used to supplicate to God in the following way:"I seek 
refuge in You from the sharr of what I did and from the sharr of what I did 
not."245 Or he used to seek refuge by his Lord from the sharr of his own nafs 
(soul)246, from the sharr of the fitna of wealth and poverty247, from the sharr 
of his ears, eyes, tongue, and heart248. 
In the light of the above, one might say that there are additional terms that 
could be added into the semantic field of sharr – although one might want to 
avoid to melt all terms in one big pot, it is possible to treat the Qur‟anic 
terms separately from the narrations of the Messenger. That was one reason 
why this part has been dealt with under a separate section. Following the 
above descriptions of the term sharr, attributes such as the fabrication of 
lies (bid‟a), hypocrisy (nifāq), cruelty (ẓulm) and injustice, and to fail to put 
the teachings of the Qur‟ān into practice fall under the semantic field of 
sharr in ḥadīth narrations. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
So far, the semantic structure of the term sharr, as defined mainly in the 
Qur‟ān itself, can be summarized as follows: sharr as well as khayr, does not 
necessarily make a statement about wrong or right, but rather about the 
benefit or loss that and action or a situation brings.249 In the case of sharr, 
the addressee in all circumstances is that man who chooses to be foolish, 
arrogant, stubborn, ignorant, impatient and unwise. What is described as 
sharr is the loss that is behind such a behavior. That the term sharr can be 
seen as loss or deficiency has been stated before by Mawdūdī. Contrary to 
the term „natural evil‟ or „moral evil‟, there is no such thing as „natural sharr‟ 
or „moral sharr‟ in the Qur‟ān.  
The terms used in the Qur‟an and which have a strong moral connotation 
are ḥusn and su„, which are also most times translated as good and evil. 
These two terms, defined by Murata and Chittick as „beautiful‟ and „ugly‟ in 
order to avoid confusion, reflect a judgment on the rightness or wrongness 
of an action performed by man.250  The reason why these two pairs, 
khayr/sharr and ḥusn/su„ are both seen simply as good and evil, might be 
because the loss or benefit of something is ultimately related to a right or 
wrong action of an individual251, hence goes back to some kind of moral 
behavior. 
The term sharr is rather a relative one, and can change according to every 
single individual. A loss that someone suffers, and which that person 
considers as being evil for him, can be a benefit and hence something good 
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for someone else.252 Or, a negative situation now, that man thinks is evil, 
can turn out for him to be good in the long run. Looking into people‟s daily 
lives will be sufficient to see a lot of conditions that exemplify the above 
verses. Even the worst of evils for many people, which is death, can be seen 
as necessary and good for the world if looked at from a broader perspective. 
In other words, all of the above are seen as evil by people, but not as sharr 
from the Qur‟anic perspective. Sharr, according to the Qur‟ān, is the loss of 
God‟s grace253, loss of guidance254, loss of God‟s resignation255, loss of 
understanding256, loss of faith257, loss of patience258 and loss of hope259. 
In light of all that loss, one can say that from the Qur‟anic perspective, sharr 
is not a thing as such and does not seem to have an external existence 
(wujūd al-khārijī) in this world. It is not man who is sharr, neither the 
attribute itself. Sharr is the loss of goodness, the loss of good character, the 
loss of good action – in other words the loss of something that exists. Hence, 
it would be appropriate to say at this stage that sharr has no external 
existence and nothing which is created (makhlūq) can be sharr. One might 
call this an immaterial existence (wujūd al-mā„nawī), which is subject to 
change, depending on man‟s change of attitude and behavior. It is 
something that can be transformed from loss into gain, and once that has 
happened, it is no longer sharr, but khayr. 
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3 Muslim Theologians and Philosophers on 
Theodicy 
3.1 Introduction 
The problem of evil has been discussed and examined by many western 
philosophers and theologians in the past and it continues to be a mystery. 
No real solution or answer has been given to the question of evil in this 
world. It remains to be the greatest challenge of belief in the God of 
traditional theism, and is used as one of the arguments against God‟s 
existence.260  Mostly theologians were the ones who believed that evil was 
not something to discuss about but rather something that needs to be faced 
without probably losing faith in God; for the problem is logical and the 
premises are incompatible: God exists; God is good; God is omnipotent; God 
is omniscient; The world contains evil. 
Then how is it that God allows evil in the world? The next important 
question, rather related to moral evil, is about the justice of God and 
predetermination. How can the justice of God be reconciled with what seems 
to be unjust; namely punishing and rewarding those whose behavior was 
predetermined for them by God? Another main question, hence, is how to 
reconcile God‟s attributes with the existence of evil in the world without 
sacrificing the absoluteness of any of the attributes? 
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Mackie gives a successful overview about main types of solutions to the 
problem of evil within the discourse so far and their incoherence261. These 
solutions, however, consist mainly of either the denial or the restriction of 
one or more of the premises stated above. Ancient philosophers such as 
Plato, for instance, made a distinction between matter and cause and thus 
stated that God is not responsible for evil because it is not „the good 
Demiurge‟ who creates evil for he has no control over it.262 The Manicheans, 
on the other hand, found a solution to the problem of evil by stating that 
God has power only over good things. Evil things are created by another 
entity or God – the evil one. Within its theological application, this principle 
is called dualism263. In order not to be confused with the mind-body dualism 
mostly used in philosophy, this term shall be called bitheism.  Hence, the 
contradiction is avoided and evil arises not because of, but inspite of God‟s 
will. Another solution is to simply deny the fifth premise, which is evil itself. 
Thus, evil is an illusion and does not really exist or evil is privatio boni264, the 
absence of good, which aims to eliminate evil as a “positive reality”265. This 
concept of privatio boni, which Mackie lists under those types of solutions 
which explicitly deny one or more of the premises stated above, is supposed 
to do the opposite. Monotheists such as Augustine have offered this solution 
to maintain the premises, especially to keep up the absolute attributes of 
God.266 
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The second main solution does not explicitly deny any of the attributes of 
God or the existence of evil and tries to uphold all premises. One statement 
takes evil as a necessary effect of good. Fire, for instance, serves the good 
while it brings along some evil. Eliminating it would mean to eliminate its 
good causes as well. This solution‟s attempt is to justify God‟s causing evil or 
allowing it. Another statement regards evil as necessary means to good. Evil 
happens to bring about something better than already exists. This principle 
is called the higher good defense267. The attempt of this solution is to avoid 
God to be charged of being evil, since the reason for doing so is morally 
sufficient. This point, however, implicitly restricts God‟s power being 
absolute, for if God is supposed to enjoy absolute power, He must be able to 
obtain good without having to employ any evil means. The third suggestion 
for a possible solution of the problem of evil is the principle of the best of all 
possible worlds268. According to this principle, the existence of evil is 
necessary for it adds to the variety in the world as well as to its own positive 
value. Hence, if evil is taken away, the world is left with less variety than 
there can be. One last solution offered is evil as a product of human free will. 
If humans bring about moral evil due to their freedom, the presence of such 
evil does not conflict with God‟s goodness. This principle, which is called the 
free will defense269, is supposed to free God from the responsibility for moral 
evil. Mackie states the problem this defense brings along is that it does not 
provide any solution to metaphysical and physical evil. Furthermore, one can 
ask, why God allows human free will knowing that the possibility of evil also 
exists, and finally, whether God can make people do choose the right at all 
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times despite to their freedom. In other words, this principle does also, 
according to Mackie, implicitly restrict or deny God‟s omnipotence.  
 Therefore, no matter which solution one would like to prefer, eventually a 
proposition is either temporarily or completely rejected. Theologians tend to 
accept the restriction of one or more attributes of God when it comes to the 
problem of evil and to re-assert them again elsewhere in the system.  
To avoid any confusion and misunderstanding, it seems important to come 
to an agreement of how to use the terms moral, physical, natural and 
metaphysical evil which are so commonly used. The first point is that „evil‟, 
as it is discussed here, is something the meaning of which has already been 
assumed. In other words, the discussion still remains, whether „evil‟ from 
human‟s point of view and as understood by humans is the same as it is 
from the Creator‟s point of view. However, this point shall be discussed in 
following chapters in further detail.  
The second point, which is about using the appropriate terminology, will be 
described here. Ninian Smart270 defines „moral evil‟ as human wickedness 
and according to Plantinga271, „moral evil‟ is the result of human choice or 
volition. Both state that the result of immoral action of a human being, 
which causes pain, is called „moral evil‟. For others like McCloskey272 who 
comes to the conclusion that there cannot be an omnipotent and benevolent 
God, „physical evil‟ is being used in equal meaning to „natural evil‟: anything 
that is involved in the constitution of earth and animal kingdom such as any 
kind of dangerous animals, natural calamities which result in human 
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suffering, various diseases and any kind of evil with which many are born. 
„Moral evil‟, on the other hand, is defined by McCloskey simply as immorality, 
such as selfishness, envy, greed and any other larger scale evil such as 
wars.273 
In this study, two main terms will be used throughout – merely to avoid 
confusions274. One is „natural evil‟, which stands for all kinds of natural 
disasters, such as earth quakes and floods; the other will be called „moral 
evil‟, which means any kind of negative situation caused through willful, 
malicious action of man. Both of these terms will be further divided into the 
two classes „physical evil‟ and „metaphysical evil‟, as is commonly used within 
the philosophy of religion. „Physical evil‟ will stand for bodily pain or mental 
anguish such as fear, illness, grief, etc. „Metaphysical evil‟, on the other hand, 
will refer to such things as imperfection, such as criminals going unpunished, 
deformities, etc. 
3.2 Main Thoughts in Muslim Theology 
Before examining the Muslim point of view of the problem of evil, it will be 
of advantage to understand the different main thoughts that have emerged 
within Muslim theological history. Besides the ahl al-sunnah, the mainstream 
Sunni thought, the Jabriyya, the Mu‟tazila and the Qadariyya (not to be 
confused with Qadiriyya275) thoughts emerged.  
                                        
273 Ibid, 100. 
274 These terms will be used only because they are known as such throughout history. It 
seems that these terms have been introduced by Plato. See The Problem of Evil, Ibn Sīnā‟s 
Theodicy, 15-29. As will be explained in the following Chapters of this study, Nursi makes 
no use of these terms since he has a different understanding of evil which is not exactly as 
described here. 
275 It should be noted that Qadariyya and Qadiriyya are two different movements. The 
Qadiriyya is an order (tarīka) of dervishes, called after „Abd al-Kādir al-Djilānī (d. 1166). For 
further information see E. van Donzel, et al. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, “Kadiriyya”, vol. IV 
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3.2.1 Jabriyya 
Jabriyya276, a deterministic thought, was first introduced and defended by 
Ja‟d bin Dirhem (d. 736) and Jahm bin Safwana (d. 745), who stated that 
humans are not free in their actions. According to this view, nothing and 
nobody else but God owns any action or deed. All actions are predetermined 
and human beings are both powerless and unaccountable. These thoughts 
of the Jabriyya, which largely ignored the understanding of human free will, 
were criticized by the rationalistic Mu‟tazilites277.  
3.2.2 Mu’tazila 
Among the founders of the Mu‟tazila is Wasil Ibn Ata (d. 748). According to 
Ata, humans are free in their actions; they are the creators of their own 
deeds, be it good or evil. God is all-Wise and Just, thus it is unlawful to 
attribute any evil or injustice to Him.278  
3.2.3 Qadariyya 
The Qadariyya are considered to be those who represented the principle of 
free will in the early period of Islam, from about 690 to the definitive 
consolidation of the Mu‟tazila at the beginning of the 9th century.279 Although 
the name indicates the doctrine of qadar, they upheld the centrality of 
human free will.280 According to the Encylopaedia of Islam, the earliest 
document of the movement is the Risāla of Hasan al-Basrī, which was 
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composed between 694 and 699281. From it, the moderate wing of the 
Qadariyya drew the following argument, which was according to the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, no innovation, however systematically formulated 
for the first time: “God creates only good; evil stems from man or from 
Satan. Man chooses freely between the two; but God knows from all eternity 
what man will choose. He only “leads him into error” (idlāl) if man has first 
given him occasion for this through his sin.”282  Although the latter part, 
which states that man first chooses to disobey God‟s command whereof God 
leads him into error, sounds like it is similar to the thought of the ahl al-
sunnah described below, the former part opens the doors and lays the 
grounds for bitheism, especially if one hands over the power of creating evil, 
to Satan.   
3.2.4 Maturidī and Ash’arī  
Within the ahl al-sunnah, there are two main theological streams, the 
Maturidī and the Ash‟arī. In view of the different socio-cultural environments 
of the two theologians, it seems to be quite normal that there are different 
views on certain issues. The founder of the Maturidī school is the Hanafite 
theologian Abu Mansur Muhammad al-Maturidī (d. 944), and this school was 
born in Transoxania (Ma Wara‟un-Nahr)283. This theological school came to 
be widely recognized as the second orthodox Sunnī kalām school besides the 
Ash‟arī. The Ash‟arī school was established by the Shafi‟ite theologian Abu al-
Hasan al-Ash‟arī (d. 936) in Iraq284. Iraq is at the same time the place where 
the ideas of the Mu‟tazila – the great opponent of Ash‟arī – flourished. That 
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is, why Imam Ash‟arī spent his life mainly disputing with Mu‟tazila scholars 
whereas Imam Maturidī‟s concern was merely to encounter some of the 
ideas of the Mu‟tazila, which made their way to Transoxania.285 Al-Ash‟arī 
was a Mu‟tazilite until he was forty years old.286 The reason why he decided 
to take a different way is unknown; however, Klein quotes As-Subkī as 
follows:  
The Sheikh (al-Ash‟arī) asked Abū „Alī (al-Jubbā-ī), „O sheikh, what have you 
to say about three persons, one a believer, another an unbeliever, and the 
third an infant.‟ He replied, „The believer is among the glorified, the 
unbeliever among those who perish, and the infant among those who are 
safe.‟ The Sheikh answered, „If the infant wills to rise to a place among the 
glorified, can he do so?‟ Al-Jubbā-ī said, „No; it will be said to him, “The 
believer achieved this grade of glory only by obedience, and you have nothing 
of the sort.” The Sheikh said, „Then if he says “The deficiency is no fault of 
mine, and therefore if Thou hadst suffered me to live, I would have rendered 
obedience like the believer” – what?‟ Al-Jubbā-ī said, „God will say to him, “I 
knew that if you survived you would surely be disobedient and incur 
punishment, wherefore I considered what was best for you and brought 
death upon you before you reached the age of responsibility.”‟ The Sheikh 
said, „Then, if the unbeliever says, “O my Lord, Thou didst know his condition 
as Thou knewest mine; therefore why didst Thou not consider also what was 
best for me?” – what?‟ Then al-Jubbā-ī was nonplussed.287  
Al-Ash‟arī seems to have discovered an inconsistency in the doctrine of 
„public interest‟ (maṣlahah) (which Klein calls misleadingly „welfare‟); that 
God would do only what was best for each individual. In fact, there are 
several points where al-Ash‟arī was in contradiction with the Mu‟tazila. Along 
with the discussion whether the Qur‟an is created or not, another 
disagreement was from the point of free will. While the Mu‟tazila emphasized 
God‟s justice, the Ash‟arites, very similar to the Maturidī view, stressed God‟s 
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omnipotence. Although al-Ash‟arī‟s view was misunderstood that it would 
undermine the possibility of free will and would imply some sort of fatalism, 
the Ash‟arites saw themselves holding a position between the Jabriyyas‟ 
privileging of divine compulsion and the Qadarites‟ and Mu‟tazilates‟ 
privileging of free will.288  
The fact that there are two main divisions within the ahl al-sunnah – namely 
the Ash‟arī and Maturidī thought – does not ipso facto mean that they are 
entirely different from each other. While the Encyclopedia of Islam states 
that the differences between Ash‟arī and Maturidī thoughts are more 
substantial than the later harmonizing theologians would admit289, according 
to Taşpınar, these two thoughts have agreed on the main issues of theology 
(kalām). They lived within the same century, however in different locations, 
and tried to explain their understandings accordingly. Therefore, says 
Taşpınar, it is quite normal that there are little differences in their way of 
interpretation. One should note, that Maturidī put more emphasis on the 
intellect („aql) than Ash‟arī did and hence was closer to the Mu‟tazila.290Al-
Maturidī took a middle position between the Mu‟tazila and the Ash‟arī in 
some subjects such as free will (irāda), the attributes of God, and so on.291 
In terms of irāda, what distinguishes al-Maturidī from al-Ash‟arī is the 
insistence of al-Maturidī that “God will lead astray (‟aḍalla) only those who, 
He knows, will choose the wrong way and will guide only those who, He 
knows, will choose the straight path. The initial choice is man‟s, not God‟s as 
it is for al-Ash‟arī.”292 
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Klein introduces the work Ar-rawdah al-bahiyyah, a twelfth century book, in 
which thirteen differences between the Ash‟arī and the Maturidī are 
enumerated: 
 
Question Answer 
 
 Al-Ash‟arī Al-Maturidī 
1. 
When one calls a certain person a believer, 
must one add, „If God wishes?‟ 
Yes No 
2.  
Can a righteous man still be damned, a 
damned person still be saved? 
No Yes 
3.  
Do infidels receive divine favors? No Yes 
4. 
Do deceased prophets continue to exist as 
prophets? 
Undecided Yes 
5. 
Is God‟s „will‟ the same as His „satisfaction‟? Yes Undecided 
6. 
Is blind faith true faith? Undecided Yes 
7. 
„Acquisition‟, on which they differed   
8. 
Can God punish one who obeys Him? Yes No 
9.  
Is our knowledge of God the result of 
revelation or of reason? 
Revelation Reason 
10. 
Are God‟s active attributes eternal, or do they 
come to an end? 
Come to an 
end 
Eternal 
11. 
Is God‟s eternal Word heard, or not? Yes No 
12. 
Can God hold man responsible for what he 
cannot do? 
Yes No 
13. 
The Hanīfites believed that prophets were 
preserved from all sins; the Ash‟arites, that 
they could commit light sins.
293
 
 
  
Figure 1: Difference between Ash‟arῑ and Maturidῑ 
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Klein states that the Ash‟arites in general did not discuss whether deceased 
prophets continue to exist as prophets (4) and whether prophets could 
commit sins (13).294 Furthermore, Klein argues that al-Ash‟arī‟s use of 
tradition in the Ibānah implies that he would have said yes to the question 
whether a righteous man can still be damned, or a damned person still be 
saved (2).295 Klein also corrects the answer given to (5), whether God‟s „will‟ 
is the same as His „satisfaction‟. He indicates that Article XIV of the Maqālāt 
creed shows that al-Ash‟arī in fact answered that question with “no” instead 
of “yes”.296 There is no answer given to the question of „acquisition‟ (7) 
however Klein thinks that al-Maturīdī is the more liberal of the two, hence 
the answers would have been accordingly.297 Finally Klein points out that the 
questions (4), (6), (10), and (13) are discussed rather by later Ash‟arites 
than by al-Ash‟arī himself.298 
3.2.5 Al-Maturidῑ on evil 
In his article on „The uses of Evil in Maturidian thought‟, Pessagno introduces 
his readers to al-Maturidī‟s Kitāb al-Tawhīd, and demonstrates the 
framework built by Maturidī for the confrontation of the problem of evil. 
According to Maturidī, whatever there is accords with wisdom (ḥikmah) and 
is not without purpose. The whole universe is governed by God with wisdom, 
which is defined as knowledgeable, purposeful competency. Wisdom is 
contrasted with folly (safaḥ), i.e. stupidity, the result of ignorance (jahl) 
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which flavors one‟s action with incompetency, meaning that the act 
described as „stupid‟ either works not at all or works wrongly.299  
The next point emphasized by al-Maturidī is, according to Pessagno, the self-
sufficiency of God that he relates with His wisdom. Pessagno does not reveal 
in his article the Arabic word for the „self sufficiency of God‟ to his reader. 
The relation between the two are that God, being self-sufficient, is not in 
need of anything, is in possession of everything, is therefore in control of 
everything and can act in total wisdom. For only an imperfect action 
indicates the lack of wisdom, and an action is imperfect if the owner of that 
action must need at some point. 300 Al-Maturidī seems to use different 
names of God for His self-sufficiency at different places in his Kitāb al-
Tawhīd. At one point, he uses Ghanī301, whereas at another place he prefers 
Rubūbiyyah302 which seems to be closer to what Pessagno relates to. 
As a last step to finalize his framework, al-Maturidī equates wisdom (ḥikmah) 
with fairness („adl). Wisdom, he states, is the attainment of “putting each 
thing in its proper place.”303 Fairness or justice („adl) has the same ability of 
establishing a balance in a cosmological sense, not to be understood merely 
as a structural, but also as a moral designation. Having said that, al-Maturidī 
now equates the two terms which opens the gates to examine evil in the 
context of wisdom instead of human justice.304 
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According to Pessagno, al-Maturidī describes evil as „a thing‟ (shay‟), an 
existent being – everything is created by God, including evil. He says that 
God as the all-wise and all-knowing, wisdom is the attainment of every 
creature. Hence, the acts of the creature have been decreed (qaḍā) by God. 
Accordingly, Pessagno points out, evil must be the result of the divine 
decree, else it could not be at all.305 Taking a look into Kitāb‟ut Tawhīd 
shows, that al-Maturidī has the following explanation on qaḍā:306 
The true nature (ḥaqīqa) of divine decree (qaḍā) is judgment about the thing 
(al-ḥukmu bi‟l-shai‟) and the certain occurrence of that thing in regard to 
what is appropriate for it (wa‟ l-qat‟u „alā mā yalīqu bihī). Sometimes, it may 
refer to the actual creation of a thing for it means the fulfillment of their 
being as they are. As stated in the former sentence, the state of every being 
exactly as they are created. The All-Knowing, who created everything, is the 
owner of judgment and wisdom. Wisdom means the attainment of the true 
nature due to each thing and putting everything in its proper place […] 
accordingly, one may say about the acts of man, that God has created them. 
In other words, God has created them and passed judgment on them. 
Pessagno states that qaḍā is, according to this passage, a metaphysical 
decision concerning the act of existence and the essential structure of each 
thing. He suggests qaḍā be seen as the determinant of the structure of the 
being.307 However, Pessagno seems to understand divine decree (qaḍā) as 
being a two-fold decision: one, that the thing be and two, that it should be 
appropriate to it. From this he concludes, that “the divine decree is 
creational and creative in the primary sense of those terms, i.e., to bring into 
being what was not”.308 This statement might be very confusing, since it 
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indicates that giving an „official permission to an act‟ is equal to „creating the 
act‟. It seems that Pessagno misunderstood al-Maturidī at this point for al-
Maturidī talks about the creation of a thing merely in relation to the 
fulfillment of its being as it is. 309 
Furthermore, al-Maturidī explains qadar as follows: 310 
As for the term qadar, it has two senses. One of them is that it is the divine 
ordinance (al-ḥadd) in accord with which the particular emerges into being, 
i.e., the making (ja„l) of everything as it is, such as good or evil, beauty or 
ugliness, wisdom or ignorance. It is the proper interpretation of wisdom that 
each thing is created as it is, thus attaining for each thing what is most 
appropriate for it… 
The second meaning of qadar is the manifestation (bayān) of that in accord 
with which each thing occurs, such as time and place, truth and falsehood 
and the reward or punishment which is assigned to each happening. The 
tradition handed down on the authority of God‟s Messenger regarding Jibril‟s 
asking him about faith is similar in what it says to one of these meanings. In 
it the Messenger is reported as saying that man‟s good and evil are from God, 
which response is linked with what we have mentioned about qadar. The first 
sense refers to the creation of the thing as it actually is. That refers to the 
acts of man, such as their emergence in a way that their imaginations cannot 
grasp in terms of good and evil, nor their intelligences determine. Thus, it is 
proven that his acts come forth as they do by the power of God. Secondly, it 
is equally impossible that men on their own determine their acts in terms of 
time and place, for the power of their knowledge cannot attain to that either. 
So, for that reason, it is also impossible that the action comes about as it 
does by their own power. Their acts in all these aspects depend on God (wa-
hiya ghairu khārijatin „ani ‟llāh), as He said [in sab‟a, 34.18]: “We have 
determined in their regard the journey…” and [in al-hajar, 15.60]: “…except 
for his wife. We have determined that she indeed is one of those who lag 
behind.” 
Accordingly, the difference between qaḍā and qadar is a very thin line. Qaḍā 
is the decision of that thing to be, and that it should be in a way appropriate 
to it. With help of the quotation above, Pessagno deduces two qualifications 
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of the second meaning of qadar. The former he calls „intrinsic clarification‟, 
stated by al-Maturidī as good-evil, beauty-ugliness, and wisdom-folly. These 
are intrinsic to the divine willing itself and to the nature of the created being, 
inasmuch as the thing is what God wills it to be. The latter Pessagno calls 
„extrinsic clarification‟, defined as the externals of the action with time-place, 
the action‟s relationship to the intellect with truth-falsehood and the 
consequences of the action with reward and punishment.311 Here, Pessagno 
tries to find something to distinguish the first and second sense of qadar and 
he chooses to do so by naming them intrinsic and extrinsic clarification. The 
conclusion Pessagno derives from all this is that 
(1)The creature, in terms of its initial act of existence is dependent radically 
on the divine decree (al-qaḍā); (2) The creature, in terms of its internal 
qualities of good-evil, ugliness-beauty and wisdom-folly, is dependent on 
divine foreordination (qadar) and (3) the creature, specifically in regard to its 
actions in their spatial, temporal, judgmental and eschatological relationships, 
is likewise dependent on divine foreordination (qadar).312 
In Topaloğlu‟s fist Chapter of the Kitāb al-Tawhīd translation, entitled by him 
„Evidence that the Cosmos has One who gave it existence‟, Maturidī offers 
numerous proofs that the cosmos being temporal is not the adequate 
explanation of its own being313. In the second proof, Māturīdī offers a quite 
interesting and unique approach explaining the existence of natural and 
moral evil. Here he states that would the world exist by its own essence, its 
state would not be the most appropriate of all conditions and its attribution 
would not be the most appropriate of any other capacity. The fact, that 
creation is mukhtalifun, different and varying shows that its being is not self-
existent; would the world exist by itself, it would have to create the best of 
all states and the most appropriate of all attributes for itself, which would 
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mean the legitimacy of the cosmos to be creative in all respects. Then, along 
with the cosmos itself, all evil and unpleasant (al-shurūr wa‟ l-qabā‟ih) 314 
would cease to exist. All this shows that creation came about by something 
other than itself (bi-ghairihī), and that „other‟ is God. 315 Here, al-Maturidī 
makes use of the existence of evil to prove the imperfection in creation and 
hence that the universe is not self-existent, i.e. eternal, but that rather it 
exists temporally and that there is a God and that He is the Creator.316  
It is possible to see the same approach of al-Maturidī, confronting the 
question of God‟s oneness317. Giving the example of the combination of 
opposites in every single creation, such as the beneficial and the harmful or 
good and evil, he emphasizes the manifestation of God‟s wisdom and 
indicates God‟s unicity (waḥdāniyya)318. Although there is nothing 
particularly new about explaining God‟s unicity through the theory of the 
combination of opposites, what is new about it, Pessagno points out, is the 
direct mention of the harmful and evil as explicit examples.319  
Clearly, al-Maturidī emphasizes the doctrine of tawḥīd, the oneness of God 
as one of the four main themes within the Qur‟anic message, taking the 
theological inference from the Qur‟an as basis: “There is nothing like Him 
(laisa kamithlihī shai‟un)” and hence states that using the term creator for 
anything else but God does go against the very Qur‟anic teaching. To the 
                                        
314 In Pessagno‟s article on “The Uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought”, the Arabic term al-
shurūr wa‟ l-qabā‟ih is translated as „moral and physical evils‟. Pessagno uses this translation 
within a quotation from Fathalla Kholeif‟s edition of al-Mūturīdī‟s Kitāb al-tawhīd (Beirut: Dar 
al-Machreq, 1970).  
315 Kitābu‟t-Tevhīd, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu, Chapter I. 
316 „The Uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought‟, 73-74. 
317 Ibid., 74. 
318 Nursi makes a difference between waḥdāniyya, wāḥidiyya and aḥadiyya. This will be 
discussed later.  
319 „The Uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought‟, 75. 
 90 
 
question how to deal with God‟s own goodness or evil in willing the 
existence of evil in the world, al-Maturidī, without hesitation states that evil 
is willed by God, though not ordered by Him; for evil is an existing thing 
(mawjūd)320 and nothing exists outside the divine power (qudra). To explain 
this issue further, al-Maturidī makes use of the doctrine of kasb, which 
means that the doing of evil is not God‟s doing it, but man‟s doing. God‟s 
part thereby is to “create the capacity that enables man to perform that 
which he has decided to do.”321 Man, with his intellect, is supposed to decide 
in light of reason and revelation, which is called free choice (ikhtiyār). 
Because there is always the possibility that man‟s choice is not in accord 
with God‟s command, human freedom is preserved. In other words, 
Pessagno lays out, “in man‟s doing evil, God is responsible for the act of 
doing as doing, but man‟s own choice for the doing of evil rather than 
good.”322 
It might be useful to give an example for the better understanding of 
Maturidῑ‟s assertion above. One might imagine a doctor and a murderer. 
Both take a knife and stab another person‟s body with it. The action itself, 
which is created by God, is, in both cases the same. What makes this action 
evil, however, is the intention or choice of the agent. While the doctor 
chooses or intends to save the life of that person, the murderer‟s intention 
or choice is to kill him. In fact, if the person would die in the hands of the 
doctor, he would not be taken accountable for it, since his inclination was 
not evil, but good. 
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Finally, having said that al-Maturidī discusses the problem of evil from the 
point of view of divine uniqueness or wisdom, rather than divine justice, 
which removes the possibility of putting God on trial, Pessagno states that 
evil becomes perfectly capable of being assigned to God. As he puts it, 
“moral evil, which, in this context, means what is done in violation of the 
divine command, is assigned to man‟s decision and subsequent acquisition 
of the action as his own.”323 
3.3 The Theory of Value 
Now, a general outline will be given about the theory of value in a broader 
sense, with use of Hourani‟s Theory of Value324. This is due to the fact that 
the definition of what is good and evil mainly flourished out of the distinction 
between two main types of this theory. 
According to Hourani, in medieval Islam, the early Abbāsid period, the 
nature of values has been highly debated among Islamic intellectuals. The 
Mu‟tazila, on the one side, suggested that values such as justice and 
goodness have a real existence independent of anyone‟s will, including 
God‟s; Hourani calls this view objectivism. On the other hand, the Ash‟arī 
and his followers insisted that all values are determined by the will of God, 
who decides what shall be just and good. Hourani names this theistic or 
divine subjectivism and that it is more commonly known as ethical 
voluntarism.325  Eventually, the Ash‟arite position prevailed and spread 
widely, especially within the ahl al-sunna. The question behind this debate is 
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what the common element is in all that is called good, right and so on; what 
a right action constitutes and how we actually know a right action. 
The objectivist view was common in the western thought before the 
twentieth century. Socrates with his view that piety is loved by the gods 
because it is good in itself as opposed to the notion  that piety is made good 
by the fact that it is loved by the gods, affirmed objectivism; later on it was 
developed by Plato and Aristotle and upheld by Stoics and most of the 
Catholic philosophers in the doctrine of natural right326. Also Kant and other 
utilitarians have accepted the idea of objectivism.327 In Islam, after the 
Mu‟tazila, this idea was mainly supported by philosophers influenced by 
Greek tradition. 
The theory of theistic subjectivism was held by Ash‟arī and all following 
Ash‟arites as well as by Ghazālī. The main critique to theistic subjectivism 
was that “if God had commanded theft and idolatry, it would have been ipso 
facto right for man to commit them.”328  
The Ash‟arites definition of value helped them to circumvent the problem of 
evil. As said previously, theistic subjectivism means that good and evil are 
not intrinsic values but rather something is good or bad because God 
commanded it to be so. But God Himself is beyond right and wrong. 
Therefore, states Hourani, if a person chooses to commit evil, he disobeys 
God‟s commands but God is the commander and not the receiver of 
                                        
326 „Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam‟, 269-78. 
327 Ibid. 
328 For more information about why the Ash‟arī view of theistic subjectivism prevailed, see 
„Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam‟, 269-78. 
 93 
 
commands; it follows therefore, that God is never evil. He creates evil 
without thereby becoming evil Himself.329  
Hourani‟s statement of God creating evil might be misleading since this 
statement is rejected by Ash‟arī. God does not create evil, everything God 
creates is good. Leaman borrows Hourani‟s term „ethical subjectivism‟ and 
offers a slightly different articulation regarding the advantage of the 
subjectivist view. He states that one does not need to bother about whether 
a benevolent God can bring about evil, since nothing in the world brought 
about by God can be called evil. “Evil, after all”, Leaman states, “is defined 
in terms of disobedience to God‟s commands, and he has commanded the 
world to take its particular form, so whatever form it takes cannot 
subsequently be called evil.”330 
The next part will elaborate the views of Ibn Sīnā.331 
3.4 Ibn Sῑnā (Avicenna) 
Shams C. Inati provides successful insights into the issue of evil in his book 
The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sīnā‟s Theodicy. According to Inati, Ibn Sīnā is 
maybe the first Muslim philosopher who has written extensively on the 
problem of evil. Ibn Sīnā‟s theodicy is here divided into three main chapters, 
his „analysis of metaphysical evil‟, his „notion of moral evil‟ and his „solution 
for the problem of evil and the problem of destiny‟. Ibn Sīnā approved many 
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philosophers before him by stating that being (wujūd) is good (khayr) and 
“goodness is being or existence”; the more being or existence something 
has, the more goodness or perfection it entails.332 Respectively, if good is 
being, than evil must be non-being („adam); hence, the less being, the more 
evil.333 However, there is not only one kind of evil for Ibn Sīnā. A second 
kind actually has some sort of being. While Ibn Sīnā names the former 
essential evil (sharr bi dhāt), for him the latter is accidental evil (sharr bil-
„arad). These kinds of evils, according to Ibn Sīnā, are metaphysical evils.  
Essential evil, which, as already said, Ibn Sīnā defines as the privation of 
existence/goodness, is divided in itself into five categories: 1) essential evil 
is privation of being, 2) essential evil is privation of the natural, 3) essential 
evil is identified with disorder, 4) essential evil is evil in all respects, and 5) 
essential evil is uncaused.  
Essential evil as privation of being does not mean absolute privation („adam 
muṭlaq), for this would lead into absolute non-existence. However, evil 
requires some sort of being in order for that being to lack goodness, so that 
one can actually talk of evil.334 Furthermore, the definition of essential evil 
according to Ibn Sīnā is the privation of that which is natural or normal for a 
being. Hence, there are different perfections a being can be missing. Two of 
them, Ibn Sīnā calls „fixed perfections‟: those perfections of power (quwwa) 
and those of actions (af„al). While the privation of the former would lead to 
the cessation of that being‟s existence, the deprivation of the latter does not 
cease its existence, yet does affect that thing‟s well-being. The third kind of 
perfection consists of useful, yet non-natural qualities. 335 
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It is hard to distinguish primary and secondary perfections from each other. 
Therefore it seems important to note that Ibn Sīnā‟s theory of primary and 
secondary perfections needs to be looked at from a body-soul relationship. 
According to Ibn Sīnā, 
the human soul is a separate intelligence, which leads its own spiritual 
existence while being united with the body, it is capable of apprehending 
itself directly […] the being thus apprehended in man , and in every existing 
thing, is not present there of necessity. The essence of „man‟, „horse‟ or 
„stone‟ does not imply the necessity of the existence of a particular man or 
horse. Existence is given to actualized, concrete beings by a Being that differs 
from all of them: it is not one of the essences that have not existence in 
themselves, but its essence is its very being.336 
While primary perfections are directly connected to the soul of a human 
being, secondary perfections are related to the body. Hence, states Inati, 
the non-existence or non-functioning of an eye or the inability of a human 
being to see does not lead to the non-existence of a human being. However, 
if the primary perfection, which is part of the soul – in this case the sight of 
a being is removed, that human being is no more a human being. 337 In 
other words, that human being no longer fulfills the criteria of the mental 
understanding of what a human being is. 
Inati criticizes Ibn Sīnā‟s theory of seeing the body separate from the soul, 
and he states that body and soul are strongly intertwined. This, Inati 
continues, leads to the conclusion that if any organ, which is a secondary 
perfection, is removed from the body the primary perfection also ceases to 
function and hence, indirectly, leads to the cessation of that human being. 
Furthermore, evil has no particular cause for only something that has an 
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external existence can have a cause. Therefore, evil does not occur due to a 
cause but rather evil is the result of the inaction of an agent338.  
Accidental evil (sharr bil-„arad), which has according to Ibn Sīnā some sort of 
being, is divided into two main categories: existing accidental evil and non-
existing accidental evil. Existing accidental evil is anything that withholds or 
destroys the good, such as grief and pain, injustice or adultery, or any 
agents that bring about a privation in the nature of anything. Since existing 
accidental evil has some sort of being, it is good. It is considered to be evil 
only because it causes evil. Acts in themselves are not evil. But if the effect 
of an act has deficiencies that act is called an evil act. Hence, an evil act is 
only called such in relation to the cause receptive to it.339 If something is 
positively real, it is good. Rain, for instance, is good. If it causes harm on 
other beings, it is called „evil‟, even though we know that there is no evil in 
the rain‟s being and that it does not touch it as such.  
Non-existing accidental evil is the lack of a tertiary perfection, a perfection 
that is not necessary for that beings wellbeing or for the whole species. 
According to Inati, “if such perfections exist, they must be over and above 
the perfections that either are (in whole or in part) constitutive of the nature 
of a being or are common features of that nature”340. Hence, the privation of 
such tertiary perfection is not evil with respect to that species, but with 
respect to what that species could have additionally had.341 Examples could 
be the lack of radiant beauty or ignorance of philosophy. A similar example 
would be the lack of knowledge of geometry, which might be evil in respect 
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to a certain individual, but not with respect to the whole species.342 Hence, 
in order for such a privation to be considered evil, there must be a desire of 
an individual, to have knowledge in geometry. For not having that 
knowledge or loosing that knowledge will cause suffering in the individual as 
a result of desiring that goodness.343 Now, Inati states, one could ask the 
question whether one knows before gaining that tertiary perfection, that 
this is a privation one would really miss, or is it something that one misses 
after losing it? In other words, do those tertiary perfections become 
necessary after the goodness of such things have been confirmed to the 
individual? According to Inati, even after the confirmation, those perfections 
remain for Ibn Sīnā tertiary perfections. Such perfections are additional to 
what is necessary for a species.344 
Coming now to the notion of moral evil, according to Ibn Sīnā, evil is 
„acquired‟ by human beings, just as the good is. He explains this using the 
different kind of intellects, such as the „practical‟, „theoretical‟ and „agent‟ 
intellect, which origins can be traced back to the Aristotelian notion of nous 
poietikos345. The „practical‟ intellect seeks knowledge in order to act in 
accordance with the good in its individual body whereas the „theoretical‟ 
intellect is to know the eternal aspects of the universe. The „agent‟ or „active‟ 
intellect („aql al-fa„l), which is the tenth and final intellect to arise through 
the process of emanation, on the other hand, makes it possible for the 
„theoretical‟ intellect to acquire the universals in the purest form; in other 
words, it is a kind of a link between the human and the divine346 
Inati explains that:  
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If the practical intellect is not strong enough to take hold of the desires and 
demands of the body, it is then overruled by these desires and demands. This 
will blind the soul, and render it unfit and unable to receive the light of the 
agent intellect. When this happens it is not possible to go beyond the light of 
imagination, and the road to truth, goodness, and happiness is then closed. 
With that, the life of ignorance, that is, the life of evil, prevails.347 
Ibn Sīnā suggests some solutions to the problem of evil, so to say; he tries 
to reconcile the presence of evil with the absolute goodness of God and all 
His other absolute attributes and names. 
First of all, from a providential aspect God knows the order, the perfect 
place of every being and their interconnection. In fact, Leaman states, 
according to Ibn Sīnā, the only sort of knowledge applicable to God is 
universal and necessary knowledge, not contingent and particular knowledge. 
Leaman states that according to Ibn Sīnā, God can know everything that 
comes into the category of theoretical knowledge, such as abstract principles 
which lie behind the construction of the world and the movements of the 
spheres; but it is pointless to think of Him coming to know the very minor 
and uninteresting facts of our daily lives.348 God‟s reflection on something is 
the production of that thing. Everything that emanates from God is good, 
however only to the extent of that thing‟s possibility, for nothing but God 
can be absolutely good. Furthermore, God is pleased with the order of the 
good. However, “its coming into existence has nothing to do with whether 
God is pleased with it, but is the unavoidable consequence of God‟s 
knowledge of, and reflections on, the order. Thus the order that emanates is 
nothing but a manifestation of the order known by God – in fact; it is an 
exact copy of that order. Hence, the existent corresponds to the known.”349  
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Secondly, according to Ibn Sīnā, there is more good than evil in the Universe. 
While evil occurs on earth, which is small compared to the universe, evil 
does not strike a whole species, but mostly individuals; not all individuals 
and only at certain times. Even if someone would say that evil is 
predominant, Ibn Sīnā reminds us that there is a difference between 
numerous and predominant. Evil is not predominant on this earth, but it may 
be widespread. Furthermore, secondary and tertiary evils are not something 
to be concerned with, since this kind of evil has not much relevance to 
theodicy.350  Inati criticizes Ibn Sīnā‟s view that evil exists only within the 
sublunary (earthly) sphere which is small in relation to the whole universe 
and argues that since there is motion in the universe, there must be some 
sort of imperfection and hence evil within the celestial sphere as well351. 
Inati does not seem to make any difference between imperfection and evil; 
he uses these terms interchangeably at many places. According to him, 
there is an ambiguity within the teaching of Ibn Sīna – although Ibn Sīna 
describes all celestial intelligences as pure goods (because free from any 
kind of matter), he also states that anything apart from God is possible in 
existence and hence not a pure good.352 If Inati has understood Ibn Sīna 
rightly, his objection seems to be justified. 
Another way for Ibn Sīnā to seek for a solution for the problem of evil is the 
common statement that evil is a necessary consequence of the good. That 
means, to bring about good causes implies the existence of causes that 
accidentally lead to evil.  Very similar to this is the notion of evil being a 
necessary means for the good, also used by Ibn Sīnā as the fourth 
argument. Accordingly, God is always concerned with the whole for the 
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notion of evil is relative to the being that is harmed by it. For some, it might 
be indifferent and for others even good. But for the whole of the world, it is 
always good.353 To the argument, that evil is willed by God, Ibn Sīnā tends 
to say that God does not will evil as such; He is aware of its presence but He 
minds it not because he knows it is necessary. Inati criticizes this argument 
by saying that God could have made humans such that they eat only earth 
and drink only water and that they take all necessary vitamins, minerals and 
proteins from these two without having to kill other beings and produce evil 
in order to continue with living. What seems to be missing from Inati‟s 
exposition is the understanding, that death is not necessarily evil and that 
the purpose of other being‟s creation might be to serve human beings in 
their survival; which would mean that these creatures are merely doing what 
they are meant to do by God. 
Ibn Rushd‟s approach to the problem of evil is in many ways different from 
that of Ibn Sīnā. Being very well known among philosophers in the western 
world, it will be interesting to look into his way of trying to find solutions for 
the problem of evil. 
3.5 Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 
Ibn Rushd, known in the West as Averroes (1126 - 1198), whose education 
was grounded on the Maliki approach to jurisprudence and whose 
introduction to theology had an Ash‟arite perspective, nevertheless was a 
defender of objectivism354; he rejected the idea that God was beyond good 
and evil; since for him, anyone is evil when he does certain types of acts or 
creates things which are evil in character. Thus, according to Ibn Rushd, this 
                                        
353 ibid., 145. 
354 Averroes and his Philosophy, 4, 154; see also George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition 
in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 250. 
 101 
 
qualification of evil also applied to God and was therefore a problem for him 
which he tried to avoid in certain ways.  
One way for Ibn Rushd to find out why a perfect God would create any kind 
of evil, was to consider Zoroastrian dualism, which he eventually rejected. 
This is obviously due to the fact that dualism suggested associationism, 
which is not acceptable to any Muslim. Ibn Rushd, just as the Mu‟tazila, also 
rejected the idea that good and evil is created by God and that He is the 
cause of both.355 This idea might have emerged due to an excessive 
sensitivity towards God, wanting to exonerate Him from any guilt and defect.  
Ibn Rushd found the answer to the question in early Platonism. According to 
Ibn Rushd, evil existed not because of God but because of the very 
existence of matter itself. Hence, existence is possible only under two 
conditions: either things, to whose existence evil is attached should not exist 
or they should exist in this condition, since more than that is not possible in 
their existence.356 Ibn Rushd uses this explanation for the existence of 
[natural] evils (ashrār), such as decay, age, etc.357, which shows that Ibn 
Rushd regarded decay and age as evil. For a Muslim philosopher this view 
brings along the difficulty that it implies God‟s omnipotence being limited. 
For one could say that God was not able to create a world completely free of 
any kind of evil. Yet, Leaman defends Ibn Rushd by making clear that Ibd 
Rushd‟s suggestion is not a specifically Platonic doctrine but rather that it is 
based on the idea that whatever has a material content is corruptible, and 
whatever is corruptible will at some point be corrupted.358 This view goes 
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back to Aristotle, according to whom the generation of one substance 
involves the destruction of another, so that the matter which was in the 
thing which was destroyed moves to the thing which is created.359 Hence, 
states Leaman, “the account which Ibn Rushd provides to reconcile God‟s 
goodness with the evil in the world does not presuppose a Platonic belief in 
the necessity of an evil nature, but rather an Aristotelian account of change 
and corruptibility.”360   
The other way of seeking a solution to the problem of evil was according to 
Ibn Rushd related to divine and human justice and the All-knowing God. The 
question at this point is how a just God could create man and be the cause 
of man‟s acts knowing that man would do injustice on earth and then suffer 
for it? In other words, why would God make man suffer for acts for which 
man is not ultimately responsible? Again as an objectivist, Ibn Rushd 
believed in the intrinsic justice of God. He asserts that all substances have 
natures which define them and their ends. The purpose of a knife, for 
instance, is to cut or the purpose of a tree is to reach a certain level of 
growth. Hence, there must be a purpose of a human being for a human 
being is also a substance. Leaman states, that according to Ibn Rushd, the 
ultimate aim of a human being is to be happy and to avoid misery.361 
According to him, happiness and misery of the soul in this world were 
natural effects of human action, rather than a reward or punishment of God. 
This is, because Ibn Rushd did not believe in the survival of each individual 
soul in the next life, but he believed in the unity of parts of the soul in the 
world-soul.362 Furthermore, man‟s moral actions affect not only the individual, 
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but the happiness of the whole community, as a whole and as a species. 
Hence, man‟s misery might not follow him in the afterlife but may well follow 
the community. The importance of belief in an afterlife, according to Ibn 
Rushd, could be taken as an indication of the wider terms of reference of 
moral action.363 
To the question whether God causes human injustice, Ibn Rushd discusses 
his theory of human free will (irāda) and its relation to divine will. He starts 
with the principle that choice (ikhtiyār) is a condition of human obligation. 
The fact that man is under obligation leads to the other fact that man must 
have choice. In this respect, Ibn Rushd goes against the Jabriyya, the 
Ash‟arites and even the Mu‟tazila by comparing volitional acts with compelled 
acts. Humans will their own acts and those acts come about through an 
operation of the agent‟s mind, he states, whereas compelled acts come 
about through external forces bringing about the act directly.364 Thus, Ibn 
Rushd is an advocate of free will and the cause of injustice is not God but 
rather the agent‟s mind. However, Ibn Rushd is not happy with the 
Mu‟tazila‟s view of complete free will, since it undermines God‟s power by 
stating that human is the creator of evil, and not God. Therefore he prefers 
to propose a middle solution which includes man‟s obligation and God‟s 
creation, in other words a cooperation of human and divine free will, which 
draws him nearer to the Ash‟arite view. However, Hourani states, if 
examined closer, he eventually gives the ultimate decision to God, “through 
a theory of complete determination of human acts.”365 If one believes in 
what Hourani states at the latter, then Ibn Rushd at this point chooses to be 
in line with the view of Jabriyya. After quoting the verse of the Qur‟an „He 
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leads astray whom He will, and guides whom He will‟ [Ibrahim, 14:4], Ibn 
Rushd claims that this verse should not be understood in the most common 
sense that God leads astray certain individuals. Rather, Hourani states, Ibn 
Rushd‟s interpretation of this verse is addressed by his doctrine of 
providence which states that providence does not extend to particulars but 
only to species. Hence, God has created a species among which a certain 
number of unknown individuals would go astray, and a certain number 
would not.366 And to the question why God created a species that would 
include people going astray instead of creating species that are completely 
free of any injustice, Ibn Rushd answers that “God chose to create a 
minority of bad natures for the sake of the majority of good ones; and this 
was made necessary by „the natural elements (tabī‟a) from which He created 
man and the composition (tarkīb) in which man was formed.‟ The only 
alternative would have been not to create man at all, and that would have 
meant renouncing the greater good.”367 
Leaman states that Ibn Rushd is aware of the Qur‟anic statements that God 
knows our thoughts, and everything happening in the world, and that no 
leaf falls without Him noticing it. Knowing every petty phenomena, He will 
certainly know all actions of every individual. Yet as a person being strongly 
influenced by Aristotle, it must be noticed that Aristotle‟s God seems to be 
unconcerned with many everyday events. So to say, God has knowledge 
over important issues, but the fact that “God is immutable and unaffected by 
matter, pure actuality without any kind of potentiality” will lead to the 
assumption that He is unresponsive about the events in the world of creation 
and corruption. 368 In other words, Ibn Rushd seems to share the view of Ibn 
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Sīnā that God does not know the particulars or at least, that He is 
unresponsive in this matter. 
A second problem pointed out by Leaman is the principle that the object of 
knowledge is identified with the intellect of the knower. This principle would 
closely connect God with the objects of the world of creation and corruption. 
However, God “must be separate from creation in status, and not appear to 
be like a very clever and well-informed natural being. Averroes in fact 
accused the theologians of making God out to be nothing more than an 
„eternal‟ man.”369  
 Being an opponent of both Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, and defending the 
traditional view of the ahl al-sunnah, Ghazālī fought against the Greek 
influence on Islam. Special attention will be given to the views of Imam 
Ghazālī, since Said Nursi credited the work of Imam Ghazālī highly and was 
influenced by this remarkable scholar. 
3.6 Al-Ghazālῑ 
Al Ghazālī (1058-1111), as an Ash‟arite, presented an understanding of the 
shari‟a which places the power and influence of God over all things.370 This 
emphasis leads to the abandonment of the objectivity of causality, ethics 
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and the world as an eternal entity.371  Furthermore, Ghazālī strongly rejects 
the idea advocated by philosophers like Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, that God 
has knowledge over only universal and important issues, and that it is 
unnecessary for God to know minor issues such as the actions of every 
individual.372 Ghazālī denounces this position as heresy and points out his 
argument as quoted by Leaman:  
this principle implies that God cannot know whether Zaid obeys or disobeys 
him, since God cannot know any new occurrences that happen to Zaid, as he 
does not now the individual Zaid… he cannot know that Zaid becomes a 
heretic or a true believer, for he can only know the unbelief and the belief of 
man in general, not as instantiated into individuals. God can even not know 
Muhammad‟s proclaiming himself prophet at the time he did.373 
The definition of goodness (ḥasan) made by Ghazālī is twofold: one is a 
technical explanation which means whatever is fitting for any end in this life. 
The other is what is fitting only for the ends of the next life. The latter is 
more important and has been focused on by the ahl al-sunnah. It is also 
important to note that reference is made here to the ends of the agent. As a 
follower of theistic subjectivism, Ghazālī believes that all God‟s acts are 
called good (ḥasan), but that they have no effect on Him and have no 
personal end.374 
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Evil (qabīḥ as it is translated by Hourani) is defined as whatever is repugnant 
or improper to an end, again meaning the end of the agent. Hourani points 
out that the Mu‟tazila had objected that the meaning of good and evil is not 
necessarily restricted to what promotes an end or to what hinders 
accomplishment of an end.375 For people might do things that are not in any 
ways advantageous to their ends; or they might avoid other acts of evil even 
if they see no disadvantage to themselves. So an individual might help and 
comfort a dying person only because he believes that this is intrinsically the 
right and good thing to do. Similarly, an unbeliever and hence a person 
without fear of an afterlife punishment, might refuse to break a contract, 
even under threat of execution for his refusal. This person regards breaking 
a contract as evil not only in relation to ends, but avoids it as an intrinsic 
evil.376 Ghazālī‟s answer to this objection is mainly to avoid the doctrine that 
attributes of good and evil are intrinsic to the acts themselves, in other 
words, to avoid the objectivist view. Hence he gives examples showing the 
self-interest of the individuals or emotional causes for the acts mentioned 
above.377 
Hourani further states that according to Ghazālī, God has no needs and the 
reason he created the world is to reveal His power and to realize His will. It 
is important to note that these ends are no benefits or advantages for Him. 
God cannot do wrong (ẓulm) for by definition, wrongdoing consists in 
dealing unjustly with the property of others. But God is the owner of 
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everything and nobody is in possession of anything God could deal unjustly 
with.378  
Hourani quotes Ghazālī from the opening passage of Iqtisād, Part 3, as 
follows: 
The totality of acts of the Exalted is admissible (jā‟iza) and none of them is 
describable as „necessary‟. We assert seven things in this part. 
We assert [1] that it is admissible for God the Exalted not to impose 
obligations (yukallifu) on His servants, as well as [2] to impose on them 
unachievable obligations, [3] to cause pain to His servants without 
compensation and without [preceding] offence [by them]; [4] that it is not 
necessary for Him to heed what is most advantageous for them, or [5] to 
reward obedience or punish disobedience… and [7] that it is not necessary 
for God the Exalted to send prophets, and if He does send them it is not evil 
or absurd, but He is able to show their truthfulness by a miracle. All these 
assertions are based on investigation of the meaning of wājib, hasan and 
qabīh. 
In his discourse with the Mu‟tazilite objection to the points mentioned above, 
Ghazālī explains the third one that God, if He wills, can cause pain to His 
servants, as something quite usual: He can do so, since He does it all the 
time and He is under no necessity not to do so because necessity does not 
apply to God. Furthermore doing so does not turn God into a wrongdoer 
since, as said before, a wrongdoer is someone who deals with another 
person‟s property without any law or command.379  
Hourani emphasizes that according to Ghazālī‟s viewpoint, human “acts do 
not cause virtues as we see in Aristotle‟s doctrine of habituation. Acts do not 
cause rewards in the next life. Virtues do not cause rewards, as they do in 
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Hindu karma or in Ibn Sīnā‟s eschatology. In all cases the rewards or the 
moral progress are bestowed by God through His grace.”380 
The issue of moral evil leads again to the topic of qadar and qaḍā. 
Abrahamov states that according to Ghazālī the issue of qadar is slippery 
and has misled many people. Traditionally, he prohibits against dealing with 
this matter those who study it for the sake of discussion and contest (bi‟l 
bahth wa‟l jidāl). Ghazālī‟s view on qadar and qaḍā is in accordance with 
Ash‟arī; those who are not satisfied with merely devotion should believe 
what Abu Hanīfa and his adherents say about this matter. “Namely that it is 
God‟s action that creates power in man (ihdāth al-istitā‟a fi‟l allah) while 
man‟s action consists using the power created (wa‟isti‟māl al-istitā‟a al-
muhadatha fi‟l al-„abd) ... These are the two basic components of the 
doctrine of acquisition (kasb).”381  
In fact, Ghazāī explains the doctrine of acquisition in his Ihyā, in the chapter 
on the Oneness of and Trust in God (tawḥīd wa tawakkul).  Ghazālī answers 
the question, how a person can be compelled and autonomous at the same 
time. For this, he states, one first need to understand the meaning of free 
will (irāda) and maybe also the difference between will and choice (irāda wa 
ikhtiyār). Free will is dependent on the knowledge that teaches man what is 
good for him. If someone tries to prick one‟s eye with a needle or if 
someone is attacked with a sword, that person‟s knowledge teaches him 
undoubtedly, that it is better for him to avert from this situation. Hence, free 
will comes into action through knowledge, and power awakens through free 
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will. Eyes close suddenly to prevent the prick of a needle and hands start 
moving to avoid the harm of a sword. All this happens instinctively, albeit 
through free will.382 Hence, free will (irāda) is the power to incline towards 
one side whereas free choice (ikhtiyār) is the freedom of a person to favor 
one action over another or to choose whether to act or not. In other words, 
irāda is a more general term whereas ikhtiyār is more specific.  
Ghazālī states, to choose the better between two goods or the worse 
between two bad can happen only through the intellect („aql). Free will can 
come about only through the certain judgment of a person‟s feelings, 
imagination or intellect. That is why it is mostly impossible for a person to 
cut his own throat. This impossibility, however, does not mean that that 
person lacks power or has no knife. It means that that person is missing free 
will, which directs and invites power. The reason for the lack of free will is 
that it occurs through the influence of the intellect or the feeling that tells 
him that not killing oneself is the better action to do.  Therefore is suicide for 
a person not the appropriate thing to do, unless that person is in the midst 
of an unbearable pain or penalty. In this case, says Ghazālī, the intellect 
pauses for a moment and thinks of what the lesser evil is. If the intellect 
decides that killing oneself is the lesser evil, and if this decision is definite, 
and if there are no obstacles, free will and power will go into action and the 
person will commit suicide.383  
Ghazālī states that free will obeys the judgment of the intellect and wisdom. 
When someone with a stick chases a person, that person runs until he is at 
the edge of a roof. Suddenly, his intellect tells him that being hit with the 
stick is better or easier than jumping from that roof. All his limbs stop 
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moving, hence his power obeys the “caller of free will” and motion obeys 
power. This shows that all of these are compulsorily ordained for mankind 
without his knowledge. Hence, he is also compelled in regards of his free 
choice (ikhtiyār). Man is merely the center of implementation. This means 
that another guides man‟s will and strength, at all times. A man is the 
intermediary of God‟s will and power flow. For example, the burning of fire is 
pure compulsion. The act of God is absolute free choice (ikhtiyār). Man‟s act 
lays between those two for man is compelled with free choice. Therefore, 
people of truth have searched for a third term and have called this state 
kasb or acquisition. Acquisition is neither contrary to compulsion, nor 
contrary to free choice: it unites the two.384  
After explaining Ghazālī‟s view and proofs on qadar and qaḍā and that 
everything in this world is due to God‟s will, Abrahamov criticizes that 
Ghazālī does not answer the question of why man should act if things are 
predetermined by God. Additionally, according to Abrahamov, Ghazālī‟s view 
of causality leaves no room for man‟s free choice (ikhtiyār).385 Despite  
Abrahamov‟s opinion, Ghazālī writes about two different kinds of proofs 
regarding God‟s determination (taqdīr) of human actions. One is the proof 
based on transmission (naqlī) and the other rational („aqlī) proofs.386 For the 
former one, Ghazālī makes use of several verses of the Qur‟an387 and based 
on these he suggests that although the action of man is his own acquisition 
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(kasb), it will not be beyond God‟s will (murād allāhu)388. Regarding the 
rational proof, Ghazālī suggests that if sins (ma„āsī) and moral evils (jarāim) 
are left out of God‟s will (irāda) and are given to the will of God‟s enemy 
Iblīs, this would lead to the increase of actions consistent with the enemy‟s 
will. In fact, the actions consistent with the will of the enemy would be more 
than actions consistent with God‟s will.389 Ghazālī says further that nobody 
would accept the presidency of someone whose enemy is more efficacious. 
According to the innovator (mubtadi‟ah), states Ghazālī, all sins are against 
God‟s will (irāda). God, who is the governor of the universe, is beyond and 
above weakness („ajz) and incapability (ḍa‟f). Ghazālī also points out that 
God has consent for goodness (khayr) and no consent for evil (sharr).390 
To the critique of Abrahamov mentioned above, there is a similar question 
Ghazālī rhetorically asks: considering that as God wills good, so He also wills 
evil; why is it then that God forbids what He wills and what He doesn‟t wills 
He commands?391 To give an example: God forbids unbelief, but at the same 
time He wills (murād) it, on the other hand, God commands prayer although 
there are people who do not practice that command, which means that God 
wills it not. What does all of this mean? Ghazālī states that command and 
will (irāda) are two different things. To show how they differ, Ghazālī uses 
the following example: A Lord who beats his servant because of his 
disobedience, is called for punishment (ta‟dhīr) by the Sultan. To show the 
servant‟s disobedience, he commands him in presence of the Sultan: “saddle 
that horse”. He does not really want the servant to saddle the horse. His aim 
is merely to show the servant‟s disobedience. For if he would not be able to 
                                        
388 Al-Ghazālī. Ihyāu „Ulūmi‟d-Dīn, Kitābu Kavāidi‟l-Akāid, Rub‟u‟l-Ibādāt, 284. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid.  
391 Ibid. 
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proof the situation to the Sultan, his excuse would not be accepted. Just like 
this example, to show the disobedience of His servants, God can command 
what he wills not.392 
3.7 Conclusion 
As elucidated in this chapter, there has been a variety of answers and 
explanations on how to reconcile God‟s attributes with the existence of evil. 
Not only has the term been divided into different categories such as „natural‟ 
and „moral‟ and examined thoroughly – on the „moral‟ aspect there has been 
extensive discussions on the responsibility of humanity for their actions, on 
irāda (free will), qadar (divine will) and qaḍā (divine decree). By doing this, 
some did depart from the ahl al-sunnah whereas others did stay within those 
boundaries.  
What is common in all is the complexity and deepness of the issue at hand. 
It is indeed hard to understand God‟s plan and ḥikmah behind every 
situation. In fact, it seems to be impossible to ever really understand God‟s 
intentions and wisdom. Despite all the ideas and viewpoints of the different 
scholars and philosophers mentioned in this chapter, in conclusion, the main 
aspect sill remains: Is „evil‟ as it is seen by humans really equal to „sharr‟ as 
it is explained in the Qur‟ān?  
Furthermore, there is the presumption in nearly every thought that evil 
exists and the solutions offered are therefore accordingly – trying to justify 
the existence of evil in many different ways. For many, evil is real, it can be 
felt and people go through it in pain and grief, such as the powerful critique 
                                        
392 Ibid. 
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of Ivan in Fyodor Dostoyevsky‟s novel.393  However, it seems that starting at 
the wrong end of the problem makes it all more complex and difficult.   
The following chapters will elaborate on how Said Nursi has understood 
sharr and whether for him sharr is existent. All other issues on ḥikmah, irāda, 
qadar and qaḍa will be discussed after Nursi‟s understanding of the quiddity 
of sharr in the light of the Qur‟ān has been introduced and examined. The 
next part is a bridging chapter on Said Nursi, his life in relation to the 
apparent „evils‟ he went through by constant imprisonments and his answers 
to these in his letters. 
  
                                        
393 Fyodor Dostoyevsky. The Brothers Karamazov (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1958, 
reissued in one volume, 1982), 283. 
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4 Short Biography on Said Nursi 
 
This chapter will give a short outline of the life of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. It 
will furthermore provide a general, chronological overview of his works. The 
aim in this chapter, however, is not to offer the reader an ordinary 
biography. Instead, the life of Nursi will be examined in the light of events 
that happened to him that might be considered negative, or even „evil‟. It 
will be interesting to see the response of Nursi to these events throughout 
his life. Moreover, this will constitute a practical example and maybe a 
certain form of application into one‟s life; in other words, a tangible example 
of how to respond to apparent evils in one‟s life that touches one directly. 
4.1 Said Nursi’s Life 
Said Nursi (1877 - 1960) was born in the village Nurs, in Bitlis, one of the 
Eastern Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which is today a city in eastern 
Turkey. He was the son of a farmer, both parents were devout Muslims.394 
He started with his studies in 1886 and studied in a series of schools 
(madrasas). In contrast to other religious scholars of his time, Nursi studied 
physical and mathematical sciences, which he concluded with a study in 
philosophy. He believed strongly that Islamic Theology (kalām) could be 
renewed and could successfully answer the attacks the Qur‟an and Islam 
were subject to, but only through bringing together different educational 
traditions.395 In a remarkably short time, he was aware of many religious 
                                        
394 Sükran Vahide. The Author of the Risale-i Nur Collection: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi 
(Istanbul: Sözler Neşriyat, 2000), 3. 
395 Sükran Vahide. „A Chronology of Said Nursi‟s Life‟ in Islam at the Crossroads, ed. Ibrahim 
Abu Rabi (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), xvii. 
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and modern sciences in such a way that he was able to compete with very 
important savants („ulama) at that time. He became a teacher and 
educational reformer.396 What makes the figure of Said Nursi so important is 
the fact that he lived through the time of constitutionalism. This is due to 
the fact that he defined and explained the importance of constitutional 
monarchy (mashrūtiyya mashrū‟a)397 in Eastern Turkey to the people, tribes 
and religious scholars to make them understand constitutionalism, 
emphasizing their conformity with the Islamic shari‟ah and the importance of 
building bridges with the folk.398 He began to work as a mediator in tribal 
disputes and traveled among the tribes as a person of religion. 
Nursi was deeply involved in public life, and put forward his ideas regarding 
educational reform, unity, constitutional monarchy (mashrūtiyya mashrū‟a), 
etc. in newspaper articles. He was active in the Ittihad-ı Muhammedī 
(Muhammadan union or society for Muslim Unity).399 
Nursi volunteered as a commander in the military on behalf of the Ottoman 
Empire in the First World War, and during his fight at the front against the 
Russians he wrote a commentary on the Qur‟an called Signs of 
Miraculousness (Isharāt al-I‟jaz).400 This was only one of the many 
commentaries and books he would write in the following years. After 
spending two years as a prisoner of war in Russia he escaped and came 
                                        
396 The Author of the Risale-i Nur Collection, 12.  
397 Nursi‟s understanding of freedom is a freedom that is conform to the norms of shari‟a 
(mashrūtiyya mashrū‟a). In that sense, Nursi believes that freedom (mashrūtiyya) is justice 
and shari‟a. See Said Nursi. „Divan-ı Harb-ı Örfī‟ in Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1921, (own 
translation); Nursi further explaines freedom‟s characteristic as neither harming one’s own 
soul (nafs) nor others. This kind of freedom, Nursi believes to be apart from an 
understanding of freedom that allows any kind of abject pleasures (safāha) as long as one 
does not harm others.  See also „Münazarat‟ in Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1941.  
398 The fruit of his endeavors is his work called the Münazarat, which Nursi composed in 
1911 as answers to the questions of the tribes in Eastern Turkey.  
399 Sükran Vahide. „A Chronology of Said Nursi‟s Life‟, xvii. 
400 The Author of the Risale-i Nur Collection, 125. 
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back to Istanbul.401 In 1922, after repeated invitations from the leaders of 
the new centre of government, Nursi finally left Istanbul for Ankara. He 
turned down the offer of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to work in the government 
of the new Republic of Turkey. In 1925 the Shaykh Said Revolt took place.402 
Although Nursi was invited to join this rebellion against the Ankara 
government, he strongly advised its leaders to give it up.403 Nevertheless he 
was also sent into exile in western Anatolia for the next twenty-five years. 
During this period Nursi started devoting himself to expounding the Qur‟ān 
and writing the Risale-i Nur, a work of approximately six thousand pages. 
It is also important to note what kind of thought influenced Nursi. He 
belonged to the scholarly tradition and was firmly grounded in classical 
Islamic scholarship. Despite some views that he might have been largely 
influenced by and attracted to Sufism, because of the Sufi environment he 
grew up in, Şükran Vahide states that there is no evidence of its influence in 
the works of the first period of his life. This, however, does not mean that 
he did not find guidance from Sufi masters. He attended madrasas directed 
by „ulama and Sufi shaykhs during his childhood, the majority of whom were 
members of the Naqshibandī (Khālidī) order; however, he never joined any 
of those orders.404 During a period of spiritual crisis of Nursi, when he 
withdrew from society, he found what he was searching for in the writings of 
                                        
401 The Author of the Risale-i Nur Collection, 119. 
402 The Shaykh Said Revolt is called after a Naqshibandi Shaykh named Shaykh Said of Palu, 
who was the leader of the revolt. See The Author of the Risale-i Nur Collection, 191, see 
also Mehmet S. Kaya. The Zaza Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern Minority in a Globalized 
Society (I.B. Tauris, 2011), 64. 
403 See Sahiner, N. Bilinmeyen Taraflarıyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Istanbul, 1990), 254-5. 
Whether Nursi has really written a letter to Shaykh Said in order to persuade him against a 
rebellion is questioned. While some believe that this was rather a Turkish nationalist reading 
among the followers of Nursi, witnesses assert that this incident is true and that Nursi‟s 
endeavors prevented many from joining the rebellion, thus saving thousands of lives.   
404 Said Nursi. Sikke-i Tasdik-i Gaybī (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaasi, 1960), 116. 
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„Abd al-Qādir Geylānī.405 Moreover, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī (1563-1624), also 
known as Imam Rabbānī, a Sufi master, was instrumental in his eventual 
finding guidance.406 Nevertheless, all of this did not lead him to Sufism but 
rather to the Qur‟ān.407 Nursi himself states his standpoint, which is also 
cited and translated by Şükran Vahide, in the following way:  
Through their good works, worship, spiritual journeying, and asceticism, the 
people of sainthood observed reality and the truths of belief from behind 
veils. The Risale however has opened up a way to reality within knowledge 
(„ilm) in place of worship; it has opened up a way to the essence of reality 
through logical proofs and scholarly arguments in place of spiritual journeying 
and recitations; it has opened up a direct way of „grater sainthood‟ within the 
sciences of kalām and „aqida and usul al-din in place of the sciences of Sufism 
and the tariqa and thus it prevails over the misguided philosophical currents 
that have defeated the tariqa and Sufi movements of this century.408 
There are some major cornerstones that should be mentioned within the life 
of Said Nursi. The first cornerstone is his eagerness for reform in madrasas. 
He was unsatisfied with the education system and developed new ideas, 
such as bringing together modern secular schools, religious schools and Sufi 
tekkes, which was a unique idea at that time.409 Another turning point in his 
life happened when he learned from a newspaper that “the British in the 
person of Gladstone had declared open war on the Qur‟ān as the chief 
obstacle to their imperialist ideas.”410 This was the moment when he decided 
                                        
405 Şükran Vahide, Islam in Modern Turkey, An Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman Said 
Nursi (New York: SUNY Press, 2005), 165. 
406 Ibid. 
407 „A Chronology of Said Nursi‟s Life‟, 2-4; Islam in Modern Turkey, 165-6; The Author of 
the Risale-i Nur Collection: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 168.  
408Said Nursi, „Emirdağ Lahikası‟ in Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol.2 (Istanbul: Yeni Asya 
Publications, 1996), 1715-1716. 
409 Abu-Rabi‟, Islam at the Crossroads, 7-8. 
410 Ibid., 5. There is no historical evidence, to the author‟s knowledge, that Gladstone has 
said this. However, in a weekly review of politics, literature and art called The New Age, 
dated March 20, 1919, Marmaduke Pickthall quotes Gladstone in his article „The Perils of a 
Propaganda‟. In his article, Pickthall writes as follows: “…It is true that Mr. Gladstone, the 
ecclesiastically-minded, once so far forgot decorum as to declare that so long as there were 
followers of that “accursed book” (the Koran), Europe would know no peace – a strange 
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to take the miraculousness of the Qur‟ān as his guide and teacher and 
dedicate his life to its service. His inner journey and spiritual search was set 
off through his contemplation of death and the overwhelming realization of 
his own age. 
4.2 Said Nursi’s Method 
First of all, it might be important to stress that there is no methodology in 
religious studies that is similar to that of natural and social sciences, because 
the study of religion is in some ways an act of trust in an authority. As 
McIntyre states in his work After Virtue, during the enlightenment, faith in 
God has been undermined and moral values have been distorted. Reason 
has become the most important aspect in acquiring knowledge – in fact, 
complete certainty was required.411 Nursi‟s methodology does not depend 
merely on reason. According to Bilal Kuşpınar, Nursi‟s epistemological 
evaluation of arguments is firstly, reason-based (nazar-ı aqlῑ), in other words, 
it is a logical presentation and argumentation of the existence and unity of 
God, of eschatology, prophethood, divine and social justice, the cosmos, as 
well as theoretical and existential theology. The cosmological and aesthetic 
arguments could count as such. Secondly, his epistemological evaluation of 
arguments is revelation-based (wahyῑ), that is, dependent, in direct relation 
with, and based on the Qur‟ān. Thirdly, authority-based, that is, according to 
transmission (hadῑth); fourthly, experimental-sensory (ḥissῑ); fifthly, 
experiential-self-developed (tajrubῑ/haqq al-yaqῑn) and lastly, heart-centered 
                                                                                                               
inversion of the truth at a time when Christendom allowed no peace to followers of that 
Book in which I find this statement among others to the same effect …” See Marmaduke 
Pickthall. „The Perils of a Propaganda‟ in The New Age, Vol. XXIV, No. 20 (Thursday, March 
20, 1919) This article, although not directly a source from Gladstone, may serve as an 
evidence for such a historical event, especially given the fact that this article has been 
written in 1919. 
411 Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, see chapter five. 
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(hadsῑ wa kashfῑ).412 The last three types of evaluation are rather personal, 
thus, it is hard for the reader to always empathize with Nursi on these, 
especially if one is not on the same spiritual and sensual level. These 
arguments, however, in a way recover the pre-modern way of knowing and 
offer a new way of argumentation which is rather tradition-constituted.  
In his works, Nursi uses certain methods to explain verses of the Qur‟an in a 
way that can be understood by people of various educational levels. His 
target is neither the „elite‟ or the academics, nor only the lay people.  
First of all, what can be seen throughout his works is that he sees the 
universe as a book. He uses this metaphor very often and one has to keep 
this constantly in mind while reading the Risale-i Nur. The universe needs to 
be „read‟ and understood as one of the three evidences413 of God‟s 
existence;414 the other two being the Qur‟ān and the Messenger sent by God. 
Adopting this approach, one will be able to regard beings for the meaning 
they signify (mānā-i ḥarfῑ), which also can transform the physical sciences 
into knowledge of God, and impel them towards their true goal.415  
Another method Nursi uses in his Risale-i Nur is the method of allegory and 
the explanation of unclear and unfamiliar truths in an easily accessible 
manner. This approach of allegorical comparisons (qiyas tamsῑlῑ) is 
essentially Qur‟anic, since the Qur‟ān uses a similar way of communication. 
Nursi explains this method as follows: 
                                        
412 Notes from a presentation delivered by Bilal Kuşpınar on the methodology of the Risale-i 
Nur Collection at the Third International Young Academics Conference in Istanbul (18-19 
June, 2011), organized by The Istanbul Foundation for Science and Culture.  
413 Nursi uses the word „proof‟ in his works not in the classical meaning as philosophical or 
scientific proof, but rather to emphasize that his explanations on i.e. the existence of God or 
the hereafter are very compelling and convincing. Colin Turner tackled this issue in his 
recently published book The Qur‟an Revealed (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2013). 
414Said Nursi, Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol.1 (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Publications, 1996), 91. 
415 Islam at the Crossroads, 26. 
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So, the stories or parables in the Words… are sorts of allusions. The truths at 
the end of the stories are extremely correct, extremely true and conformable 
to reality; they are the allusive meanings of the stories. Their essential 
meanings are comparisons that bring distant objects close like a telescope 
and however they may be it does not damage their veracity and truthfulness. 
Moreover, all those stories are comparisons or parables. Purely to enable 
people in general to understand, what is properly communicated without 
words is put into words, and immaterial and abstract matters are represented 
in material form.416 
Just as in many places in the Risale-i Nur, Nursi uses this way of allegory 
also for the “ten proofs of the resurrection of the dead that are based on 
such matters as the order in the universe, the wisdom and purposes 
followed in beings, and the absence of futility and absence of waste.”417  
Lastly, what can also be stated here as one of the methods of Nursi is the 
type of reflective thought (tafakkur), which is based on the divine names 
and a form of deductive reasoning. Through reflective thought one observes 
the universe and tries to read the divine marks on every single creation. 
4.3 A Chronological Overview of Nursi’s works on sharr 
The writings of Nursi on sharr are spread throughout his works. While at 
some places he briefly touches on the topic, in other instances he deals with 
it in length.418 The chronological overview below only covers those pieces 
related to the problem of sharr, which Nursi has covered in a major way. 
There are quite a lot of other places in the Risale-i Nur, wherein direct and 
related topics are treated, however, it would be beyond the scope of this 
overview to cover all of them. 
                                        
416Said Nursi, The Words (Istanbul: Sozler Publications, 1998), 644. 
417 See concised forms in „Muhakemat‟ in The Risale-i Nur Collection, Vol. 2, 2028-9; Signs 
of Miraculousness, 59 ff.; and in more detail in The Words, 521 ff. 
418 In this chronological outline, only the lengthy and more detailed parts shall be 
mentioned. All other parts will be considered in this study as well, however, not within this 
part of the study. 
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Composed Year  Explanation 
1914-1916 A major treatise is Nursi‟s interpretation of chapter 2, verse 
7 of the Qur‟ān419, which can be found in Signs of 
Miraculousness.420 This piece can be better understood in 
connection with the Twenty-Sixth Word of The Words. Also 
in Signs of Miraculousness, Nursi explains the Qur‟anic 
narrative on the creation of the first human being421 and 
how sin entered the perfect paradisal state of Adam and 
his wife.422 
1927 Very important pages and passages can be found 
especially in his writings on divine determining (qadar) and 
free will (juz‟ ikhtiyar).423 In the same year, he has also 
composed the Eighteenth Word, in which he explains 
chapter 3, verse 188 of the Qur‟ān424. In there, Nursi 
explains the powerlessness of man, the function of free 
will and the beauty of everything that God creates. 
1929 Furthermore, in the Twenty-Third Word of The Words, 
Nursi analyses two aspects of mankind, one pertained to 
                                        
419 “Allah has sealed their hearts and their hearing; their sight is dimmed and a terrible 
punishment awaits them.” 
420 Said Nursi, Signs of Miraculousness, 79 ff. 
421 Qur‟ān, [2:30] “Behold your Lord and Sustainer said to the angels: “I will create a 
vicegerent on earth.” They said: “Will You place therein one who will make mischief therein 
and shed blood? Whilst we do celebrate your holy name?” He said: “I know what you know 
not.””  
422 Said Nursi, Signs of Miraculousness, 262 ff. 
423 Said Nursi, The Words, Twenty Sixth Word, trans. Şükran Vahide (Istanbul: Reyhan 
Ofset, 2002), 477. 
424 “Do not think those who are pleased with what they have done and love to be praised 
for what they have not done, immune from punishment; a painful punishment is in store for 
them.” 
 123 
 
invention (ijād), good, acts and positivity; the other 
pertained to destruction, non-existence, sharr, negativity, 
and passivity. 
1928-1930 Another piece that has been of major importance for this 
study is the First Aim of the Thirtieth Word, the treatise on 
the ana and „divine Trust.‟425 In 1930, Nursi wrote the 
Twelfth Letter, in which he answered questions such as 
the reasons for the creation of Satan and why God inflicts 
innocent people with calamities.426 
1933 In the Fourteenth Word of The Words, Nursi interprets 
chapter 99, verses 1-5 of the Qur‟ān427. In this treatise, 
Nursi explains the hitherto so-called „natural evils.‟ 
1934 Moreover, Nursi explains chapter 23, verses 97-98 of the 
Qur‟ān428, where he talks about the reason for the creation 
of Satan and about sharr.429 Very important for Nursi‟s 
views on existential theodicy is the Twenty-Fifth Flash, 
which is a message for the sick and comprises twenty-five 
remedies. 
Nursi wrote mainly between 1899 and 1949. Considering the fact that Nursi‟s 
years of exile and thus, his years of torment and loneliness, began in around 
                                        
425 In this treatise, Nursi interprets chapter 33, verse 72 of the Qur‟ān: “We offered the 
Trust to the heavens, the earth, and the mountains, but they refused to carry it, but man 
carried it. He has indeed been unjust and ignorant.” 
426 Said Nursi, The Letters, 61 ff. 
427 “When the earth shall quake violently, and the earth shall bring forth its burdens; And 
man shall say “That is happening to it?” On that Day, it shall relate its tales; That its Lord 
has inspired it.” 
428 “And say: Lord I seek refuge with You from the agitations of the devils. And I seek 
refuge with You lest they join me.” 
429 Said Nursi, The Flashes Collection, 103 ff. 
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1925 and lasted until approximately 1950, it is interesting to see that he 
wrote most of his treatises on sharr during this period of his life. During this 
time, albeit often in very helpless situations, Nursi never lost hope. Through 
the Qur‟ān, his main source of inspiration, he aspired to inspire the people 
around him and those yet to come in the future. It was not been possible, 
though, to trace and identify, whether his approach to the subject matter 
has been affected through all the above periods. Some examples for this will 
be given in the next section. 
4.4 Nursi’s approach to sharr in his Lifetime – some examples 
Said Nursi himself was the victim of a lot of evils that were committed 
against him. Exploring his life shows that his response to these evils has 
been exceptional. His life serves as a living example to his writings. This 
matter will be elaborated in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
It has been said previously that Nursi spent most of his life in prison and 
exile. Despite all the stress, discomfort and bad treatment he was exposed 
to in old age, he knew how to turn the bad situation he was in, into a 
bearable and profitable one. So he says: 
… Later they took us to Denizli Prison, and put me into solitary confinement 
in a stinking, cold, damp ward. I was most unhappy at my old age and illness 
and the difficulties visited on my friends because of me, and most distressed 
at the confiscations of the Risale-i Nur and the cessation in its activities, when 
the Divine grace suddenly came to my aid. It transformed that huge prison 
into a Risale-i Nur madrasa, proving it was a „School of Joseph‟.430 … the 
conquests began both within the prison and outside. It transformed our 
losses in that calamity into significant gains and our distress into joy. It once 
                                        
430 The term „School of Joseph‟ is often used in the Risale, referring to Prophet Joseph who 
was imprisoned innocently for many years and was patient and obedient to his Lord. Nursi 
uses this term to refer to the situation in prison, which turned into a school where other 
inmates started taking lessons from Said Nursi and helped him writing copies of his works. 
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again showed the meaning of the verse “But it is possible that you dislike a 
thing which is good for you.431”432 
Nursi very often talks about Divine grace, Divine determining as well as 
Divine justice, when it comes to his life. Interestingly enough he uses the 
verse [2:216] that has been mentioned before in Chapter 2, on the analysis 
of the term sharr in the Qur‟ān.  This verse is used again by Nursi in relation 
to his wish to withdraw from social life into a cave or onto a mountain like 
those who abandoned the world in old times.433 He was thinking about this 
when he was twenty years old, planning to realize it towards the end of his 
life. However, says Nursi, this wish of his has been transformed by the grace, 
compassion and justice of his Lord to his old age into a different form. It has 
transformed the caves into prisons, and the places of seclusion and 
loneliness into solitary confinements. These prisons and solitary 
confinements were, according to Nursi, far superior than caves and 
mountains, for they did not only give him the benefits pertaining to the 
Hereafter, but also strenuous service of the truths of belief and the Qur‟ān. 
For this reason, Nursi applies the same verse [2:216] into his life again, 
adding to it that “good lies in what God chooses”.434 
The very same verse serves as a motivation when Nursi writes letters to his 
approximately hundred friends who are taken together with him into Denizli 
Prison, in October or November 1943.435 Nursi points to the wisdom behind 
matters and states that if the veil was drawn back, it would make them 
                                        
431 Qur‟ān, 2:216. 
432 Said Nursi. The Flashes Collection, 333-4. 
433 Ibid., 336. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Said Nursi. Hutbe-i Şamiye (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2011), 23. 
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thank God and see His grace and mercy.436 Towards the end of the letter, he 
writes the following words of comfort: 
… Do not blame those who were the cause of this affair. The far-reaching and 
fearful plans for this calamity had long since been laid, and in the event we 
have got off lightly. God willing, it will pass quickly. In accordance with the 
meaning of the verse “It may be that you hate a thing, and it is good for 
you”, do not be grieved.437 
When Nursi was sent into exile and was isolated from everyone in a small 
village called Barla, he did not lose hope but remained faithful to whatever 
God had planned. The authorities allowed Nursi to receive visitors only 
occasionally and they had spread rumours and slander about him to frighten 
off the local people. He was watched, followed and harassed continuously.438 
A Letter he wrote to his students439 around 1929 shows very well the state 
of Nursi and his interpretation of the situation he was in. In there he 
considers the “exile” to be “God‟s mercy”, the “solitude on the mountains” to 
be a “retreat in the safe and sincere mountains of Barla”; and all the 
wrongful actions of „the worldly‟440 against his person, Nursi understands to 
happen for his further employment in the service of the Qur‟ān.441  The 
reason why non of his relatives and fellow countrymen where allowed to 
visit him, despite the offer of a general amnesty to all other leaders and 
shaykhs, according to Nursi was in order to leave his mind clear and was 
“the means of his receiving the effulgence of the All-Wise Qur‟ān as it is, 
free of all malice and ill-will”.442 In other words, according to Nursi, all the 
                                        
436 Said Nursi. The Rays Collection, 319. 
437 Ibid. For furhter, similar examples in form of letters written by Nursi in this regard see 
The Rays Collection, 349; Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1651; 1685; 1706; 1731; 1763. 
438 Şükran Vahide, Islam in Modern Turkey, 189. 
439 Said Nursi, Letters, trans. Şükran Vahide (Istanbul: Sözler Neşriyat, 2001), 66. 
440 This term (ehl-i dünya) is used by Nursi for those whose view is restricted merely to the 
life in this world and who disregard the hereafter. 
441 Letters, 67. 
442 Ibid. 
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tyranny was turned into mercy by the All-Compassionate Sustainer and All-
Wise Creator.    
Examples about Nursi‟s way of looking at the wrongful and unjust 
treatments he was exposed to and the way he interpreted those in an 
eloquent, positive and especially Qur‟anic way are innumerable. In this 
chapter, just a few examples have been given in order to illustrate Nursi‟s 
attitude towards evil that inflicted him personally. This study will go on to 
explore Nursi‟s thoughts on the ontological, theological and philosophical 
view of the problem of sharr443. 
  
                                        
443 The word „evil‟ is not used here and will not be used in the following chapters in 
particular because this study argues that Nursi‟s explanation of the term is in accordance 
with the term sharr used in the Qur‟ān and as such not to be confused with the term evil 
used by previous philosophers and theologians mentioned in the study. 
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5 Prologue to sharr in the Risale-i Nur 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will serve as a preface to Nursi‟s presentation of sharr. The 
sensitivity and complexity of this issue entails the brief treatment of certain 
other aspects first, before proceeding to the core problem of sharr. This is 
due to the following reasons:  
One of the many methodologies employed by Nursi in his works is faith-
based. As has been explained in the introduction of this study, Nursi often 
times uses faith as a tool to read and interpret events, situations and 
creation itself. In this regard, it has been considered necessary to provide 
the reader with a chapter that deals with faith-related issues – albeit in 
connection with sharr – first, before proceeding with the main topic, that is, 
the problem of evil in the Risale.  
As the semantic analysis of sharr in the Qur‟ān has shown, and as further 
analysis of Nursi‟s works in this regard will illustrate, disbelief (kufr) and 
idolatry (shirk) were two main terms that fell under the semantic field of 
sharr. Therefore, to ease the reader‟s way as he embarks towards the 
journey of understanding this aspect of sharr according to the Qur‟anic 
narrative – and in the following chapters according to the Risale – the 
treatment of the Oneness of God (tawhῑd), faith (ῑmān) as well as 
„connection‟ (intisāb) will be briefly elaborated upon. The analysis of tawhῑd 
will be closely linked with the concept of „Divine Names Theology‟444, a 
                                        
444 A concept that has been named as such for the first time by Izzet Çoban in his article 
named „Nursi on Theodicy: A New Theological Perspective‟ in Classic Issues in Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology Today, Vol. 4, Part 3 (2010).  
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concept that is widely used by Nursi throughout his works, also in relation 
with sharr.   
In the following chapters, another main aspect will be the nature of sharr 
and its quiddity. Therefore, this chapter will look into the concept of being 
(wujūd) and non-being445 („adam) to form the basis for future discourse. 
These terms will be employed in a major way in chapter six and seven.   
Finally, life (ḥayāt), bearing evidence of God‟s unity and reflecting Divine 
mercy, has come to be another important aspect for the apprehension of the 
notion of sharr and has thus been analyzed briefly in this chapter.  
In this regard, the first section will deal with God‟s Oneness (tawhῑd) as the 
first „pillar‟, so to say, through which Nursi tries to counter disbelief (kufr) 
and idolatry (shirk). 
5.2 Tawhῑd 
Tawhῑd is Nursi‟s most basic premise that he establishes in the Risale before 
any other issue related to faith. It is one of the most fundamental issues not 
only in terms of the problem of sharr, but in terms of most of the other 
themes of theology and philosophy that Nursi deals with.  
As it is well known, the first part of the shahadah expresses tawhῑd by 
saying that „There is no god but God‟. This is supported in the Qur‟ān at 
many different occasions.446 The understanding of God, however, can be 
different in each religion. It is for this reason, maybe that if someone says “I 
don‟t believe in God”, Muslims familiar with their religion‟s teachings might 
                                        
445 Alternatively, „existence‟ and „non-existence‟. 
446 Eg. “No god is there but one God” (5:73); “God is but one god” (4:171); “your god is 
one God, so submit to Him” (22:34).  
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easily reply, “I don‟t believe in the God you don‟t believe in either.”447  Since 
it is quite often justified that one does not believe in the god he has come to 
understand, the first part of the shahadah, according to Murata and Chittick, 
is supposed to put this understanding back to its right place.448  
„There is no god but God‟ (lā ilahe illallāh) is thus an affirmation of the True 
Object of Worship. To understand this phrase better, Nursi suggests looking 
closer at creation. In this regard Nursi employs the teleological argument449, 
also known as the argument of design, which was introduced in the Islamic 
tradition for the first time by Ibn Rushd. The latter proposed that order and 
continual motion in the world is caused by God‟s intellect; with His absolute 
knowledge, He provides order to the lesser intelligences.450 The argument 
later became very famous through William Paley (d. 1805) who drew an 
analogy between the universe and a watch.451 Similar arguments have been 
brought forth by Nursi, stating that  
every needle must have its manufacturer and craftsman and every village 
must have its headman; every letter must have been written by someone. 
How can it be that a so extremely well-ordered kingdom should have no 
ruler?452  
                                        
447 Murata, S.; Chittick, W. C. The Vision of Islam (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 46. 
448 Ibid., 58. 
449 The teleological argument aims to argue for God‟s existence based on apparent design 
and purpose in nature, beyond the scope of any such human activity. Nursi, in fact, employs 
all three major arguments for the existence of God, namely the Cosmological, Ontological 
and Design arguments, in his works. Explaining Nursi‟s perspective on all of these would go 
beyond the scope of this study. It is worth mentioning, that Nursi does not restrict himself 
to these arguments. He also includes religious experience, moral experience and love, which 
Markham talks about in Understanding Christian Doctrine, 39.  
450 Kogan, Barry S. Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (Suny Press, 1985), 240-243. 
451 Paley claimed that in the same way as an intricate workmanship of a watch points to an 
intelligent designer, the intricate workmanship of the world, too, shows an intelligent 
designer. For more information, see his work Natural Theology or the Evidence of the 
Existence and Attributes of the Deity (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
452 The Words, 60. 
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The argument of design has been criticized mostly by David Hume (d. 1776), 
in fact, before Paley‟s book.453 The main arguments against design as 
introduced by Paley have been firstly the weakness of parallel between the 
world and a human artifact. Secondly, Hume claimed that there are 
naturalistic explanations for the order which do not require a designer.454 
This was later developed by Charles Darwin (d. 1882), who claimed that the 
world fitted perfectly together because that which „did not fit in‟ did not 
survive. 455  Hence, the perfect order was not established through God, but 
rather through natural selection. The third critique of the design argument 
was that albeit its affirmation of the existence of a designer, it did not 
necessarily get to God. In other words, it did not need to be the creator God 
revealed in Scripture. Another major problem with the argument was related 
to the study at hand, namely the considerable amount of evil and suffering 
in this world. What kind of designer must that be, who established the 
balance of nature based on animals feeding on each other?456   
For Nursi, the wise creativity, systematic unfolding and most compassionate, 
generous, merciful munificence and bountifulness proves the necessary 
existence and Unity of an Active, Creative, Opening, Munificent Possessor of 
Glory.457 Furthermore, the phrase „He is one‟ (wahdehu), Nursi continues, 
demonstrates an explicit degree in the affirmation of Divine Unity. Hence, 
Nursi‟s teleological approach is looking at creation, and seeing a universal 
ordering and balancing, a universal wisdom and justice, as well as power 
                                        
453 Hume, D. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and the Natural History of Religion 
(Oxford Paperbacks, 2008)  
454 Understanding Christian Doctrine, 36. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid., 37. See also „Evil Makes a Strong Case Against God‟s Existence‟ by David Hume, in 
Part Five of Philosophy of Religion by Peterson, M.; Hasker, W., et al. Nursi is arguably the 
first scholar who addresses the suffering of non-human beings under the category of the 
problem of evil. See more in chapter seven of this study. 
457 Letters, 272. 
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and knowledge. In other words, creation tells man that it is merely a veil 
behind which One Powerful over all things Who has Knowledge of all things, 
is apparent.458  
This concept of universal ordering, balancing and wisdom, which is very 
much emphasized throughout the Risale with numerous examples, serves as 
one cornerstone for the existence of apparent ashrār. For it may help man to 
try to rid himself from judging according to the apparent and to try to look 
at events from a broader perspective. 
Having said this, the Qur‟ān summarizes its teachings about God in the „most 
beautiful names‟ (al-asmā‟ al-husnā), husnā being the superlative adjective 
from hasan, which means „beautiful‟ and „good‟.459 In here is an implication 
of the Qur‟ān that God himself is good and beautiful and that his names 
express His beauty and goodness. Important to note however, is the fact 
that the divine names are never personified or looked upon as separate 
beings.460 Each name represents a certain quality or an attribute and not a 
concrete thing.461  
                                        
458 Ibid., 273. 
459 Murata, S.; Chittick, W. C. The Vision of Islam (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 58. 
460 Theological disputes have taken place in regards to whether God‟s attributes are identical 
with His essence. Arguably the first theologian to deal with this topic has been Ghahm ibn 
Ṣafwān (d. 746), stating that God is not a thing (shay‟). Scholars such as Ḍirār ibn 'Amr (d. 
815), Ḥafṣ al-Fard (fl. at the beginning of the ninth century), and Sufyān ibn Saḥbān (or 
Saḥtān, a Murji‟ite jurisprudent and speculative theologian) believed that God would create 
a sixth sense in the resurrection so that people would know God‟s essence through that 
additional sense, that is, by a divine act. However, most of the theologians such as 
Mu‟tazilῑs, Kharijῑs, Shi‟ites, and Murji‟ites rejected this view. While some believed that the 
attributes belonged to the divine essence, others asserted that attributes are identified with 
names, and both are referred to as acts. Ghazālῑ discussed this issue extensively in al-
Iqtiṣād fῑ al-I‟tiqād (ed. Ibrahim Agah Çubukçu; Hüseyin Atay, Ankara 1962) and in al-
Maqṣad al-asnā fῑ sharḥ ma‟ānῑ asmā‟ Allāh al-husnā, trans. David B. Burrell; Nazih Daher 
(Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1999). Ghazālῑ (d. 1111) claimed that one can know 
God‟s essence the same way one knows of things without shape and measure, such as 
power and love. Fahr al-Dῑn al-Rāzῑ (d. 1209), in his early phase, asserted that God‟s 
essence can be known, however, in his later works he expressed a contrary view. For more 
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Tawhῑd means that all these qualities denoted by the Divine Names belong 
truly to God and only secondarily or metaphorically to the creatures. In other 
words, there is no god but the Merciful would mean, for example, that there 
is no mercy but God‟s mercy; the mercy of God overshadows all other 
mercies in the universe.462 This example can be extended to all the other 
Names of God, such as the Praiseworthy, the Knowing, the Strong, the 
Creator, the Permanent, the Independent, etc. 
Another meaning of tawhῑd  mentioned by Murata and Chittick can be found 
mostly in Sufi tradition and is hidden in the Name „the Real‟ (al-Haqq) which 
means that there is no other reality than God. According to this tradition, 
everything other than God is unreal, ephemeral, transitory, illusory, 
vanishing, nothing.463 Illusory not in the sense of nihilism, though, since 
nihilism implies a sense of meaninglessness and despair. In the case of al-
Haqq, everything has a relative, meaningful reality; the message that the 
name al-Haqq conveys is that there can be no reality without „the Real‟ that 
is absolute. While God is the absolute reality, all other realities are relative 
and exist only through that absolute Reality (al-Haqq).464 In other words, 
everything exists through God‟s existence. This is explained in further detail 
through the Divine Names. Every creation, being a manifestation of God‟s 
Divine Names and Attributes, is shaped, changed and altered according to it. 
Sometimes, these changes appear like sharr to the eye of the observer. 
                                                                                                               
information see Binyamin Abrahamov. „Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Knowability of God's 
Essence and Attributes‟ in Arabica, T. 49, Fasc. 2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 204-230. 
461 The Vision of Islam, 59. 
462 Ibid., 60. 
463 Ibid., 61. 
464 Ibid., 62. See also wājib al-wujūd (necessary existent) and mumkin (contingent) beings 
under the discussion on „Being (wujūd)‟ in this chapter. 
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5.2.1 Divine Names Theology 
Throughout his works, Nursi fundamentally establishes a theory that has 
been called by Çoban „Divine Names Theology‟465.  According to this theory, 
everything in this universe is the manifestation and mirror of the Divine 
Names and Attributes of God.  Unlike Ibn Jarῑr at-Tabarῑ‟s (d. 923) work on 
the Asmā al-ḥusnā, or al-Bayhaqῑ‟s (d. 1066) al-Asmā‟ wa al-Sifat, in which 
Bayhaqῑ covers the topic in terms of Hadῑth literature; or unlike Ghazālῑ‟s (d. 
1111) al-Maqṣad al asnā fῑ sharḥ asmā‟ Allāh al-ḥusnā, in which Ghazālῑ 
concentrates more on the conceptual, structural and descriptive aspect of 
Divine Names and Attributes; and also unlike Fakhruddῑn al-Rāzῑ‟s (d. 1210) 
Lawāmi‟ al-bayyināt fῑ asmā‟ Allāh wa‟l -ṣifāt, who, similar to Ghazālῑ, 
commentates on the ninety-nine names of God;  Nursi constitutes a whole 
new Weltanschauung that is designed to link literally everything and every 
event with the Names and Attributes of God.   
One example for this has been chosen due to its direct relation with the 
problem of sharr. Nursi explains that man has been given a tool named 
ana466, which is a key to the Divine Names.467 It is, at the same time, 
defined by Nursi as one aspect of the „Divine Trust‟ (amānah) that the 
heavens and mountains refrained from undertaking468. According to Nursi, 
God has given man the ana so he may comprehend the essence (māhiyya) 
of His Names, Attributes and actions. This unique interpretation of Nursi is a 
major step towards explaining the question whether one can know God.  
                                        
465 Çoban, I. „Nursi on Theodicy: A New Theological Perspective‟ in Classic Issues in Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology Today, Vol. 4, Part 3 (2010), 116. 
466 Ana has been translated as „I‟ or „ego‟. In this study, the original term will be used.  
467 The Words, 558. This whole issue will be elaborated upon in chapter seven. 
468 Ibid., 557 ff.  Nursi interprets the Qur‟ānic verse „We offered the Trust to the heavens, 
the earth, and the mountains, but they refused to carry it and were afraid of it, but man 
carried it…‟ (Qur‟ān 34:72).  This will be discussed in further detail in chapter seven. 
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Ghazālῑ provided fundamental illustrations and insights, explaining how there 
are two ways of knowing God. The first was inadequate and the second 
closed469; that is, the former consisted of mentioning names and attributes 
and comparing them with what was known to oneself and the latter, being 
the impossible path, consisted of waiting to attain all the divine attributes to 
the point of becoming a „lord‟.470  
Nursi seems to have borrowed this basic concept of Ghazālῑ and developed it 
through his interpretation of the Divine Trust, contributing to this discourse 
in a major way. Nursi explains further that this ana has no external reality.  
It is rather something nominal, just like the imaginary lines in geometry.471 
An absolute and all-encompassing thing cannot have a boundary and 
therefore it is impossible to understand the essence of something that 
cannot be limited in any way.  It is impossible to comprehend the essence of 
permanent light without darkness; thus, one cannot understand something 
without the chance to compare.  Likewise, since the Attributes of God such 
as Power (qudra) and Knowledge („ilm) also have no boundary, it is not 
possible to understand them.  In order for these Attributes to be known, a 
nominal border needs to be demarcated; this is done by ana.   
Nursi further explains two stages for this purpose.  In the first stage, the ana 
imagines itself to possess nominal dominicality (rubūbiyyah), power (qudra), 
knowledge („ilm) and ownership (mulkiyya).  He starts drawing a line 
between his own area and the area of his Lord, saying: “up to here mine, 
after that, His.”472 With the help of this line, he starts developing a sense of 
the essence (māhiyya) of terms like „knowledge‟, „power‟, „dominicality‟ and 
                                        
469 Al-Ghazālῑ. Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fῑ sharḥ ma‟ānῑ asmā‟ Allāh al-husnā, 40. 
470 Ibid. 
471 The Words, 558. 
472 Ibid. 
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„ownership‟.  In the second stage, he starts to realize and comprehend that 
along with the whole universe, he himself also is God‟s possession; thus he 
lifts the nominal line he had drawn before.  He realizes the infinity of God‟s 
knowledge, power and ownership and starts to consciously and 
deliberatively believe in God.473 This ana, if not used for its right purpose, 
can lead to sharr.474  
In another illustration Nursi points out that the realities and attributes of all 
beings and of the universe are each based on one or more Divine Names.  
True natural science, he explains, is based on the Name of All-Wise (Ḥakῑm), 
true medicine on the Name of Healer (Shāfῑ), and geometry on the Name of 
Determiner (Muqaddir), etc.475 Just as all the sciences are based on and 
come to an end in a Name, the realities of all human attainments are based 
on the Divine Names.476 Thus, the fact that human beings go through 
different kind of hardships and ashrār (pl. sharr) may be to reflect and be a 
mirror of the numerous Names and Attributes of his Creator.  These 
apparent ashrār may help him to develop and reach perfection.   
How different names can reflect on one single thing is explained by Nursi in 
the following way: The All-Wise maker delimits, orders and gives determined 
proportions and shapes to all things, particular and universal, through the 
manifestation of His Names.  Thus He makes them recite His Names of 
Determiner (Mukaddir), Orderer (Munazzim) and Giver of Form 
(Muṣawwir).477 
                                        
473 Ibid., 559. 
474 This will be explained in further detail in chapter seven. 
475 The Words, 655. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid., 657. 
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He determines the limits of their shapes in such a way that He displays His 
Names of All-Knowing („Alῑm) and All-Wise (Ḥakῑm).  Through forming them 
within those limits, with care and craftsmanship, He displays His Names of 
Maker (Sānῑ‟) and Munificient (Karῑm).  Nursi, in this lengthy treatise, goes 
on illustrating Names such as Gracious (Laṭῑf), Loving (Wadūd), Known One 
(Ma‟rūf), Bestower (Mun‟im), Compassionate (Raḥῑm), Gentle (Ḥannān), 
Merciful (Raḥmān), Beautiful (Jamῑl), and so on.478  This shows one way of 
reading the Universe and seeing the realities of things, for as Nursi quotes a 
group of the most learned (muhakkikῑn awliyā) saying: “The Divine Names 
constitute the true reality of things, while the essence of things are only 
shadows of that reality.”479 
Despite of all the above, vital for the understanding of the problem of sharr 
is that God is known for having qualities that are apparently contradictory. 
These are most commonly categorized into two groups, being called Glorious 
(Jalālῑ) and Beauteous (Jamālῑ) names such as His Wrath and Mercy 
respectively. Murata and Chittick explain this apparent contradiction by 
stating that although God is one, He is dealing with many creatures.480 Not 
only does He interrelate with each creation in a different way, the forms of 
this interrelation change over time. For instance is God the Giver of Life 
(muhyῑ) and at the same time the Taker of Life (mumῑt). Every giving of life 
is at the same time a death.481 A seed dies under the earth before it shoots 
forth; likewise does a person die, but is born again into the next world. Thus 
death is not only destruction and extinction. Nursi states: 
With Divine permission, all creatures are unceasingly flowing in the river of 
time; they are being sent from the World of the Unseen; they are being 
                                        
478 Ibid., 657 ff. 
479 Ibid., 655. 
480 The Vision of Islam, 67. 
481 Ibid., 68. 
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clothed with external existence in the Manifest world; then they are being 
poured in orderly fashion into the World of the Unseen, and it is there that 
they alight. At their Sustainer‟s command, they continuously come from the 
future, stop by in passing pausing for a breath, and are poured into the 
past.482 
Nursi further explains that God gives life with His power and discharges with 
His wisdom. Hence, what man calls death which is defined by some as the 
worst of all evils483, is in reality a transformation from the sphere of power to 
the sphere of knowledge.484  
How this categorization of God‟s names into Glorious (Jalālῑ) and Beauteous 
(Jamālῑ) can be further explained, and what their relationship is with khayr 
and sharr, will be explained in the following section on tanzῑh and tashbih. 
5.2.2 Tanzῑh and Tashbih 
In the technical language of theology, there are two terms that express the 
perception of God‟s nearness (qurb) and mercy and that of his distance 
(bu‟d) and wrath; tanzih (declaring incomparability) and tashbih (affirming 
similarity) respectively.485 While the former literally means “to declare 
something pure and free from something else,”486 the latter stands for “the 
declaration of something similar to something else.”487 Thus tanzih is to 
declare God free of all the defects and imperfections in the creatures. In this 
respect, God cannot be compared to any of His creation, as it is stated in the 
Qur‟ān, “Nothing is like Him.”488 This view has been supported by 
                                        
482 Letters, 284. 
483 That death is the worst of all evils has been stated by scholars such as the English 
Philosopher Thomas Hobbes. See chapter 3 of Schumacher, B.N. Der Tod in der Philosophie 
der Gegenwart (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004) 
484 Letters, 284. 
485 The Vision of Islam, 70. 
486 Ibid. 
487 Ibid. 
488 Qur‟ān, 42:11. 
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philosophers such as Ja‟d bin Dirhem (d. 736) and Jahm bin Safwān (d. 745), 
who were at the same time pioneers of the birth of the science of kalām. 
They went so far in their view of tanzih in that they tried to minimize the 
relation between God and the universe.489 Tashbih, on the other hand, 
asserts that God must have some sort of similarity with His creatures since 
they designate His attributes such as knowledge, desire, power, mercy, 
generosity, etc. This view has emerged as a reaction to the former, and 
these philosophers have later become known as anthropomorphist 
(mushabbih) for they tried to relate God with space and tried to reify Him.490  
Murata and Chittick claim that mostly the Glorious (Jalālῑ) names express 
tanzih as they stress God‟s difference from creation. And it is mostly the 
Beauteous (Jamālῑ) names that express tashbih for they emphasize God‟s 
nearness to creation and His concern for His creatures.491  
Nursi states that the two terms „Glory be to God‟ (subhanallah) and „Praise 
belongs to God‟ (alḥamdulillah) describe God‟s attributes of glory (jalāl) and 
beauty (jamāl) respectively. Subhanallah, which comprises the attribute of 
jalāl shows that servant („abd) and creation (makhlūq) is distant from God. 
Alḥamdulillah, on the other side, which comprises the attribute of jamāl 
shows that God, with His Mercy (raḥmah) is close to His „abd and 
makhlūq.492 For instance has the sun, from man‟s perspective, two aspects. 
One is closeness (qurb), the other is distance (bu‟d). The former aspect 
provides warmth and light, the latter aspect keeps it pure and exempt from 
                                        
489 Güven, M. „Hakikat ve Mecaz Bağlamında Müteşabih Bir Kavram Olarak “İstivâ”‟ in 
Hikmet Yurdu, Yıl: 3, C:3, S: 6 (Jul.-Dec., 2010), 180. 
490 Ibid. For further information, see also Shahristānῑ, al-Milel ve‟n-Nihal, Vol. I, pp. 105–
109. 
491 The Vision of Islam, 71. 
492 Nursi, S. Mesnevῑ-i Nuriye, trans. Abdülmecid Nursi (Istanbul: Söz Basım Yayın, 2006), 
165. 
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man‟s damages and havocs. From this point of view, man can only be 
affected by the sun, but he cannot influence on it.493 In the light of this 
analogy, man praises (ḥamd) God in respect to His closeness to man, with 
His raḥmah. In respect to man‟s distance from God, man glorifies (tasbῑḥ) 
Him. 
While Murata and Chittick look at nearness (qurb) and distance (bu‟d) in 
respect to „realness‟ and „lack of realness‟, Nursi explains it from the 
perspective of the „universal‟ and the „particular‟. In other words, if one takes 
the name Provider (razzāq), for instance, one glorifies God who provides all 
creation (makhlūq) with His bounties; whereas on the other side, man 
praises God who, among all the creation, also provides that particular man 
with His bounties. Thus, one might say that subhanallah relates to the 
general whereas alḥamdulillah relates to the particular. The following 
analogy might shed light over this issue: if a council would provide fabulous 
service to the whole city and all the streets would be neat and tidy and well 
organized, one might feel awe towards that councilor. And if the street in 
front of one‟s own house is likewise neat and well organized, one will feel 
thankful and contented. However, if one‟s personal and specific wish or 
intent is not satisfied, even if the whole city is fully organized, one will feel 
dissatisfied with the council and its works. One the other side, if the whole 
city would be generally disorganized but that man‟s specific street would be 
neat and organized, that man would certainly feel satisfied, for his personal 
needs would be met.  
Nursi explains: 
The acts of the Almighty are, first of all, concerned with Him, not with the 
carnal „I‟ and its narrow mind. The “wheel” of creation does not revolve 
                                        
493 Ibid. 
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according to the carnal „I‟‟s fancies, and it did not witness His creation of the 
universe. Surely, Imam Rabbānῑ told the truth: “The gifts of the Sovereign 
can be borne only by those qualified for them.”494 
In the light of the above, those two aspects, awe and thankfulness need not 
to be confused but seen in a differentiated manner. Otherwise, justice and 
uprightness will merge. But what is important is to appreciate those two 
positives separately. Thus, one should ask for the tidiness of the whole city 
in the same manner as one should expect one‟s personal street to be tidy 
and neat. They should not mingle, but they should be side by side. This is 
the mystery of subhanallahi wa biḥamdihi. 
Likewise, something is called by man sharr if the outcome of it is detrimental 
for him. The general and universal aspect of it is thereby mostly overlooked. 
However, something that is sharr for one might be beneficial for others.495 
One might say that sharr is inherent to the universe in respect to tanzih 
whereas khayr is inherent to the universe in respect to tashbih.496 While the 
former suggests that the universe has nothing of khayr since God alone is 
khayr and God is totally other than the universe; the latter emphasizes that 
the universe is khayr through God‟s khayr as much as creation is able to 
reflect God‟s signs and activity in the cosmos.497 In other words, to say that 
something is khayr would mean that it shares the divine names and 
attributes of God to some degree. And to say that something is sharr would 
thus mean that it lacks the divine attributes and names to some degree.  
Since nothing can reflect the divine names and attributes absolutely, one has 
                                        
494 Ibid., 104. 
495 Further detail regarding this point will follow in chapter six. This point has also been 
mentioned in chapter two, the semantic analysis of sharr in the Qur‟ān. 
496 The Vision of Islam, 110. 
497 Ibid.  
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to accept that all things are both khayr and sharr.498 While Murata and 
Chittick claim that the cosmos is good inasmuch as God displays His signs 
and activity in it, Nursi would rather oppose defending the position that God 
always displays His attributes and names, but it is up to the ability of 
creation to reflect those in the best manner. 
However, there is one issue that is important to note. If the point is 
accepted that God, in other words „the Real‟, is absolute khayr and coincides 
with everything that is good, this would mean that the unreal corresponds 
with sharr.499 In other words, according to Murata and Chittick, “sharr is the 
lack of good, the lack of light, the lack of reality, the lack (or insufficient 
reflection) of the divine qualities.”500 
5.3 The concept of faith (ῑmān) and ‘connection’ (intisāb) 
As has been indicated in the introduction of this chapter, it is essential to 
discuss faith in relation to the problem of sharr for without ῑmān theodicy 
becomes somewhat useless. Attempts have been made to explain the 
problem of evil separate from faith, for instance during the period of the 
Enlightenment.501 One such scholar was Newton, who suggested a self-
contained, mechanical system, capable of being represented mathematically 
by the concept of motion, matter and space and time. This theory of his, 
however, was ultimately not enough to solve the problem. On the contrary, 
more problems were maybe added: firstly, how could evil exist in the world 
                                        
498 Ibid. It is important to note that according to the authors, khayr and sharr does not 
imply a moral statement about right and wrong, but rather about the benefit or loss that 
something brings. According to the authors, husn and su‟ have a strong moral connotation, 
although the two pairs are often used interchangeably.  
499 Ibid., 109. 
500 Ibid., 110. 
501 Surin, K.  „Theodicy?‟ in The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), 
226. 
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represented by this mechanistic system that was so precisely ordered and 
aesthetically proportioned? Secondly, from a theologians‟ perspective, how 
could one accommodate morality and religious faith in a world governed by 
the laws of a rigidly mechanistic and ultimately godless system?502 Thus the 
need arose to find a way of circumventing the problem of reconciling the 
existence of evil with the existence of an increasingly „absent‟ God. 
The only way to achieve this new explanation was gradually to shift the 
burden from reliance on God‟s will to the belief in man‟s understanding and 
powers.  This was a shift that was to occupy the whole Enlightenment, and it 
was not accomplished easily.  In fact … the separate … traditions each had 
their own kind of ingenuity, and, fashioned quite different notions of „secular‟ 
theodicy, or „anthropodicy‟.503 
Anthropodicy has thus been developed as an alternative or even substitute 
to theodicy.  The latter was, according to the thinkers of the Enlightenment 
and post-Enlightenment such as Newton, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, 
Kant and Hegel, no longer valid in a world where the voice of God wasn‟t 
heard any more.  The question is, however, whether man can handle evil on 
his own – without ῑmān – as an anthropodicy, regarding evil not as „evil‟ (for 
this has a religious connotation) but as human fault or error.504  
As the second reason for the insufficiency of theodicy, Surin mentioned the 
abstract conception of evil used by the theodicist.505 He criticized the 
concentration of theoretical solutions of theodicy, discarding any practical 
                                        
502 Ibid., 227. 
503 Ibid., 228, quoted from Ernest Becker, The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification 
of the Science of Man (New York: Free Press, 1976), 17. 
504 To read more on the discussion about anthropodicy, read Sontag, Frederick.  
Anthropodicy or Theodicy? A Discussion with Becker‟s “The Structure of Evil” in Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion, Vol.  49, No.  2 (Jun., 1981), pp.  267-274. 
505 „Theodicy?‟, 230. 
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implications.  This kind of theodicy which has practical solutions to evil and 
suffering is called „Existential Theodicy‟506.   
It stands to reason that Nursi was opposed to the idea of anthropodicy and 
firmly believed in the necessity of faith. Thus, faith (ῑmān) appears to be one 
of the most important topics in the Risale.  Nursi does not provide one single 
definition of ῑmān; however, he compares in many instances a faithful 
person with a faithless one.507 Nursi, rather than giving plain definitions, 
prefers to illustrate what it is like and how the life of a human being changes 
with ῑmān.  Nursi thereby emphasizes the importance of true or unshakable 
faith (tahqῑq al-ῑmān) as opposed to a faith based on imitation (taqlῑd al-
ῑmān).  Throughout his works, he tries to establish a tahqῑq al-ῑmān firstly on 
himself, and secondly on his reader.508 It is striking that Nursi explains faith 
(ῑmān) almost like a window through which man observes the world.  
Depending on the window‟s cleanness does the perception of the world, 
from the onlooker‟s perspective, change.  Hence one is inclined to say that 
the apparent sharr in this world is perceived as such depending on the 
degree of faith (ῑmān) one has. On the other hand, what might influence the 
wisdom of human beings negatively is the „veil of commonplace‟, which will 
be explained now. 
5.3.1 The Removal of the Veil of Commonplace 
To be in a constant relation with the Creator entails ridding oneself from the 
veil of commonplace.  This is essential for this veil hinders one to realize the 
countless bounties and beauties of God and instead makes him concentrate 
                                        
506 Existential Theodicy from the perspective of the Risale will be discussed briefly in chapter 
7. 
507 See The Words, pp. 27-31; 45-50; The Rays Collection, pp. 604-608. 
508 For more information on the existence of God and the establishment of tahqῑq al-ῑmān, 
the following treatises can be consulted: The Flashes Collection, pp.  232-254; The Rays 
Collection, pp. 123-200 and pp. 226-229; The Words, pp. 287-318 and pp. 173-176. 
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maybe on the one apparent ugliness.  Nursi accuses philosophy of falling 
into this kind of trap, concealing all the extraordinary miracles of power 
through the veils of commonplace.509 Belittling man‟s creation as ordinary 
and looking at it indifferently, philosophy points out as an object of 
instruction a person who has diverged from the perfection of creation by 
having three arms or two heads.510 The questions about how God could 
allow this to happen starts to occupy the minds of people, without thinking 
once about the thousands and millions of creations having two arms and one 
head.  One is so familiar with the situation that a person has two arms and 
one head, that it never strikes him as being a bounty and blessing, as being 
pure goodness (khayr al mahdh). 
Another example provided by Nursi is the veil of ingratitude that is drawn by 
philosophy over the regular sustenance of infants and young from the 
treasury of mercy as being ordinary.  Instead,  
spotting an insect under the sea which is an exception from the general order 
and is alone and isolated from its fellows, being fed with green sea-weed, 
philosophy wants to make the fishermen weep for it, because of the Divine 
favor and munificence manifested on it.511 
This behavior ultimately becomes eligible for sharr as described in the 
Qur‟ān and the Risale, namely being ungrateful (k-f-r).512 Thus one might 
say that Nursi‟s suggestion is not to discard sharr but to do justice on the 
fact that God‟s creation is generally khayr, deserving to be seen and 
appreciated as such. 
In the chapters to come, Nursi will set up a relation between being/existence 
(wujūd) and khayr; and non-being/non-existence („adam) and sharr. This in 
                                        
509 The Words, 150. 
510 Ibid. 
511 Ibid. 
512 See Qur‟ān, 55:1-78. Also chapter 2 of this study. 
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fact forms the basis for Nursi‟s methodology for most of his treatise on the 
nature of sharr as well as the twelve principles that will follow in chapter six 
are build upon this concept. Therefore, the following part will serve as a 
fundament to this relation, forming an essential aspect for the establishment 
of the theories of khayr and sharr as explained by Nursi. 
5.4 The concept of being (wujūd) and non-being (‘adam) 
As indicated before, it will be useful to understand the concept of being and 
non-being in the Risale-i Nur in order to better understand the concept of 
khayr and sharr as it is explained by Nursi.  This is because Nursi‟s 
explanation of the term sharr depends on the comprehension of the terms 
wujūd and „adam.  Being (wujūd) is put by Nursi in direct relation with khayr 
whereas non-being („adam) is the counterpart of sharr.  According to Nursi, 
non-being (‟adam) is pure sharr (sharr al-mahdh) whereas existence (wujūd) 
is pure good (khayr al-mahdh)513.  Since wujūd is the opposite of „adam and 
since it is far more difficult to explain what non-being is, it might be helpful 
to first understand the nature of wujūd to then grasp the meaning of „adam 
and hence the concept of sharr. 
5.4.1 Being (wujūd) 
The Arabic term wujūd is used as an abstract noun representing 
existence.514 In this study, „being‟ and „existence‟ will be used 
interchangeably for the term wujūd.  What has been discussed in more 
detail in the past by philosophers such as Aristotle, Ibn Sīna, Ibn Rushd and 
Mullā Ṣadrā was the difference and definition of being and essence.  They all 
agreed upon the necessity to distinguish between being and essence and 
                                        
513 The Flashes Collection, 106. 
514 P.J.  Bearman, TH.  Bianquis, et al.  The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.  XI (Leiden: Brill 
2002). 
 147 
 
that these two are not the same.  Ibn Sīna defined the distinction of these 
two terms by naming them wujūd and māhiyya, the latter thereby 
representing essence or quiddity.515 He was also arguably the first 
philosopher to speak of God as the wājib al-wujūd, “the only being whose 
essence is to exist”516, or, in other words, the only necessary existent, in 
contrast with everything else which is contingent.  While philosophers went 
on discussing which one of these, existence or essence, has priority over the 
other, the Risale has its own usage.   
The term wujūd has three different forms in the works of Nursi.  One is 
called wājib (necessary), the other mumtanī (impossible) and the third is 
called mumkin (contingent/possible).517  The former is used as previously 
defined by Ibn Sīna, as the One whose existence is necessary.  This term 
can only be used for the existence of the Creator of everything, which is God.  
In this regard, Nursi will also use the term wājib al-wujūd when comparing 
God‟s existence with the rest of creation.  The second term, mumtanī, is 
anything for which it is impossible to exist.  One example is shirk (applying 
partners to God), for God has no partners and it is impossible for God to 
have any partners whatsoever.  The last term is used for anything which 
may or may not exist.  These things can equally be or not be.  This term is 
used for anything but God, in other words, for the whole creation.518  Nursi 
explains contingency in more detail by saying that their existence and non-
                                        
515 Morewedge, P. „Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sῑnā‟s „Essence-Existence‟ Distinction‟ in 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 92, No. 3 (Jul., -Sep., 1972), pp. 425-435. 
516El-Bizri, N. „Avicenna and Essentialism‟ in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Jun., 
2001), pp. 753-778. 
517 See dictionary part of Sözler (The Words) by Nursi, S. (Istanbul: Sözler Basım Yayın, 
2008). 
518 The Rays Collection, 162 ff. See also dictionary part of Sözler (The Words) by Said Nursi 
(Istanbul: Sözler Basım Yayın, 2008) 
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existence are, within the sphere of contingency, equal.519 To explain how the 
Creator is able to create one single individual with the same ease as creating 
all living beings, and that there is no difference for God between many and 
few or great and small, Nursi gives the example of a big and sensible scale.  
He states: 
if two walnuts of equal weight were placed on a pair of scales which were 
absolutely precise and large enough to weigh mountains, and a tiny seed was 
added on one of the walnuts, it would raise one of the pans to the height of a 
mountain-top and lower the other to the bottom of the valley with the same 
ease as raising one pan to the skies and lowering the other to the valley 
bottom if two mountains of equal weight had been placed in the pans and a 
walnut added to one.  In exactly the same way, in the terminology of the 
science of theology (kalām), contingency (imkān) is equal in regard to 
existence (wujūd) and non-existence („adam).  That is, if there is nothing to 
cause their existence, things which are not necessary (wājib) nor impossible 
(mumtanī) but contingent (mumkin) are equal in regard to existence and 
non-existence; there is no difference.520 
In other words, one might say that when talking about contingency, being 
(wujūd) is whatever God chooses and non-being („adam) is whatever God 
does not choose.  For instance, if one would say that the chance for a 
human being to exist is one in a million, those whom God chooses to exist 
become beings, whereas those He does not choose fall into non-existence 
(„adam). 
Whatever the degree of existence (wujūd) is, that God has given beings, 
states Nursi, their right before the wājib al-wujūd is nothing else but to offer 
                                        
519 The Rays Collection, 624-625. Nursi did borrow this idea most likely from Ibn Arabī.  
William Chittick explains Ibn Arabī‟s view as follows: “…‟possibility‟ is the fact that all things 
stand midway between necessity and impossibility.  In themselves, they have no claim on 
existence.  They are nonexistent things that have the potential to exist.  They can only 
come to exist if God gives them existence.  No thing can escape its own possibility, for its 
possibility pertains to its very essence.  Ibn Arabi refers to this point while providing one of 
his many commentaries on the saying, “God has seventy veils of light and darkness.”” See 
William C.  Chittick, Sufism: A Beginner‟s Guide (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008), 190. 
520 The Rays Collection, 625. 
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thanks and praise.  In no way, Nursi continues, do beings have any other 
rights before the necessarily existent One, nor can they claim them.  For all 
the degrees of existence that are given are occurrences and each requires a 
cause.  Degrees which are not given are possibilities (mumkin), and 
possibilities are non-existent („adam) as well as being infinite.  No non-
existent („adam) requires a cause, for one cannot assign a cause for 
anything infinite.521  
Thus states Nursi, all the degrees of existence such as having tasted life, 
having been created as a human being, good health and well-being, etc.  
are pure bounties (ni‟mah) from his Lord which he has received 
undeservedly.  Bounties are contingencies (mumkin) and non-existent 
(„adam) in type and non-deserved and as such man has no right to complain 
about his Lord with meaningless greed for the bounties he has not 
received.522  
Another important aspect that Nursi points out is that once a being‟s duties 
are completed, that being  
takes off its garment of external existence and sends it apparently to non-
existence, but in fact to an existence within the sphere of His knowledge.523  
Nursi does not believe that there is an absolute non-existence („adam 
muṭlaq), but the non-existence that is talked about is merely an apparent 
„adam.  This is because nothing ceases to exist within the knowledge of God 
(„ilm ilāhī); they pass from the sphere of power to the sphere of knowledge; 
from the manifest world to the world of the unseen.524  
                                        
521 Letters, 337.  Nursi provides this explanation in relation with Qur‟ān 5:1 and 14:27 “God 
does/decrees whatever He pleases”.   
522 Ibid., 338. 
523 The Rays Collection, 625; also see Letters, 340. 
524 Letters, 340. 
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According to Nursi, all the beauty and perfection in things pertain to the 
Divine Names and are their manifestations.  Since the Names of God are 
eternal and their manifestations are also everlasting, the embroidery on 
everything will be renewed, refreshed and made beautiful.  Hence, Nursi 
states, they do not go into non-existence;  
their realities (ḥaqīqat), essences (māhiyya) and identities, which are the 
means of beauty and loveliness, effulgence and perfection, are enduring.525 
This point is important to keep in mind throughout the next chapters since it 
comprises an answer to the assumption that death is sharr.  It gives comfort 
and assurance that death is not equal to „adam and ergo that it is not sharr; 
on the contrary that it is the continuation of wujūd in a different form and 
therefore equals khayr. 
5.4.1.1 Mulk and Malakūt 
In relation to existence (wujūd) different scholars have introduced similar 
yet slightly different categorizations in relation to the Divine. Ibn „Arabῑ, for 
instance, taught about „Five Divine Presences‟526 (al-ḥaḍarāt al-ilāhiyyat al-
khams). It is important to note, though, that what Ibn „Arabῑ was referring 
to individually, was later on systematized and adopted in form of a doctrine, 
                                        
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibn „Arabῑ‟s disciples, such as Ṣadr al-Dῑn al-Qūnawῑ, Sa‟ῑd al-Dῑn al-Farghānῑ, Mu‟ayyid 
al-Dῑn al-Jandῑ, Kamāl al-Dῑn „Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānῑ, and Sharaf al-Dῑn Dāwūd al-Qayṣarῑ, 
in time, came up with five to six levels of existence, naming them in different ways. The 
most common form seems to be derived from the commentary on Ibn „Arabῑ‟s Fuṣūṣ al-
Ḥikam, called Sharḥ Fuṣus al-Ḥikam, as follows: 1) The presence of Essence („ālam-i hāhūt 
or „ālam al-Aḥad); 2) The Presence of the Attributes and Names, that is, the Presence of 
Divinity („ālam-i lāhūt or „ālam al-Wāhad); 3) The Presence of the Acts, that is, the Presence 
of Lordship („ālam al-jabarūt or „ālam-i arwāh); 4) The Presence of Image-Exemplars and 
Imagination („ālam al-malakūt or „ālam-i mῑthāl); 5) The Presence of Sense-Perception and 
the Visible („ālam al-mulk or „ālam-i nasut or „ālam al-ajsām). For more information, see al-
Kashānῑ. Sharḥ Fuṣūs al-Ḥikam (Cairo, 1966), chapter on Joseph, 132. Also see Chittick, W. 
„The Five Divine Presences‟ in The Muslim World, Vol. 72, Issue 2 (Apr., 2007), 122; Konuk 
A. A. Fuṣūs‟l Ḥikem Tercüme ve Şerhi I, ed. Mustafa Tahralı; Selçuk Eraydın (Istanbul: M.Ü. 
Ilahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2010), 66-67. 
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first by his chief disciple al-Qūnawῑ (d. 1274)527 and later by his other 
students. Al-Ghazālῑ, on the other hand, in his work Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayn al-
Islām wa‟l zandaqa, also mentions five levels of existence, albeit naming 
them differently.528  
Nursi points out that everything (makhlūq) in this world has two different 
faces.  While one of these is the outer face, called mulk, the other one is the 
inner face, called malakūt.   
Mulk is that part of a thing which is visible to human beings but which is not 
the reality of that being.  For instance, 1) when man looks at something, it 
appears to him as if these beings are the owners of action and power; 2) 
man also considers sharr in this world and among created things to have 
real existence (wujūd ḥaqiqa); 3) furthermore, for man, some of created 
things seem to be more difficult or easier than others.  However it is 
important to note that all these three aspects mentioned are actually created 
in the inner world of man and are not the reality of the universe and 
creation.  The reason for this different perception is the fact that man‟s 
nature is not able to comprehend reality, in other words, the malakūt aspect 
of things.  Hence it would not be wrong to say that mulk is the personal 
world of each human, how it reflects in his own soul.   
Malakūt is the reality of being (wujūd).  In this real face of being, it can be 
seen that 1) nothing else but God is the real actor and owner of power; 2) 
                                        
527 Chittick, W. „The Five Divine Presences‟, 109. 
528 According to al-Ghazālῑ, the five levels of existence are called as follows: 1) essential 
existence (wujūd al-dhātῑ); 2) sensual existence (wujūd al-ḥissῑ), 3) imaginative existence 
(wujūd al-khayālῑ); 4) intellectual existence (wujūd al-„aqlῑ) and finally, 5) figurative 
existence (wujūd al-shibhῑ). For further details, see Jackson, Sherman A. On the Boundaries 
of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abu Hamid al-Ghazālῑ‟s Fayṣal al-Tafriqa (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Görmez, M. „Gazālῑ Felsefesinde Varlık Mertebeleri Bakımından 
Hadislerin Anlaşılması ve Yorumlanması‟ in Ankara Üniversitesi Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt 
39, Sayı 1 (1999). 
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ashrār (pl.  of sharr) have no real existence and that their reality is non-
existence („adam); 3) none of creation has any influence on God‟s power 
and hence that everything is of equal ease for Him.   
Nursi explains this in the following lines: 
… that is to say, causes have been placed so that the dignity of power may 
be preserved in the superficial view of the mind.  For like the two faces of a 
mirror, everything has an outer face (mulk) that looks to this manifest world, 
which resembles the mirror‟s colored face and may reflect various colors and 
states, and an inner face (malakūt) which looks to its Maker, which resembles 
the mirror‟s shining face.  In the outer face which looks to the manifest world 
may be states incompatible with the dignity and perfection of the Eternally 
Besought One‟s power, so causes have been put to be both the source and 
the means of those states.  But in the inner face, that of reality, which looks 
at their Creator, everything is transparent and beautiful; it is fitting that 
power should itself be associated with it.  It is not incompatible with its 
dignity; therefore causes are purely apparent and in the inner face of things 
and in reality have no true effect.529 
In the light of the above, one reason for the existence of causes is due to 
God‟s mercy to human beings.  Causes serve as a shield between man and 
God‟s sovereignty, power, infallibility and goodness.  They are created in 
order that man does not accuse God directly for any apparent sharr that he 
observes with his superficial mind.  However, according to Nursi these 
causes are influential only in the outer face of things (mulk) which is the 
manifest world.  In reality (malakūt), causes have no true effect, for that is 
the realm of God‟s direct power which is always beautiful and good. 
It is interesting to mention that the Encyclopaedia of Islam mentions mulk 
and malakūt as synonymous to each other and does not explain malakūt any 
further.  No philosophical, mystical or theological reference is given, except 
                                        
529 The Words, 300-301. 
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some verses from the Qur‟ān regarding mulk.530 Nursi however sees a major 
difference in those two terms.  It is two different ways of looking at things.  
Although it seems to be impossible for man to look at the inner face 
(malakūt) of things, the question arises whether it is possible at least to a 
certain extent? Nursi explains that this might be possible, and can be 
achieved through the contemplation (tafakkur) of created things.  For this 
method, which comprises two different ways of looking at things, Nursi 
introduces two new terms which he names manā-e ismī vs. manā-e ḥarfī. 
5.4.1.2 Manā-e ismῑ and manā-e ḥarfῑ 
He states that in forty years of his life and thirty years of education he has 
learned four words/terms (kalima).  Those words are „self-referential‟ (manā-
e ismī); „other-indicative‟ (manā-e ḥarfī); intention (niyyah) and viewpoint 
(naẓar).531 Due to its relevance here, emphasis will be laid on the former two 
terms. 
 Everything has two aspects.  One points to the Creator whereas the other 
points to the being itself.  The latter aspect should be, states Nursi, like a 
very thin curtain or a transparent piece of glass that shows the aspect 
pointing to the Creator behind that curtain.  Hence, “when looking at the 
bounties (ni‟mah), one should be able to see the Blessing-giver (Mun‟īm), 
when looking at all the art, one should see the Artist or Designer (Sānī) and 
when looking at the causes, one should be able to realize and remember the 
Real Causer (Muessir Haqīqī).”532 In other words, according to Nursi, one 
should regard all beings as a meaningful letter, bearing the meaning of 
another (manā-e ḥarfī), on account of their Maker.  In this case, one would 
                                        
530 C.E.  Bosworth; E.  van Donzel; et al.  The Encyclopaedia of Islam, see „Mulk‟. „Malakūt‟ 
is not listed as separate word to look at. 
531 Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol 2, 1297. 
532 Ibid. 
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say „How beautifully they have been made! How exquisitely they point to 
their Maker‟s beauty!‟533 The opposite would be to look at all beings as 
signifiers of themselves (manā-e ismī), that is, to look at them on account of 
themselves as natural philosophy has done.  Instead of appreciating the 
beauty of their Maker, one would say „How beautiful they are,‟ thereby 
making them ugly.534 The concept of manā-e ismī and manā-e ḥarfī will be 
set into relation with khayr and sharr in the discussion of „the soul‟ (ana), 
which can be found in chapter seven. 
This method is similar to that of Ibn Arabī, who talks about a “vision through 
the veil”535; perfect and complete unveiling is thereby impossible for it is a 
divine attribute.  Nursi would share the opinion of Ibn Arabī that no one can 
know the realities exactly as God knows them.  Ibn Arabī, like many other 
Sufis, uses the term al-a‟yān al-thābita to describe the objects of God‟s 
knowledge536.  As soon as these are created with an outer appearance and 
send to the world, they are called fayḍ muqaddas.  The Sunni kalām 
scholars, on the other hand, have called beings within the knowledge of God 
māhiyya and their created versions haqīqa.537  Nursi, on the other hand, 
prefers to use the term „being of knowledge and the unworldly‟ (wujūd „ilmī 
wa manawī) instead of a‟yān thābita and māhiyya; and the term creation 
(makhlūq) or the „circle of power‟ (daira qudra) instead of fayḍ muqaddas 
and haqīqa.    
                                        
533 The Words, 145. 
534 Ibid. 
535 Sufism: A Beginner‟s Guide, 191. 
536 „The Five Divine Presences‟, 112; see also Ebu‟l-Alā Afῑfῑ, „İbn Arabi‟de A‟yan-ı Sabite; 
Mu‟tezili Düşüncede Ma‟dumat‟ in İbn Arabi Ansına (Makaleler), trans. Tahir Uluç (İstanbul: 
İnsan Yayınları, 2002) 
537 Demirli, Ekrem. Sadreddin Konevῑ‟de Bilgi ve Varlık (Istanbul: Iz Yayıncılık, 2005), 337.  
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While at one point Nursi states that everything has two faces, as mentioned 
before (mulk and malakūt), on another occasion he states that the world 
and all things have three faces.538 The first face, states Nursi, looks to the 
Divine Names and is their mirror.  Death, separation, and non-existence 
cannot intrude on this face; instead one is able to find renewal and 
renovation539.   
The second face, as introduced by Nursi, looks to the hereafter.  It serves 
eternity and makes transitory things as though eternal.  Here too, there is 
no death, neither decline but the manifestations of life and eternity.540  
The third face, on the other hand, looks to transient beings.  This face, 
states Nursi, is the beloved of ephemeral beings and those following the 
caprices of their souls; a place of trade for the conscious, an arena of trial 
and examination for those charged with duties.  Since there is death and 
separation in this third face, the cure for the pains and wounds of decline 
and extinction are the manifestations of life and eternity in its inner face. 
To summarize, Nursi states that 
This flood of beings, these travelling creatures, are moving mirrors and 
changing places of manifestation for the renewal of the Necessarily Existent 
One‟s lights of creation and existence.541 
In other words, if one is able to look at any event – be it good or bad from 
his perspective – merely as a manifestation of the Necessarily Existent One‟s 
names and attributes, that is, if one is able to link the third face always with 
the first two faces, it might ultimately help to understand to a certain extend 
how there is beauty in everything that God creates.  For one starts to read 
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539 Ibid. 
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and perceive the many names of his Lord wherever one looks and starts 
building a close relationship (intisāb) with Him.  Everything else but the 
Creator becomes unimportant and transient, their importance thereby lays 
only in them being mirrors of the Divine. 
5.4.2 Non-being (‘adam) 
Non-being is a translation of the Aristotelian term privatio and means the 
absence of existence or being.542 In Aristotelian philosophy, a distinction is 
made between two different kinds of non-existence: absolute non-existence 
versus relative non-existence; the latter meaning either the absence of a 
quality in matter and/or the pure potentiality of matter.543 Since according to 
Aristotle, the absence of a quality contains potentially its opposite, Aristotle‟s 
theory of becoming is based entirely on this concept of privation. In other 
words, all becoming is the actualization of a relative non-existent or 
potential.544 
The existence of the non-existent has been discussed most acutely by the 
Stoics545 and their terminology can be found among the Muslim 
theologians.546 The Mu‟tazilis, for instance, considered non-existence („adam) 
as a thing (shay‟). They asserted that God knew the entities He was going to 
create before the existence of the world. Thus, what He knew had, since He 
                                        
542 Aristotle. Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, Book I.; Gibb, H. A. R.; Kramers, J. H., 
Schacht, J., et al.  The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.  I (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 178. 
543 Aristotle. Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, Book I. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Stoicism is a school of Hellenistic philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium in Athens in the 
early 3rd century BC. Stoics were concerned with the active relationship between cosmic 
determinism and human freedom.  
546 Gibb, H. A. R.; Kramers, J. H., Schacht, J., et al.  The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.  I, 
178. 
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knew it, a certain reality. Creating the world, He gave those entities the 
accident of existence.547  
According to Nursi, there is no absolute non-existence („adam muṭlaq). But 
he addresses in his works seemingly different kinds of non-existence.548 One 
he calls apparent non-existence („adam dhāhirῑ). God gives external 
existence (wujūd ḥarijῑ) to things whose forms are present in His knowledge 
or who exist as knowledge. This can be compared to spreading a special 
liquid over invisible writing in order to reveal it. Through the command „“Be!” 
and it is (kun fa yakūn)‟549 God brings into external existence from apparent 
non-existence things whose plans, programmes, shapes and proportions are 
present in His knowledge.550 Furthermore, states Nursi, non-existence can 
only be apparent if it is put in relation with the all-Knowing God. If the 
Creation of things would be, for instance, referred to different hands and 
causes; since they do not possess comprehensive knowledge, non-existence 
would not be apparent but absolute. And absolute non-existence can in no 
way be the source of existence.551 Thus, according to this kind of apparent 
non-existence, it is used for things that are not or not yet present in the 
visible world and are yet to be given external existence, if God wills. Hence, 
contingent (mumkin) beings, who God decides to bring into this visible world, 
are given external existence whereas those contingents who God decides 
not to create, are left in the knowledge of God, in other words, in apparent 
non-existence.   
                                        
547 Ibid. 
548 These different kinds of non-existence will be elaborated upon in further detail in the 
coming chapters. They have been kept short in this chapter just to provide a summary of 
what Nursi considers to be non-existence. 
549 Qur‟ān, 36:82. 
550 The Rays Collection, 33.  
551 Ibid. 
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Another kind of non-existence, according to Nusi, is disbelief (kufr) since it is 
a denial of the truths of belief. For this, Nursi provides the example of a man 
who is submerged in misguidance and cannot extricate himself. This man, 
who does not believe in God, will also deny the existence of Paradise and 
Hell. However, states Nursi, the existence of Hell is still immeasurably better 
than eternal annihilation552 for man and even animals will receive pleasure at 
the pleasure and happiness of their relatives, offspring and friends.553  
Hence, if a man, out of his disbelief (kufr) does not believe in Hell, he will 
have to accept non-existence not only for himself but for all his loved ones. 
Thus, non-existence is absolute sharr (sharr mahdh) for with the annihilation 
of man together with all his loved ones, it causes pain to man‟s spirit, heart 
and inner nature severer that a thousand Hells.554 Nursi states: 
For if there was no Hell, there would be no Paradise. Through your disbelief, 
everything falls into non-existence. If you go to Hell and remain within the 
sphere of existence, those you love and your relatives will be happy in 
Paradise, or will be recipients of compassion in some respect within the 
spheres of existence. This means you should support the idea of Hell existing. 
To oppose it is to support non-existence, which is to support the elimination 
of innumerable friends‟ happiness.555 
Furthermore, there are also forms of non-existence in the form of existence. 
Egotism is one of them. It is, states Nursi, a form of non-existence that has 
acquired the colour and form of existence due to a mistaken claim of 
ownership. Egotism appears through the lack of knowledge of man‟s mirror-
like being and the imagination of the imaginary to be real.556 The source of 
all beauties, Nursi continues, is existence and the source of all sharr is non-
existence. According to him, the most elevated, most luminous, most 
                                        
552 See also Signs of Miraculousness, 89. 
553 The Rays Collection, 249. 
554 Ibid. 
555 Ibid., 249-250. 
556 Ibid., 90. 
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powerful and farthest from any blemish kind of existence requires a beauty 
that is necessary in being, pre-eternal and everlasting, the firmest and most 
elevated; this kind of existence will express such a beauty and indeed will be 
such as beauty.557 In other words, the lack of awareness that one is merely 
a mirror that reflects the beauty of the Necessary Existent One, which leads 
to egotism, is defined by Nursi as a form of non-existence that has acquired 
the colour and form of existence. For no matter how real a beauty may 
seem, it can never reach the state of absoluteness. Therefore Nursi 
distinguishes between two types of contingent beings. One is being in 
egotism. This kind of being faces non-existence and eventually turns into 
non-existence. The other is non-existence through the abandonment of 
egotism. This faces the Necessarily Existent One (wājib al wujūd) and 
eventually attains existence (wujūd). Thus, states Nursi, “if you strive for 
existence, be nonindulgent so you will find it.”558  
Another form of non-existence is incompetency, in other words, not to fulfill 
one‟s duties. Nursi claims that all faults arise from non-existence or lack of 
ability, or destruction which are all not existent and pertain to non-
existence.559 That is why there is no need for power and strength to perform 
sharr and destruction that pertain to non-existence. Every insignificant 
power or pity act, sometimes even the lack of action may lead to extensive 
destruction and non-existence. 560   
Closely linked with existence (wujūd) is life (ḥayāt) and its purpose.  It is 
necessary to explore how Nursi explains what the purpose of life is, for this 
will generate another basis for the explanation of sharr and its nature. 
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5.5 Life (ḥayāt) and its purpose 
Life (ḥayāt) is the manifestation or mirror of al-Ḥayy, one of the names of 
God, meaning the living.  Al-Tabarῑ says that the word ḥayy describes Him 
who has perpetual life and a permanent existence (baqā) without any initial 
or terminal limit.  Contingent (mumkin) beings, on the other hand, although 
also living, have a life that begins at a definite point and ends at a fixed 
limit.561 Al-Tabarῑ further states that all commentators agree on this.  There 
are however points, where they disagree.  While some argue that al-Ḥayy 
means that God Himself provides for the maintenance of His creatures and 
allots every creature its portion and is therefore living by virtue of His 
management (tadbῑr) of the Universe and not by virtue of Life; others claim 
that He is living by virtue of Life, being one of His attributes.  Others again 
say that it is one of His names.562 Al-Zamakhsharῑ argues that ḥayy describes 
one who has knowledge and power.563 Al-Rāzῑ explains ḥayy by taking up 
Ibn Sῑnā‟s distinction between wājib al-wujūd and mumkin beings.  However, 
contrary to Ibn Sῑnā‟s assertion that the existence of the contingent being 
does necessarily follow from the existence of the necessary being in itself; 
Al-Rāzῑ says that creatures do not necessarily proceed from God: they are 
created by Him in His Wisdom and His Freedom.  This is how ḥayy should be 
understood.564  
Nursi would agree with al-Rāzῑ that God creates beings in His Wisdom and 
His Freedom.  For Nursi, life is the „highest manifestation‟ (jilwa „aẓām (j-l-y) 
                                        
561 Al-Tabarῑ. Jami„ al-bayān 'an ta'wῑl ay al-Qur'ān, ed. Mahmud Muhammad Shakir and 
Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, Vol. 5 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1954-), 386. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Zamakhsharῑ, Abu al-Qāṣim. Al-Kashshāf „an Haqāiq al-Tanzῑl, Vol. 1 (Cairo, 1948), 291. 
564Al-Rāzῑ, Fakhr al-Dῑn. Mafātῑḥ al-ghayb, Vol. 2, Beirut, 307 ff. 
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(„-ẓ-m)) of al-Ḥayy and most „pleasant manifestation‟ (tajallῑ laṭῑf (j-l-y) (l-ṭ-
f)) of al-Muḥyῑ. 
Nursi, commenting on the (Qur‟ān 30:50565; 2:255566), explains al-Ḥayy and 
al-Muḥyῑ in twenty-nine points.567 He looks at life in regard to the universe; 
art (san‟at) and essence (māhiyya); he explains thanks and worship to be 
the result of life and he asserts that life looks to the six articles of faith and 
proves them.  According to Nursi, life not only bears evidence of the oneness 
and unity of God, it also delicately reflects Divine mercy and is a mirror of 
the Divine Attributes and Names.568 
Nursi explains that there are numerous purposes for the existence (wujūd) 
of everything and numerous results for their lives (ḥayāt). These purposes 
and results are not restricted to this world and merely to the „soul‟ (nafs) of 
men, as the people of misguidance might think. The purposes of existence 
and results of the lives of all things relate to three categories.569 
The first category, which is the most exalted one, pertains to the Creator. In 
this category, the purpose of all things is to proclaim, by means of their lives 
and existence, the miracles of power and the traces of artistry of the Maker 
(Sānῑ‟) and display them to the gaze of the Glorious Monarch (Sulṭān dhul-
Jalāl). Since nothing can exist without the Necessarily Existent One (wājib al 
wujūd), and since everything is but a reflection of the Divine Names and 
Attributes of the wājib al wujūd; to live for a fleeting second or even only 
                                        
565 “Behold, then, the marks of God‟s Mercy, how He revives the earth after it was dead.  
He, indeed, is the One Who revives the dead and He has power over everything.” 
566 “God! There is no god but He, the Living, the Everlasting.  Neither slumber nor sleep 
overtakes Him.” 
567 The Flashes Collection, 426. 
568 Ibid., 428. 
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the potentiality and intent for existence570 is enough, without ever emerging 
into life, to remain untouched by vanity and purposelessness.  
The second category for the purpose of existence and result of life pertains 
to conscious creation. Everything is like a missive, displaying truth or a wise 
word of their Maker, offering itself to the gaze of angels, jinn, animals and 
men, desiring to be objects of contemplation and to be read by every 
conscious being that looks upon it.571  
In the third category, on the other hand, the purpose of existence and result 
of life pertains merely to the „soul‟ (nafs) of that thing. Therefore the 
consequence of such being is only minor, such as the experience of pleasure 
and joy, and living with some degree of permanence and comfort.572 
Hence one might say that while the purpose of a thing related to its own 
„soul‟ (nafs) and its worldly existence is one, the purpose related to its Maker 
is hundreds. This is, states Nursi, how apparent opposites such as divine 
wisdom (ḥikmah) and economy (iqtiṣād) is perfectly compatible with divine 
liberality (jūd) and infinite generosity (sehā). While on the individual level, 
liberality and generosity predominate, in universal purpose wisdom 
predominates and the name of all-Wise (Ḥakῑm) is manifested.573 Thus 
everything, including the purpose of the fruits of a tree can be divided into 
the three categories that have been established above. 
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571 The Words, 86. 
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 163 
 
5.5.1 The two faces of life: mulk and malakūt 
The two faces of everything, namely mulk and malakūt has been mentioned 
before.  Nursi argues that these two faces of life are shining, elevated and 
without dirt or defect.  Nursi further claims that life is an exceptional being 
(makhlūq), on which both faces, apparent causes veiling the disposal of 
Divine power have not been placed, as it is the case with other things 
(shay‟).574 This could be accepted with malakūt, the inner face that is the 
reality of being; but what about mulk, being the outer face, visible to human 
beings? How can that face be free from any apparent causes? If Divine 
power is directly visible in both faces of life, would this not mean that 
everyone should believe in God? 
5.5.1.1 The face of „mulk‟ in things (ashyā) and the purpose of apparent 
causes 
Nursi explains that everything in the universe is good and beautiful with very 
minor sharr and ugliness (kubh), only for the purpose of being a unit of 
measurement, showing the degrees of khayr and beauty (ḥusn).  In this 
regard, states Nursi, sharr becomes khayr and kubh turns into ḥusn.575  
However, to the superficial view of conscious beings, apparent ugliness, 
badness, disasters and calamities can very likely lead to complaints and 
anger.  In order for these complaints and angers not to be directed to the 
Ever-Living and Self-Subsistent One (dhāt ḥayy qayyūm) and so that the 
contact of sacred, pure Divine power with apparently vile and filthy things 
should not offend the dignity of power, apparent causes have been made a 
veil to those disposals of power.  These causes, states Nursi, cannot create, 
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but function as a target of unjust complaints and objections.576 For example 
Azra‟il (the angel of death) as well as other causes function as apparent veils 
so that the anger and complaints of those who do not see the true, beautiful 
face of death are not directed to the Ever-Living and Self-Subsistent One.577 
5.5.1.2 The face of „mulk‟ in life (ḥayāt) 
On the other hand, life, that is also created (makhlūq), has no such apparent 
minor sharr to it, states Nursi, neither on the inner (malakūt) nor the outer 
(mulk) face.  Since there is nothing to invite complaints or objections, these 
faces of life have been surrendered directly, without veil, to the hand of the 
„life-giving, restoring, resurrecting‟ Name of the Ever-Living Self-Subsistent 
One – just as it is with light (nūr), being (wujūd) and „giving of being‟ 
(ῑjād).578 
Furthermore Nursi emphasizes that since life is the most important result 
and fruit of the universe, and at the same time the purpose of its creation, it 
certainly is not restricted to this fleeting, brief, deficient, painful worldly 
life.579  Thus, the aim and result of this tree of life, states Nursi, ought to be 
eternal life, life in the Hereafter. 
5.6 Life after death 
Faith in a life after death is a vital part of the problem of sharr.  Nursi 
explains by means of God‟s Divine Names and Attributes twelve reasons why 
there must be an afterlife. According to Nursi, the Divine Names and 
Attributes indicate, show and logically require the existence of the hereafter. 
                                        
576 Ibid. 
577 Ibid. 
578 Ibid., 429-30. 
579 Ibid., 431. 
 165 
 
This is because compared to the Names and Attributes that are absolute, 
man in this world can have only  
a taste of that generosity, enough to whet his appetite but not to satiate him, 
and only a dim light coming from the perfection, or rather a faint shadow of 
its light, without in any way being fully satisfied. It follows then, that man is 
going toward a place of eternal joy where all will be bestowed on him in full 
measure.580  
God‟s dominicality (rubūbiyyah) and sovereignty (saltanāt), under His Divine 
Name the Sustainer (Rab), are reflected in the cosmos in order to display His 
perfections along with their lofty aims and elevated purposes.  All this, states 
Nursi in the First Truth, requires the establishment of a reward for those 
who, through faith and worship, respond to these aims and purposes and 
punishment for those who treat His purposes with rejection and scorn.581 
In the Second Truth, Nursi points out all animate being‟s form of sustenance, 
thereby emphasizing the nourishment of the weakest and most powerless, 
who are being sustained in the best form.  This, states Nursi, is the 
manifestation of God‟s generosity and bounty, reflecting the Divine Names of 
Generous (Karῑm) and Merciful (Raḥῑm).582 After providing plenty of 
examples, Nursi concludes that God makes Himself known to man with all 
His well-ordered works and expects recognition through worship from man 
whom He has endowed with the most important capacities.  Furthermore, 
Nursi continues, God makes Himself beloved of man through the numerous 
adorned fruits of His mercy and expects man to make himself beloved of 
God through worship.  God also demonstrates His love and mercy to man 
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through variegated bounties and expects to be respected by man with 
thanks and with praise.583  
Hence a place of requital for those who fail to recognize Him and a realm of 
reward and eternal bliss for those believers who respond to the Merciful and 
Compassionate One in faith, thanks and veneration is necessary and 
conceivable.584  Nursi justifies this as follows: 
... There must therefore be a realm of blessedness appropriate to that 
generosity and worthy of that mercy. One would otherwise have to deny the 
existence of the sun that fills every day with its light. For irrevocable death 
would transform compassion into disaster, love into affliction, blessing into 
vengeance, intellect into a tool of misery, and pleasure into pain, so that the 
very essence of God‟s mercy would vanish.  
There must in addition be a realm of punishment, appropriate to God‟s glory 
and dignity. For generally the oppressor leaves this world while still in 
possession of his might, and the oppressed while still subject to humiliation. 
These matters are therefore deferred for the attention of a supreme tribunal; 
it is not that they are neglected...585 
The second paragraph is in particular important for the purpose of this study, 
for it offers justice for those in pain who have been afflicted with different 
sorts of sharr, particularly committed by other fellow human beings.  
As has been illustrated in the first two truths, Nursi explores and links the 
existence of an afterlife with the Divine Names and Attributes of the Creator, 
such as the Wise (Ḥakῑm); the Just („Ādil); the Generous (Jawād); the 
Beautiful (Jamῑl) in relation with beauty (jamāl); the Answerer of Prayer 
(Mujῑb); the Compassionate (Raḥῑm); the Glorious (Jalῑl) in relation with 
splendour (ḥashmat); the Eternal (Bāqῑ); the Preserver (Ḥafῑẓ); the Guardian 
(Raqῑb); the Beautiful (Jamῑl) in relation with promise (wa‟ad); the Glorious 
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(Jalῑl) in relation with threat (wa‟ῑd); the Eternally Living and Self-Subsistent 
(Ḥayyul Qayyūm); the Giver of Life (Muḥy) and Giver of Death (Mumῑt); and 
the Truth (Ḥaqq).586 Henceforward, those aspects that are relevant to the 
current topic will be elaborated upon in further detail. 
5.6.1 The Wise and Just 
In the beginning of this chapter it has been said that Nursi (in accordance 
with the Qur‟ān) defines disbelief (kufr) as sharr. Hence, with the guidance 
of Ḥakῑm and „Ādil, he states that it is indeed possible that those disbelieving 
in God‟s wisdom and justice and rebel against Him in insolence should be 
chastised. True justice, according to Nursi, requires that man should be 
rewarded and punished, not in accordance with his pettiness, but in 
accordance with the magnitude of his crime, the importance of his nature 
and the greatness of his function as human being.587 However, he continues, 
not even a thousandth part of that wisdom and justice is exercised with 
respect to man in this transient world; it is rather deferred.588 Since most of 
the misguided leave this world unpunished and most guided leave it 
unrewarded; all things must be postponed for a supreme tribunal, and 
ultimate bliss.589 
5.6.2 The Glorious and Eternal 
With the names the Glorious (Jalῑl) and Eternal (Bāqῑ), Nursi points out the 
transient nature of everything, despite their high value and most exalted and 
beautiful artistry. The fact that the life span of everything is so short implies, 
states Nursi, that everything is only a sample, a form of something else; 
                                        
586 Ibid., 74-102.  
587 Ibid., 78. 
588 Ibid., 77. 
589 Ibid. 
 168 
 
thus it functions as a pointer to the authentic and original objects to be 
found in a place eternal and everlasting.590 Someone who has truly 
understood the wisdom behind this will not be afflicted with loss and 
calamities, for he will always see this world, including himself, subject to 
fade and reunification with the Eternal (Bāqῑ). There must then be a 
different purpose of these adornments of high value and brief duration; that 
is, according to Nursi, for instruction in wisdom, for arousing gratitude, and 
for encouraging men to seek out the perpetual originals of which they are 
copies.591 
How the name of the Eternal (Bāqῑ) is manifested in everything and how 
everything is created for eternity can be understood by everything‟s 
annihilation with only one aspect and its remaining eternal with numerous 
other aspects. Nursi gives the example of a flower that lives for a short 
period of time and then 
hides behind the veil of annihilation. That flower goes leaving its apparent 
form in the memory of everything that sees it, its inner essence in every 
seed. 592 
From this example Nursi explains how a human being as the highest form of 
life and possessor of soul, should be closely tied to eternity. Thus Nursi 
points out that the annihilation of the visible body of a being is only one 
aspect of that being. There are numerous other aspects, such as the soul of 
man which possesses an extremely exalted and comprehensive nature, that 
do not annihilate and that are eternal. 
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5.6.3 The Preserver and Guardian 
Another very important Divine Name that is related to the problem of sharr 
pertains to the Preserver (Ḥafῑẓ). According to this Name, everything is 
preserved with the utmost order and balance. Nursi states that God “causes 
all things to be preserved in mirrors pertaining to both the outer and inner 
worlds. To demonstrate the universality and comprehensiveness of the law 
of preservation, Nursi provides the example of the memory of man, the fruit 
of the tree, the kernel of the fruit or the seed of the flower.593  Likewise, 
states Nursi, if God cares to preserve such impermanent and insignificant 
things, He will as well preserve the deeds and actions of man who has been 
given the lofty disposition of humanity, the rank of the supreme vicegerency, 
and the duty of bearing the Divine Trust.594 The importance of this Attribute 
of God in regards to the problem of sharr can be seen in the following lines: 
... the Master of all creation devotes great care to the orderliness of all things 
that come to pass in His realm. He pays great attention to the function of 
sovereignty, and lavishes extreme care on the dominicality of kingship. Thus 
He records, or causes to be recorded, the pettiest of happenings, the smallest 
of services, and preserves in numerous things the form of everything that 
happens in His realm. This attribute of Preserver indicates that an important 
register of deeds will be subjected to a precise examination and weighing: the 
records of men‟s deeds will stand revealed...595 
In other words, as a result of this kind of precise preservation no deed and 
action gets lost. The smallest injustice on earth is recorded and will be asked 
about. And since man is mostly not called into account and judged in fitting 
fashion while in this world, it follows that he must proceed to a Supreme 
Tribunal and a final felicity.596 
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Nursi concludes that  
such a manifestation of life, which is the light emitted by the sun of eternal 
life, cannot be limited to this Manifest World, this present time, this external 
existence.  On the contrary, each world receives the manifestation of that 
light in accordance with its capacity, and the cosmos together with all its 
worlds is alive and illuminated through it.  Otherwise, as the misguided 
imagine, beneath a temporary and apparent life, each world would be a vast 
and terrible corpse, a dark ruin.597 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed some topics that form the basis for the problem 
of sharr. Every issue in Islam is linked primarily with the main articles of 
faith, being God‟s Oneness (tawhῑd) and an eternal life after death (ḥashr). 
Thus it has been considered most relevant to tackle these issues in this 
chapter before proceeding to the other topics. 
The concept of tawhῑd has been discussed in relation to the Divine Names 
and Attributes of God as well as the understanding of „declaring 
incomparability‟ (tanzih) and „affirming similarity‟ (tashbih), or in other words, 
God‟s nearness (qurb) to His creation and contingent being‟s distance to 
their Creator (bu‟d). A relation has been established between tashbih and 
tanzih/qurb and bu‟d and the treatment of khayr and sharr.  While sharr is 
inherent to the universe in respect to tanzih, khayr is inherent to the 
universe in respect to tashbih. The former, it has been said, suggests that 
the universe has nothing of khayr since God alone is absolute khayr and 
totally other than the universe; the latter points out that the universe is 
khayr through God‟s khayr as much as creation is able to reflect God‟s signs 
and activity in the cosmos. Since nothing can reflect the Divine attribute of 
khayr absolutely, it follows that all things are both khayr and sharr.  
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Furthermore, the concept of faith (ῑmān) has been included into this chapter. 
Thereby, it has been discussed whether a theodicy without faith, in other 
words, anthropodicy, is possible or not. After emphasizing the essentiality of 
establishing a connection with the Creator, ways towards that establishment 
have been suggested through the removal of the veil of commonplace.  
Being (wujūd) and non-being („adam) has been introduced as an elementary 
aspect for the understanding of the existence and essence of sharr as 
explained by Nursi.  It has been said that according to Nursi, non-being is 
pure sharr (sharr al mahdh) whereas being is pure good (khayr al mahdh). 
In relation to being (wujūd), terms such as Necessarily Existent (wājib al 
wujūd), impossible (mumtanῑ) and contingent/possible (mumkin) have been 
introduced. Additionally, the two aspects of being, namely mulk and malakūt 
have entered the discussion.  
In order to better understand the reason for the existence of apparent sharr, 
the discussion of life (ḥayāt) and its purpose has been deemed suitable. 
How life and its purpose relate to three different things, such as to the 
Creator, to conscious creation and to the „soul‟ (nafs) has been explained 
further. Already the arguments on life have shown the necessity to a life 
after death, which has been also included into this chapter. Divine names 
such as the Wise and Just, the Glorious and Eternal as well as the Preserver 
and Guardian have confirmed their own necessity to form a basis for the 
understanding of sharr. 
From this point onwards, the next chapters will deal mostly directly with the 
problem of sharr in the Risale. 
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6 The Nature of Evil according to the Risale-i Nur 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter as well as chapter 7 will discuss again the questions that have 
been raised regarding sharr so far in this study and an attempt will be made 
to try to answer these questions – this time from the perspective of the 
Risale. The reader will realize that there is not only one ultimate answer to 
the problem of sharr. The Risale offers several answers and each of them 
need to be considered and taken into account. Each one of them looks at 
the problem from a different perspective and provides what Nursi describes 
as respective remedies. To be satisfied at the end, one needs to see the 
whole picture and look at all remedies as a whole. 
The current chapter will illustrate how Nursi approaches the problem from 
different angles, thereby using well known theories, but nevertheless 
combining these theories with aspects that are original to the Risale. Nursi 
partially shares the theory of privatio boni, and employs the theory of „the 
best of all possible worlds‟, „world of duality‟, and „principle of plenitude‟ in 
his own way. He furthermore discusses the necessity of minor ashrār as a 
test, in relation to the creation of Paradise and Hell, in terms of calamities 
and inflicts as well as natural disasters. Additionally, he explains why Satan 
has been created. Establishing a relation between sharr and worship, he 
creates a new theological concept that he calls „negative worship‟.  
Thus the questions that will be addressed in this current chapter are as 
follows: What is the nature of sharr? Does sharr exist? How can sharr be 
reconciled with God‟s Omnipotence; in other words, why does God allow 
sharr to exist? Why did God create Satan knowing that he will misguide so 
many human beings? Why does the world exist of dualities and what is the 
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purpose of all this? Is this world perfect or imperfect; in other words, could 
there be a more perfect world than already exists? What is the relationship 
between sharr and worship? 
Nursi takes on the Qur‟anic concept of the Names and Attributes of God as a 
major aspect in his works. One might say that He employs this conviction in 
nearly every area of theology and philosophy.598 Thus, in Nursi‟s conception, 
theodicy as well is completely based on the Divine Names. In this respect, 
he establishes a close relationship between theodicy and the Divine Names 
of God.599 It is crucial to understand this concept for it is also closely linked 
with the doctrine of tawhῑd, the absolute Oneness of God. It is the idea that 
there is unity in diversity. Every single creation, from an atom to the stars in 
the universe, manifests the Divine Names and Attributes of God. This 
includes God‟s Beauteous (jamālῑ) as well as His Glorious (jalālῑ) Names. 
Every one of them as well as together in unity, form a (what shall be called) 
„Divine Mosaic‟ and point to their Creator, the owner of those particular 
Divine Names. Thus one might say that Nursi‟s theology as well as his 
ontology is based on the Divine Names. 
Nursi upholds the idea of al-Maturidῑ‟s wisdom-centric approach to the 
problem of sharr600 without discarding at the same time His absolute Justice, 
Power and Will. Nursi would agree that there is an infinite wisdom behind 
                                        
598 The employment of the divine names and attributes is not particular to Nursi‟s works. 
The study of divine names is implicit in Islamic thought because it is the connecting thread 
of the Qur‟ān. Thus, one might say that the majority of theological thinking of Islam 
revolves around the divine names revealed in scripture.  
599 Nursi might have borrowed the Divine Names concept from Ibn „Arabῑ, who states that 
there is no existent possible thing in everything other than God that is not connected to the 
divine relationships and lordly realities (al-ḥaqā‟iq al-rabbāniyya) known as the Most 
Beautiful Names (Ibn „Arabῑ. Al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, Vol. II, Chapter 73, 115.27). Ibn „Arabi 
extensively explains the relationship between the Divine Names and the Real (al-ḥaqq) as 
well as the creation or contingent beings.  
600 Al-Maturidῑ‟s view on sharr in relation to wisdom (ḥikmah) has been discussed in chapter 
3 of this study. 
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the creation of sharr and we can know only as much of it as our wisdom 
allows. 
It has been said in the beginning of this study that there are two main 
approaches to the problem of evil. One is monism, the other bitheism. 
Hence, the starting point will be to discuss the notion of bitheism a bit closer 
to then proceed with major principles of the Risale regarding sharr. 
6.2 The Notion of Bitheism 
It stands to reason that any kind of dualism or bitheism is rejected in the 
Risale. The notion that there are two entities, good and evil, that are 
completely opposed to each other and that evil can be overcome only 
through one destroying the other, implies two different ideas. One idea is 
that there is a good entity called God and an evil entity called Satan. These 
two entities are in constant struggle with each other. This idea suggests that 
Satan has also creative power, just as God has. However, Nursi states that 
Satan and its followers do not interfere in creation and they can have no 
share in Divine sovereignty. Furthermore, they do not carry out those works 
such as the varieties of unbelief, misguidance, sharr and destruction, 
through any power or ability; what seems to look like power is rather neglect 
and abstaining from action. It is the commitment of sharr through not 
allowing khayr to be done, that is they become sharr.601 It will be explained 
later that since “bad and sharr are a sort of destruction, their causes do not 
have to be an existent power and active creativity. Rather, vast destruction 
comes about through one command pertaining to non-existence („adam) and 
one condition being spoilt.”602  In the light of the above, Nursi criticizes the 
bitheism of the Zoroastrians and Manicheans. According to him, the 
                                        
601 The Flashes Collection, 103. 
602 Ibid.,107. 
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imaginary god of evil which they called Ahriman, was Satan, the cause for 
ashrār through the power of free choice  (ikhtiyār al-juz‟ῑ) and non-creational 
acquisition (kasb).603 
The second kind of dualism, which is called „internal dualism‟ suggests that 
God is infinitely good and at the same time the source of surd evil. The 
solution offered by this second kind of dualism to the problem of evil is 
called by E. S. Brightman „theistic finitism‟. According to this solution, God‟s 
being is responsible for evil, though not God‟s will. God intrinsically resists it, 
but it is not something God chooses.604 Brightman‟s God is thus a finite God 
who did the best that He could and therefore was a more suitable object of 
worship – this notion was better than an unlimited God who could do away 
with all evils but chooses not to do so; who allows such evils to go 
unchecked and its victims go uncomforted.605  
Dilley does not think that it is a problem to believe in a finite God who will 
have no ultimate control over everything and who will not be able to 
guarantee that its experiment in trying to shape matter could not have an 
unhappy end.606 This is because Dilley argues that what happens to the 
world of matter has never been important for traditional theodicies or 
defenses of God. Dilley further asks whether theodicies or defenses of God 
have in mind any specific outcome as to the natural world or human history 
as part of their solution to the problem of evil.607 While he claims that 
theodicists of a God of unlimited power always offer eschatological solutions 
                                        
603 Ibid. The notion of free choice (ikhtiyār al-juz‟ῑ) and acquisition (kasb) will be discussed 
in chapter 7. 
604 F. B. Dilley. „A Finite God Reconsidered‟ in International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, Vol 47, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), 33. 
605 Ibid. 
606 Ibid., 35. 
607 Ibid., 36. 
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to the problem of evil rather than finding solutions under the conditions of 
history.  Furthermore, according to scholars such as Crombie, Mitchell and 
Hick theodicy works independently of what happens to the material world, it 
is a matter of what happens to souls in the hereafter.608 Thus Dilley asks 
what difference it makes to traditional theodicists whether a finite God 
ultimately controls the destiny of matter, if the success of unlimited God 
theodicies does not depend on what happens to matter.609  
Dilley criticizes the notion of an unlimited God who could do away with all 
evils but chooses not to do so and who allows such evils to go unchecked 
and its victims go uncomforted. On the other hand, he also criticizes 
theodicists of typically offering eschatological solutions to the problem of evil. 
Thus, he defends the belief in a finite God, who at least tries his best to 
prevent evils to happen. It seems that Dilley would like to see that victims 
are comforted in this world, and if possible immediately, or even better, that 
they do not become victims at all. The fact that a comfort in the hereafter 
seems to be too „classical‟ of an answer is because it is too far in the future. 
Human beings always prefer an immediate gain or comfort over a belated 
one. Nursi provides a very vast response to the necessity of the existence of 
a hereafter and the comfort it brings to victims in the Tenth Word of his 
work The Words. That a firm eschatological belief is one of the basic 
elements in dealing with the problem of sharr has been explained in Chapter 
5 of this study. 
According to Nursi, the world of matter is of utter importance for every 
single material being has a very important duty to fulfill in terms of being the 
manifestation of God‟s absolute Divine Names. What will happen to the 
                                        
608 Ibid. 
609 Ibid., 37. 
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world of matter is explained by Nursi in his treatise on the „world of duality‟, 
also covered in this current chapter.  
Furthermore, Nursi refers his reader in relation to the co-eternity of matter 
with God, to the scholars of religion and theology (kalām), stating that they 
have proven that matter is not eternal.  Nursi himself also explains this 
through the principles of contingency (imkān) and createdness (ḥudūth).610 
Since this issue is outside the scope of this study, it will not be discussed 
further. 
Now, it has been seen above that the absoluteness of God‟s power has 
particularly become a problem in relation to the problem of evil. The fact 
that God does not lift evil although He has the power to do so has maybe 
drawn man to be satisfied with a God Who has limited power but Who does 
the best He can to prevent evil. Nursi provides the following explanations of 
how God‟s infinite power should be imagined. 
6.3 The All-Powerful (qadῑr) 
The idea of a limited God has been asserted by scholars such as Plato, Ibn 
Rushd611, John Stuart Mill, Samuel Alexander, William James, Alfred North 
Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. This study 
will touch on the absoluteness of God‟s Power (qadῑr muṭlaq). This hopefully 
will then show that, according to Nursi, God‟s power does not have to be 
limited in order to justify the existence of sharr. 
                                        
610 For more information regarding this, see The Rays Collection, 163 ff; Signs of 
Miraculousness, 163 ff; see also The Words, pp. 287-318; 619-723; The Letters, pp. 264-
307. 
611 While G. F. Hourani asserts that Ibn Rushd was a defender of early Platonism, believing 
that evil came about because of matter and not because of God, Oliver Leaman suggested 
that Ibn Rushd was rather an Aristotelian, defending the continuity of matter. For more 
information, see chapter 3 of this study.  
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Nursi explains that the Qur‟anic verse “Your creation and your resurrection is 
but like a single soul”612 proclaims God‟s perfect power, explaining that 
nothing at all is difficult for Him and that the greatest things and the 
smallest are the same in relation to His power.613 But how is one to 
understand that impotence and feebleness cannot intervene in God‟s power? 
And what does it mean that no obstacles can ever become interpenetrated 
with it? Furthermore, how can one explain that in God‟s power, particulars 
are equal to universals and minor things are like comprehensive ones? These 
three principles will now be explained in further detail. 
Regarding the first point, Nursi emphasizes that Pre-Eternal Power is of 
necessity intrinsic to the Essence and can in no way be separated from it.614 
If something exists in its essence, it cannot be affected by its opposite. Thus, 
since power is essential to the Divine, the Essence which necessitates that 
power cannot be affected by impotence or feebleness, the opposite to power. 
In fact, the degrees of existence of a thing occur through the intervention of 
its opposites.615 If one takes a look at contingent (mumkun) beings, one is 
able to see that everything exists together with its opposites. There is hot 
and cold and the degrees of heat come about through the intervention of 
cold; there is beauty and its degrees occur through the existence of ugliness, 
etc. Contingent beings have innumerable degrees in all of their attributes 
because qualities such as warmth and beauty are not inherent, natural and 
necessary. They are influenced by their opposites and through this influence 
the existence of degrees, diversity, variance and change arose in the 
world.616 Since impotence cannot intervene in that essential power, there 
                                        
612 Qur‟ān, 31:28. 
613 The Words, 545. 
614 Ibid., 546. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Ibid. 
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can be no degrees in it. It follows then, that for such an absolute power that 
has no degrees and that no kind of feebleness or impotence can affect, all 
things that it decrees will be the same in relation to the absolute.617 In this 
respect, God is indeed able to lift all ashrār from this world. But as it has 
been mentioned above, things‟ degrees are known through their opposites. 
Those opposites are called by Nursi „units of measurement‟, and by others, 
they have come to be known as evil.618  
In regards to the second point which states that no obstacles can ever 
become interpenetrated with Divine Power, Nursi states that Divine power is 
related to the inner face (malakūt) of things. As it has been explained in 
chapter 5, Nursi states that the universe has two faces like a mirror. One is 
its external face (mulk), resembling the coloured face of the mirror. 
Everything here exits with its opposites, such as beautiful and ugly, khayr 
and sharr, big and small, difficult and easy, etc. These matters which are 
called apparent causes have been made a veil to the disposal of Divine 
Power,  
so that the hand of power should not appear to the mind to be directly 
concerned with matters that on the face of it are insignificant or unworthy. 
For majesty and dignity require it to be thus.619  
However, Nursi continues, causes have no true effect for the Unity of 
Oneness requires that they have none. 
The other face of the universe is called the inner face (malakūt) which looks 
to its Creator.620 This aspect faces its creator without any causes or 
                                        
617 Ibid. 
618 The notion of „unit of measurement‟ will be elaborated upon later in this chapter. 
619 Ibid., 547. 
620 Ibid. 
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intermediary, thus, obstacles cannot interfere in it. In this respect, he says, a 
particle becomes brother to the sun. In conclusion of this point, Nursi states: 
Divine power is both simple, and infinite, and essential. The place connected 
to Divine power has neither intermediary, nor stain, nor is it the scene of 
rebellion. Therefore, within the sphere of Divine power great does not take 
pride of place over small. The community does not take preference over the 
individual. Universals cannot expect more from Divine power than 
particulars.621 
In the third point Nursi explains how in God‟s power, particulars can be 
equal to universals and minor things can be like comprehensive ones. He 
states that Divine power‟s relation is according to certain laws that are like 
mysteries in the universe. These mysteries, Nursi calls ‟transparency‟, 
„reciprocity‟, „balance‟, „order‟, „disengagedness‟ and „obedience‟. All of these 
six mysteries or laws will be shortly described. What can be derived from 
these examples and mysteries is firstly that lifting the hardship of a single 
particle is of same ease to the Creator as lifting the burden or calamity of a 
whole country or continent; secondly, that God‟s Beauteous (jamālῑ) and 
Glorious (jalālῑ) Names, that are all absolute, will be manifest and reflected 
in creation to the amount of the thing‟s ability and capacity.  
6.3.1 Mystery of Transparency (shafāfiyah) 
To explain this mystery, Nursi uses the analogy of the sun. The sun‟s image 
and reflection can be seen and is displayed on the whole surface of the sea 
as well as on every single drop of the sea. If the whole surface of the globe 
was composed of varying fragments of glass and exposed to the sun, Nursi 
continues, every single piece of glass as well as the globe‟s entire surface 
would manifest the sun‟s reflection in the same way, without being divided 
                                        
621 Ibid. 
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into pieces or being diminished.622 If the sun would possess willpower and 
willed to confer the radiance of its light and image of its reflection, the 
degree of difficulty would be the same between conferring its radiance to 
the whole surface on the earth and conferring it on a single particle.623  
6.3.2 Mystery of Reciprocity (muqābala) 
For this Nursi gives the example of human beings forming all together a 
form of a circle and each one of them holding a mirror in their hands. At the 
centre of that circle stands another individual with a candle in her hand. The 
radiance and manifestation reflected in all the mirrors surrounding the 
central point will be the same, and its reflection will be without obstacle, 
fragmentation or being diminished.624  
6.3.3 Mystery of Balance (mawāzanah) 
Nursi asks his reader to imagine a huge and very sensitive and accurate 
scale. Whatever is placed in its two pans, be it suns, stars, mountains, eggs 
or even particles, it will require the same force to raise one pan of those 
huge sensitive scales to the sky and lower the other to the ground.625  
6.3.4 Mystery of Order (al-niẓām) 
For this Nursi compares the turning of a huge ship with that of a toy boat. 
Both are of same ease, states Nursi. 
                                        
622 Ibid. 
623 Ibid., 547-548. 
624 Ibid., 548. 
625 Ibid. 
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6.3.5 Mystery of Disengagedness (tajarrud) 
For example, states Nursi, a nature disengaged from individuality regards all 
particulars from the smallest to the greatest as the same and enters them 
without being diminished or fragmented.626 In other words, God‟s essence is 
not like any other essence. It is not of the same kind as the universe. It is 
rather abstract and its essence is flawless. Thus, nothing in the universe can 
influence God or can restrain Him. In this context, to be disengaged means 
to be purified from something. For instance, to be a fish requires to be 
limited to many attributes and restrictions pertaining to fish. A fish cannot 
live without food, it cannot live outside of water and, because it is limited to 
a certain body, cannot be at the same time in more than one place. These 
kinds of attributes are essential and indispensible for fish no matter whether 
small or big. Thus there is no difference between a big fish and a small fish, 
so long as both aren‟t purified from the above attributes and restrictions. 
From this point of view, none of them can dominate or rule over the other. 
God‟s power is not of the same kind as the universe. In other words, it is 
purified from the attributes and restrictions of the universe. Thus, any 
restriction that is in the universe does in no way bind God‟s attribute of 
Power. In respect to God‟s absolute Power, creating and ruling over a small 
fish is exactly the same as creating and ruling over a big whale.  
6.3.6 Mystery of Obedience (ṭā’ah) 
Just as a commander causes an individual to advance with one command, in 
the same way does he cause a whole army to advance with the same 
command. Nursi explains this mystery further with an example that will be of 
particular importance in chapter 7, for it explains the creation of human 
                                        
626 Ibid. 
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actions after his inclination. Everything in the universe, states Nursi, has a 
point of perfection (kamāl), and everything has an inclination towards that 
point.627 When inclination increases, it turns into need; and when need 
increases, in becomes desire; increased desire, on the other hand, turns into 
attraction. All of these, attraction, desire, need and inclination are each 
seeds and kernels which together with the essence (māhiyya) of things 
conform to the creative commands (awāmir takwinῑ)628 of Almighty God.629 
Nursi continues: 
The absolute perfection of the true nature of contingent beings is absolute 
existence. Their particular perfections are an existence peculiar to each which 
makes each being‟s abilities emerge from the potential to the actual. Thus, 
the obedience of the whole universe to the command “Be!” is the same as 
that of a particle, which is like a single soldier. Contained all together in the 
obedience and conformity of contingent beings to the pre-eternal command 
of “Be!” proceeding from the Pre-Eternal will are inclination, need, and 
attraction, which are also manifestations of Divine Will.630 
This last mystery, in fact, might also serve as a response to Aristotle‟s 
„principle of continuity‟ which has been discussed under the sub-heading 
„The Principle of Plenitude‟. Nursi has suggested twelve principles with which 
he intends to explain the existence, nature and reason for sharr. 
6.4 Principles of the Risale regarding khayr and sharr 
The following metaphysical631 principles that are spread all over the Risale 
will help to structure the issue and then elaborate on them for a better 
understanding. These principles have first been enumerated in Izzet Coban‟s 
                                        
627 Ibid. 
628 Creative commands (awāmir takwinῑ) are commands that God placed into creation. It is 
an umbrella term for innate laws as well as God‟s customs (adatullah), such as the burning 
of fire, the freezing of water or the shooting of seeds.  
629 Ibid. 
630 Ibid., 548-549. 
631 Metaphysical in the sense that it is based on abstract and theoretical reasoning. 
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„Nursi on Theodicy: A New Theological Perspective‟ and have been 
elaborated in this thesis in a major way. These principles are all derived from 
within the Risale and as such form an implicit methodology and framework 
from within Nursian discourse and his exegesis. In this respect, these 
principles form the heart and foundation, so to say, of the Nursian 
understanding of sharr. To have a system in it, the structure will start with 
existence (wujūd) and non-existence („adam) and then will be followed by 
the notion of khayr and sharr. 
1. Principle: Any existence (wujūd) requires an existent cause.632 In other 
words, it is based on one or more causes which have an actual reality. 
All necessary causes need to combine in order for something to come 
into existence. Non-existence („adam), on the other hand, is dependent 
upon non-existential things. The non-existence of a thing may take place 
through the non-existence („adam) of only one of all its conditions and 
causes. 
2. Principle: There is no absolute non-existence („adam al-muṭlaq) in the 
universe. Everything, states Nursi, has a sort of existence in Divine 
Knowledge („ilm ilāhῑ) even before it has been created. After its creation, 
it has an external existence and enters the „realm or circle of causes‟ 
(which is this present world) and after that thing dies or ceases to exist, 
it goes back to the Divine Knowledge which is an apparent, but not an 
absolute non-existence („adam).633 
                                        
632 The Flashes Collection, 106. This is not valid for the Necessarily Existent One (wājib al-
wujūd). His existence is not dependent on any cause. He is the Pre- and Post-Eternal One 
without Whose existence nothing else can exist. In other words, the existence of anything is 
dependent on His existence. 
633 Letters, 340. 
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3. Principle: Serves as an ontological relationship. Nursi most likely 
borrowed this principle from Ibn Sῑnā.634 It links existence (wujūd) with 
goodness (khayr) and non-existence („adam) with sharr. It states that 
existence is pure good (wujūd khayr al-mahdh) whereas non-existence 
is pure sharr („adam sharr al-mahdh).635 From this relationship, the other 
principles derive. 
4. Principle: Sharr is non-existential („adamῑ) in nature and arises from non-
existence („adam).636 It has been said before that the non-existence of a 
thing may take place through the non-existence („adam) of only one of 
all its conditions and causes. Thus, it follows that sharr occurs through 
the non-existence of one of the causes that would be necessary for 
something to exist.637 One might give the following example: in order for 
every child to be safe, all causes would have to gather (that is to say for 
instance every single human being would have to be morally pure and 
ethically equipped). If one of the causes does not exist (if one person is 
morally and ethically spoilt), child abuse can occur. Nursi gives more 
than one reason for sharr being non-existent in nature and having non-
existence as its cause. The first reason is rather ontological whereas the 
second reason is related to free will. 
From an ontological perspective, for anything to exist in this world, as 
has been stated in the first principle, all the necessary causes need to 
join together and be existent.638 For a flower to grow, the conditions of 
                                        
634 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟a Theodicy, 65-66. 
635 The Flashes Collection, 106. 
636 Ibid., 103-104; 106. 
637 This point of Nursi is almost identical with Ibn Sῑnā‟s definition of essential evil, which, 
according to Ibn Sῑnā, requires some sort of cause. It is thus the privation of being, albeit 
not an absolute privation („adam muṭlaq). Nursi shares Ibn Sῑnā‟s view, that absolute 
privation or, in other words, absolute non-existence, is not possible. For more information, 
see The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟a Theodicy, 67 ff.  
638 The Flashes Collection, 106. 
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water, air, soil and sunlight need to exist. For a flame, a match, an 
inflammable matter and air are the conditions. If there is the inflammable 
matter and air, but no match, the flame will not come into existence. 
Whereas non-existence („adam) can rely on non-existential matters; a 
non-existential matter can be the cause for non-existence.  For a building 
to stand firm, all conditions need to be fulfilled. But if only one 
supporting pillar does not exist, the building will collapse – the result is 
destruction and non-being. 639 
Because of these two principles, states Nursi, huge destruction, unbelief, 
misguidance and sharr can occur from among the jinn and men. 
However, they do not interfere at all in the act of creation, and they can 
have no share in Divine souvereignty. Fruthermore, Nursi carries on, 
those works are not carried out by jinn and man through any power or 
ability; the power lies in neglection and abstaining from action640, in 
other words, in non-existence. 
5. Principle: The second principle said that there is no absolute non-
existence („adam al-muṭlaq) in the universe – following this the fifth 
principle teaches that there is no absolute sharr (sharr al-muṭlaq) in the 
universe either.  
6. Principle: To abandon a minor sharr can lead to greater sharr.641 For 
instance is it sometimes necessary to make a surgical intervention to a 
person in order to avoid greater harm. If that minor intervention which 
seems to be sharr, takes place, it eventually leads to khayr, to goodness, 
to the recovery of that person. However, if that minor sharr (that 
surgical intervention) is avoided or discarded, this can lead to much 
                                        
639 Ibid. 
640 Ibid., 107. 
641 Signs of Miraculousness, 32-33; 88. 
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bigger health problems. Hence one might say that ashrār can be good 
with regards to their outcome, their results. This principle has been 
called the higher good defense. 
7. Principle: Sharr has some sort of external reality or minor existence.642 
The point is how this external reality is interpreted and perceived by 
human beings. The minor existence of sharr, says Nursi, is in fact good 
and not sharr. It is a „unit of measurement‟643, for it contributes to the 
development of innumerable abilities and potentialities in human nature 
and all creation. In this respect, Nursi partly shares the viewpoint of 
Monism which regards evil to be good if it can be seen in its full cosmic 
context.644 However, Nursi‟s view of minor sharr as a „unit of 
measurement‟ does not correlate with the idea that evil is merely an 
illusion of man‟s finite perspective, as it is asserted by Monism. For Nursi 
does not deny the existence of sharr. Contrary, he accepts its minor 
existence for he believes that it is part of the manifestation of God‟s 
Divine Glory as the eighth principle states.645 
8. Principle: Ashrār are, according to Nursi, the manifestations of Divine 
Glory646 and thus they come from God and they require a certain reality 
for manifestation and serve as a mirror of His Glorious Names. This is 
clearly in contradiction with the theory that asserts that evil is an illusion 
                                        
642 The Flashes Collection, 104; 429. 
643 The Rays Collection, 39. 
644 Evil and the God of Love, 15. 
645 To avoid any misunderstanding, it is worth noting that Nursi implies accidental evil at this 
point. He might have borrowed this idea from Ibn „Arabῑ, who states that “nonexistence 
gazes upon the possible thing in respect of its being a possible thing; but at that moment it 
dwells in Sheer Good (khayr al-mahdh). Whatever reaches it from nonexistence‟s gazing 
upon it because it is a possible thing – to that extent is the evil which the cosmos finds 
where it finds it.” (Ibn „Arabῑ. Al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, Vol. III, Chapter 349, 207.33:291). 
See also The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 290 ff. 
646 The Flashes Collection, 115; The Words, 194-195. 
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of man‟s finite perspective, as monism states.647 Nursi explains that it is 
because of the lack of ability and lack of capacity of creation that 
something becomes sharr. For example, in the white and beautiful light 
of the sun, some substances become black and putrefy and that 
blackness is related to their capacity – but it is God Who creates the 
ashrār through a Divine law which comprises numerous benefits.648 
Hence, sharr, according to Nursi, has an accidental reality; it originates 
directly from God however it is not caused by God. 
9. Principle: All good things are the manifestation of Divine Beauty and as 
such originate from God. Thus, they too are real. The difference with 
ashrār is that God is the cause of all good things. This is because their 
causes are existential. They don‟t come about through the lack of 
capacity or ability, but rather from something existential.649  
10. Principle: The last three principles stand in relation with so called „moral 
evil‟, in other words, with the commitment of ashrār by human beings 
through their wrong choices. 650 The tenth principle, thus states that the 
creation of sharr is not sharr, rather the desire for sharr is sharr. In 
other words, man, with his free choice, inclines towards or desires a 
sharr action and God creates it for him. 
11. Principle: Free will (juz‟ῑ irada) has no actual existence. It rather is like a 
unit of measurement. 
12. Principle: And finally, destruction, which pertains to non-existence, is 
easy. This means that one does not need to be creative to destroy 
something. A minor action, like placing dynamite into a building and 
                                        
647 See Introduction of this study. 
648 The Words, 478. 
649 This does not mean that God cannot create from ex nihilo. It rather means that God 
does not lack any ability or capacity, thus he is the cause of any akhyār (pl. of khayr) which 
pertain to existence. 
650 These principles will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7. 
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afterwards pulling the trigger is enough to make a whole building 
collapse; whereas it will take months and a lot of manpower to rebuild it 
again. 
6.5 The Definition and Nature of sharr: Illusion or Reality? 
Firstly, an overview shall be given about previous thoughts that have 
explained evil as illusion. There is, for example, Monism that suggested that 
evil has no objective reality and is rather an illusion of man‟s finite 
perspective and thus can be seen as „lesser good‟. Similarly is moral evil (e.g. 
the sin of a person) due to lack of complete truth, a privation of truth. This 
thought is shared by Augustine through his theory of privatio boni, the 
absence of goodness. The criticism to this thought was that even if evil 
would be accepted as an illusion, it is still very real for it can be felt and is 
experienced painfully by creation. A reconciliation, according to Hick, can 
only take place if one is able to show that evil is justly deserved or that it is 
a means to a good end. 
On the other hand, chapter 2 on the Semantic Analysis of the term sharr in 
the Qur‟ān has shown that there is no such description as „natural‟ or „moral‟ 
sharr in Qur‟anic understanding. „Sharr‟ according to the Qur‟ān, it has been 
said, is the loss of God‟s grace, the loss of guidance, the loss of resignation, 
the loss of understanding, the loss of faith, the loss of patience and the loss 
of hope. In other words, it consists of attributes such as parsimony, disbelief, 
idolatry, the violation of a treaty, aversion, slander and transgression.651 It 
has also been argued that, despite these definitions of the Qur‟ān, some 
exegetes have interpreted sharr to be attributes as well as actions. Exegetes 
such as Mawdūdῑ, for instance, considered illnesses, hunger, being hurt 
                                        
651 For a detailed layout, see chapter 2 of this study. 
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during war, to burn in fire, to be hurt by a scorpion or to grief out of the loss 
of one‟s child as first grade sharr. Those attributes that have been 
mentioned above Mawdūdῑ saw as ashrār of second grade.  
So, should sharr be treated as illusion or reality? Or how else should sharr 
be approached? And what is it then that makes man think sharr to be so 
genuine and real?  
These questions will be discussed from Nursi‟s perspective by examining the 
principles of „privatio boni‟, „the best of all possible worlds‟, „the nature of a 
world of duality‟, and „plenitude‟. 
6.5.1 Sharr as ‘privatio boni’ 
The concept of privatio boni, in other words, the lack of goodness has been 
introduced by Augustine. According to him, evil is a defective good, an 
imperfection and therefore cannot exist apart from goodness.652 In other 
words, evil cannot be a substance, for then it would be good by definition. 
And if something were deprived of all good, it would not exist at all.653 
William Babcock asserts that Augustine tried to find an answer to the cause 
of evil (or evil will) but was not particularly successful.654 Making no real 
distinction between evil and sin, Babcock quotes Augustine‟s definition of sin 
as a will either to keep or to obtain something that justice forbids when 
there is freedom to abstain.655 Burn also provides a definition for evil 
according to Augustine. Thus, to the degree that a being does exist and act, 
its reality derives from God; to the extent that it fails in being and falls short 
                                        
652 Saint Augustine, The Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 43. 
653 Ibid., 124. 
654 W. S. Babcock. „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟ in Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc., 
Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 28-55. 
655 Ibid., 37. 
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in operation, it is evil.656  Augustine asked himself the question how an evil 
act arises657 - for the answer to this question it will be helpful to see first, 
what the nature of evil (of sharr in this case) is, in the first place. 
Ibn Sῑnā upheld the idea of privatio boni, however not as the only way to 
define evil. According to him, evil had many different kinds and in some 
cases evil was also existent. Ibn Sῑnā stated that essential evil (sharr bi dhāt) 
was privation of existence/goodness.658 
While the notion of provatio boni in respect to „moral evil‟ will be discussed 
in Chapter 7; Nursi has not only one approach to the nature and existence of 
sharr. According to him it would not be right to entirely deny the existence 
of sharr. While in some cases he defines sharr as a „unit of measurement‟, in 
other instances he states that it has a minor existence – one might say, an 
accidental existence – serving as the manifestation of God‟s Divine Glorious 
Names and as such, taking part of the „Divine Mosaic‟ that ultimately 
indicates the Oneness of God (tawhῑd). From this respect, sharr, even if 
minor, becomes not only relatively real but also an important part of creation.  
Accordingly, Nursi shares the idea of privatio boni, albeit partially, for he 
seems to disagree with its definition. The fact that Nursi is in line with the 
definition of sharr as demonstrated by the Qur‟ān raises a question that 
needs to be elaborated. The Qur‟anic understanding of the two terms khayr 
and sharr was not that these terms make a statement about right and wrong. 
It was about the benefit and loss that an action brings. Thus, it has been 
stated that sharr, according to the Qur‟ān, and in fact according to Nursi, is 
the loss of God‟s grace, loss of guidance, loss of God‟s resignation, loss of 
                                        
656 J. Patout Burns. „Augustine on the Origin and Progress of Evil‟ in Journal of Religious 
Ethics, 11-12. 
657 „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 45. 
658 For more information, see Chapter 3 of this study. 
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understanding, loss of faith, loss of patience and loss of hope.659 This might 
raise the questions that these losses are in a way also some sort of privation. 
However, it is important to note that these losses are not defections. It does 
not mean, for instance, that when resignation, understanding, or faith is 
defective, sharr occurs. In other words, deficiency should not be confused 
with loss. 
6.5.2 The Best of All Possible Worlds 
The theory of the „best of all possible worlds‟ has been firstly discussed by 
al-Ghazālῑ (d. 1111) with the doctrine of al-aslah660 and later by Leibniz (d. 
1716). According to this theory, the existence of sharr is necessary for it 
adds to the variety in the world as well as to its own positive value. Hence, if 
sharr is taken away, the world is left with less variety than there can be. 
Nursi takes this theory and looks at it from a slightly different angle. 
Explaining the Qur‟anic verse “Who has created everything in the best 
way”661, Nursi claims that the universe is perfect; as perfect as creation and 
created things can be. He believes that in everything, even in things that 
appear most ugly, there is an aspect of true beauty. He states that there are 
two aspects to creation: either something is „essentially beautiful‟, that is, it 
is beautiful in itself, or it has „relative beauty‟, in other words, it is beautiful 
in regard to its results.662 Thus Nursi compares the apparent ugliness to a 
veil, underneath which most shining instances of beauty and order is 
hidden.663 In the season of spring, for instance, that mostly evokes stormy 
rains and muddy soil, is hidden the smiles of innumerable beautiful flowers 
                                        
659 See Chapter 2 to remember. 
660 For more information, see Eric Linn Ormsby. Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute 
over al-Ghazālī‟s „Best of all Possible Worlds‟ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 
661 Qur‟ān, 32:7. 
662 The Words, 240. 
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and well-ordered plants. Even autumn, which normally evokes harsh 
destruction and mournful separations is hidden the discharge from the 
duties of their lives of the amiable small animals, the friends of the coy 
flowers so as to preserve them from the blows and torments of winter 
events which are manifestations of Divine Might and Glory; and under the 
veil of which the way is paved for the new and beautiful spring.664 Likewise 
do potentialities sprout and grow beautifully through events such as storms, 
earthquakes and plague; the abilities of sparrows unfold through the hawks 
harrying them and man thinks that this is incompatible with mercy.665 But 
because of man‟s self-centeredness and adoration of the apparent, he 
considers only the externals and pronounces them ugly. Or he reasons 
according to the result that merely looks to himself and judges it to be ugly. 
Whereas, if, of their aims one looks to man, Nursi continues, thousands look 
to their Maker‟s Names.666 Thus, Nursi advices his readers to look at these 
events with the eyes of wisdom, to accept them as perfectly correct. In this 
respect, Nursi shares the idea of the Qur‟ān that sharr is relative and that it 
therefore can change according to every single individual.667   
Furthermore does Nursi emphasize that a lot of scientific research and 
experience has shown that khayr and beauty and perfection always 
dominates in the universe; sometimes completely, sometimes in its result. 
Every scientific study of the universe teaches such universal principles and 
perfect order about species and groups, that reason is unable to suggest 
anything more perfect. For instance, states Nursi further, all sciences such 
as anatomy in medicine, the solar system in cosmography, or any other 
science related to plants and animals show in each one of their universal 
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667 See chapter 2. 
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principles the order and miraculous Power and Wisdom of their Creator and 
points to the respective Qur‟anic verse.668 
6.5.3 The Nature of a World of Duality 
Nursi talks about a world of duality or opposites, which is essentially 
different from the understanding of the „theory of opposites‟ in Hinduism. 
While the Hindu tradition taught that goodness within a person becomes 
valuable only if it is in a struggle against evil (dharma being separated from 
adharma), and – in a broader sense – good in the universe is valuable only 
because it exists together with evil; Nursi does not share the idea that the 
value of things is dependent on the existence of sharr. He rather states that 
God will allow minor ashrār in order for greater khayr to happen. Everything 
God creates is inherently valuable and khayr, either intrinsically or from the 
point of view of its results.669 The latter thereby sometimes requires minor 
ashrār to exist.  
The fact that this world is necessarily a world of opposites makes Alan Watts 
state that in Hinduism there is no problem of evil. Evil is an integral part of 
God, just as good is, and stems from Him. Some Hindu myths also say that, 
sometimes, there might be evils which trouble humans because the gods, in 
order to free themselves from sin, have elected to inflict them on mortals 
and hence have transferred these troubles from themselves to mankind.670 
Nursi, on the other hand, makes a distinction between calamities and ashrār 
that occur through the misguidance and wrong choice of human beings. He 
does not call natural disasters „sharr‟ for he believes that they are the 
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669 The Words, 240. 
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manifestation of the Divine‟s Glory and his glorious (jalālῑ) Names. And those 
minor sharr that accidentally exist in the universe are in fact called sharr 
only metaphorically, because they ultimately result in greater khayr. 
Nursi shares the idea of al-Maturidῑ that the combination, confrontation and 
interpenetration of opposites in creation, such as khayr and sharr, pain and 
pleasure, light and darkness, heat and cold, beauty and ugliness and 
guidance and misguidance manifests God‟s Divine Wisdom and indicates 
God‟s Unity.671 Good can be known, pleasure can be understood, light‟s 
importance can be grasped and the degrees of heat can be realized through 
the existence of their opposites. Thousands of varying degrees of beauty 
come into existence through ugliness.672 The concept which states that the 
existence of evil is necessary for it adds to the variety in the world, Nursi 
would partly agree with. He would not call these opposites sharr, but rather 
„units of measurement‟ that help human beings to understand, feel and 
maybe even enjoy the variety of degrees in this world. 
Nursi does not look at this concept only from the perspective of this 
transitory realm. He believes that the eternal realm, in other words Paradise 
and Hell will be formed through the ultimate separation of these opposites, 
one pouring into Paradise, the other into Hell. He states that the floods of 
this continuously agitated universe are emptied into those two pools. 673 
Emphasizing God‟s Divine Wisdom “which we do not yet know of”674 in this 
context, he states that this Wisdom necessitates certain truths like  
the result of the examination and trial, truths of the Divine Names‟ 
manifestations, the originals of the embroideries in this transient world, the 
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aims and benefits of the duties of beings, the wages of the acts of service of 
creatures, the truths of the meanings the book of the universe stated, the 
sprouting of the seeds of innate disposition, the opening of a Supreme Court 
of Judgment, the displaying of the sample-like panoramas taken from this 
world, the rendering of the veil of apparent causes, and the surrendering of 
everything directly to the All-Glorious Creator.675 
For those truths to come about, the purification of opposites will be 
necessary, because the world needs to be delivered from change, transience, 
transformation and extinction. Furthermore, causes of change and matters 
of conflict need to be separated out.676 In short, Nursi believes that the 
eternal realm is a realm purified from all kinds of opposites. 
6.5.4 The Principle of Plenitude 
The „Principle of Plenitude‟, named as such by Arthur Lovejoy, is defined by 
him in a wider sense than the concept introduced by Plato. While, according 
to Plato, the “universe is a plenum formarum in which the range of 
conceivable diversity of kinds of living things is exhaustively exemplified”677, 
Lovejoy adds to the definition of this principle that no genuine potentiality of 
being can remain unfulfilled; the extent and abundance of the creation must 
be as great as the possibility of existence. Since the Source is perfect and 
inexhaustible, creation must commensurate with the productive capacity of 
that Source.678 This theory implies that everything that is possible, that is, 
every contingent being (mumkun) that has a potentiality to exist must exist 
in actuality; it has no potency not to be realized.679 That is, God is not free 
to create or not, and He is also not free to choose some possible kinds of 
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beings as the recipients of the privilege of existence, while denying it to 
others.680 For this would be contrary to God‟s goodness.  
As it has been indicated several times before, Nursi‟s ontology is based on 
the Divine Names of God. The fact that there is an infinite variety of creation 
is answered by Nursi with the help of two verses of the Qur‟ān. One states 
that “Indeed, your Sustainer is Doer of what He will”681 and the second 
states “Everyday in [new] splendour does He [shine]! (kulla yawmin huwa fῑ 
sha‟nin)”682 The former verse states that there is nothing God must do. He 
is absolutely free in doing how He wills and He is the one who decides what 
to create and what not. The latter verse points out that God is constantly in 
relation with His creation and creates everyday anew.  
Interpreting these verses of the Qur‟ān, Nursi reminds his readers of the 
astonishing, unceasing activity in the universe and of those fleeting beings 
that continuously change and are renewed. While Nursi points out that this 
important matter could not been solved by philosophy and reason, he 
attempts to give a twofold answer to it.683 A social duty or natural function, 
enthusiastically performed by a person will mostly have two reasons to it: 
The first reason will be what Nursi calls the „ultimate cause‟, in other words, 
the benefits, fruits and advantages which result from that duty. The second 
reason for the enthusiastic performance of that duty Nursi calls 
„necessitating cause and reason‟, that is, a love, a desire, a pleasure which 
cause the duty to be performed. 684 For instance will the pleasure and 
longing that arises from appetite drive a person to eat several times every 
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day, and the „ultimate cause‟ to it will be the nourishment of the body and 
perpetuation of life.685 
In the same way, states Nursi, there are two vast instances of infinite 
wisdom for the endless activity in the universe and they are based on two 
sorts of Divine Names: 
The first wisdom, according to Nursi, is that God‟s Most Beautiful Names (al-
asmā al-ḥusnā) have incalculable sorts of manifestations. The variety in 
creation arises from the variety of the manifestations.686 The Names require 
to be manifested in a permanent fashion. In other words, adds Nursi, they 
want to see and display the manifestations of their beauties in the mirrors of 
their embroideries. The „Book of the Universe‟687 and missives of beings is 
renewed in every instant by those Names. Thus, the Divine Names display 
each letter to the study and gaze of the Most Pure and Holy Essence, the 
One signified, as well as to all conscious beings; they require to make each 
of the letters read.688 
The second instance of wisdom is related to the point that all activity is a 
sort of pleasure.689 Likewise, states Nursi, has the necessarily existent One 
(wājib al-wujūd) boundless sacred compassion and holy love, in a suitable 
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way and form appropriate to His essential self-sufficiency and absolute 
riches and in a manner fitting for His absolute perfection.690 Nursi continues: 
He has a boundless sacred ardour arising from that sacred compassion and 
holy love, and an endless holy joy arising from that sacred ardour, and, if one 
may say so, an infinite sacred pleasure arising from the sacred joy. And 
pertaining to that Merciful and Compassionate One, is, if the term is 
permissible, a boundless sacred gratification and infinite holy pride arising 
from the boundless feeling of compassion that springs from the sacred 
pleasure, sacred gratification and pride which arise from the gratitude and 
perfections of creatures which result from their abilities emerging from the 
potential to the actual and their developing within the activity of power. It is 
these which necessitate in boundless fashion, an endless activity.691 
This quite lengthy paragraph of Nursi explains that God creates out of Divine 
Compassion and Love an infinite number of beings. Those attributes of God, 
such as His Compassion, Love, Ardour, Pleasure, Joy, Gratification, Holy 
Pride arise from the gratitude, activity and perfections of His creature. The 
gratitude and perfection of creatures, according to Nursi, is nothing else but 
the emerging of their abilities from the potential to the actual.  And all of 
these attributes of God require an endless activity; and activity and change, 
as it has been defined elsewhere in the Risale, are nothing else but pure 
goodness (khayr al mahdh) and existence (wujūd), whereas calm, repose, 
idleness, monotony and arrest from action are forms of non-existence 
(„adam), and harm.692 Nursi further claims that life finds its perfection 
through action and it manifests various actions through the manifestation of 
the Divine Names.693  
Looking now further into Plato and Aristotle and later on Plotinus, one can 
see the major differences between their view and that of Nursi. 
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According to Aristotle‟s metaphysics, matter is an eternal element of reality 
that exists alongside form and God. Unlike Plato‟s Demiurge, Aristotle‟s God 
is not a active creator and does not know about the existence of other 
things. He does also not interact in any ways with other things. However, 
Aristotle was in agreement with Plato that matter is eternal, exists 
independently of God, and is a source of evil.694 Aristotle‟s „principle of 
continuity‟695 fused with the Platonistic doctrine of the necessary „fullness‟ of 
the world.696 Thus, the Platonic principle states that  
if there is between two given natural species theoretically possible 
intermediate type, that type must be realized – and so on ad indefinitum; 
otherwise, there would be gaps in the universe, the creation would not be as 
„full‟ as it might be, and this would imply the inadmissible consequence that 
its Source or Author was not „good‟697 
This great chain of being as introduced by Aristotle and later on developed 
by Plotinus and others ultimately stated that anything that reaches its own 
perfection cannot endure to remain in itself but generates and produces 
some other thing. This is not only valid for beings that have the power of 
choice but for all other beings as well. It follows, then, that the Most Perfect 
Being and the First Good will not remain shut up in itself as though it were 
jealous and impotent; thus something must be begotten of it.698 Hence, 
according to Plotinus, it is by no means the will of the being who meted out 
to all their several lots that inequalities exist among them, for it was 
necessary according to the nature of things that it should be so.699 In 
relation to Theodicy, then, the questions are answered in the following 
                                        
694 „A Finite God Reconsidered‟, 30. 
695 The „Principle of Continuity‟ asserted that “things are said to be continuous whenever 
there is one and the same limit of both wherein they overlap and which they possess in 
common.” The Great Chain of Being, 55. 
696 The Great Chain of Being, 55. 
697 Ibid., 58. 
698 Ibid., 62. 
699 Ibid., 64. 
 201 
 
ways: While according to Plotinus, the only meaning that can seemingly be 
attached to the term „evil‟ is the privation of good, he believes that those 
who find fault with the nature of the universe do not know the successive 
grade of beings.700 For according to the doctrine above, everything that has 
reached its perfection must come into existence. In other words, since that 
coming into existence is outside of God‟s will, he cannot be blamed for the 
existence of evils. This dualistic approach is clearly rejected by Nursi. 
Furthermore, no creature has the right to claim more qualities than he has 
received for this would be comparable to asking for all animals to have horns 
just because some animals have them.701 Additionally, it is better for an 
animal to be eaten by another than that it should have never existed at all. 
Thus they are needed to make up the set.702  
Plotinus additionally states that generally speaking conflict is only a special 
case and a necessary implicate of diversity. “Difference carried to its 
maximum is opposition.”703 Opposition is the only way to produce otherness 
and therefore the World-Soul will produce things opposed to one another; 
this way perfection will be realized.704 
The doctrine above eliminates God‟s constant activity, His Divine Will and 
Power in the universe, seeing Him merely as the first cause of everything. It 
goes so far as to stating that He reaches some sort of perfection (that is His 
essence changes and is therefore not absolute) and as a result of that 
perfection begets other things. Nursi‟s „Divine Names Ontology‟705 which is 
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an ontology developed in the light of the Divine Names, does not cohere 
with these respective doctrines, as it has been shown above. For according 
to Nursi, the activity in the universe is based on an utter Knowledge, 
Wisdom and Perception.706 
6.6 The Necessity of sharr (why does God create sharr?) 
A very famous question is about the creation of sharr. Why does God create 
sharr and isn‟t the creation of sharr, sharr? Nursi states that the creation of 
sharr is not sharr, rather the „acquisition‟ of sharr, in other words the desire 
for sharr, is sharr.707 This is because when God creates something, that act 
looks to all consequences whereas the desire of man to do sharr looks to a 
particular result, for it is a particular relation.708 Nursi provides two allegories 
to this problem. Rain for example, is a creation from God which has 
thousands of consequences to it. All of these consequences are positive, 
beneficial and good. If out of wrong choice, some people receive harm from 
rain and it becomes sharr for them, they cannot say that the creation of rain 
is not mercy, but sharr.709 Likewise it is with fire. The creation of fire bears 
lots of benefits and good. But if some people are harmed by it because of 
their own misuse, for instance through thrusting their hands into it while 
cooking, they cannot say that the creation of fire is sharr for it was not 
created to burn them.710 Thus, Nursi continues, “the lesser sharr is 
acceptable for the greater good.” If one would abandon a minor sharr which 
will ultimately lead to a greater good, just in order to avoid that lesser sharr, 
a much greater sharr will have been perpetrated.711 If there is for instance a 
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finger infected with gangrene, the doctor will decide to amputate that finger, 
which is a right and good decision, although it looks like it is sharr. But if it is 
not amputated, the whole hand will be amputated, which is a much greater 
sharr.712   
Thus one might say that God does not create sharr. What God creates is 
always khayr. Thus, perfection, good (khayr) and beauty are essentially 
what are intended in the universe, states Nursi, and are in the majority.  
Relatively, defects, ashrār, and ugliness are in the minority, and are 
insignificant, secondary and trivial. Their Creator created them interspersed 
among good and perfection not for their own sakes, but as preliminaries and 
units of measurement for the appearance, or existence, of the relative truths 
of good and perfection.713 
What are relative truths and what makes them so significant that partial 
ashrār are approved for their sakes? Nursi explains: 
Relative truths are the ties between beings and the threads with which their 
order is woven. They are the rays from which is reflected each unique being 
of the species in the universe. Relative truths are thousands of times more 
numerous that real truths, for if the real attributes of a person were 
sevenfold, the relative truths would be seven hundred.714 
This has to do with the countless degrees or grades a human being has, 
within each of his attributes. These degrees, each one of them being a 
relative truth, exist and become manifest through the „concept of 
opposites‟.715 For instance, states Nursi, if there were no ugliness and it 
would not permeate beauty, the existence of beauty with its infinite degrees 
would not be apparent.716 
                                        
712 The Letters, 62. 
713 Signs of Miraculousness, 32. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid., 33. 
716 Ibid. 
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6.6.1 Sharr as a Test and the creation of Paradise and Hell 
As it has been stated in Chapter 2, there are verses in the Qur‟ān that clearly 
state that sharr is a test by God717. While the term sharr in this verse has 
often rather been understood as a material loss or a severe or incurable 
illness or the rebellion of one‟s child; if taken in its Qur‟anic semantic context, 
such attributes as disbelief, ungratefulness, aversion, etc., become a test. 
Thus, by creating Satan, making man accountable and sending prophets, 
God has opened up an arena of trial, examination, competition and striving 
so that the different levels of humankind will appear and will be 
separated.718 Without striving and competition, the potentialities of humans 
would have remained equal. Thus, there would be no difference between 
the noblest of humanity and the lowest of the low. Thence, the creation of 
Satans and ashrār look to great and universal results and the fact that they 
are brought into existence is not sharr. If they become sharr in particular 
instances, this is because of their abuse and because of wrong choices of 
man and not of the Divine.719  
Paradise and Hell, Nursi explains, are two fruits which point to eternity from 
the tree of creation and are two results of the chain of the universe. He 
compares them with two storage tanks, wherein the universe is ultimately 
poured with the appropriate matters.720 There are according to Nursi, many 
reasons why God has willed the change and transformation of this world. He 
has accordingly combined khayr and sharr, and mixed harm with benefit and 
included ugliness in beauty721, so that the different levels of humankind may 
clearly be defined. For this, He willed trial and competition and for there to 
                                        
717 Qur‟ān, 21:35. 
718 The Letters, 63. 
719 Ibid. 
720 Signs of Miraculousness, 212. 
721 Ibid., 213. 
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be differences and change among men, so he mixed in bad people with 
good. At the time of the closure of the realm of trial, Nursi states, bad 
people will be confronted with the verse “get you apart… o you guilty 
ones”722, and the good will be honored and graced with the verse: “so enter 
there to dwell forever!”723 Thus, Nursi concludes, the universe will ultimately 
be purified and those matters that gave birth to sharr and harm will be 
separated on one side to become the fitments of Hell; whereas those 
matters that gave birth to good and benefit will become fitments of 
Paradise.724 
6.6.2 Why Satan has been created 
One might ask why an infinite good, merciful and compassionate God 
permits Satan, who is considered to be pure sharr (sharr al mahdh), to 
harass the people of belief and make lots of people go to Hell. The answer 
of Nursi is quite interesting. There are a lot of universal good purposes in 
the existence of Satan, Nursi explains, and human attainments and 
perfections.725 According to Nursi, the existence of Satan is therefore sharr 
only in a minor way and without an external reality, compared to all the 
khayr that it entails.  
Nursi believes that to understand the idea behind such a statement, it is 
important to have knowledge about the nature of humankind. Human nature 
is equipped with innumerous abilities726, most of which he himself is not 
aware of. These abilities and potentialities need to develop. Thus Nursi 
                                        
722 Qur‟ān, 36:59. 
723 Qur‟ān, 39:73. Also see Signs of Miraculousness, 213. 
724 Ibid. Also see The Words, 553-554. 
725 The Flashes Collection, 104. 
726 Ibid. 
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explains how this development is interrelated with many other features. 
Figure 1 shows this relation. 
 
Figure 2: Existence of minor sharr 
The development of these abilities and potentialities depends on action. The 
action of the mechanism of progress, states Nursi, is brought about through 
striving. And striving occurs through the existence of sharr spirits such as 
Satan and through the existence of harmful things.727 If there would be no 
striving, no action, and no potentialities in human nature, man would be the 
same as an angel, his situation being constant. Thus there would be no 
differences between human beings.728 Those minor evils which are dispersed 
among the good creation should not be seen as existing ashrār but as the 
cause for striving, motion and the development of innumerable potentialities, 
in other words, as a unit of measurement. 
Furthermore, Nursi continues, it would be contrary to wisdom and justice to 
abandon a thousand instances of good so as to avoid one minor evil.729 Now 
the question might be, that due to the seducement of Satan, a lot of people 
                                        
727 Ibid. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Ibid. More about wisdom will be explained in Chapter 7. 
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go astray and fall into disbelief. Hence, this cannot be called minor evil. 
Nursi states that importance and value look mostly to quality and only a little 
or not at all to quantity.730 If there are ten „perfect man‟ (insān kāmil)731 who, 
through the struggle against the „soul‟ (nafs)732 and Satan, gain profit, honor, 
enlightenment and value for humankind; their gain can in no way be 
reduced to nothing by the people of misguidance causing harm to 
mankind.733  Nursi compares these people of misguidance with vermin, 
meaning that they also might be harmful however they are God‟s creatures 
and as such, there are good purposes in their existence, despite of minor 
sharr. It might occur to minds that a comparison in form of quality-quantity, 
in other words, stating that ten qualitatively high men (from a pure 
humanitarian perspective) cannot be equal to thousand misguided men is a 
bold statement that goes against God‟s compassion and mercy to all 
humankind.  
Nursi would share the view that piousness or straightness (ṣāliḥāt) means to 
make things better. Every single human being is asked to perform piousness 
and straightness („amal ṣāliḥ), in other words to strive for the better. No one 
can say, “I don‟t care”, because the sin and bad action of one man will 
                                        
730 See also The Letters, 63. 
731 Nursi‟s definition of insān kāmil is as follows: “…to struggle to be a perfect human being 
through journeying with the heart and striving with the spirit and spiritual progress; that is 
to say, to be a true believer and total Muslim; that is, to gain not superficial belief, but the 
reality of belief and the reality of Islam; that is, to be directly the bondsman of the Glorious 
Creator of the Universe, in the universe and in one respect as the universe‟s representative, 
and to be His addressee, and friend, and beloved, and to be a mirror to Him; and through 
showing man to be on the best of patterns, it is to prove man‟s superiority to the angels. It 
is to fly through the lofty stations with the Shari„a‟s wings of faith and works, and to behold 
eternal happiness in this world, and even to enter upon it.” Nursi, S. The Letters, 535. 
These sentences that describe the perfect man can be seen as a summary of Ibn Arabῑ‟s 
description of al-insān al-kāmil. To read more about it, see T. Izutsu. Sufism and Taoism: A 
Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts (London: University of California Press, 
1983), pp. 218-262.  
732 Nafs refers to the nafs al-ammārah, the evil-commanding „soul‟. 
733 The Flashes Collection, 105. 
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harass or disturb the other; not as an individual, but in the name of 
humanity. In this respect, neither rewards, nor sins are personal. To give an 
example, one might say that mankind is a big pool and every single dirt that 
is thrown in it concerns all humanity. Thus, every human being is either the 
honor or the disgrace of the human family. Thus, ever single honorable act 
of one man will be appreciated by the whole human race and will be taken 
as much more valuable than the disgraceful actions of a thousand men. In 
this respect, one might understand Nursi‟s concept that quality is more 
important than quantity. 
Contrary to the followers of Jesus who turned the „unpleasant angel‟ (that is, 
Satan) into a grand, malevolent figure, into God‟s enemy, His antagonist or 
even His rival734, Nursi assures that Satan is much weaker than many people 
assume.  The reason is because sharr, as indicated before, is not a 
constructive but a destructive matter. And destruction is much easier than 
construction for the former pertains to non-existence („adam) whereas the 
latter pertains to existence (wujūd).  Nursi explains this in the light of the 
analogy of a building. It is well known, states Nursi, that one man can 
destroy in one day (nowadays, in a few minutes) a building made by twenty 
men in twenty days.735 Similarly, a child is able to destroy hundreds of acres 
of woodland with one single match. Sometimes even, there is no need to do 
anything, in other words, simply not to fulfill a duty in order to cause big 
harm. 
One might ask, how then, goodness can prevail if construction and repairing 
and good are much harder than sharr. This can be achieved through 
                                        
734 Knut Schäferdick, "Satan in the Post-Apostolic Fathers," s.v. " σατανας,” Theological 
Dictionary of the New Testament 7 (1971), 163-65. 
735 The Flashes Collection, 103-104. 
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connecting (intisāb) with the Creator and asking for His help, for it says in 
the Qur‟ān “And the end is [best] for the righteous”.736 
It has been said earlier that the Qur‟ān and well as Nursi in his works define 
disbelief (k-f-r), going astray (ḍ-l-l), aversion (‟-r-ḍ) and transgression (ṭ-gh-
y) (among others) to be sharr. The Qur‟ān threatens the people of 
misguidance, complaining greatly about them mostly on account of one 
minor action, as though he had committed a thousand of crimes. To the 
apparent reason („aql al-ẓāhir), this does not seem in accord with the 
Qur‟ān‟s justice, apt eloquence and the congruence and moderation of its 
style.737 Why would one possessor of weakness and poverty, although in 
misguidance, be threatened in such a comprehensive way? Furthermore, the 
Qur‟ān states that the universe grows angry at the evil of the people of 
misguidance, and the universal elements become wrathful, and all beings 
furious. With the words “almost bursting in fury”738 does the Qur‟ān describe 
the anger of Hell at the people of unbelief in the Hereafter and the rage of 
the other beings at the unbelievers and people of misguidance.739 Why do 
such unimportant actions and personal sins of insignificant men attract the 
anger of the universe in such a way? A similar question has been posed by 
fundamental option theorists740 and other religious ethicists, scholars such as 
                                        
736 Ibid., 104. See also Qur‟ān, 7:128. Furthermore, Nursi refers to the Qur‟ān, 23:97-
98:“Oh my Sustainer, I seek refuge with You from the whisperings of the Evil Ones, and I 
seek refuge with You, my Sustainer, lest they should come near me.” 
737 The Flashes Collection, 105. 
738 Qur‟ān, 67:8. 
739 The Flashes Collection, 119. 
740 The fundamental option theory rejects a legalistic emphasis on correct action in 
everything one does and instead, focuses on the person‟s general orientation for or against 
God. In other words, as long as that fundamental orientation (for God) does not change, 
individual sins do not really matter. For more information, see James J. Warner (1998) Karl 
Rahner and the Option of Grace in Freedom: A critical examination of Rahner's 
understanding of both fundamental option and virtue ethics and the link between them in 
the light of their classical antecedents and contemporary developments in moral theology, 
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Thomas Aquinas and Augustine, and later Richard Niebuhr, Karl Rahner, 
Charles Curran, Franz Böckle and James Keenan. Should sin be taken 
seriously as a power or force deeply affecting the individual person or world; 
or should it merely be seen as an act without much influence, an act that 
can easily be eradicated?741 
According to Nursi, one tiny action and small deed of Satan or of those who 
are the followers of Satan, can cause great destruction and violation of the 
rights of many creatures.742 How is this possible? Previously it has been 
stated that mankind is comparable to a big pool and every action of an 
individual concerns all the other individuals. Nursi‟s illustration is that of a 
large merchant ship of a king. If one man working on that ship neglects a 
small duty, all the efforts of those employed on the ship and all the fruits of 
their labor will be lost and will go to nothing.743 In this case, that man 
cannot say:”what significance can one tiny duty of mine have?” Thus, it will 
be rightful for the owner of that ship to complain about and threaten the 
rebellious man on account of all his subjects who are connected with the 
ship. And that man deserves to be punished, not for that insignificant action 
but for is dreadful results and not in the owner‟s name but in that of the 
rights of his subjects.744 
                                                                                                               
moral philosophy and fundamental theology. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Australian Catholic 
University.  
741 Ch. E. Curran. The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A Synthesis. (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1999), 39. For more information, see D. F. Weaver. „Taking 
Sin Seriously‟ in The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 45-74. 
742 The Flashes Collection, 105. 
743 Ibid. 
744 Ibid., 106. 
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Similarly to this allegory, the people of disbelief (kufr), through their 
apparently insignificant mistakes and sins745 transgress against the 
numerous creatures and nullify the result of their elevated duties. Through 
their denial and disbelief, they reject the manifestations of the Divine Names 
which are apparent in the mirrors of beings, exalting their value.746 They 
insult those sacred Names and by degrading the value of all beings, greatly 
detract them.747 Since all beings are dominical officials charged with elevated 
duties, the people of disbelief cast them down.748 Thus, one is able to realize 
the wisdom that is behind the threats and punishment of the Monarch of 
Pre- and Post-Eternity749 for man‟s being might be small but his guilt can be 
great and his sin grievous.750  
How then should Divine Wisdom be reconciled with the existence of ashrār 
that result in punishment? Divine Wisdom, Nursi explains, necessitates the 
existence of relative truths and their appearance is possible only through the 
existence of sharr.751 But sharr needs to be held within its limits to prevent 
aggression, which can only be achieved through intimidation. Intimidation, 
on the other hand, only truly affects the conscience if it is verified and 
actualized by the existence of external torment.752 For conscience, similar to 
the intellect and imagination, is truly affected by intimidation only if it 
perceives from various indications the eternal, external reality of torment.753 
                                        
745 the biggest one being the denial of the existence of God and through it the trivialization 
of the value of all other creation 
746 Signs of Miraculousness, 88. 
747 The Flashes Collection, 119. 
748 See also The Letters, 62. 
749 The Flashes Collection, 106. 
750 Ibid., 119. 
751 Signs of Miraculousness, 88-89. 
752 Ibid., 89. 
753 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, not only disbelievers, but also believers can sometimes 
be carried away by the Satan‟s baseless deceits and rebel against God; 
despite there being so many means guiding them to the straight path. The 
Mu‟tazilites and some Kharijite sects asserted that someone who commits a 
grievous sin either becomes an unbeliever or is in a state between belief and 
unbelief754. Fundamental option theorists, as mentioned before, claimed that 
each individual makes a choice for or against God. After that choice has 
been made, single acts of that individual may or may not be in accord with 
his fundamental orientation in favor of God. Thus, these acts do not change 
the individual‟s basic orientation. Only if the individual‟s fundamental option 
changes against God does he fall out of a state of grace. In other words, a 
person can commit particular sins without losing a state of grace. What 
about acts such as adultery, or homosexuality? Nursi points out that it is not 
due to the lack of unbelief or weakness of belief, that believers are being 
deceived by the Satanic machinations.755  Thus Nursi does not share the 
Mu‟tazilites view and states that man can be thrown into serious peril 
through some insignificant matter pertaining to non-existence („adam).756  
Furthermore, man‟s lower „soul‟ (nafs) always listens to Satan. However, as 
has been discussed before, God with His nearness (qurb) to His creation, His 
names of Often-Forgiving (ghafūr) and All-Compassionate (raḥῑm) are turned 
to the people of belief with a maximum manifestation. 757 Nursi is aware of 
the fact how import it is to understand the functionality of humankind and 
what her nature is in order to grasp the respective problem. He states that 
human beings tend to prefer an ounce of immediate pleasure to a ton of 
postponed, hidden pleasure; likewise does he abstain from an immediate 
                                        
754 The Flashes Collection, 110. 
755 Ibid., 108. 
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slap more than a year of torment in the future.758 Especially if man‟s 
emotions are dominant, they do not heed the reasoning of the mind. Desire, 
illusion and emotion do not see the future and if the „soul‟ (nafs) assists 
these emotions, the heart being the seed of belief, and the mind fall silent 
and are defeated.759 Thus, Nursi concludes  
…committing grievous sins does not arise from lack of belief but from the 
defeat of the heart and mind through the predomination of emotion, desire, 
and illusion.760 
Thus Nursi closes his treatise with the passage of the Qur‟ān: 
Say: I seek refuge with the Lord and Cherisher of mankind, the Ruler of 
mankind, the God of mankind, from the mischief of the whisperer [of sharr], 
who withdraws [after his whisper] – [the same] who whispers into the hearts 
of mankind – among jinns and among men.761 
6.6.3 Calamities and Inflicts 
The existence of different calamities and tribulations are mostly considered 
to be sharr for it harms and inflicts man. The question then is asked why 
God allows this to happen and how this can be reconciled with His Mercy. It 
has been discussed in chapter 5 that God has Names of Beauty (jamāl) and 
also Names of Glory (jalāl). And it has also been said that all Names of God 
necessitate a reality to be reflected on and to be a mirror to these Names.762  
                                        
758 Ibid., 111. 
759 Ibid. 
760 Ibid. 
761 Qur‟ān, 114:1-6. 
762 Nursi is in line with Ibn „Arabῑ, who claims that what is normally called „imperfection‟ is in 
fact perfection, since it allows for the actualization of the various levels of existence and 
knowledge. In other words, would there be no imperfection like diminishment, decrease, 
lack; there would be no creation and Divine Reality would not disclose itself and God would 
be the Nonmanifest instead of the Manifest, which is absurd. (The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 
294.)  
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Furthermore, Nursi argues, man mostly errors in reasoning by thinking that 
he, with his body and all his faculties and feelings, belongs to himself; that 
he is the owner of himself. However, God is the possessor (mālik) of 
everything and He holds sway over His possessions as He wishes, including 
human beings. Thus, the body of a human being is comparable to the 
garment of a craftsman. Just as the craftsman, in order to display his art 
and skill, may shorten and lengthen his garment and the model who is 
wearing it has no right to complain; similarly does God cloth man in a  
most artistically wrought being bejeweled with faculties like the eye, the ear, 
and the tongue. In order to display the embroideries of various of His Names, 
He makes man ill, afflicts him with tribulations, makes him hungry, fills him, 
makes him thirsty and makes him revolve in states like these.763 
This is important for if life would pass monotonously with permanent health 
and well-being, it would become a deficient mirror. It would even reduce 
life‟s value and transform its pleasure into distress.764 For permanent 
idleness, repose and well-being in time turns into boredom and so time 
passes quickly, man throws himself either into vice or into amusements. 
Nursi even states that such a man becomes hostile to his valuable life and 
wants to kill it and make it pass quickly.765 
Nursi further explains the nature of life (ḥayāt) with the following words: 
In order to strengthen the essence of life and display the manifestation of His 
Names, He makes man journey in numerous such conditions … in any event, 
calm, repose, idleness, monotony and arrest from action are forms of non-
existence („adam) and harm. Action and change are existence (wujūd) and 
good. Life (ḥayāt) finds its perfection through action, it progresses by means 
of tribulations. Life manifests various actions through the manifestation of the 
Divine Names, it is purified, finds strength, it unfolds and expands, it 
                                        
763 The Letters, 64. 
764 The Flashes Collection, 280, The Words, 487. 
765 Ibid. 
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becomes a mobile pen to write its own appointed course; it performs its duty, 
and acquires the right to receive reward in the hereafter.766 
At another instance, Nursi describes grieves, calamities, difficulties and 
tribulations767 that living creatures go through as a means to the renewal of 
the lights of existence and the purification of their lives, for through these 
grieves, calamities, difficulties and tribulations the darkness of non-existence 
draws distant768. It has to be pointed out that according to Nursi, it is any 
kind of sharr that is been drawn distant through grieves and calamities that 
happen to lives. In short, Nursi explains, since life displays the impresses of 
the Most Beautiful Names, everything that happens to it is good.769 
Thus, a rich and idle man living in luxury will complain about the time never 
passing and will maybe search for activities such as amusements to make 
time pass. Or he will constantly strive for worldly ambitions and complain of 
not possessing this and that. On the other hand, a poor man living in 
hardship or someone stuck by disaster, or a worker, if he is sensible, will 
thank his Lord for being able to work. He will feel time passing very quickly 
and will ask for the evening not to approach so fast so that he can finish his 
work. He will believe that life also passes very quickly and thus will always 
believe that that hardship he is going through will also pass. In other words, 
Nursi emphasizes that while the pleasure and value of life lies in hardship 
and labor, ease and health make life bitter and make it wanted to be 
passed.770 
Maybe it is for this reason that when a few young and ill men came to visit 
Said Nursi and ask him to pray for their well-being, he says that he would 
                                        
766 The Letters, 65. 
767 The Words, 487. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Ibid. 
770 The Flashes Collection, 281. 
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pray for them, however he does not feel sorry for them and that he is not 
opposed to their illness. Nursi explains that he noticed that each of these ill 
youths had begun to think of the Hereafter to a greater degree than their 
contemporaries. They were lacking the drunkenness of youth. Thus Nursi 
would advice these youth to be patient until that illness awakens them 
completely and after it has performed its duty, God willing, the 
Compassionate Creator will restore them to health.771 
6.6.4 Natural disasters 
The Qur‟ān does not count natural disasters among ashrār. Maybe it is 
because of this that Nursi prefers to use the term disaster or torment, rather 
than sharr when explaining some aspects about earthquakes. And it is for 
this reason that the heading for this section has become „the existence of 
calamities and inflicts‟ rather than „natural evils‟. Nursi‟s interpretation for 
natural disasters such as earthquakes is that it is the result of sin and 
wrongdoings in society.772 Why the whole country would shake because of 
the wrongdoings of some individuals, Nursi responds that general disasters 
result from the wrongdoings of the majority: most people participate in the 
actions of tyrannical individuals by supporting them either actively, or 
morally or in some other connection.773 So why is it then that those innocent 
people who have nothing to do with such tyrannical actions are struck by 
those disasters and how does Divine Justice permit this? At this point Nursi 
refers to the Qur‟anic verse “And fear tumult or oppression, which affects 
                                        
771 Ibid., 269. 
772 Nursi refers to the following Qur‟ānic verse and interprets it: “When the earth is shaken 
to its [utmost] convulsion. And the earth throws up its burdens [from within], And man cries 
[distressed] “What is the matter with it?” On that Day will it declare its tidings. For that your 
Sustainer will have given it inspiration” Qur‟ān, 99:1-5.  
773 The Words, 186. 
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not in particular [only] those of you who do wrong.”774 In other words, this 
verse confirms the assertion that disasters also inflict innocents. To explain 
this situation, Nursi reminds his reader again that this world is a place of trial 
and examination. Thus the reality remains veiled to foster competition and 
striving. If the innocent remained untouched by such disasters, the lowest of 
the low among humanity would submit just like the highest of the high and 
the door of spiritual and moral progress would be closed and the mystery of 
accountability spoiled.775 The fact, so Nursi, that God‟s Wisdom requires a 
combined affliction of both guilty and innocent, the share of the innocent 
touched by such disasters is a manifestation of mercy within the wrath of 
that calamity. Their lost worldly and transient property becomes, according 
to Nursi, like alms and gains permanence, and the relatively little and 
temporary difficulty and torment is a form of martyrdom for them which also 
gains for their transient lives a permanent life.776 Thus, the earthquake 
becomes for the innocent an instance of Divine mercy within the wrath. The 
importance of faith in the hereafter, as emphasized in Chapter 4, is essential 
to accept calamities and inflicts such as these, but also to be able to bear 
with and endure any other kind of ashrār arising from ill actions of ill minded 
people.  
Another question that might come to mind is, since God is All-Just, All-
Compassionate, All-Powerful and All-Wise; why does He not give particular 
punishments for particular wrongs instead of inflicting a mighty element? 
How is this reconcilable with the beauty of His mercy and His all-
encompassing Power?777 To answer this question, Nursi uses the sixth 
principle which states that to abandon a minor sharr can lead to greater 
                                        
774 Qur‟ān, 8:25. 
775 The Words, 186. 
776 Ibid., 186-187. 
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sharr. For according to Nursi, all the elements are given numerous duties 
and not only one duty. Each one of these duties cause them to produce 
numerous different results.778 Thus, states Nursi, if only one result of one of 
an element‟s duties is ugly, sharr or calamitous, all the other good results 
turn this one also into good.  Nursi continues: 
If the element which is angry at man, is prevented from that duty, so that the 
single ugly result will not occur, then instances of good to the number of the 
good results will be abandoned, and so since not doing a necessary good is 
sharr, instances of sharr will be perpetrated to the number of the instances of 
good. A single sharr not occurring would be extremely ugly, contrary to 
wisdom, contrary to reality, and a fault. And power, wisdom and reality are 
free of fault.779 
In other words, although from the perspective of man, such calamities and 
disasters that inflict human beings look very comprehensive, it should be 
known that in reality it is only one among other general duties of a mighty 
element and thus is perfect wisdom and justice; and mercy for the 
oppressed.780 
How man should be responding to calamities and how he can turn this time 
of struggle and suffering into an eternal profit and bliss is explained by Nursi 
through worship and in particular through supplication. 
6.7 Sharr and worship 
Firstly it will be useful to understand the notion of worship defined by Nursi. 
According to him, worship means that the servant („abd) sees his own faults, 
                                        
778 Ibid. 
779 Ibid. 
780 Ibid. In the continuation of this treatise, Nursi criticizes with determination those who 
state that this kind of calamities are the result of a fault in the rock strata inside the earth, 
or even a chance event, natural and without purpose. He points out that even if it is a fault 
in the strata, it should not be forgotten that that fault also has a Causer and that it happens 
through Divine command and in accordance with His Wisdom.   
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impotence, and poverty and prostrates in love and wonderment before 
dominical perfection, Divine mercy, and the power of the Eternally Besought 
One.781 Nursi emphasizes the long journey for a human being to develop and 
learn. It takes man twenty years to learn completely the conditions of life782, 
but this is still not sufficient and he will go on learning until the very end of 
his life. It takes man to rise up to his feet one to two years and 
approximately fifteen years until he can distinguish between harm and 
benefit.783 Thus, what distinguishes human beings from other creatures is 
that human being‟s innate duty is perfection through learning and to 
proclaim his worship to God through supplication.784 That is to say, another 
meaning of worship and supplication is to know the answers to the following 
questions: “Through whose compassion is my life so wisely administered in 
this way? Through whose generosity am I so kindly raised? Through whose 
graciousness am I so delicately nurtured and ministered to?”785 Hence, the 
purpose of worship is to turn minds towards the All-Wise Maker. It induces 
obedience and submission and establishes connection (intisāb)786. And 
maybe the most essential of all is that this order leads to the realization of 
the mystery of wisdom, and the wisdom is testified to by the perfect art in 
the universe.787 But what might be the relationship between terms such as 
worship, wisdom, impotence and weakness and apparent ashrār? To explain 
this, Nursi introduces two terms, one of which he calls „positive worship‟ 
(muthbat „ibādah) and the other negative worship (manfῑ „ibādah).788 The 
former is the well-known type consisting of supplications and five daily 
                                        
781 Ibid., 52. 
782 Ibid., 324. 
783 Ibid. 
784 Ibid. 
785 Ibid. 
786 See Chapter 5. 
787 Signs of Miraculousness, 162.  
788 The Flashes Collection, 23-24; 267. 
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prayers. The latter are illnesses and calamities. These, Nursi calls negative 
forms of worship for they make man realize his impotence and weakness. 
Thus, with his impotence and weakness, man knocks the doors of the All-
Compassionate Creator and takes refuge in Him. This kind of worship, in 
other words, remembrance of God in times of illness and calamities is 
sincere and without hypocrisy.789 Based on narrations, Nursi claims that a 
life passed in illness is counted as worship for the believer, on condition he 
does not complain about God.790 
Nursi establishes a relation between worship and sharr and/or calamities 
based on the Divine Names. In fact, He wills human beings to turn to Him in 
any situation. For the manifestation of His Names, with His infinite Power 
and unlimited Mercy, He has created man with an infinite impotence and 
unlimited want inherent in his nature.791 Human beings are thus capable of 
receiving unlimited varieties of pain, as well as infinite varieties of pleasure. 
The degrees of pain and pleasure in human beings have no limit. His 
Beauteous Names are manifested in good health and all kinds of different 
pleasures whereas His Glorious Names become visible in illness, pain and 
disasters and are put in motion. For instance does hunger manifest the 
Name of Sustainer (razzaq), illness the Name of Healer (shāfῑ), and so on.  
Thus, while matters like good health, well-being and pleasures are supposed 
to cause man to offer thanks and turn towards his Creator, likewise, matters 
such as misfortune, illness and pain are supposed to make humans aware of 
their weakness, impotence and poverty and thus turn towards their Creator 
                                        
789 Ibid., 267. 
790 Ibid. Narrated from al-Albani, Sahihu Jami‟i‟-Saghir 256. 
791 Ibid., 28. 
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and seek help in the all-Powerful and becomes himself an ode to the Glory 
of God, fulfilling the duties of his nature.792 
Thus one might say that according to Nursi, impotence, weakness and 
poverty that is innate in human nature requires the existence of ashrār. For 
someone who is constantly well, has absolutely no worries and lives his life 
in idleness and monotony develops in time a state of self-reliance that drives 
him towards arrogance and egotism. He does barely remember that he is a 
created being with responsibilities, who has certain duties to fulfill towards 
his Creator.  Thus, one might say that in order to realize one‟s weakness, 
poverty and impotence and with this awareness turn towards one‟s Creator 
in worship; and through this kind of turning, attract His Compassion and 
Mercy, the existence of sharr and calamities is necessary. And in this turning 
towards the Creator in times of hardship and difficulty, the meaning of the 
following Qur‟anic verse seems to be hidden: 
So, verily, with every difficulty there is relief. Verily, with every difficulty there 
is relief. Therefore, when you are free [from your immediate task], still labor 
hard, and to your Lord turn [all] your attention.793 
6.8 Final Comparisons between previous Theodicies and the 
Theodicy of Nursi 
Although there seem to be a lot of similarities in Ibn Sῑnā‟s theodicy with 
that of Nursi, the fact that Ibn Sῑnā does not base his arguments on Divine 
Names makes Nursi‟s approach original. For instance does Ibn Sῑnā define 
the lack of action (af‟al) as evil, which Nursi would agree with, for according 
to Nursi, any kind of idleness and monotony pertains to non-existence and is 
                                        
792 Ibid. 
793 Qur‟ān, 94:5-8. 
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therefore sharr.794 The notion of accidental evil (sharr bil-„arad) as 
introduced by Ibn Sῑnā is yet another similar aspect to that of Nursi, who 
stated that the creation of sharr is not sharr, rather the „acquisition‟ of sharr, 
in other words the desire for sharr, is sharr.795 On the other hand, Nursi 
would deny the notion of non-existing accidental evil of Ibn Sῑnā and would 
agree with Inati‟s criticism that the privation of tertiary perfection796 is not 
evil with respect to that species, but merely with respect to what that 
species could have additionally had.797 Even that would not be considered by 
Nursi as sharr for since God is the true owner of everything, He is free in 
giving each creature the amount of features He wishes. For every single 
feature given to a being is already a plus, compared to the fact that that 
being did not exist and was given everything from ex nihilo.  
Ibn Sῑnā‟s further argued that God does not will evil as such; He is aware of 
its presence but He does not mind it because he knows it is necessary. Inati 
criticized this argument by saying that God could have made humans such 
that they eat only earth and drink only water and that they take all 
necessary vitamins, minerals and proteins from these two without having to 
kill other beings and produce evil in order to continue with living. Nursi‟s 
answer to this criticism would be that it completely ignores the purpose of 
life and the purpose of human beings‟ creation. While the former purpose 
has been explained in chapter 5 and partly in this current Chapter, the latter 
purpose, namely human being‟s creation will be elaborated upon in the next 
Chapter. 
                                        
794 The Words, 487. 
795 The Letters, 62. More about the acquisition of sharr in chapter 7. 
796 Tertiary perfection is not necessary for that being‟s well-being or for the whole species. 
797 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sina‟s Theodicy, 97.  
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Nursi has been influenced by Ghazālῑ, and this is manifest in his works. For 
instance  Ghazālῑ defines evil (qabῑḥ) as whatever is repugnant or improper 
to an end (the end of the agent). Nursi also emphasizes greatly and in many 
instances the notion that minor ashrār can exist to bring about universal 
good which ultimately is also good to the agent as part of that universe. 
Furthermore, Nursi, like Ghazālῑ, points out that God is the possessor of 
everything and thus is free in realizing His will as He wishes. Nursi explains 
this idea under the Name of Mālik al Mulk. However, to stress this point 
again, Nursi‟s Divine Names Theology adds a completely new perspective of 
looking at the issue at hand. The differences between the scholars 
mentioned above and Nursi on so called „moral evil‟ will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
Contrary to some philosophers such as Razi, who stated that in this world 
evil surmounts goodness, Nursi assures his reader that creation is based on 
khayr and that sharr has merely a dependent existence (tāba‟, written in the 
Risale as „tebeῑ‟)798. Nursi‟s explanation, however, is quite different from that 
of Maimonides and Ibn Sῑnā. Nursi states that khayr is universal (kullῑ) 
whereas sharr is minor (juz‟ῑ).799 For each species (naw‟) in this world, a 
science has emerged and still emerges. Science is composed of universal 
principles (qawā‟id kullῑ) (principles that are generally accepted). These 
general or universal principles are discoverers of the beauty of order in each 
species.800 Thus all sciences are loyal testifiers of orderly beauty.801 Nursi 
                                        
798 The word tāba‟ means that the existence of something is dependent of the existence of 
another. 
799 Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1995. (own translation).  
800 For this beauty in order, one might cite the following verse: “He Who created the seven 
heavens one above another: No want of proportion will you see in the creation of God Most 
Gracious. So turn your vision again: Do you see any flaw? Again turn your vision a second 
time: your vision will come back to you dull and discomfited, in a state worn out.” (Qur‟ān, 
67:3-4)  
801 Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1995. 
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further states that universality is an evidence of order. For instance is it 
universally accepted that there is gravity on earth; that water boils at one 
hundred degree Celsius, etc; for if there is no order in something, a theory 
cannot universally come into existence. These testifiers (sciences) are 
purified with induction, through the eye of wisdom.802 In other words, it is 
for instance universally accepted that every living individual dies. Man has no 
ability to see every single individual in the past and the future. But from 
those few examples, one is able to derive that all living beings will die.  This 
fact has no exemptions803. But sometimes order is not visible because its 
circle is wider than the scope of vision; because it cannot be imagined and 
comprehended, the unique order cannot display itself. 804  
Thus, Nursi states, all the sciences testify and all wise visions derived from 
induction affirm that in creation the main goal and real purpose and absolute 
dominant is beauty (ḥusn), goodness (khayr), justice (ḥaqq) and perfection 
(kamāl). On the other hand, sharr and ugliness (qubh) and superstition 
(bāṭil) are dependent (tebeῑ), discomfited (maghlūba), and dilapidated 
(maghmūra). Even if they descend upon, it is temporal.805 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered several topics that hopefully have shed light to the 
problem at hand, namely the nature and existence of sharr; not the moral 
aspect of it (such as free will and inclination) but the aspect of so called 
„natural evils‟. The terms „evil‟ as well as „natural evil‟ has been avoided in 
this chapter and will be avoided in the next as well. This is due to the 
                                        
802 Ibid., 1995. 
803 The Qur‟ān also verifies this fact in [3:185]: “Every soul shall have a taste of death”. 
804 Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1995. 
805 Ibid., 1995. 
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different meanings that these two terms entail. The implication of evil as has 
been used in history covered a whole range from disasters, calamities, 
disabilities, imperfections, wars, tortures, all kinds of cruelties, until, 
ultimately, death. From among these, mainly calamities and disasters such 
as earthquakes, tsunamis and others have been called „natural evils‟. The 
semantic analysis of sharr in the Qur‟ān, covered in chapter 2, has shown 
that the meaning of sharr is quite different. Accordingly, almost none of the 
above can be named as sharr806. This chapter has shown that Nursi‟s 
definition of the term is in line with that of the Qur‟ān. While the Qur‟ān 
mainly describes religious, moral or ethical deficits such as disbelief, idolatry, 
parsimony, violation of covenants, aversion from God, slander and/or 
transgression among ashrār, Nursi additionally states that there exists minor 
sharr as a „unit of measurement‟; or to be a means to a good end; or to 
avoid greater ashrār; but most important of all: to manifest the Glory of the 
Divine. 
Twelve metaphysical principles have been derived from the Risale that are 
like summaries of Nursi‟s understanding of sharr. Most of these principles 
are ontological. These principles have served as cornerstones throughout 
this chapter and will continue to do so in the coming chapter. In summary, 
the first principle stated that existence requires an existing cause whereas 
non-existence depends upon non-existential things. The second principle 
asserted that there is no absolute non-existence in the universe. According 
to the third principle, existence was pure good (wujūd khayr al-mahdh) 
whereas non-existence was pure sharr („adam sharr al-mahdh). The fourth 
principle said that sharr is non-existential and arose from non-existence. 
Following this, the fifth principle taught that there is no absolute sharr in the 
                                        
806 For the semantic analysis of the term sharr in the Qur‟ān, see chapter 2. 
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universe. The sixth principle stated that the abandonment of a minor sharr 
could lead to greater sharr (higher good defense). The seventh principle 
asserted that sharr has some sort of minor existence or external/relative 
reality. According to the eighth principle, ashrār were the manifestation of 
Divine Glory – they originated directly from God, however they were not 
caused by Him. The ninth principle said that akhyār (pl. khayr) were the 
manifestation of Divine Beauty – they originated directly from God and were 
caused by Him. According to the tenth principle, the creation of sharr was 
not sharr but the desire for sharr was sharr. The eleventh principle stated 
that free will had no actual existence and lastly, the twelfth principle 
asserted that destruction pertained to non-existence and was easy to 
perform. 
This chapter has further emphasized that Nursi‟s originality lies in explaining 
theodicy in the light of the Divine Names and Attributes of God. In this 
respect it has been stated that sharr originates from God (in being the 
manifestation of Divine Glory), but is not caused by God. The manifestation 
of Divine Glory, on the other hand, should be understood in relation with the 
lack of capacity, or ability of creation.807 There is no contradiction according 
to Nursi, in stating that sharr originates from God and at the same time that 
whatever originates from God is good. For according to Nursi, underneath 
every veil of apparent ugliness, there is hidden most shining instances of 
beauty and order.808 
Furthermore, in the light of the principles of „privatio boni‟, „the best of all 
possible worlds‟, „the nature of a world of duality‟ and „plenitude‟, the 
question of whether sharr is an illusion or reality has been discussed. 
                                        
807 The Words, 478. 
808 Ibid., 240. 
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Accordingly, Nursi did not share the idea of Augustine that evil is a defective 
good and the lack of goodness and therefore cannot exist apart from it. He 
upheld the idea of Ghazālῑ and later also Leibniz of „the best of all possible 
worlds‟, in the light of the Qur‟ān, 32:7. He emphasized the beauty in every 
creation, either essentially or in regard to its results and thus advised his 
reader to look at every event with the eye of wisdom in order to see its 
perfection. Regarding the principle of a world of dualities, Nursi shared the 
idea of al-Maturidῑ that the opposites in this world manifest God‟s Divine 
Wisdom and indicate God‟s Unity. But while those opposites that add to the 
variety in this world are generally called evil, Nursi called them „unit of 
measurement‟; a means to help human beings understand and enjoy the 
variety of degrees in creation. 
Dilley critically remarked that what happens to matter has never been 
important for traditional theodicies. He furthermore asked whether 
theodicies or defenses of God have in mind any specific outcome as to the 
natural world.809 In Nursi‟s theology and theodicy, the change, tribulations, 
and different states matter and creation goes through it due to the many 
different Divine Names and Attributes they manifest. Hunger in the world 
points to the Divine Sustainer; illness to the Divine Healer, and so on. In this 
regard, the transformation in matter is, according to Nursi, a very important 
duty of creation. There will be, however, a place that is pure of any kind of 
change and transformation, a realm that is free from any kind of opposites; 
that is, according to Nursi, the hereafter. 
Nursi also explained the principle of plenitude, quite differently from Lovejoy, 
though. Lovejoy pointed out that any potentiality of being must be fulfilled810 
                                        
809 F. B. Dilley. „A Finite God Reconsidered‟, 36.  
810 The Great Chain of Being, 55. 
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– which implied that God is not free to create or not, for this would be 
contrary to God‟s goodness; hence comes the variety in this world.  Nursi, 
on the other hand, stated that firstly, the variety in creation stemmed from 
God‟s Most Beautiful Names that have incalculable manifestations. Secondly, 
since all activity is a sort of pleasure, Nursi talked about sacred ardour, 
sacred compassion, holy love, holy joy, sacred pleasure, sacred gratification 
that could be attributed to the Creator. Nursi continues that these attributes 
arise from the gratitude and perfections of creatures, resulting from their 
abilities emerging from the potential to the actual and their developing 
within the activity of power. 
Nursi additionally elaborated on the question of the necessity of sharr and 
the reason why it is created. Stating that the creation of sharr is not sharr, 
rather the acquisition of it is sharr, he continued with his explanation with 
different approaches. He looked at this issue firstly from the perspective that 
lesser sharr is acceptable for greater good. It might be useful at this point to 
remember Hick‟s statement: For a reconciliation to take place, one must be 
able to show that either evil is to be justly deserved or that it is a means to 
a good end.811 Secondly, Nursi discussed this issue as a notion of a test and 
examination, a competition and striving that will ultimately lead to the 
emergence of the different levels of humankind and their separation from 
each other. Thirdly, Nursi said that the creation of Satan serves the 
development of innumerable potentialities of humankind. Thus, according to 
him, Satan‟s creation is merely a minor sharr in comparison to all the khayr 
that it entails.  
Nursi further provided answers to the following questions: Why does God 
allow lots of people to go astray because of Satan? Why is a misguided man, 
                                        
811 Evil and the God of Love, p. 23. 
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being a possessor of weakness and poverty as human being, threatened so 
drastically in the Qur‟ān? In relation to the Qur‟ānic verse 67:8, Nursi further 
discussed the question: Why do such unimportant actions and personal sins 
of insignificant men attract the anger of the universe? How should Divine 
Wisdom be reconciled with the existence of ashrār that result in 
punishment? 
Another important statement made by Nursi was that the “commitment of 
grievous sins do not arise from lack of belief but from the defeat of the heart 
and mind through the predomination of emotion, desire, and illusion.”812 
With this statement Nursi proclaimed his opposition to the Mu‟tazilite view 
that the committer of a grievous sin becomes an unbeliever.  
In this chapter, Nursi has also touched on calamities and inflicts as well as 
natural disasters. He has given different reasons of how their existence can 
be reconciled with God‟s mercy and has also asserted that these do actually 
not fall into the category of ashrār. What seems to be quite original about 
Nursi‟s view is his statement that through grief, calamities, difficulties and 
tribulations the darkness of non-existence draws distant.813  
Nursi finally suggested a form of response to calamities and inflicts, and 
added that the time of struggle and suffering can be turned into an eternal 
profit and bliss. This could be achieved, according to Nursi, through worship. 
This anthropological approach of Nursi aims to make human beings aware of 
their impotence, poverty and weakness; through that awareness and their 
proclamation to the Creator, Nursi aims to show them their richness and 
                                        
812 The Flashes Collection, 111. 
813 The Words, 487. 
 230 
 
power.814  In relation to worship, Nursi has further provided two new terms 
into the discourse, one being „positve worship‟, and the other „negative 
worship‟. 
The next chapter will discuss Nursi‟s perspective on so called „moral evil‟, 
and in relation with it the notion of free will, the „divine Trust‟, the „soul‟ and 
arrogance and Adam‟s Fall. Nursi will try to give answers to the questions of 
who the creator of sharr is and what the difference is between the creation 
of sharr and the inclination to do sharr. He will furthermore elaborate on the 
question of ethical responsibility for the existence of sharr – man or God? 
  
                                        
814 Ibid., 493. Nursi, relying on the Qur‟ān, 91:9 states that man‟s perfection lies in his 
awareness of imperfection, his power in his awareness of impotence and his wealth in his 
awareness of poverty. 
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7 The Moral Aspect of sharr and Existential 
Theodicy 
7.1 Introduction 
This current chapter will discuss the „moral aspect‟ of sharr from Nursi‟s 
perspective; that is, any kind of sharr that man chooses to commit with his 
free will. This study has shown that from a Qur‟anic perspective, there is in 
fact no other aspect of sharr, other than „moral sharr‟. While natural 
calamities and disasters did not fall under the Qur‟anic description of it, any 
kind of misbehavior by man against God‟s will has been named sharr.  
Chapter 6 has shown, how far Nursi‟s description of the so called „natural 
aspect‟ of sharr is in line with the Qur‟anic view of this term. This chapter 
will disclose Nursi‟s coherence with the Qur‟anic „moral aspect‟ of the term.  
In relation with the notion of free will, there are several more aspects that 
need consideration. Nursi discusses them in different chapters under 
different topics; however, a relation between them will be made and seems 
to be appropriate. Issues such as free will (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār) and predestination 
(qadar) have been discussed already in earlier chapters, albeit by different 
scholars. This section therefore aims to put Nursi into a discourse with those 
who came before him. 
The current chapter will seek to find answers in Nursi‟s works to the 
following questions: Who or what is the cause of an „evil will‟ and who 
created it? How did sin enter into the perfect paradisal state of Adam and his 
wife? How should divine determining be understood? Does God create some 
with the intention to punish them and others with the intention to save 
them? Why did God choose to create a being who He knew would freely sin?  
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Nursi tries to approach the issue of the moral aspect of sharr from different 
angles. First of all, Nursi introduces the different faculties of humankind. He 
discusses this issue in relation with the „straight path‟ (ṣirāṭ al-mustaqῑm) in 
the opening chapter of the Qur‟ān, the fatiḥa.815  Nursi asserts that the 
transgression of these faculties, be it their excess or their deficiency, may 
lead to the separation from that straight path and hence may lead to sharr. 
This will be one illustration for why man is capable of committing sharr and 
what the guideline is for him to avoid it. This thesis, or so to say, scheme of 
Nursi can be seen as some sort of a template that can be employed in 
different areas.  
Secondly, in connection with the moral aspect of sharr, Nursi discusses the 
creation of Adam and his Fall. For the verses in the Qur‟ān that are related 
to the creation of the first human being start with a conversation of God 
with the angels, who seem to question God‟s decision. The question 
discussed here is thus, how man, who is capable of committing sharr and 
shedding blood can be given the vicegerency on earth? Additionally, why 
Adam was expelled from Paradise? The discussion centers on whether Adam 
was the first human being committing sharr by being disobedient to God, 
eating from that forbidden fruit. Another question is whether Adam was the 
first conscious being or whether there existed other beings before the 
creation of the first human being? These questions aim to analyze whether 
Adam and/or his wife can be blamed for the existence of so-called evil on 
earth and the Qur‟anic narrative on why God chose to create a human being 
capable of committing sharr. 
                                        
815 Al-Fatiḥa (the Opener) is the first (opening) chapter of the Qur‟ān and is a prayer for 
God‟s guidance, stressing His Lordship and Mercy. The respective verse is „guide us to the 
straight path‟.  
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Thirdly, Nursi brings into the discourse the notion of the „ana‟816 and 
„inordinate self-esteem‟ (anā‟iyyah) in relation with sharr. Nursi illustrates 
that the latter, that is the inordinate self-esteem, elucidates through the 
misuse of the „ana‟ and results in sharr and „adam. This aspect is of 
particular importance for it bears a point made by Nursi that is arguably 
original and – so to say – unique: namely, the link between „ana‟, and, if 
misused, its encouragement for all kinds of ashrār. 
Fourthly, Nursi deals with the nature of divine determining (qadar) and free 
will (juz‟ῑ irāda). He discusses free will‟s capability of choosing sharr; the 
nature of it, why it has been given to man and what its function is or should 
be. Nursi links this with the Qur‟anic verse “Whatever good (ḥasana) 
happens to you is from God, but whatever evil (sayyiatin) befalls you is from 
yourself”.817 He further analyses the famous question around the possibility 
to reconcile divine determining with free will. Through his discussion on the 
nature of free will, Nursi introduces a very important and arguably unique 
point that is capable to serve as another main cornerstone of this discourse: 
namely, the link between free choice and „relative matters‟ (‟amr ῑtibārῑ), and 
through this link the ascription of that choice to man.  
Finally in this chapter, after having shown through Nursi‟s works that sharr, 
in fact, is committed through the mal inclinations of human beings, Nursi 
offers some pragmatic solution to apparent ashrār; that is, to inflictions that 
are mostly seen by the superficial mind as sharr. 
                                        
816 The word ana has been translated by Şükran Vahide as the „I‟. In other works, it is also 
translated as the „ego‟. In this study, we prefer to use the original word ana as it is, without 
translating it; instead descriptions and definitions shall be provided to the reader.   
817 Qur‟ān, 4:79. 
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7.2 Faculties of Humankind and the Ability to do sharr 
The following faculties of humankind, that Nursi will talk about, have been 
expressed before by al-Ghazālῑ in his Kitāb sharḥ „ajā‟ib al-qalb. While 
Ghazālῑ categorizes these under the self or soul (nafs)818, Nursi states that 
these faculties have been given to man so that his spirit (rūḥ) can live in a 
body that is constantly changing, needy and exposed to dangers. These 
three faculties are classified as instinct (quwwa al-shahawiyya), for self-
interest; intellect (quwwa al-aqliyya), to distinguish the useful from that 
which is harmful and to distinguish khayr from sharr; and aggression 
(quwwa al-ghaḍabiyya), to fend off the harmful.819 
These strengths are restricted by religion, states Nursi, but there is no 
restriction in the nature of human beings because God‟s wisdom 
necessitated that humanity should achieve perfection through the mystery of 
competition820. Thus, in case of the absence of any innate limitation each of 
these propulsions are examined by Nursi in three categories: deficiency 
(tafrῑṭ), optimal (wasaṭ) and excess (ifrāṭ). With this categorization, Nursi 
aims to guide his readers to the understanding of what „the right course‟ (al-
ṣirāṭ al-mustakῑm) might mean; whereas al-Ghazālῑ, by introducing these 
faculties, is more concerned with the purification of the heart on its journey 
in reaching God. Ultimately, both agree on the importance of the 
preservation and care of the body, since the body is the kingdom of the soul 
(nafs)821 and the house of the spirit (rūḥ).822   
                                        
818 Al-Ghazālῑ. Marvels of the Heart (Kitāb sharḥ ‟ajā„ib al-qalb), trans. Walter James Skellie 
(Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2010), 7. 
819 Signs of Miraculousness, 29.Nursi borrowed this concept from al-Ghazālῑ and applied it to 
his exegesis of sūrat al-Fātiḥa. For more information, see The Marvels of the Heart, 
especially p. 14ff.  
820 Signs of Miraculousness, 29. 
821 Marvels of the Heart, 18. 
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Figure 3: The Faculties of Humankind 
 
7.2.1 Instinct (shahwa) 
Nursi explains that this disposition is to satisfy the basic needs for livelihood. 
Examples for this level of motivation are eating, drinking, sleeping, talking, 
and sexual satisfaction and so on.823 If, in exertion, man understates this 
strength, the result will be apathy, the will for nothing (khumud). On the 
other hand, Nursi continues, if man enters excess, profligacy, in other words, 
careless wastefulness and shameless and immoral behavior occurs (fujūr).824  
                                                                                                               
822 The Words, 535. 
823 Walter James Skellie notes that this idea corresponds somewhat to the Platonic thought 
of the rational and irrational souls. The rational soul, according to Plato, was created by God 
and placed in the head, but the irrational part was the creation of the demiourgoi. Its nobler 
part is anger, or the spirited, irascible nature (thymos), and has its seat in the heart or 
thorax; while the base part, which is appetence, or the concupiscible nature (epithymia), 
has its seat in the abdominal cavity. See Marvels of the Heart, xix; Plato, Timaeus, trans. R. 
G. Bury (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1929). 
824 Signs of Miraculousness, 30. 
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But the optimal is explained by Nursi as uprightness („iffa). At this level, 
there is desire for everything which is included in the ethical-religious frame 
and there is listlessness for everything which is out of this frame.825 Physical 
and mental harms for oneself and for others occur, if these defined borders 
are overstepped towards both poles. Although the aim of this study is not a 
comparison between Christianity and Islam, this is perhaps comparable to 
Augustine‟s statement. Augustine explained that lust becomes evil or wrong 
if the human soul perversely delights in sensual pleasures, thereby 
neglecting his self-control, which would be in line with the state of fujūr 
mentioned by Nursi. Augustine further explained that that self control leads 
to spiritual realities far more beautiful, with a loveliness which cannot 
fade826; comparable maybe to the state of „iffa in Nursi‟s explanation. It 
might also be useful to remember at this point Eliaçık‟s interpretation of 
chapter 113, verse 4827 in Chapter 2 of this study; for according to Eliaçık, 
the meaning of this verse was to seek refuge by the Lord from the sharr of 
becoming a slave of provoked desires and lustful addictions, and from 
temptations and all kinds of blowing that evoke these feelings.828 This 
sounds very much like a description of Nursi‟s definition of fujūr. 
7.2.2 Intellect (‘aql) 
This ability is, according to Nursi, to distinguish the beneficial from harm, to 
accept the good and to dissociate from and deny what is sharr. The 
deficiency of the power of intellect is thus, Nursi continues, stupidity and 
foolishness (ghabāwa). Therefore man lives in a state of primitiveness. The 
                                        
825 Ibid. 
826 The Problem of Evil – A Reader, 61. 
827 “… and the sharr of those who blow into knotted reeds” 
828 Yaşayan Kur‟an, 445. 
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excess of the intellect leads to deception and over-meticulousness in 
trivialities (jarbaza).829  
The middle way is explained by Nursi as being wisdom (ḥikma).830 Nursi 
shows that this power should be employed, for instance in the question of 
the creation of actions. In this respect, states Nursi, the view of the Jabriyya 
can be categorized as excess (ifrāṭ), for it completely deprives man from it. 
The Mu‟tazila, on the other hand, can be categorized according to Nursi as 
deficient (tafrῑṭ), in the sense that it attributes all effect to man. Nursi thus 
claims that the ahl al-sunna is the optimal (wasaṭ). This is because according 
to Nursi, this school positions itself in between the other two and gives the 
beginning of the actions to free will (juz‟ῑ irada) and the end of it to divine 
will (kullῑ irada).831 
7.2.3 Aggression (ghaḍab) 
Nursi states that this faculty is given by God to repulse harmful and 
destructive things. The state of minimal or no aggression, in other words the 
deficiency of it, is cowardice (jabāna). In this state, man fears what is not to 
be feared of and enters delusive imagining. The excess of it, Nursi continues, 
is uncontrolled anger (tahawwur), which is the progenitor of despotism, 
domination and tyranny.832 Hence, this level bears all kinds of violence and 
delinquency.  
                                        
829 Signs of Miraculousness, 29. 
830 Ibid. Nursi links this with the Qur‟anic verse: “He who has been given wisdom, has been 
given great good” [2:269]. 
831 Ibid., 30. 
832 Ibid. 
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The optimal state of this compulsion is called by Nursi courage (shaja‟a); the 
meaning of it is giving freely of oneself with love and eagerness for the 
upholding of the Word of Divine Unity.833  
Thus, Nursi concludes that the six extremes are tyranny and the three 
middle ways are justice and the Straight Path mentioned in the Qur‟ān.834 
This thesis of Nursi is by no means an objective one. It is the subjective view 
and interpretation of him regarding the meaning of the right course (ṣirāṭ al-
mustaqῑm), mentioned in the opening chapter of the Qur‟ān, the al-Fātiḥa. 
Nevertheless, it might provide a guideline for the functioning of the innate 
nature of man and it might also provide an indication of what man is actually 
asking God‟s help for. 
Nursi has stated previously the fact that these compulsions or powers in 
human beings, as introduced above, are of unlimited nature. This was 
supported by Maimonides‟ statement that evil arises through imperfect 
human institutions of the state. The result was tyranny and war. Another 
kind of evil introduced by Maimonides was man‟s excess in desire and asking 
for things he does not really need in order to live a useful life. This kind of 
evil inflicts man himself.835  
This shows that perfection through competition is intended by God. It might 
well be stated that the mystery of competition lies in the right conduct of 
free will. This faculty, namely free will, is employed in every little aspect of 
man‟s life, for he is in a constant state of having to make decisions of some 
sort. In the following, it shall be discussed, why God decided to create a 
human being with free choice and what the importance of this faculty is for 
                                        
833 Ibid. 
834 Qur‟ān, 1:6; 11:112. 
835 Moses Maimonides, 120; A Maimonides Reader, 305. 
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human beings, in his relation with God and other beings, such as the angels, 
who do not possess such a faculty. 
7.3 Adam’s Creation and the Fall 
The creation of the first human being, as mentioned in the Qur‟ān, has been 
the source of a lot of various interpretations. The Qur‟anic narrative 
illustrates most importantly, how sharr entered into the creation of God 
through the first human being and through the rebellion of Satan. In this 
respect, the Qur‟anic definition of sharr appears to be ungratefulness 
(kufr)836 to God, with its main manifestations to be rebellion and 
disobedience against His commands. It is also noteworthy, however, that 
the Qur‟anic narrative ends with the human‟s repentance, God‟s forgiveness, 
and God‟s promise of guidance for all.837 
 The respective verse revealing God‟s decision and the angels‟ reaction to 
that decision is what Nursi focuses his own exegesis on. There are several 
aspects therein, that require further analysis, including the issue of free will. 
The verse reads: 
Behold, your Lord and Sustainer said to the angels: „I will create a vicegerent 
on earth.‟ They said: „Will you place therein one who will make mischief 
therein and shed blood? Whilst we do celebrate Your praises and glorify Your 
holy [name]?‟ He said: „I know what you know not.‟838 
                                        
836 Stowasser used the word „disbelief‟, which might be misleading since disbelief in God can 
neither be attributed to Adam as the first human being and messenger of God, neither to 
Satan. But ungratefulness, which is another meaning of kufr might be more appropriate.  
837 Barbara Freyer Stowasser. „Theodicy and the Many Meanings of Adam and Eve‟ in 
Theodicy and Justice in Modern Islamic Thought, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‟ (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2010), 1. 
838 Qur‟ān, 2:30. 
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Nursi, in the light of the verse above, tries to prove the existence of 
angels839 and talks about man‟s vicegerency (khalῑfatun). What is of concern 
for this study is the vicegerency of man.  
It is however significant to see in this verse the reaction of the angels 
immediately after God announces his decision to create a vicegerent. Hence, 
the angels either knew about the meaning of vicegerency840; or they must 
have seen a previous example of what beings with the responsibility of 
vicegerency are capable of. Considering the meaning of the term khalῑfa, the 
question needs to be asked, who Adam was to replace or succeed. Al-Qāḍῑ 
states that there were only two possibilities to answer this question. One, 
this khalῑfa replaced and succeeded some other creature(s) on earth; two, 
he was a khalῑfa of God.841 Interestingly enough, the early exegetes 
preferred to employ the first choice and thus rely on isrā‟iliyyāt material 
instead of endorsing the second choice at all. It was not until the late 
exegetes such as Tabarῑ, that the second choice, namely that a khalῑfa is 
God‟s khalῑfa was considered842. 
                                        
839 Signs of Miraculousness, 262 ff. 
840 The modern intellectual approach to the term is mainly socio-political. To understand the 
rather exegetical interpretation of the term, it is necessary to look into early exegetical 
literature. Wadād al-Qāḍῑ approached the issue from an „exegetically historical‟ perspective, 
not ranging beyond the Umayyad period. He asserted that the early exegetes came up with 
five main meanings to the root word of khalῑfa (kh-l-f). 1. To succeed, to follow, to come 
after another; 2. To replace, to substitute, to take the place of another, to deputize for; 3. 
To substitute, to replace, to take the place of another, but after this other is gone, 
destroyed or death, etc. thereby succeeding him; 4. To inhabit, to cultivate; and finally, 5. 
To govern, to rule, to be king. According to al-Qāḍῑ, the first two meanings have been 
employed by many early exegetes, being the most famous interpretations. The third one, 
being very similar to the second meaning, preconditions the death or destruction of the one 
replaced. For more information, see Al-Qāḍῑ, Wadād. „”Khalῑfa” in Early Exegetical Literature‟ 
in Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Bd. 28, Nr. ¼ (1988), pp. 392-411.  
841 Al-Qāḍῑ, Wadād. „”Khalῑfa” in Early Exegetical Literature‟ 406. 
842 Ibid. 
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Nursi in his interpretation also preferred to use the first meaning, stating 
that khalῑfatan suggests that before conditions on the earth were readied for 
human life, there were intelligent creatures for whose lives, conditions 
during the earth‟s early epochs were suitable. This view, states Nursi, is in 
conformity with the questions of science (qaḍiyya al-ḥikma). He also points 
out the most widely held view, namely that these creatures were species of 
jinn843, but they spread corruption on the earth and therefore were 
succeeded by mankind844. Ahmed Hamdi Akseki also asked the question 
whether Adam was really the father of the human race, or whether there 
were some other human beings before him; he came to the result that there 
were probably humanlike creatures before Adam.845 Whether this view of 
Ahmed Hamdi Akseki is at odds with that of Nursi or not is questionable, 
since Akseki might as well have meant jinns who are humanlike in many 
aspects. Furthermore, Nursi first states that there were intelligent creatures 
for whose lives, conditions during the earth‟s early epochs were suitable 
then he explains the widely held view that these creatures were a species of 
jinn.  
While analyzing this verse, Nursi emphasizes that the angels‟ questioning 
and their doubts is related to mankind being „placed‟ (jā‟ilun) on the earth 
                                        
843 Al-Qāḍῑ offers Muqāṭil b. Suleymān‟s commentary on sūra 2:30, albeit mythical, as 
follows: “God created the angels and the jinn before He created the devils and men, i.e. 
Adam. He made the jinn the inhabitants of the earth and the angels the inhabitants of the 
heavens. Then jinn fell into discord and jealousy, and they started killing each other, 
whereupon God sent to them a host of the inhabitants of the lower heaven, headed by Iblῑs, 
and so they descended to the earth. There they were not required to do as many acts of 
worship as required in heaven, and thus they desired to stay on earth. It is then that God 
revealed to them: I am going to make a „khalῑfa‟ other than you, and I am going to raise 
you back to heaven. Man, then, was going to replace the angels on earth, but the angels 
were going to continue to exist elsewhere in the heavens. Man in this sense is the deputy of 
the angels…” Al-Qāḍῑ, Wadād. „”Khalῑfa” in Early Exegetical Literature‟, 400. 
844 Signs of Miraculousness, 267. 
845 Veysel Kaya. „Can the Quran Support Darwin? An Evolutionist Approach by Two Turkish 
Scholars after the Foundation of the Turkish Republic‟ in The Muslim World, Vol. 102, Issue 
2 (Apr. 2012), 360-361. 
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and appointed to cultivate846 it. They are thus not questioning God‟s will to 
„create‟ (khāliqun) a human being and give him existence.847 For existence is 
pure good (wujūd khayr al-mahdh) and creation is an essential act (fi‟l dhātῑ) 
of God and therefore cannot be questioned.848 The angels are perfectly 
aware, and have no doubts that everything that God creates is good.   
Nursi further points out the reason why, according to the verse above, man 
is placed „in (fῑ) earth‟, although mankind is „on earth‟: the choice of in (fῑ) 
implies, Nursi states, that man resembles the spirit breathed into the earth, 
and if man ever quits earth, the earth will fall apart and expire.849 This 
shows the importance that is given to man.  
Additionally, Nursi interprets the following phrase “He said: „I know what you 
know not‟”, which is God‟s answer to the questioning of the angels for why 
God wants to create human beings.  The inna in innῑ a‟lamu („I know‟), Nursi 
states, is confirmative and rebuts doubts and hesitation.850 Nursi explains 
that this inna spreads light on several aspects. According to Nursi‟s 
interpretation, there is much good and many advantages in mankind; there 
is also sinfulness but this is minor. It would be opposed to wisdom, Nursi 
continues, to abandon the former due to the latter.851 Additionally, man 
holds a mystery which qualifies man for vicegerency. This mystery is known 
by the Creator, however unknown by the angels, Nursi points out. 
Furthermore, Nursi proceeds, there is an instance of wisdom in the creation 
                                        
846 Here Nursi seems to employ one of the many meanings of the term khalῑfa, namely „to 
cultivate‟, which has been pointed out in the previous footnote as the fourth meaning of the 
term according to al-Qāḍῑ.  
847 Signs of Miraculousness, 267.  
848 Ibid. 
849 Ibid. 
850 Ibid., 269. 
851 Ibid., 270. 
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of human beings that renders them superior to the angels; again, the angels 
did not know this, but God knew.852 
Thus Nursi concludes with the following lines: 
When Allah the Most High created pure good (khayr al-mahdh), that is, the 
angels, and pure sharr (sharr al-mahdh), that is, the devils, and that which 
was neither khayr nor sharr, that is, the animals, being the Munificent 
Bestower of Bounties, His wisdom necessitated the existence of a fourth 
category that embraced both khayr and sharr. [That is, human beings.] Thus, 
if the [human] powers of anger and instinct submit to the power of 
intellect853, through effort and striving, man rises higher than the angels. But 
if the reverse is the case, he falls lower than the beasts, for he has no 
excuse.854 
In this respect, Nursi points out, that man is asked to direct and use the 
faculties given to him in his nature, in the right way. It has been said 
previously, that these faculties are not limited in any way in the innate 
nature of man, however limits have been set to them through revelation. 
Man, with his free will and the guidance of revelation, is thus asked to use 
his intellect to distinguish the right from the wrong. Thus, Nursi does not 
share Augustine‟s view to restrict the free exercise of will to the first instance, 
the first sin of the first human being.855 To blame Adam for the sins of 
humanity and to say that after the first sin, man sins involuntarily and is the 
moral agent of the evil that he commits only in the sense that he is himself 
the author of the condition in which he cannot help but sin856, seems rather 
to be an attempt to escape the difficult problem at hand.  
One might rather want to ask how sin entered into the perfect paradisal 
state of Adam and his wife (whose name is not mentioned in the Qur‟ān), in 
                                        
852 Ibid. 
853 See the „Faculties of Humankind‟ in this chapter. 
854 Signs of Miraculousness, 270. 
855 „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 40. 
856 Ibid. 
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the first place. Adam and his wife, both being human, were able to 
distinguish between right and wrong; for they did possess an intellect, and 
they were directly guided by the Lord. Muslim theologians are divided in 
questions whether Adam did eat from that forbidden tree before or after his 
prophecy857; and whether this act should be considered as a sin, or as 
something else. In regards to the latter point, some believed it to be sin 
(some branches of the Kharijites), and others described the act as a minor 
sin or „slip‟ (zalla)858; others still interpreted it as forsaking the better 
(majority of the ahl al-sunnah), a misinterpretation859, forgetfulness 
(majority of Maturῑdῑs) or relativity of sin (Abū Ishāq al-Isfarā‟ini (d. 
1027)).860  
Nursi believes in sin being the requirement of man‟s nature (that is, also of 
the nature of Adam as the first human), contrary to that of the angels.861 
Having said this, Nursi does not explain, whether Adam was given free will 
from the very outset or only after he had been expelled from Paradise. In 
fact, nowhere seems Nursi to interpret the respective verses in the Qur‟ān 
that narrate the Fall of Adam and his wife.862  
According to Augustine, Adam, in his heart, must have already turned away 
from God in order for the devil‟s solicitations to be able to make any appeal 
to him.863 In other words, neither Adam nor his wife would have committed 
the deed (of eating from the forbidden fruit) if they had not already been 
                                        
857 Ferruh Kahraman. „Hz. Adem‟in Yasak Ağaca Yaklaşması‟, 207ff. 
858 Abū Ḥanῑfa (d. 767), Abū al-Lays al-Samarkandῑ (d. 1270) and Abdallah Ibn Omar al-
Baidawi (d. 1286) were amongst those who believed Adam‟s action to be zalla.   
859 Abū „Ali al-Jubbā‟i, Mālik bin Anas (d. 710), Ibn Arabῑ (d. 1148), and Sahl al-Tustarῑ (d. 
896) believed in Adam‟s action to be a misinterpretation.   
860 „Hz. Adem‟in Yasak Ağaca Yaklaşması‟, 210. 
861 The Letters, 62.  
862 Nursi explores verses up to 2:34, but then goes on with 2:41. But the verses that talk 
about Adam‟s Fall can be found in 2:35-38. 
863 Evil and the God of Love, 65-66. 
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“evil in will”.864 This statement of Augustine indicates an „original evil‟, an evil 
that came first in secret, which resulted in the other evil in the open,865 
namely, acting against God‟s command. However, there is no indication 
suggesting that this is a definitive answer. The Qur‟ān narrates that after 
Adam and his wife had eaten from the forbidden tree, their private parts 
became visible to them and they started to cover themselves with the leaves 
of paradise.866 This might mean that after their inclination towards doing 
something that is wrong, worldly desires appeared in them; and after their 
slip (zalla), they realized their nakedness – that is, they became self-aware. 
In other words, Nursi might agree with the following order: Adam and his 
wife had been created as vicegerents (khalῑfa). They had been given free 
will (juz‟ῑ irada) from the very outset. However the pure good (khayr al-
mahdh) environment in paradise was not able to show them their 
potentialities as human beings – until they were confronted with pure sharr 
(sharr al-mahdh) in form of Satan. Their confrontation with Satan and their 
inclination towards his whisperings made them feel a desire towards the 
worldliness. And finally, as a result of their zalla they became self-aware (or 
became aware of their faculty of instinct (shahwa)). 
According to Nursi, desire, illusions and emotions do not see the future. 
Assisted by the nafs that incites to sharr (nafs al-ammārah), the heart (qalb), 
being the seat of belief and the intellect („aql) fall silent and are defeated.867 
Nursi might have borrowed this concept from al-Ghazālῑ, who stated that 
powers such as appetence (shahwa) and anger (ghaḍab) must be held in 
                                        
864 „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 42. Although the term „evil in will‟ has been 
preferred by Augustine, it might be more suitable to say „able to sin‟ instead. 
865 Ibid., 43. 
866 Qur‟ān, 7:22.  
867 The Flashes Collection, 111. 
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check by the rational soul868 or intellect („aql). When the intellect dominates 
these lower powers, justice is established for the soul and the body; when 
the lower powers dominate the intellect, it becomes their slave.869  
Thus, Nursi further explains, committing grievous sins does not arise from 
lack of faith but from the defeat of the mind and heart through the 
predomination of emotion, desire and illusion.870 This statement of Nursi‟s 
serves at the same time as an answer to the Mu‟tazilites‟ assertion that 
someone who commits a grievous sin will enter disbelief (kufr).  
A similar statement to that of Nursi was made by Ibn Sῑnā and by 
Maimonides. The former claimed that if the „practical intellect‟ is not strong 
enough to assume control over the desires and demands of the body, they 
will prevail; in which case the soul will lose the ability to receive the light of 
the „agent intellect‟. And in this case, the road to truth, goodness and 
happiness will be closed and the life of ignorance and evil prevails.871 
Maimonides stated that self-inflicting evil arises where the imagination 
dominates the intellect;872 that is, were desires and illusions have gotten the 
upper hand. In this regard, the statements above may serve as a further 
explanation for the interpretation of Ihsan Eliaçık to chapter 113, verse 4 of 
the Qur‟ān, in which he stated:  
As a human being, I seek refuge, oh Lord, in You from the sharr of becoming 
a slave of provoked desires and lustful addictions, and from temptations and 
all kind of blowing that evoke these feelings.873 
                                        
868 Al-Ghazālῑ most probably adopted this concept from Plato‟s „rational‟ and „irrational soul‟, 
who stated that the excellence or virtue of the rational soul is wisdom, that of anger is 
courage and that of appetence is temperance. See The Marvels of the Heart, xix ff. 
869 The Marvels of the Heart, xix. 
870 The Flashes Collection, 111. 
871 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟a Theodicy, p. 123. 
872 Moses Maimonides, p. 120; A Maimonides Reader, p. 302-303. 
873 Yaşayan Kur‟an, Vol. 3, 445. Explained further in chapter 2 of this study. 
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7.3.1 Adam was taught the Names 
In the Qur‟ān, God asks the angels to prostrate before Adam, which they all 
do except of Iblis.874 Nursi explains that the reason why the angels are 
asked to prostrate before Adam is the fact that Adam has been taught all 
the Names.875 Nursi believes that this event was just the tip of a universal 
principle, namely the teaching of countless sciences, and numerous all-
embracing branches of knowledge about the universe, and extensive 
learning about the Creator‟s attributes and qualities.876 This teaching, Nursi 
further explains, afforded man superiority not only over the angels but also 
the heavens, earth and the mountains in the question of the bearing of the 
Divine Trust.877 Thus, through man‟s comprehensive disposition, he is the 
vicegerent on earth. This vast disposition of man and his ability and 
potentiality to rise above the state of the angels might serve as an answer to 
whether God is ultimately responsible for the existence of sin, because He 
chose to create a being whom He knew would freely sin. For, according to 
Nursi, God‟s purpose for the creation of humanity does not seem to be a 
human being without any sins; but rather the creation of a human being 
that, albeit constantly exposed to sin, remains in a constant struggle of 
pleasing God and a permanent progress.878  
In the same chapter of the Qur‟ān, a few verses later, is stated that Iblῑs 
refused to prostrate before Adam out of arrogance and haughtiness. 
According to Nursi‟s interpretation, this shows that most of the physical 
                                        
874 Qur‟ān, 2:34. 
875 Ibid., 2:31. 
876 The Words, 254. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, 1302-1304. Nursi relates his outline to the following Qur„anic verse 
(39:53): “Say: ‚O my Servants who have transgressed against their souls (anfusihim)! 
Despair not of the Mercy of Allah. Allah forgives all sins: for He is Oft-Forgiving, Most 
Merciful.‟”  
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beings in the universe and their representatives and appointed beings are 
subjugated to man and further that man‟s senses are predisposed and 
amenable to benefiting from all of them.879 Iblῑs‟ refusal thus indicates, Nursi 
believes, what a fearsome enemy and serious obstacle in the path of man‟s 
progress sharr matter and its representatives as well as sharr inhabitants, 
are.880 In this respect, Nursi points out, with the example of Adam as one 
single being, the Qur‟ān points to all human beings. 
How serious that obstacle of sharr, as interpreted by Nursi, is, can be easily 
seen in the following verse of the Qur'ān, where it states that Satan made 
Adam and his wife stumble in the garden of Paradise and brought about the 
loss of their erstwhile state.881 Why, though, would Adam, being in a 
spiritually and morally good position, oriented with love towards God, prefer 
or freely choose to be evil and miserable? Nursi, like mainstream Muslim 
thinkers882, believes that the reason why Adam was expelled from Paradise 
was a duty he had to fulfill. The result of his duty, according to Nursi, was 
the unfolding of all mankind‟s spiritual progress, and the revealing of all 
humanity‟s potentialities as well as man‟s essential nature of being a 
comprehensive mirror to all the Divine Names.883 Nursi further explains that 
if Adam would have remained in Paradise, his rank would have been fixed 
like that of the angels. There would be no levels of progress and man would 
not have been able to unfold his potentialities. Furthermore, Nursi states, 
there are numerous angels whose only reason for creation is to worship God, 
                                        
879 The Words, 254. 
880 Ibid. 
881 Qur‟ān, 2: 36 
882 The mainstream view is that it was Divine Will that Adam descended to the world; his act 
of eating from the forbidden tree through the use of his free will, started the history of 
humankind, as predestined by God. For further information, see Kurtubῑ, Al-jāmῑ al-aḥkām 
al-Qur‟ān, Vol. 11 (Egytp: Dār al-Kutūb al-Miṣrῑ, 1962), 255.  
883 The Letters, 61. 
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in an unchanging manner and in a fixed rank.884 To create man for the same 
kind of duty would have been in vain; but there is no vain in God‟s creation.  
Divine Wisdom, Nursi explains, required a realm of accountability 
appropriate to the potentialities of man, who would traverse infinite degrees. 
For this reason, Nursi continues, Adam was expelled from Paradise for his 
well-known sin – sin, Nursi adds, being the requirement of human nature 
and contrary to that of the angels.885 
The notion that the first human being was sent to earth with a certain 
responsibility, consciousness, freedom of choice and potentialities awaiting 
to be discovered is closely linked with the notion of the „divine Trust‟ which 
is supposed to remind man of this very responsibility. What this 
responsibility entails will be elaborated in the next section. 
7.4 The Notion of the ‘Divine Trust’ (amānah) 
The root-word of amānah is a-m-n. According to Ali Bulut, in his unpublished 
Master Thesis, derivatives of this root-word is mentioned 879 times in the 
Qur‟ān886. The direct meaning of a-m-n is, according to Bulut, to trust a 
person or a being with peace of mind and heart.887 Bulut‟s conclusion, after 
a semantic analysis of the term, is that the common denominator for the 
meaning of amānah is „trust‟.888 In the history of Islam until most recent 
studies, a lot of different interpretations have been made regarding what the 
„Divine Trust‟, mentioned in the following verse of the Qur‟ān, might mean: 
                                        
884 Ibid., 62. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Bulut, Ali. „Kur‟ân‟da Emânet Kavramı‟ (Unpublished Master Thesis, Süleyman Demirel 
University, 2002), 138. 
887 Ibid. 
888 Harr, G. I. B, et al. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, volume I (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986) 
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We did indeed offer the Trust to the heavens, and the earth, and the 
mountains; but they refused to undertake it being afraid thereof. But man 
assumed it; indeed, he is most unjust (ẓalūman), most foolish (jahūla)889. 
The range of interpretations seems to be innumerable. Mullā Ṣadrā890 (d. 
1640) claims that what is meant by the „divine Trust‟ is man‟s vicegerency of 
God on earth, which has been accepted by him.891 Thus Mullā Ṣadrā 
continues, the fact that it was man who overtook the „Divine Trust‟ and no 
other being shows that every object in the universe is a fragmentary Being, 
ontologically broken and disintegrated and is therefore unable to understand 
and shoulder this responsibility.892 Man, being an ontological whole and 
accomplished Being, a universe in a nutshell, is capable of understanding the 
gravity of this responsibility.893  
It seems as if this statement of Mullā Ṣadrā is derived from Jāmῑ‟s894 (d. 
1492) – and thus, maybe indirectly from Ibn „Arabῑ‟s – description of the 
perfect man (insān kāmil) and the following justification that it could have 
been no other being than man to shoulder the „Divine Trust‟. For Chittick 
explains that according to Jāmῑ,  
only through man does God gaze upon Unity in multiplicity. In Himself He 
sees nothing but Unity, and in the world nothing but multiplicity. But in man, 
Unity and multiplicity are combined in such a way that all of God‟s Attributes 
– or in other words the Name “Allāh” – are manifested within one unitary 
locus of theophany in the midst of the plurality of the world.895 
                                        
889 Qur‟ān, 33:72. 
890 Ṣadr ad-Dῑn Muḥammad Shῑrazῑ, also known as Mullā Ṣadrā, was an Iranian Shi‟a 
philosopher and theologian of Islam and a scholar („ālim) who led the Iranian cultural 
renaissance in the 17th century.  
891 „Abdul Haq, M. „Mullā Ṣadrā‟s Concept of Man‟, 285. 
892 Ibid., 286. 
893 Ibid. 
894 Nur ad-Dῑn Abd ar-Raḥmān Jāmῑ is known for his achievements as a scholar, mystic, 
writer, composer, historian and and the greatest Persian and Sufi poets of the 15th century. 
He was of the school of Ibn „Arabῑ.  
895 Chittick, W. C. „The Perfect Man as the Prototype of the Self in the Sufism of Jāmῑ‟, 151. 
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For this reason, Jāmῑ explains the vicegerency of God (khalῑfat Allāh) 
mentioned in the Qur‟ān to mean that man manifests the All-embracing 
Name within the world, namely “Allāh” and therefore has been given the 
responsibility for the whole of creation.896 In this respect, Jāmῑ further 
explains, man serves as the isthmus (barzakh) between God and the 
world.897 Qūnawῑ898 (d. 1274) puts it slightly different in saying that the 
Perfect Man is the isthmus between the necessity (wājib) and possibility 
(mumkun) and the mirror which unites the attributes of Eternality with those 
of the temporal events.899 In the light of the explanations of Jāmῑ‟s Perfect 
Man, this man carried the „Divine Trust‟ for he possesses a perfect and total 
receptivity (qābiliyya) for all of the Divine Names; as opposed to all other 
levels of existence who refused to carry the „Divine Trust‟ because they are 
loci of manifestations for only certain Names of God.900 
Mohammad Iqbāl901 (d. 1938), from another perspective, explains that man 
is the trustee of a „free personality‟ which he accepted at his peril.902 He links 
this „free personality‟ with the notion of the „ego‟; the „ego‟ thereby meaning 
rather the soul (nafs) than the „I‟ (ana).903 He defines the ego to be a “unity 
of mental states”.904  
                                        
896 Ibid., 152. 
897 Ibid. 
898 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. Muḥammad b. Yūnus Qūnawī was one of the most 
influential thinkers in mystical or Sufi philosophy. He was one of the best students of Ibn 
„Arabῑ.  
899 „The Perfect Man as the Prototype of the Self in the Sufism of Jāmῑ‟, 152. 
900 Ibid., 154. 
901 Also known as „Allāma Iqbāl was a philosopher, poet and politician in British India who is 
widely regarded as having inspired the Pakistan Movement. He is considered to be one of 
the most important figures in Urdu literature. 
902 Iqbal, M. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 90. 
903 Kılıç, C. Büyük Mütefekkir Dr. Muhammed Ikbal: Hayatı, Şahsiyeti ve Fikirleri, 116. 
904 The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 93. 
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But this is not all: the „divine Trust‟ has been defined by different scholars in 
many different ways. It has been interpreted to be servant-hood and the 
intellect905. Thus, betrayal of that Trust will lead to atrocity and ignorance. It 
has been further interpreted as obedience906, the world and everything that 
is in it; homeland; property; family; religion; and generation (lineage).907  
Before proceeding to Nursi‟s understanding of the ana and „Divine Trust‟, it 
might be useful to define very briefly the notion of the soul (nafs) that will 
be employed. 
7.4.1 The ‘soul’ (nafs) 
According to Picken, the term nafs occurs with its derivatives 398 times in 
the Qur‟ān.908 Picken enumerates five points the nafs can point to. Nafs, he 
states, can signify “the soul (rūḥ),”909 being extracted from the body at 
death by angels; it can signify the human being (insān) as a whole, including 
both the body and the soul; it can also signify the human being‟s power of 
understanding, in other words, that the “human being has the ability to 
comprehend and reason using his intellect to arrive at and perceive certain 
ideas and concepts”910; nafs can also signify the heart, indicating that an 
emotional aspect exists, such as the attributes of remembrance (dhikr) and 
concealing a secret (sirr); finally, it can signify an inclination to good and evil, 
being, according to Picken, one of the outstanding characteristics of the 
                                        
905 Kur‟an-ı Kerῑm Meali, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 
<http://www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/meal/Ahzap.htm>, last access 19 November 2012  
906 Ibn Kathīr. Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Online English Version) 
907  Engin, S. „Emaneti Yüklenmek„ in Altınoluk Internet Arşivi, No. 238 (Dec., 2005), 26. 
<http://dergi.altinoluk.com/index.php?sayfa=yazarlar&yazar_no=1037&MakaleNo=d238s02
6m1&AdBasHarf=&limit=0-15>, last access 19 November 2012. 
908 Picken, G. „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 106. 
909 Ibid. 
910 Ibid. 
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nafs.911 These various facets of humanity, including both the physical and 
metaphysical, states Picken, are inferred by the term nafs and therefore, are 
all the object of purification from the Qur‟anic perspective.912  
What needs to be criticized, however, is Picken‟s misleading equation of the 
nafs and soul (mostly translated as „nafs‟) and in addition to that, his 
translation of the soul as rūḥ in Arabic. The latter is more commonly 
translated as „spirit.‟ Picken relies on the Qur‟anic verse 6:93, which states 
that the angels stretch forth their hands to grip the souls (anfusakum) and 
drag them outwards. In this regard, Picken claims that this expression might 
signify the rūḥ, in other words, the spirit913, which is quite misleading. A 
suggestion at this point might be that the verse refers to al-Ghazālῑ‟s 
explanation of the soul (nafs) that includes his blameworthy qualities (ṣifāt 
madhmūma) and which includes both the faculty of anger (ghaḍab) and of 
appetence (shahwa).914 Or it might refer to the second meaning of soul 
according to al-Ghazālῑ, which is man‟s essence.915 
In the light of the verse  
By the self (nafs), and the proportion and order given to it; and its inspiration 
as to its wrong and its right;- truly he succeeds who purifies it, and truly, he 
who defiles it has failed916  
                                        
911 Ibid., 107. 
912 Ibid., 118. 
913 Al-Ghazālῑ provides two different meanings for the term spirit (rūḥ). The second 
meaning, which is more of a concern to him, is a subtle tenuous substance in man which 
knows and perceives. It is a marvelous and lordly (rabbānῑ) affair, the real and ultimate 
nature of which most intellects („uqūl) are unable to grasp. Al-Ghazālῑ, Marvels of the Heart, 
7. 
914 Marvels of the Heart, 7-8. 
915 Marvels of the Heart, 8. This explanation seems more appropriate than that of Picken 
because, if the whole verse is taken into account, one can see that it talks about the 
injustice of man who imputes falsehood to God. Falsehood and wrongdoing, on the other 
hand, in the literature of Islam, is mostly attributed to the evil-commanding soul (nafs). 
916 Qur‟ān, 91:7-10. 
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one is able to see not only the potentiality that the nature of the self bears, 
but also the possibility of its purification and defilement.917 Picken argues 
that these are the only verses in the Qur‟ān that make use of both the soul 
(nafs) and its purification (tazkiya) in one place, thus deserving further 
attention. 918 One can further see in this verse that the nafs is the receiver of 
inspiration (from God) to choose between what is wrong and what is right 
and thus has been given free will. While this, according to Picken, also 
indicates the human being‟s rational faculty or intellect („aql) it should be 
kept in mind that having to choose between iniquity and righteousness is a 
moral dilemma; therefore, the importance and influence of the heart (qalb) 
and of the conscience (ḍamῑr) cannot be underestimated.919 
One important discussion that Picken takes on is the question about „who‟ it 
is that is doing the purifying of the nafs. Picken explains that scholars such 
as Farrā‟920 (d. 822) and Zajjāj921 (d. 923) believed that it is God that is the 
subject.922 Whereas there is a second view that states that it is the human 
being who brings about this process at a personal level. In this case, Picken 
explains, the verse would mean: “indeed he who has caused his self to be 
purified has indeed attained true success.”923 Picken notes that this latter 
rendering is the preference of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). 
                                        
917 „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 102. 
918 Ibid. 
919 Ibid., 103. 
920 Al-Farrā‟ is known for his famous commentary of the Qur‟ān, the Ma‟āni al-Qur‟ān, being 
one of the most comprehensive of the early commentaries on the Qur‟ān. 
921 Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhῑm b. Sahl b. al-Sārῑ al-Zajjāj was a lexicographer and grammarian, and 
an intimate student of al-Mubarrad Abū‟l Abbās Muḥammad b. Jazῑd al-Azdῑ (d. 900), the 
most important representative of the so-called Baṣran school of grammar in his time. 
922 „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 104. 
923 Ibid. 
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Particularly interesting is Picken‟s survey of the different sensations, feelings 
and emotions alluded by the Qur‟ān that the nafs consciously perceives.924 
For there are aspects of the nafs therein, that fall into the Qur‟anic definition 
of sharr. For instance does Picken point out the fulfillment of the nafs‟ 
pleasures and appetites (shahwa) that are in most cases harmful and 
destructive for the nafs in this world.925 This has also been pointed out by 
Yazır in his interpretation of chapter 114, verse 4 of the Qur‟ān926 in which 
he suggested that waswās is either the nafs al-ammārah or Satan (shayṭān). 
He considered the kind of waswasa that comes from one‟s own nafs al-
ammārah or shayṭān to be internal (enfusῑ) sharr927 which harms the one 
that shelters it.   
Picken further emphasizes the impatience of the nafs in events that befalls it, 
which overshadows its endurance (ṣabr) most of the time.928 It has been 
said previously in this study that the impatience of man makes him ask God 
for things that are sharr for him, thinking that it is khayr.929 Thirdly does 
Picken call his reader‟s attention to another negative perception of the nafs, 
namely miserliness (also translated as avarice or selfishness) (sh-ḥ-ḥ)930. 
Explaining that this is one of its overwhelming qualities commonly found in 
many anfūs (pl. of nafs), Picken says that the Qur‟ān strongly encourages its 
eradication.931 Miserliness, or in other words, parsimony (b-kh-l) has been 
defined as one of the terms that fall into the semantic field of sharr in the 
Qur‟ān. While Picken also conceals the other faculties of the nafs, such as 
                                        
924 Ibid., 108. 
925 Ibid. 
926 “From the sharr of the slinking whisperer (waswās al-khannās)”; see chapter 2. 
927 Hak Dini Kur‟an Dili, vol.9, p. 6423 
928 „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 108. 
929 See chapter 1, explanations on chapter 10, verse 11 of the Qur‟ān. 
930 See for instance Qur‟ān, 4:128. 
931 „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 109. Qur‟ān, 2:265; 4:4; 18:28; 59:9; 64:16. 
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envy and jealousy, fear, conceit, anxiety and distress, the ability to 
comprehend, and so on, Picken stresses the fact that in the light of all the 
above, the nafs is responsible for its actions within the realms of its 
capacities.932 
7.4.1.1 The three states of the soul (nafs) 
Lastly it will also be useful to point out the three different states933 of the 
nafs as described by the Qur‟ān. In this respect defines Picken the first state, 
namely the „soul/nafs inclined to evil‟ (nafs al-ammārah bi‟l su‟), in the 
following way: 
This state of the nafs occurs when the human being is overcome by his 
desires, to the extent that he pursues the appetites of his soul to the 
exclusion of everything else. In this state the limits set by God are made 
secondary in comparison to the fulfillment of corporeal needs and desires. 
Thus, the performance of forbidden acts is common and the ultimate result is 
sin and transgression.934 
This statement is comparable to the state of excess of the power of „Instinct‟ 
explained by Nursi, which he called profligacy (fujūr). Nursi defined this 
state as careless wastefulness and shameless and immoral behavior.935 This 
kind of behavior, which is some sort of transgression, falls under the 
semantic field of sharr in the Qur‟ān, as has been explained previously. Thus, 
                                        
932 Ibid., 111. 
933 These three states of the nafs mentioned by Picken occur in the Qur‟ān. There are 
however more states that one can find in literature. Most of these terms are borrowed from 
Greek philosophers‟ discussion on the soul and are thus called vegetable soul (nafs al-
nabātῑ), animal soul (nafs al-ḥayawānῑ), or the rational soul (nafs al-nāṭiqa). For more 
information on these, one may consult Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn 
Muḥammad al-Ghazālῑ, Ma‟ārij al-Quds fῑ madārij ma‟rifat al-nafsi, 4th edn (Beirut: Dār al-
Afāq al-Jadῑda, 1980); Muḥammad ibn „Umar al-Rāzῑ, „Ilm al-akhlāq, trans. English by M.S.H. 
Ma‟sumi, 3rd edn (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1992), pp. 87-167; Yūsuf Maḥmūd Muḥammad, 
al-Nafs wa‟l rūḥ fῑ‟l fikr al-insānῑ wa-mawqif Ibn al-Qayyim minhu (Doha: Dār al-Ḥikma, 
1993), pp. 145-251. 
934. „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 112. 
935 Signs of Miraculousness, 30. 
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one might say that it is the nafs which incites to sharr (nafs al-ammārah bi‟l 
su‟)936, which is one major factor why human beings, in their utilization of 
free choice, are likely to be inclined towards sharr. This point might also 
shed some light on Augustine‟s dilemma of why the soul937 would ever 
determine itself to the evil if it is good and its first orientation is to the 
good.938 For Nursi explains that everyone has an inner faculty situated in a 
corner of the heart (lumma-i shayṭāniyya) which is the means to diabolical 
suggestions and temptations and a satanic tongue which speaks through the 
promptings of the imagination – contrary to its owner‟s will.939 This lumma-i 
shayṭāniyya, Nursi further explains, is like an ear and a tongue, inferring the 
existence of an external sharr individual who blows on the one and makes 
the other speak.940 
So, is man supposed not to love his self at all, then? Nursi‟s approach to love 
of one‟s soul (nafs) is an interesting one. He does not ask man to dislike his 
nafs for this would be a task too difficult for a human being. He rather states 
that the love to one‟s self should be a love that sees its short-comings and 
trains it with a compassion that seeks to perfect it, and that impels it 
towards good.941 For this kind of love results, Nursi further explains, in 
giving the self objects of love worthy of it in Paradise.942 
                                        
936 Picken defines the term ammārah as „constantly urging, always demanding, inciting and 
instigating‟. This is the exaggerative form of the nafs. For further information and Jurjanῑ‟s 
definition of nafs al-ammārah, see Picken, G. „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 112. 
937 Presuming that the „soul‟ of Augustine indicates the notion of the „soul‟ (nafs).  
938 „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 30. 
939 The Flashes Collection, 118. 
940 Ibid. 
941 Words, 678. 
942 Ibid. 
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Picken calls the second state of the nafs „the self-reproaching soul‟ (nafs 
lawwāma)943, explaining that in this state, the veil of disobedience is lifted 
and the soul begins to blame itself for the transgressions it has committed, 
inclining towards repentance, regret, self-criticism and reproach.944 Picken 
further provides some different views on the meaning of the term lawwāma, 
which is worth noting. One opinion, as explained by Picken is, that the term 
means „shifting repeatedly‟, in other words, the soul is characterized by its 
changeability, fickleness, and inconsistency, never remaining steadfast upon 
one state of affairs.945 As an example, Picken states, that the soul in this 
state is mindful then heedless, loves then hates, is happy then sad, is 
obedient then disobedient, righteous then immoral, and so on. Another 
opinion about the meaning of the term lawwāma, according to Picken, is 
„blame‟.946 This means that either the soul blames itself or is blameworthy. 
In other words, in this state the human being is constantly in the state of 
blaming his own self in the sense of questioning himself and his actions 
according to their rightness and truthfulness. The opposed behavior would 
be to constantly sanction one self, trying to justify and defend all of one‟s 
actions, thoughts and intentions in one or another way. It would not be 
wrong to state that Nursi would agree with  this kind of tazkiya, or in other 
words the constant remembrance that it is nothing but one‟s own self that 
deserves to be blamed and that is blameworthy.947 
                                        
943 Also translated as „the upbraiding soul‟, “for it upbraids its possessor whenever he falls 
short in the worship of his Master.” SeeThe Marvels of the Heart, 8. 
944 „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 113. 
945 Ibid. 
946 Ibid., 114. 
947 Throughout the Risale, Nursi addresses always his own soul/nafs in many different ways, 
such as “Oh my lazy soul”; “Oh my senseless soul”; “Oh my soul, which laughed in its youth 
and now weeps at its laughter”; “Oh my ignorant soul”; “Oh my soul full of doubts and evil 
suggestions and exceeding it bounds”; “Oh my foolish soul, charmed at glory, enamored of 
fame, addicted to praise, and without equal in egotism”, etc. These are taken from the first 
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The third state of the nafs is called by Picken „the tranquil soul‟ (nafs al-
muṭma‟inna), which is the state of tranquility from establishing God‟s 
obedience, accepting His threat of punishment and promise of reward in 
Paradise, being satisfied with His decree.948 Picken further explains that a 
person who has reached this state  
has put his trust in God alone, has truly tasted the sweetness of faith and felt 
the pleasure of communicating with its Lord, to the extent that it seeks no 
other substitute. As such it does not deviate from God‟s devotion, nor is it 
affected by the changes in circumstances that normally cause change in the 
psychological state of the human being, or attracted to the ornamentation of 
the worldly life.949 
Picken elaborates this issue further by pointing out that this state can be 
reached through constant remembrance of God, as mentioned in the Qur‟ān, 
13:28;950 and through a firm faith in divine predestination (qaḍa‟ wa‟l-qadar). 
The latter being the final of the six articles of faith in Islam, Picken notes, is 
arguably the most difficult to actualize, since it requires firm conviction 
(yaqῑn) in God‟s overall wisdom and plan. In other words, this kind of 
conviction would require that man, no matter what kind of human or 
personal tragedy and ashrār befalls him, his faith in the Almighty remains 
firm, because of his faith in foreordainment.951 Furthermore a nafs that is 
muṭma‟inna, Picken points out, is not overjoyed by the bounties it receives 
but rather recognizes God‟s favor upon it and fulfills the divine right of 
gratitude.952 This state thus brings about God‟s pleasure and satisfaction. 
Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya‟s comment on the state of tranquility of the self is 
                                                                                                               
250 pages of the Words. However, this kind of expressions blaming the soul can be found 
throughout the works of Nursi. 
948 „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 115. 
949 Ibid. This state is alluded to in the Qur‟ān, 89:27-30. 
950 Ibid., 116. 
951 Ibid. See also Qur‟ān, 57:23-24; 64:11. 
952 Ibid. 
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particularly interesting in that it completely concentrates on attributes and 
characteristics of a human being. He states:  
If the nafs becomes at ease from doubt to certainty, from ignorance to 
knowledge, from heedlessness to remembrance, from deception to 
repentance, from ostentation to sincerity, from deceit to truthfulness, from 
being incapable to being competent, from tyranny of conceit to the 
submissiveness of humility, from arrogance to modesty, from laxity to action, 
then the soul has achieved tranquility.953 
Some of the characteristics in this statement are again a reminder of the 
excessive states of the three faculties of humankind illustrated by Nursi 
before, such as ignorance, deceit, incapability, tyranny, arrogance and laxity.   
Picken concludes in the light of the above, that the nature of the soul (nafs) 
tends to negative potentialities; however with volition, will, training and 
experience, its positive potentialities can be nurtured.954 Nurturing and 
training one‟s soul until it reaches the second and even third state 
mentioned above does apparently not mean that one is completely freed 
from the evil commands of the nafs. That this is a lifelong struggle is stated 
by Nursi, when he says that sometimes the nafs which incites to sharr (nafs 
al-ammārah) is transformed into nafs al-lawwāma or nafs al-muṭma‟inna, 
handing over its weapons and equipment to the nerves (āsāb).  And the 
nerves of temperament continue its function till the end of life.955 According 
to Nursi, this is the reason why many saints and purified ones have 
continued to complain about their nafs which incites to sharr while they 
were in the state of nafs al-muṭma‟inna.956 So it is not the nafs which incites 
to sharr that afflicts them but rather its function which has been handed 
                                        
953 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Al-Rūḥ (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-„Aṣriyya, 2000), 259. 
954 „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, 118. 
955 The Letters, 387. 
956 Ibid. 
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over to the nerves. Thus, Nursi further explains, the sickness is not of the 
heart but of the imagination.957  
Nursi employs the ana as another branch or as part of the nafs. It would be 
wrong though, to state that the nafs is made up of the ana. The following 
section will discuss the notion of ana and its connection with sharr in further 
detail. 
7.5 The ‘ana’ as one Aspect of the ‘Divine Trust’ (amānah) 
Nursi introduces the „divine Trust‟ (amānah) mentioned in verse 33:72 to be 
the „ana‟; thereby defining ana as both, a key to the Divine Names and a key 
to the locked talisman of creation.958 Nursi‟s Divine Names Theology has 
been introduced before in this study. Considering the fact that this concept 
is spread all over Nursi‟s works, it is no surprise that one comes across this 
concept another time.  
As it is with many faculties and other created things, they have positive as 
well as negative aspects, depending on how they are used or misused. The 
same it is with the ana, which, according to Nursi, has been throughout 
history, and continues to be the seed of a terrible tree of Zaqqūm959 and at 
the same time the seed of a luminous tree of Ṭūbā960. In other words, ana is 
such a tool that can lead man to Paradise as well as to Hell, depending on 
one‟s knowledge of it and its use. Accordingly, Nursi first explains the nature 
and purpose of ana, and later illustrates how the misuse of it can lead to 
sharr.  
                                        
957 Ibid., 388. 
958 The Words, 558. 
959 See Qur‟ān, 37:62; 44:43; 56:52. 
960 See Qur‟ān, 13:29. Also Nursi, S. The Words, 557. 
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In this respect, Nursi states that the ana is a tool or a key with which man is 
supposed to open the doors of the universe.961 This key, Nursi further 
explains, is attached to man‟s „soul‟ (nafs). Another tool given to humankind 
by his Creator is, what shall be called an „inordinate self-esteem‟ 
(anā‟iyyah)962, in order to discover the hidden treasures of the Creator of the 
universe.963  
With the introduction of these two tools, Nursi establishes another discourse 
that will lead to the discussion of the existence of sharr, in case these tools 
are not used in accordance to their purpose. What is their purpose then? 
Nursi explains the reason why the ana is given to man in the following lines: 
The All-Wise Maker gave to man as a Trust an ana which comprises 
indications and samples that show and cause to recognize the truths of the 
attributes and functions of His dominicality (rubūbiyyah), so that the ana 
might be a unit of measurement and the attributes of dominicality and 
functions of Divinity might be known.964  
Thus, first of all Nursi believes that what is meant by the „Divine Trust‟, 
mentioned in verse 33:72 of the Qur‟ān, is the ana. Thus the ana must be 
something quite serious, given the fact that, again according to the same 
verse, the heavens, the earth and the mountains refused to undertake it – in 
fear. Nursi explains that the ana serves man in recognizing God‟s 
dominicality (rubūbiyyah). This is possible if man can relate to the attributes 
and functions of Divinity, which the ana is a means of.  Then, Nursi 
continues explaining the quiddity of ana:  
… it is not necessary for a unit of measurement to have actual existence; like 
hypothetical lines in geometry, a unit of measurement maybe formed by 
                                        
961 The Words, 558. 
962 Most commonly called the „I-ness‟ or „ego‟. 
963 The Words, 558. 
964 Ibid. 
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hypothesis and supposition. It is not necessary for its actual existence to be 
established by concrete knowledge of proofs.965 
In other words, according to Nursi, the ana has no actual, external 
existence; it is a unit of measurement, something hypothetical, that helps 
man in his understanding or in relating one thing with another. In this case, 
the ana helps to relate to the Names and Attributes of the Divine and their 
absoluteness. Nursi explains that anything that is absolute is very difficult to 
grasp, simply because it has no limits or ends, no shape and no form and 
thus cannot be determined in any way.966 He compares this situation with an 
endless light, stating that such a light cannot be comprehended without 
drawing a line of real or imaginary darkness. Similarly, Nursi continues, 
God‟s attributes such as knowledge and power or His names such as the all-
Wise and all-Compassionate are absolute, endless, undeterminable and thus 
unknowable. At this point, Nursi explains, the ana comes into play.  It draws 
a hypothetical and imaginary limit to the Divine attributes and names, by 
imagining itself a “fictitious dominicality, ownership, power and 
knowledge.”967 Thus, making a division, the ana says “up to here, mine, 
after that, His.” Or it understands: “Like I am the owner of this house, so 
too is the Creator the owner of the universe.” It may also state: “As I made 
this house and arranged it, so someone must have made the universe and 
arranged it.”968 Through repeating this principle in every aspect of life, using 
tiny units of measurement, it slowly understands the true nature of Divine 
attributes and names.969 
                                        
965 Ibid. 
966 Ibid. 
967 Ibid. 
968 Ibid., 559. 
969 Ibid., 558. 
 264 
 
Although the concept of the ana seems to be pretty much sui generis, and 
unexplored by Western writers970, it still reminds of the discussion whether 
God can be known through cognition or through experience. Can God be 
experienced? Is it possible to give a clear definition of God? One might also 
ask whether there is a relation between the ana and religious experience: 
does the correct use of the ana lead one to some sort of religious 
experience? Wieman explains that two methods have been used to show 
how one can know God. Firstly to show that one knows God just as one 
knows other objects. Secondly to show that knowledge of God is a special 
kind of knowledge that maybe requires a special faculty or a kind of 
knowledge that is different from ordinary cognition.971 Wieman believes in 
the hopelessness of the latter one and asserts that God is an object of 
experience. The example he provides as being unquestionably religious is 
…the very common human appeal to God in the hour of bewilderment when 
the individual (and often the group) feels baffled and defeated. It is when he 
is not sure of himself that he turns to God; when he is in doubt, and yet feels 
the urgency of action; when he does not know which way to turn, and yet 
feels that he must turn some way. Above all it is when one has staked all his 
life‟s success and happiness upon some enterprise and feels it threatened 
with disaster or actually ruined.972 
This example of religious experience provided by Wieman relates to the 
remembrance and experiencing of God in times of „loss of ownership‟. This 
could be an enterprise as well as a loved one. Nursi‟s concept of the ana is 
also related with the issue of ownership, albeit an ownership that is 
illusionary and that needs to be „surrendered‟ or „submitted‟ to God.973 That 
is to say, Nursi would perhaps agree that if man accepts that all his 
                                        
970 Colin Turner, Hasan Horkuc. Makers of Islamic Civilization: Said Nursi (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2009), 67. 
971 Henry Nelson Wieman. „How Do We Know God?‟, 113. 
972 Ibid., 120. 
973 This underpins the notion of islām or submission. See Turner, Horkuc. Makers of Islamic 
Civilization: Said Nursi, 65. 
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belongings are temporal and illusionary and if he gives up his claims to 
ownership; this will lead to the „purification of the soul (nafs)‟ and he will 
ultimately experience God. Thus, Nursi would condition religious experience 
with the purification of the self, and at the same time, he would agree with 
Wieman on the point that knowledge of God does not require a special 
faculty. 
7.5.1 The ‘self-referential’ and the ‘other-indicative’ 
With these examples, Nursi points out another important aspect of the ana, 
namely, „other-indicative‟ (manā-e ḥarfī);974 that it shows the meaning of 
things (in this case the meaning of the attributes and names of the Creator) 
other than itself.975 Right at this point, Nursi begins to explain how the ana 
can also become a tool for sharr. He argues that the ana has two faces. 
While the first of these faces looks towards good (khayr) and existence 
(wujūd), the other face pertains to sharr and destruction and thus to non-
existence („adam).976 The following figure provides an overview of Nursi‟s 
idea. 
                                        
974 The concept of „self-referential‟ (manā-e ismῑ) and „other-indicative‟ (manā-e ḥarfī) has 
been explained in chapter 5 of this study. Translations of these terms have been borrowed 
from Makers of Islamic Civilization: Said Nursi, 67ff. 
975 The Words, 559. 
976 Ibid., 559-560. 
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Figure 4: The Two Faces of „Ana‟977 
In an original way, Nursi establishes a relation between the ana as one 
aspect of the „Divine Trust‟ and prophethood and religion on one side, and 
philosophy on the other. Nursi‟s critique in this respect is to philosophy 
without religion. Because of its relevance for the study at hand, these two 
faces of ana introduced by Nursi will be elaborated upon in further detail. 
7.5.2 The ‘ana’ pertaining to khayr 
The first face of ana, which pertains to good (khayr) and existence (wujūd), 
is only capable of receiving favor978, states Nursi. This statement is in fact 
connected with Nursi‟s interpretation of the verse “Whatever good (ḥasana) 
                                        
977 Composed from The Words, pp. 559-563. 
978 Ibid., 559. 
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happens to you is from God, but whatever evil (sayyiatin) befalls you is from 
yourself”979. Since the ana knows itself to be other-indicative (manā-e ḥarfī), 
showing the meaning of another, namely God, it is aware that it cannot 
create and thus accepts whatever is given.980 Given the assertion that it has 
no actual existence but is merely an illusory line or a unit of measurement, 
Nursi adds that its dominicality (rubūbiyyah) is imaginary. It is like a 
thermometer or barometer that indicates the degrees and amounts of 
things; a measure that makes known the all-encompassing and limitless 
attributes of the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd).981 Nursi offers this 
thought as an interpretation of the Qur‟anic verse “Truly he succeeds who 
purifies it”982. Thus Nursi believes that he, who knows his soul (nafs) in this 
way and acts according to it, is included in the good news of this respective 
verse.983 But Nursi does not stop here but goes one step further stating that 
after man has observed the universe through the telescope of the ana and 
has seen what the universe is, what duties it performs; and after all this 
knowledge of man which has remained as light and wisdom for him, the ana 
abandons its imaginary dominicality and supposed ownership and realizes 
God‟s sovereignty and that to Him alone belongs all praise and that all will 
be brought back to Him.984 Nursi concludes that through this realization man 
achieves true worship and attains the rank of the „Most Excellent of Patterns‟ 
(aḥsan taqwῑm)985. This rank can be compared to the „Perfect Man‟ (insān 
kāmil) described by Ibn „Arabῑ. 
                                        
979 Qur‟ān, 4:79. Further details about this in „Free Will‟ of this chapter. 
980 The Words, 559. 
981 Ibid. 
982 Qur‟ān, 91:9. The two verses preceding this verse are “By the soul (nafs), and the 
proportion and order given to it; and its inspiration as to its wrong and its right;-truly he 
succeeds who purifies it (meaning the nafs).” 
983 The Words, 559. 
984 Ibid. 
985 Ibid., in indication of the Qur‟ān, 95:4. 
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7.5.3 The ‘ana’ pertaining to sharr 
The second face of ana, according to Nursi, pertains to sharr and leads to 
non-existence („adam). This face in particular is of interest for it is directly 
related to this study. This face, states Nursi, becomes activated if the ana 
forgets the wisdom of its creation and abandons the duty of its nature; thus 
views itself merely in the light of its nominal and apparent meaning.986 This 
is the state of betrayal of the „Divine Trust‟, asserts Nursi, when the ana 
believes that it owns itself and comes under the category of the Qur‟anic 
verse “And he fails who corrupts it.”987 Thus, if the ana is misused in this 
way, or in other words, if the ana of a human being thinks of itself not in 
terms of a hypothetical line, it will permeate all parts of that human being, 
states Nursi. Like a gigantic dragon, Nursi continues, it will swallow up that 
human being and the entire person with all his faculties will become pure 
ana.988 The ana, claims Nursi, is supported by an „inordinate self-esteem‟ 
(anā‟iyyah)989 of the human race at large. Through this kind of inordinate 
self-esteem, it uses itself as a yardstick and compares everyone and 
everything with itself; it contests the commands of the Glorious Maker and 
starts dividing God‟s sovereignty between them and other causes.990 This 
state is, according to Nursi, the addressee of the verse “To assign partners 
to God is verily a great transgression.”991 
Nursi then concludes that the ana, while in this state, is in complete and 
utter ignorance (jahl muṭlaq), no matter how sophisticated it is and how 
knowledgeable it is in science. He thus continues: 
                                        
986 Ibid., 560. 
987 Qur‟ān, 91:10. This verse again refers to the soul (nafs). 
988 The Words, 560. 
989 Also translated as „egoism‟ or „I-ness‟.  
990 The Words, 560. 
991 Qur‟ān, 31:13. 
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[…] For when its senses and thoughts yield the lights of knowledge of the 
universe, those lights are extinguished because such an ana does not find 
any material within itself with which to confirm, illuminate, and perpetuate 
them. Whatever it encounters is dyed with the colours that are within it. Even 
if it encounters pure wisdom, the wisdom takes the form, within that ana, of 
absolute futility. For the colour of an ana that is in this condition is atheism 
and ascribing partners to God, it is denial of God Almighty. If the whole 
universe is full of shining signs, a dark point in the ana hides them from view, 
as though extinguished.992 
Remembering the semantic field of sharr in the Qur‟ān, one will be able to 
see that two of these terms that fell into that semantic field are mentioned 
here by Nursi. Ascribing partners to God and denial of God are, as it has 
been seen before, considered to be sharr according to the Qur‟ān. As the 
quotation above indicates, to Nursi, any science or knowledge that does not 
lead a person to the knowledge of God (ma‟rifatullah), is nothing but utter 
ignorance. 
7.5.4 How Philosophy may lead to sharr 
In the light of the above, Nursi explains how he believes that ashrār occur. 
He points out that since the time of Adam until now, two lines of thought 
have always continued and have spread throughout all classes of 
humanity.993 One of them is according to Nursi the line of prophethood and 
religion, and the other the line of philosophy in its various forms.994 The 
former is explained by Nursi as sheer worship in which the ana knows itself 
to be a bondsman, serving Another than itself. It is completely aware that it 
exists only through the creativity of Another. Thus, states Nursi, it knows all 
its ownerships to be temporal and apparent and it knows its own function to 
be conscious service to that Other.995 Without going further in the line of 
                                        
992 The Words, 560. 
993 Ibid., 561. 
994 Ibid. 
995 Ibid. 
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prophethood and religion, the latter one, namely the line of philosophy shall 
be elaborated, since according to Nursi, this line may well result in ashrār.996 
As previously mentioned by Nursi, it is the line of philosophy997 that regards 
the ana as carrying no meaning other than its own, in other words, being 
„self-referential‟ (manā-e ismῑ). In this respect, in Nursi‟s view, the ana works 
purely on its own account and regards its existence as necessary and 
essential; assuming itself to be the real master in its sphere of disposal.998 In 
this line then, the duty of the ana becomes perfection of self which 
originates from self-love. Nursi criticizes in this respect philosophers like 
Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Sῑnā and Farābῑ for their claims that the ultimate aim of 
humanity is to liken themselves to the Necessary Being and to resemble 
Him.999 For this thought, according to Nursi, encourages „inordinate self-
esteem‟ (anā‟iyyah) and polytheism and opens the doors for various forms of 
associating partners with God (like nature and other causes).1000 Whereas, 
what is intrinsic to human nature is impotence and weakness, poverty and 
need, deficiency and imperfection; if this door is closed, states Nursi, then 
the road to worship is closed as well.1001  
                                        
996 Ibid. 
997 Nursi‟s usage of philosophy is twofold. While he uses the term to refer to it in the 
classical sense, he also, in more often, uses the term alluding to the materialistic 
interpretation of science: “The philosophy the Risale-i Nur strikes at fiercely and attacks is 
not absolute, but the harmful sort. For the philosophy and wisdom that serve the life of 
human society, and morality and human attainments, and industry and progress, are 
reconciled with the Qur‟ān. Indeed, such philosophy serves the Qur‟ān‟s wisdom and does 
not oppose it. This sort the Risale-i Nur does not bother with. As for the other sort, since it 
both leads to misguidance, atheism, and the swamp of nature, and is the cause of vice and 
dissipation, heedlessness and misguidance; and since with its spellbinding wonders it 
opposes the Qur‟ān‟s miraculous truths, the Risale-i Nur attacks and deals slaps at it with 
the powerful proofs in the comparisons contained in most of its parts. It does not attack 
beneficial, rightly-guided philosophy. Members of the secular schools can therefore embrace 
the Risale-i Nur without hesitation or objection.” See The Staff of Moses, 8. 
998 The Words, 562-563. 
999 Ibid., 563. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 Ibid. 
 271 
 
Following these statements, Nursi now concludes that the line of philosophy, 
if it does not obey the line of religion, gives moral support to tyranny, 
encourages despots and urges oppressors to claim divinity. This is because 
according to the principles of philosophy without religion, states Nursi,  
… power is approved. „Might is right‟ is the norm. It says „All power to the 
strongest.‟ „The winner takes all,‟ and „In power there is right‟.1002 
According to this thought, anyone who has power and is strong claims to be 
right, no matter what he does.1003 The line of religion, on the other hand, 
defends that power is in right, in other words, that the one who is right has 
or should have power.  
Thus, Nursi thinks that this kind of thought bears and gives birth to all kinds 
of ashrār, the biggest thereof being the denial of God and the association of 
partners with God. Until here, Nursi tried to illustrate how the misuse of ana 
and thus the betrayal of the „Divine Trust‟ will lead the human being to the 
commitment of sharr, on his own account, being responsible thereof1004. It is 
important to note that Nursi is not completely and blindly opposed to 
philosophy. He believes that in history, whenever the line of philosophy did 
unite with the line of prophethood and religion; that is to say, whenever 
philosophy has been obedient and in service to religion, the world of 
humanity has experienced a brilliant happiness and social life.1005 However, 
the separation of the two has led to goodness and light being drawn to the 
side of religion and sharr and misguidance to the side of the line of 
                                        
1002 Ibid.  
1003 This refers to the theory of evolution, that is, evolution by natural selection. It refers 
particularly to the notion of the „survival of the fittest‟, which, arguably was not introduced 
by Darwin himself, but named as such for the first time by the philosopher Herbert Spencer 
in 1864. See Herbert Spencer. Principles of Biology (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1886) 
1004 How man is responsible himself for the ashrār he commits will be elaborated later in this 
chapter. 
1005 The Words, 561. 
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philosophy.1006 Thus, Nursi believes that philosophy needs to be nurtured 
and fed by prophethood and religion. 
Nursi continues by means of four examples criticizing philosophy for firstly, 
trying to imitate and become like the Necessary Existent One (wājib al-
wujūd) as self-perfection1007; secondly for introducing conflict concerning 
social life stating that “life is conflict”1008; thirdly, for claiming that “from one, 
one proceeds”. In other words to claim that from one thing, only one thing 
can proceed and all other things will proceed from the latter by means of 
intermediaries1009; and fourthly the assertion that the purpose of every living 
being looks to itself or is connected with benefits for mankind.1010 
It is thus quite significant, that Nursi sees the misuse of ana to be the origin 
for various other claims of philosophy in addition to the above mentioned, 
such as denying God choice; that His divine knowledge is not concerned with 
insignificant matters; that nature has the power to create; or that there is no 
afterlife and instead that souls are pre-eternal1011. Nursi concludes: 
Indeed, the powers of sharr have raised up the minds of atheistic 
philosophers as though with the beaks and talons of their anas and have 
dropped them in the valleys of misguidance. Thus, the ana is an idol in the 
microcosm, like nature is in the macrocosm.1012 
Nursi also explains thus that philosophy that has not obeyed the line of 
religion has lost its way and the ana therefore has taken the reins into its 
                                        
1006 Ibid. 
1007 Ibid., 564.  
1008 Ibid. 
1009 Ibid. Here, Nursi criticizes the thought of the „Prime Mover‟ first introduced by Aristotle. 
Since this thought, according to Nursi, bears associating partners with God, in other words, 
believe in idols, it is nothing but sharr. 
1010 Ibid., 565. For further information, see The Words, pp. 95-100. 
1011 Ibid., 566-567. 
1012 Ibid., 567. 
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own hands, running into all sorts of misguidance.1013 Nursi makes use of his 
theses mentioned before, the faculties of humankind and states that in this 
case, the faculty of instinct has given birth to idols and goddesses. In the 
branch of aggression, it has nurtured the fruits of greater and lesser 
Nimrods, Pharaohs and Shaddads, ruling over unfortunate mankind.1014 And 
the faculty of the intellect gave birth to atheism, Materialism, and Naturalism, 
throwing man into confusion.1015 
Now the respective verse stated that  
We did indeed offer the Trust to the heavens, and the earth, and the 
mountains; but they refused to undertake it being afraid thereof. But man 
assumed it; indeed, he is most unjust (ẓalūman), most foolish (jahūla)1016 
If man is indeed the most comprehensive of all creation and capable to carry 
this very important divine Trust, why is it then that he is called in this verse 
most unjust (ẓalūman) and most foolish (jahūla)? According to Nursi, one of 
the reasons is man‟s interference in God‟s Divine duties. By doing so, Nursi 
states, man burdens his weak shoulders, his impatient head and debilitated 
heart in a way he cannot bear himself.1017 Furthermore, Nursi believes that 
man is called unjust (ẓalūman) and most foolish (jahūla), when he misuses 
the purpose of the ana and thus betrays the Divine Trust.1018 Contrary to 
animals, Nursi states, there are no limitations to the facutlies and inclinations 
of man. The inclination to tyranny and the love of the own nafs takes the 
upper hand. If the vicious side of ana and the „inordinate self-esteem‟ 
(anā‟iyyah), such as vanity, egocentrism, arrogance and obstinacy joins that 
                                        
1013 Ibid., 563. 
1014 Ibid., 564. 
1015 Ibid. 
1016 Qur‟ān, 33:72. 
1017 Said Nursi. Ilk Dönem Eserleri (Istanbul: Söz Basım Yayın, 2007), 49. 
1018 Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol 2, 1341. 
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inclination, it will produce such great sins humankind has no name for.1019 
Nursi further gives examples to unjust behavior saying for instance that 
every individual has numerous attributes. One of these attributes may 
sometimes summon hostility but the Qur‟ān teaches, states Nursi, that 
hostility should be shown to that respective attribute and not the innocent 
individual – for he deserves merely to be pitied. But the foolish unjust, Nursi 
continues, will be unfair to the individual because of the single attribute; in 
some cases, he will even extent his hostility to the individual‟s family 
members and his colleagues.1020  Nursi in the light of the above, further 
explains that since a thing has numerous causes it can be that that malicious 
attribute is not due to the heart‟s malice but the result of an external cause. 
Therefore, if the attribute is malicious or even infidel-like, the individual itself 
cannot be malicious.1021 
In the light of all the above, it might be appropriate to state that the correct 
use of the ana and thus the upholding of Divine Trust as well as man‟s 
concentration on his own duties instead of his interference in the Divine, is 
all connected with divine determining and free will. 
7.6 Free Will (juz’ῑ ikhtiyār) and Divine Determining (qadar) 
Nursi in The Words interprets [15:21] and [36:12] of the Qur‟ān1022 and 
treats divine determining (qadar) and free will (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār) (or power of 
choice) in the same chapter, due to their close connection.  
                                        
1019 Ibid., 2045. 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 Ibid. 
1022 “And there is not a thing but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us, but 
we only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures.” [15:21]; “And of all things 
have we taken account in a Clear Book.” [36:12] 
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Trying to understand the notion of divine determining and free choice is very 
important, mainly for the following reason: If it is claimed that all actions are 
created by God, that is, if it is believed that it is Divine Power that makes 
one speak, walk, laugh, think, etc; furthermore, if it is asserted that man is 
responsible and accountable for his actions – then there must be something 
about man, some possession of his that makes him responsible as such. For 
if all actions are created without man‟s interference, like it was claimed by 
the Jabriyya , it is impossible to hold him accountable. On the other hand, if 
it is man who creates his own actions, like asserted by the Mu‟tazilites, then 
it becomes difficult to believe that God is the creator of everything. Thus the 
questions arise, who is to blame for moral ashrār? Can one put God on trial 
saying that if He had not pre-determined, man would not have done any of 
the moral ashrār which he committed? It is justified if man says that he 
cannot be held responsible for he is just a puppet acting in accordance with 
the Preserved Tablet (lawḥ al-maḥfūḍ)1023? This issue, it seems, can be 
solved only if the nature of free will and divine determining is comprehended.  
Right in the beginning of his treatise, Nursi points out that divine 
determining as well as free will pertain to state and conscience, thus are not 
theoretical and do not pertain to knowledge.1024 According to Nursi, divine 
determining and free will have the duty to prevent man from irresponsibility 
and haughtiness. That is, the moment man becomes too pre-
deterministic1025 in his thoughts and actions, attributing everything he does 
                                        
1023 The term Preserved Tablet (lawḥ al-maḥfūḍ), also known as the “mother of the book” is 
mentioned in the Qur‟ān, 13:39 as follows: “God erases what he will, or confirms. And with 
Him is the mother of the book.”  
1024 The Words, 477. 
1025 Determinism is the idea that everything that happens, including all human actions, is 
completely determined by prior events / or God. This term should be distinguished from 
pre-determinism, namely the idea that the entire past (as well as the future) was 
determined at the origin of the universe. For more information, Van Inwagen, P. „Moral 
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to God, the power of choice confronts him and reminds him of his 
responsibility and obligation. On the other hand, the moment he start 
attributing all his good deeds and achievements to himself, divine 
determining confronts him showing him his limits and reminding him that 
without God‟s grace and help, he would not be able to achieve them.1026 
Thus, Nursi explains that divine determining has been included among the 
matters of belief to save them from pride and conceit; not to relieve them 
from their obligations and responsibility. Likewise, free will has been 
included in order to be the source of ashrār; not to be the source of 
virtues.1027 This is because good deeds are wanted and required by Divine 
mercy, created by dominical power. Man‟s share in those, explains Nursi, is 
merely supplication, belief, consciousness, and consent. In the case of 
ashrār, however, it is man‟s nafs that wants them, either through 
capacity1028 or through choice. God thereupon, creates the ashrār through a 
Divine law which comprises numerous benefits.1029  
Nursi claims that divine determining is exempt from evil and ugliness with 
regard to results and fruits, and free from tyranny in respect to reason and 
cause. According to Nursi, divine determining looks to the true causes and 
acts justly but man, constructing his judgment on causes which he sees only 
superficially, falls into error within the pure justice of divine determining.1030 
He makes this clear with the following example: 
                                                                                                               
Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise‟ in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 
3, No. 4 (1999), pp. 341-350. 
1026 The Words, 477. 
1027 Ibid., 478. 
1028 “In the white and beautiful light of the sun some substances become black and putrefy, 
and the blackness is related to their capacity” and not to the sun or its light. The Words, 
478. 
1029 The Words, 478. 
1030 Ibid. 
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“a judge finds you guilty of theft and sends you to prison. You are not a thief 
but you have committed a murder which no one knows about. Thus, divine 
determining also sentenced you to imprisonment, but it sentenced you for the 
secret murder and acted justly. Since the judge sentenced you for a theft of 
which you were innocent, he acted unjustly. Thus, in a single thing, the 
justice of divine determining and divine creation and man‟s wrongful choice or 
acquisition were apparent in two respects…”1031 
7.6.1 Compatibility of Divine Determining and Free Will 
Nursi‟s view on the compatibility of divine determining and free will is that 
these two are not opposed to each other and can be perfectly reconciled. 
This opinion of Nursi is in contradiction with Ibn Sῑnā, for instance, who is a 
hard determinist. Although he insisted on the fact that human beings are 
free1032, he believed that every being and every action is the necessary 
consequence of external causes.1033 From a radically deterministic 
perspective, then, if human beings are not free in their choices and their 
actions, should God be responsible? Ibn Sῑnā‟s answer would be no for he 
believes that God is also not free in His actions, that is that He is also 
determined – not by external causes like it is with human beings, but by His  
own nature.1034  Freedom of choice implies that after one has done 
something, that he could have done otherwise. However, Ibn Sῑnā claimed 
that God cannot at any moment chose to do anything except what necessity 
has determined God‟s nature to do.1035 Who, then, is going to be held 
                                        
1031 Ibid., 478-9. 
1032 Ibn Sῑnā believes that faith and reason demand the advocacy of human free choice. See 
The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟s Theodicy, 161. 
1033 Ibid. 
1034 Ibid., 162. Nursi‟s assertion that the misuse of ana is the origin of various claims of 
philosophy, one of the being to deny God choice, makes itself manifest here. 
1035 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟s Theodicy, 162. This view of Ibn Sῑna is also supported 
by Hourani who claims that „determinism‟ was central to Ibn Sῑna‟s philosophy as opposed 
to traditional „predestination.‟ While the former suggests that human acts and characters 
are predestined by a freely willed decision of God; the latter understands al-qadar as the 
„determination‟ of man‟s life as a part of a cosmic system in which God causes His effects by 
the necessity of His nature and their natures. See Hourani, George F. „Ibn Sīnā's 'Essay on 
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responsible for moral evils? In Ibn Sῑnā‟s system, no one could be held 
responsible, since there was no room for moral responsibility because any 
being in this system, including God, cannot help doing what they do.1036 This, 
it might be imagined, also lifted the issue of reward and punishment. In this 
regard, there was no punishment and reward1037 in the sense that is 
understood, if the Qur‟anic verses would be taken literally. Rather, according 
to Ibn Sῑnā, punishment was the alienation from God whereas reward was 
equal to closeness to God. In other words, they were the effects of our own 
behavior in the present life.1038  
According to Ibn Rushd, the agent‟s mind was to be blamed for moral evils. 
That is, comparing volitional acts with compelled acts, he asserted that man 
wills his own acts and those acts come about through an operation of the 
agent‟s mind; whereas compelled acts come about through external forces 
bringing about the act directly.1039 In this respect was Ibn Rushd an 
advocate of free will and the cause of injustice was not God but rather the 
agent‟s mind. 
Ghazālῑ‟s view was that God cannot do wrong (ẓulm) for by definition, 
wrongdoing consisted in dealing unjustly with the property of others. But 
God was the owner of everything and nobody was in possession of anything 
God could deal unjustly with.1040 Furthermore, Ghazālῑ was opposed to Ibn 
Sῑnā‟s eschatology and explained that rewards or the moral progress of man 
were bestowed by God through His grace.1041 In regards to the issue of man 
                                                                                                               
the Secret of Destiny'‟ in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1966), 25; 40. 
1036 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟s Theodicy, 162. 
1037 „Ibn Sīnā's 'Essay on the Secret of Destiny'‟, 33. 
1038 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟s Theodicy, 164. 
1039 „Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics‟, 257. 
1040 „Ghazali on the Ethics of Action‟, 74.  
1041 Ibid., 77. 
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being compelled in his actions and being autonomous at the same time, 
Ghazālῑ claimed that man‟s free will directed and invited power. Man‟s 
intellect (‟aql), on the other hand, influenced his free will.1042 Since free will 
obeyed the judgments of the intellect and wisdom1043, it meant that all of 
this was compulsorily ordained for man without his knowledge. Man being 
merely the center of implementation, another guided man‟s will and strength, 
at all times. In the light of the above, Ghazālῑ believed that man was the 
intermediary of God‟s will and power flow being compelled with free choice. 
This intermediary state of man has been called kasb or acquisition.1044 
Nursi‟s thought, being in line with that of Ghazālῑ, is radically different with 
that of Ibn Sῑnā and Ibn Rushd. First of all he claims that the fact that 
human beings are not capable of understanding God‟s wisdom and the 
compatibility of free will and divine determining does not ipso facto prove 
that it is not so.1045 As opposed to the claim that human beings choose 
necessarily out of their determination to external factors, Nursi explains that 
out of necessity, everyone perceives in himself a will and choice. The fact 
that man cannot explain its nature does not prove its non-existence. There 
are, according to Nursi, many things, although their existence is self-evident, 
man does not know their true nature. Man‟s ignorance of a thing is no 
proving for its non-existence.1046  
                                        
1042 Al-Ghazālῑ. Ihyā Ulūm-id-Dῑn, Kitāb at-Tawhῑd wa at-Tawakkul, Vol. IV, pp. 238-286. 
1043 In chapter 3, the example was given about a person being chased by someone with a 
stick until that person stopped at the edge of a roof. Suddenly his intellect told him that 
being hit with a stick was better or easier than jumping from the roof. All his limbs stopped 
moving, that is, his power obeyed the „caller of free will‟ and motion obeyed power. For 
further detail, see chapter 3. 
1044 Ihyā Ulūm-id-Dῑn, Kitāb at-Tawhῑd wa at-Tawakkul, pp. 238-286. 
1045 The Words, 480. 
1046 Ibid. 
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Nursi thirdly believes that divine determining can be understood as some 
sort of knowledge („ilm). Knowledge is connected with man‟s will and choice, 
that is, God knows through His absolute and all embracing knowledge what 
man will do or choose. Knowledge („ilm) is dependent on the thing known 
(ma‟lūm).1047 The thing known is not dependent on knowledge. In other 
words, knowledge does not direct the thing known with regard to its 
external existence. This is because the essence of the thing known and its 
external existence look to will and are based on power.1048 Two examples 
will be given for the theses above. Firstly, one should think of a pear. The 
pear in my mind is knowledge („ilm), whereas the known (ma‟lūm) is the 
pear itself in real life. One might ask the question whether the pear is like 
that because of my knowledge („ilm), or whether, due to the pear being as it 
is (ma‟lūm), I know it the way it is? In other words, is my knowledge 
dependant on the external appearance of that pear? Or is that pear which is 
ma‟lūm, dependant on my knowledge? If I knew the pear as a water melon; 
would the pear turn into one? The answer would be no because the 
appearance of the pear is not dependant on my knowledge. It does not look 
like that because of my knowledge of it. Rather I know that pear as it is 
because of its shape and appearance.  
The second example that will be provided has two aspects to it. Firstly, one 
might think of a commander who takes a camera and goes off to check on 
two of his soldiers keeping guard. He sees that both of them are sleeping. 
He records them with his camera. In this example, knowledge („ilm) is the 
record in that camera and the knowledge of the commander about the 
                                        
1047 Nursi shares this statement with the ahl al-kalām. See Qādi, „Abd al-Jabbār. Sharhu‟l-
Usūl al-Ḥamsa (Bayrūt, 2001), 290. Or see also Ghazālῑ, Abū Ḥamῑd M. al-İqtiṣād fῑ al-İ‟tiqād 
(Bayrut: Dāru‟l-Qutub al-„İlmiyya, 1983), pp. 65-66; Fahraddῑn al-Rāzῑ. al-Arba‟ῑn fῑ Usūl al-
Dῑn, ed. Aḥmad Hijāzῑ al-Sakā, Vol. 1 (Qāhira: 1986), 207. 
1048 The Words, 481. 
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situation of the two soldiers. The known (ma‟lūm), on the other hand, is the 
sleeping of the soldiers. The questions are the same as in the above 
example: Did the soldiers sleep because their commander recorded them? 
Or did the commander record them because they were sleeping? It is 
obvious that the second is the case. If, the next day, the commander would 
call these two soldiers, would show them the records and would say to them 
that they will be punished for sleeping while on duty; it would be ridiculous if 
the soldiers would reply: “You are the cause for our shortcoming, if you 
would not have recorded us, we would not have slept while keeping guard.” 
This is because the knowledge (the commander‟s knowledge about the 
soldiers) is dependent on the known (the soldier‟s sleeping while keeping 
guard). 
The second aspect of this example is as follows: Assuming that this 
commander is able to travel in time and hence able to travel to the future 
before these days have come; and thus able to know about what is going to 
happen in the future before it has actually happened. Also assuming that the 
commander has seen these two soldiers sleeping while keeping guard in a 
month time; has recorded them and has come back in time. After a month 
has passed, he has shown the two soldiers the recording saying that he 
knew a month ahead of time that they were going to sleep, the soldiers still 
have no right to say that it is the commanders fault that they have slept.  
Nursi‟s view that knowledge („ilm) is dependent on the known (ma‟lūm) 
should therefore be understood as in the light of the above examples. In this 
respect, one might say that divine determining, which is a kind of knowledge, 
is not in contradiction with the choices that human beings make. One does 
not nullify the other. This view of Nursi is opposed to that of Ibn Sῑnā who 
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stated that the existent (ma‟lūm) corresponds to the known („ilm).1049 Ibn 
Sῑnā‟s assertion derives from his thought that the coming into existence of 
something is the unavoidable consequence of God‟s knowledge of, and 
reflections on, the order. The order that emanates is nothing but a 
manifestation of the order known by God – in fact it is an exact copy of that 
order. Hence, the existent corresponds to the known.1050 
7.6.2 Nature of Free Will 
There are some further, basic points that also need clarification and that 
scholars such as Augustine have dealt with. According to Babcock, Augustine 
tried to find an answer to the Manicheans‟ assertion1051 that man sins 
because he is compelled by the dark power of evil operating upon man from 
within; for in reality, if man would not be overwhelmed by this power of evil, 
the soul, the self, would not turn away from the good.1052 Thus, the 
Manicheans, Babcock further explains, posed the question, why the soul 
would ever determine itself to the evil, if it is good and its first orientation is 
to the good? Augustine never escaped this question, nor was he able to 
solve it.1053 If the term mentioned by Augustine, namely „the soul‟ or „the self‟ 
is seen as the equivalent to the soul (nafs) in Islam, one might well say that 
the nafs seems to have an utterly different notion than the self of Augustine. 
For the nafs never really pertains to good; it rather commands the evil.1054 
                                        
1049 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟s Theodicy, 129. 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 It should be kept in mind at this point, that the Manicheans were bitheists who believed 
in two external powers; one good, the other evil. Augustine himself was a Manichean before 
his conversion in 386 and tried to find answers to the problem of evil and free will from a 
theistic point of view. See „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 31 ff. 
1052 „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 30.  
1053 Ibid. 
1054 The Literature of Islam explains the nafs, or nafs al-ammārah to be an evil-commanding 
soul. This issue, which is mainly a spiritual or even mystical field of study, is dealt with 
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From this perspective, the question, why the soul (or the self) would ever 
determine itself to the evil becomes superfluous.  
Furthermore Augustine decided to choose a more delicate and difficult 
position as opposed to the assertion of the Manicheans that evil stems from 
the contrary nature opposing the divine and existing independently. 
Augustine claimed that the origin of evil comes forth from God, the human 
soul and the fallen angels.1055 Thus he insisted on only two kinds of evil: sin 
and penalty. The former being moral evils committed by moral agents and 
the latter being the punishment that God justly imposes in response to 
sin.1056 Babcock explains that, particularly regarding the first kind of evil, 
namely moral evils committed by moral agents, Augustine faced a problem 
that was two-fold:  
...on the one hand, to establish the claim that the evil that persons do is 
specifically moral evil, of which they may rightly be counted the moral agents 
and for which, therefore, they are justly subject to penalty. But on the 
other... even though human beings are capable of (moral) evil, they 
nevertheless came forth good from God and do not implicate God in evil as 
the maker of the makers of human sin and wretchedness.1057 
 
Augustine‟s answer lay in freedom of will. He defined will as “an 
uncompelled movement of mind either to acquire or to avoid losing some 
object” and sin as “will either to keep or to obtain something that justice 
forbids when there is freedom to abstain”.1058 As far as could be understood, 
unlike Nursi, Augustine did not provide an explanation for the nature or 
                                                                                                               
within the sphere of Sūfism, under the name tazkiyat al-nafs. For more information, see. 
„Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟, pp. 101-127 
1055 „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 31. 
1056 Ibid.  
1057 Ibid., 31-2. 
1058 Ibid., 37. 
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quiddity of free will or choice as such. He did, however, recognize the 
difficulty in trying to explain the cause for the first sin and preferred rather 
to speak of a „deficient‟ rather than an „efficient‟ cause of the first evil 
will.1059 He stated: 
... the cause is not an efficient but a deficient cause because the evil will itself 
is not something effective but something defective. For to defect from the 
highest to a lesser good, that is to begin to have an evil will.1060 
As will be seen in the following explanations of Nursi, this point of Augustine 
is quite similar to Nursi‟s assertions that free choice (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār) (Nursi 
does not talk about evil will as such, though) has no actual external 
existence.  It appears when man makes a choice, and disappears again 
when there is nothing to choose.  Nursi calls this a „theoretical matter‟ (amr 
itibārī)1061.  In other words, theoretical matter is called anything that man 
names for description such as the words „above‟, „underneath‟, „left‟, „right‟, 
„big‟, „small‟, „far‟, „close‟, and so on.  All of these have no external reality but 
no one can claim the non-existence of them either.   
Hence, Nursi states, that the nature and quiddity of free choice (juz‟ῑ 
ikhtiyār) is unknown to us.  However,  
everyone perceives in himself a will and choice; he knows it through his 
conscience.  To know the nature of beings is one thing, to know they exist is 
something different.  There are many things which, although their existence 
is self-evident, we do not know their true nature.  The power of choice may 
be included among these.1062    
Nursi, as other traditional Muslim scholars, criticizes the Mu‟tazili 
thought that suggests that man is the creator of his acts and the Jabrī 
                                        
1059 Ibid., 46. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 The Words, 479. 
1062 Ibid., 480. 
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thought that proposes that man has absolutely no role in his actions.1063 He 
categorizes both outside of the ahl al-sunna.  Furthermore, he states the 
difference between Maturīdī and Ash‟arī (both of the ahl al-sunna) thoughts 
lie in the issue of inclination (mayalān), which is the essence of the power of 
choice.   
 
Figure 5: Free Choice, Acquisition and Sharr 
According to the Maturīdī, says Nursi, inclination is a theoretical matter (amr 
itibārī) and may be attributed to God‟s servants1064.  But the Ash‟arī did 
consider it to have existence, therefore they did not attribute it to man.  
Instead they stated that the power of disposal (taṣarruf) within inclination is 
a theoretical matter, which, according to Nursi, “makes the inclination and 
the disposal together a „relative matter‟ (amr nisbῑ) lacking a definitive 
external existence.”1065  
Turner rightly points out the puzzling point here: while Ash‟arῑ agreed that 
inclination and the power of disposal together constituted a mental entity 
that had no external existence which could therefore not be attributed to 
                                        
1063 Ibid., 482. 
1064 The reason why it can be attributed to God‟s servants is, as stated earlier, because 
theoretical matter has no external existence and thus does not require a cause to 
necessitate it. Therefore, it can attributed to man. 
1065 The Words, 482. 
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man, he believed inclination to be a created matter when standing on its 
own. Why this is Nursi did not explain.1066   
The term „relative matter‟ introduced by Nursi, is just slightly different from 
„theoretical matter‟.  While theoretical matter can be explained through 
certain descriptive words as mentioned before, „relative matter‟ appears not 
to describe things but to relate them to other things.  For instance, if I say 
„left‟, I mean left from my perspective.  From the perspective of the person 
standing in front of me, „left‟ would become „right‟; or the second floor of an 
apartment is „above‟ the first floor, but „underneath‟ the third floor.  The 
building and the floor do exist.  However, „above‟ and „underneath‟ have no 
external existence.  They are „relative matters‟.  Similarly, goodness is 
existent; with the intervention of sharr, different levels of goodness appear. 
Babcock claims that Augustine was not able to find the continuity with the 
dispositions, inclinations, motivations, aims and intentions of the agent that 
must be present if an act is to count as the agent‟s own and therefore as an 
instance of moral agency.1067 Nursi seems to have been able to provide an 
answer to this problem. 
According to Nursi, theoretical and relative matters have no external 
existence. Ontologically speaking, in order to appear, there is no 
requirement for all causes to gather.  The lack of such a requirement does 
allow the ability to choose.  Nursi now goes one step further, and closes the 
circle of one‟s understanding of free choice.  He states:  
If the cause of the theoretical matters acquires the weight of preference, the 
theoretical matter may become actual and existent.  In which case, at that 
juncture, it may be abandoned.  The Qur‟an may say to a person at that 
point: “This is sharr; do not do it.”  Indeed, if God‟s servants had been the 
                                        
1066 Colin Paul Turner. The Qur‟an Revealed, 379. 
1067 „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟, 49. 
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creators of their actions and had had the power to create, then their wills 
would have been removed.  For an established rule in the sciences of religion 
and philosophy is: “If a thing is not necessary, it may not come into existence 
[of itself].” That is, there has to be a cause for a thing to come into existence.  
The cause necessarily requires the effect.  Then no power of choice would 
remain.1068 
In the light of the above statement, one might say that no matter whether 
free choice is a theoretical or relative matter, in both cases, it has no 
external existence and thus is not a thing (shay‟). Therefore, it can be 
ascribed to man (the agent) for one cannot claim the creation of something 
that does not really, externally exist.  
In the light of the above, all deeds1069 mentioned in chapter 2 that fall under 
the semantic field of the term sharr in the Qur‟ān are freely chosen by man 
and thus are ascribed to him. 
Mackie asserted in chapter 3, that the free will defense does not offer a 
solution to the question whether God can make people do choose the right 
at all times. This question is connected in some ways with the Qur‟anic verse 
113:2, in which man is asked to seek refuge by God from the sharr of what 
He has created. To the objections to this verse why God would ask someone 
to seek refuge in Him for something He willed to happen, Fakhr al-Dῑn al-
Rāzῑ stated that God cannot be taken into account for anything He does.1070  
Nursi‟s explanations above represent an answer to Mackie‟s assertion as well 
as to the objections to the verse mentioned, for which Rāzῑ confined himself 
with a short answer.  Following Nursi‟s illustration, to make people choose 
                                        
1068 The Words, 482. 
1069 These deeds were parsimony, going astray, disbelief, idolatry, violation of covenant or 
treaty, aversion from God, slander, and transgression as mentioned in the Qur‟ān; and the 
fabrication of lies, hypocrisy, cruelty, injustice and to fail to put the teachings of the Qur‟ān 
into practice as mentioned in the hadῑth narrations. 
1070 Tefsīr-i Kebīr Mefātihu‟l-Gayb, surah Falaq (Online version). 
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the right at all times, would make free choice an actual existent matter with 
all necessary causes existent, which is impossible. Nursi explains this further 
in the following lines: 
If you say: Preference without a cause or attribute to cause the preference is 
impossible (tarjῑḥ bilā murajjih muḥāl). But the theoretical or relative matter 
we call human acquisition (kasb) sometimes does a thing and sometimes 
does not. Now if there is nothing to cause the preference, this would 
constitute an instance of preference without something to cause it. Does this 
not demolish one of the most important foundations of theology?1071 
It has been stated in chapter 5 that every contingent (mumkin) being‟s 
existence (wujūd) and non-existence („adam) is of equal possibility for that 
thing. If it has come into existence, there must have been a determinant 
(murajjih) that caused the thing to exist by preferring its existence over its 
non-existence. This determinant is called in theology the necessarily existent 
One (wājib al-wujūd), in other words, something whose existence is self-
necessitated. The question posed above asks what the status of that faculty 
within man, namely inclination or disposition, is. Since that faculty has no 
external existence, this means that there is no determinant causing the 
actions of man? 
Nursi‟s answer is as follows: 
…preference without a cause or attribute to cause the preference is 
impossible. That is, a being deemed preferable or superior without a cause or 
attribute to make it so is impossible. But preference without something to 
cause it is permissible and occurs. Will is an attribute, and its mark is to 
perform a work such as that.1072 
In the statement above, Nursi agrees that it is not possible for something to 
come into existence without a determinant, which is the wājib al-wujūd. And 
it is that very cause who declares something „preferable‟ or „superior‟ over 
                                        
1071 The Words, 482. 
1072 Ibid. 
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something else. However, in the case of human free will, man‟s inclination 
(mayalān) or disposal (taṣarruf) does not do such thing. It does not declare 
something „preferable‟ or „superior‟. The only thing it does is to choose 
between two possibilities. While it may incline towards doing one thing today, 
it may as well choose to refrain from doing the same thing the next day. 
This can be explained with the following illustration: x wants to slap y. In 
this case, x, the slap and y are all creatures (makhlūq) and thus created by 
God. However, „wanting or intending to slap‟ or „having an inclination to slap‟ 
is not a creation but a theoretical matter (amr itibārῑ). After x decides to slap 
y, that is, after x has chosen one of two possibilities (to slap or not to slap), 
the action takes place. If this action is sharr, the ethical teachings of the 
Qur‟ān whispers into the ear of x: “Don‟t do this!” Since theoretical matter, 
which is merely an inclination, is not in need of any causes in order to 
appear, x can always relinquish, if he wishes. If theoretical matter would 
have been dependant on external causes, x‟s free choice would have been 
taken away and he would be coerced to act in a certain way. Just as fire, 
after all causes have gathered, has no other choice but to burn.      
It might be helpful to summarize what has been said about free choice, 
acquisition and sharr so far: free choice (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyārῑ) has no external 
existence and is a theoretical or relative matter (amr itibārī or amr nisbī).  Its 
causes are non-existential and therefore it is subject to change.  Similarly, 
acquisition (kasb) also has no external existence and is also subject to 
change.1073 Sharr is non-existential in nature, it is a unit of measurement, 
and in most cases the result of human acquisition (kasb) or inclination 
(mayalān).1074 
                                        
1073 The Words, 479. 
1074 Ibid. 
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According to Nursi, God does not create sharr.  Within the creation, along 
with minor ashrār (pl. of sharr), there is major goodness (khayr).  To 
abandon major goodness for a minor sharr results in greater sharr.  
Therefore, a minor sharr becomes like good.1075  
Nursi further explains that since God is the creator of all things man has no 
interference in creation whatsoever.  His part is only the inclination or the 
power of disposal within the inclination. This statement is quite similar to 
that of Ghazālῑ who explained that it is God‟s action that creates power in 
man while man‟s action consists using the power created.1076  
Then Nursi asks the following: If God creates the murder, why am I called 
murderer?1077 And secondly, how can huge destructions and big ashrār 
happen through such a small part that is within the responsibility of man?1078 
Regarding the first question, the following image might be of help which 
derives from the explanations of Nursi: 
                                        
1075 Ibid., 478. 
1076 Abrahamov, Binjamin. „Al-Ghazālῑ‟s Theory of Causality‟ in Studia Islamica, No. 67 
(1988), 79.  
1077 The Words, 482. 
1078 Ibid., 479. 
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Figure 6: Explanation of the relation between theoretical matter and external existence1079 
Nursi makes use of the Arabic grammar rules in order to answer this 
question. According to the rules of Arabic grammar, an active participle 
maybe derived from an infinitive (which is a theoretical matter and 
subjective), but not from its outcome (which has an external existence). The 
infinitive, states Nursi, is the acquisition. It is subjective and is something 
that has no external existence (therefore attributable to man). As the result 
of his acquisition, he can thus acquire the title of the active participle. That 
is, why man, as in the example above, receives the title murderer.  The 
outcome of the infinitive, on the other hand, is God‟s creature.1080 It is 
attributed to God because it is something fixed and concrete and has 
external existence. If one searches for the responsible, he cannot find it 
around God‟s creation, but rather around the acquisition.  
Turner emphasizes an important point worth noting here: The question 
posed above is “Since the one who creates the murder is Almighty God, why 
do you call me a murderer?” Turner points out that this question is based on 
                                        
1079 Own figurative illustration of Nursi‟s example: The Words, 482-483. 
1080 The Words, 482-483. 
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a false premise since it assumes the infinitive to be created by God. It has 
been stated that murder has no real existence and thus cannot be „created‟ 
but „acquired‟ by man. Turner thus believes that the right way of asking the 
question would be “Since the one who creates death is Almighty God, why 
do you call me a murderer?” and continues: 
Nursi, although clearly aware that the premise upon which the question is 
based lacks validity, gives the questioner the benefit of the doubt and 
eschews a direct attack on his faulty reasoning, electing instead to clarify the 
issue by means of a measured and compelling appeal to the internal logic of 
Arabic grammar.1081  
To the second question, how huge destructions and big sharr happen 
through such a small part that is within the responsibility of man, such as his 
acquisition, Nursi explains that the reason lies in the nature of sharr which is 
non-existential and destructive.  Vast destructions and innumerable 
instances of non-existence may occur through a single theoretical matter 
and one instance of non-existence.1082 E.g., if the captain of a ship abandons 
his duties, the ship may sink and the labor of all those employed on it may 
become useless.  The reason for that vast destruction is a simple 
abandonment of duty, through the provocation of a theoretical free 
choice.1083  In this respect, Nursi sides himself with Ibn Sῑnā in that 
(essential) ashrār “…are not due to the action of the agent but to the 
inaction of the agent…”1084 Hence, destruction is easy for it is non-existential, 
whereas construction is difficult for it is existential.  While it takes a minute 
and minimum effort to burn down a house, e.g. through lighting up one 
match, it takes many months to rebuild it. 
                                        
1081 The Qur‟an Revealed, 383. 
1082 Ibid., 479. 
1083 Ibid.; „Mesnevī-i Nūriye„ in Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1382. 
1084 The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sῑnā‟a Theodicy, p. 81. 
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7.6.3 All goodness pertains to God, all sharr pertains to man 
In direct relation with the above, Nursi interprets the following verse of the 
Qur‟ān:  
Whatever good (ḥasana) happens to you is from God, but whatever evil 
(sayyiatin) befalls you is from yourself1085 
The message Nursi thinks this verse conveys is that man has no right to 
boast for things he has actually not done. For man‟s soul (nafs) consists of 
nothing else but fault and sharr. Even if there would be some khayr, it would 
be quite minor (juz‟ῑ), like his free choice (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār). However, Nursi 
continues, man should not say: “my sharr is also quite minor”, for with his 
free choice (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār) he can commit major sharr.1086  Nursi reminds 
himself and the reader of man‟s purpose, namely his vicegerency and how 
creation is favorably disposed to this purpose. Thus, Nursi states, any 
mistake that man commits terminates the fruits of creation‟s work and thus 
leads to major loss.1087 Nursi explains that the soul (nafs), which is in one 
way the disciple of Satan – contrary to the premise – makes man think of his 
khayr to be abundant and all-encompassing, and his sharr to be very minor 
and insignificant; thus becoming Pharaoh-like.1088  
Nursi explains this with the analogy of a foolish man who becomes part of a 
merchant ship crew. Each one of these individuals pay a certain amount and 
fulfill a certain duty on that ship. However that foolish man, through denial 
of his duty, becomes the reason for that ship to sink. Every individual makes 
a loss of thousand liras. Then they turn to that foolish man and say: “You 
must take all our loss on, for you have spoilt all our work.” But the foolish 
                                        
1085 Qur‟ān, 4:79. 
1086 Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, Vol. 2, 1382. 
1087 Ibid. 
1088 Ibid. 
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man replied: “No, I do not accept this. This loss should be split up and I 
shall take over my part.”1089 Nursi continues with his analogy: The second 
time, the foolish man has fulfilled all his duties on the merchant ship and 
they have made one thousand liras profit. They said: “Loss is according to 
duty and profit according to capital. So let us split the profit up according to 
our capitals.” But the haughty man replied: “No, all profit is mine, for before 
you said that I have to take on all the loss. And I did not accept. Thus, all 
profit should be mine as well, then.” Following to this statement, it was said 
to him: “Oh ignorant man! The existence (wujūd) of something pertains to 
the coming together of all its causes; thus, the fruits of that being (wujūd) is 
split up to all causes. Profit is the fruit of being. But loss is the fruit of non-
being („adam). And non-being comes about through the lack of one or more 
causes. Therefore, the fruit of non-being will be given to that lacking 
cause.”1090 
After providing the above analogy, Nursi continues to explain the meaning of 
the above mentioned Qur‟anic verse. He gives four reasons why man has no 
right to be haughty and prideful. Firstly, Nursi states, sharr are from man, 
khayr are from elsewhere. Secondly, the sharr of man is vast, whereas his 
khayr is very minor.1091 The third reason provided by Nursi is that man has 
received the payment for his good deeds („amal khayr) in advance, before 
his actions. According to Nursi, all goodness of man together cannot 
correspond to one hundredth of God‟s bounties towards man. Therefore, 
Nursi states, Paradise is granted to man out of God‟s mercy and blessing; 
whereas Hell is the punishment for man‟s actions and hence pure justice. 
For man is capable to commit grievous and eternal crime with minor 
                                        
1089 Ibid. 
1090 Ibid., 1383. 
1091 Ibid. 
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sharr.1092 And as fourth reason, Nursi states that khayr become khayr if it is 
for the sake of pleasing God. If it is for God, it is with His permission.1093 
Thus, Nursi continues, man‟s right is thankfulness instead of haughtiness. 
For any action that bears haughtiness, Nursi explains, is sanctimony and 
hypocrisy. And sanctimony and hypocrisy turns khayr into sharr.1094 
7.7 Existential Theodicy in Nursi 
This study has shown that Nursi defines sharr most commonly as disbelief 
(kufr) and the association of partners with God (shirk). This is in line with 
the Qur‟anic definition of the term sharr. Thus, according to Nursi, the worst 
of human misfortune is that which effects religion.1095 Nursi in fact believes 
that any other misfortunes that do not affect religion, in reality are not 
misfortunes, in other words, cannot be named sharr.1096  
It is difficult to offer consolation to inflictions that befall human beings, more 
so if these human beings are innocent – and worst of all, if they are 
innocent and children. An often cited and hence famous example for this is 
Dostoevsky‟s The Brothers Karamazov, in which Ivan Karamazov, facing the 
death of an innocent child, is forced to “hand back his ticket” to existence. 
In such cases, after having offered an initial consolation, what follows mostly 
right after is trying to look for reasons.  
Nursi offers practical solutions and cures on how to deal with certain 
disasters, calamities, misfortunes that befall human beings. Furthermore, he 
offers solutions to the biggest of ashrār, namely disbelief, saying that 
                                        
1092 Ibid. 
1093 Ibid. 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 The Flashes Collection, 26. 
1096 Ibid. 
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psychologically as well as cosmologically, the cure for all kinds of so called 
moral ashrār is faith (ῑmān). For a man who has faith, in other words, a 
believer (mu‟min) has established on a cosmological level his own 
ontological status. According to this man, “since we have an infinitely 
precious bounty like belief, both old age is agreeable, and illness and death. 
If there are things that are disagreeable, they are sin, vice, innovations 
(bid‟a)1097 and misguidance.”1098 The way to get rid of all these ashrār is to 
walk in the light of tawhῑd with faith and love. For Nursi states that  
if love, man‟s sweetest, most pleasurable, and most precious emotion is 
assisted by the mystery of Divine unity, it gives miniscule man the expanse 
and breadth of the universe, and makes him a petted monarch of the 
animals.1099  
Thus, what has to be done is to “rend the ana and show Him.”1100 In this 
regard, some of the possible solutions introduced by Nursi for ashrār shall be 
elaborated upon. By doing this, attention will be given not only to the 
concrete definitions of sharr, such as kufr or shirk, but also those kinds of 
apparent calamities that appear to the human eye as sharr. 
7.7.1 Suffering and Death of Innocent Children 
Coming back to the suffering and death of young, innocent children, Nursi 
writes a letter of condolence addressed to Hafız Halid Efendi, who, at that 
time1101 had recently lost a child. In this letter, he refers to the term 
„immortal youths‟ of the following verses of the Qur‟ān: “Round about them 
will wait immortal youths”1102 and “…immortal youths will wait upon them: 
                                        
1097 For more information on Nursi‟s understanding of bid‟a, see The Letters, 508-516.   
1098 The Flashes Collection, 304. 
1099 The Rays Collection, 24. 
1100 The Words, 369. 
1101 This letter was written sometime between 1928-1932. 
1102 Qur‟ān, 56:17. 
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when you seest them you would think them scattered pearls.”1103 With the 
guidance of these verses Nursi explains that children who die before 
reaching maturity will remain perpetually as eternal, lovable children in a 
form worthy of Paradise. Being in this state, they will be an everlasting 
means of happiness in the embrace of their mothers and fathers who go to 
Paradise.1104 Nursi compares this kind of love and happiness that parents will 
have towards their children in an everlasting place, with a short love that is 
mixed with sorrows in this world and states that the former should be a 
great source of happiness for believers.1105 
As Nursi does quite often, he offers an analogy for a better understanding of 
the second point. He invites his reader to think of a man in prison together 
with his young child, sent to comfort him. Now the man suffers two sorrows, 
his own and that of his child whom he cannot make as comfortable as he 
wishes. Then the compassionate judge offers to take the child and look after 
him in a fine palace but the father refuses for the child is his only comfort in 
that prison. His friends reason with him saying that the child might go to a 
spacious palace. When the child stays in prison, he will suffer and will cause 
his father suffer with him; whereas in the palace, the child might act as an 
intercessor and might attract the “mercy of the king”. However, it is 
necessary that the father trusts in the king‟s wisdom and benevolence.1106 
With this analogy Nursi intends to show that the children in fact are 
fortunate for being taken into the realm of beauty where they can intercede 
for their parents. It is in fact the parents, who remain miserable captives in 
the dungeon of the world. Thus, grief becomes meaningless.1107  
                                        
1103 Ibid., 76:19. 
1104 The Letters, 100-101. 
1105 Ibid., 101. 
1106 Ibid. 
1107 Ibid. 
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Furthermore Nursi reminds, similar to al-Ghazālῑ, that God is the possessor 
of every creation. In this respect, the child too, was the creature, possession 
and artifact of the Most Compassionate Creator. He was put temporarily 
under the supervision of the parents and made them the servant of the child. 
In return, the child gave them pleasurable compassion as an immediate 
wage. Thus, Nursi states that a believer should always remember that his 
share of the child is only one out of nine hundred and ninety nine. God, 
however, is the true owner of that child.1108 
Nursi further invokes the parents‟ compassion to their child being the 
manifestation of God‟s absolute Compassion. Compassion, Nursi states, is 
much more direct than passionate love; it leads to a direct bond with the 
Almighty God. Parents who “love their child more than all the world”, when 
it dies, turn their face from this world and find the True Bestower of 
Bounties who is really worthy of the heart‟s attachment.1109 
7.7.2 Old Age 
Nursi offers salve and relief for the elderly who might perceive old age as 
sharr due to various physical as well as mental illnesses, limitations of 
various kinds and the ever approaching reality of death. After all, the 
assertion that „death is the worst of evil‟1110 has been asserted by some 
scholars such as the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.  
                                        
1108 Ibid. 
1109 Ibid. 
1110 Marc C. Murphy‟s aim in his essay is to show that this standard view of Hobbes‟ is 
correct. See Murphy, M. C. „Hobbes on the Evil of Death‟ in Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie, Bd. 82, pp. 36-61. For a more general view on the evil of death, see chapter 3 
of Schumacher, B.N. Der Tod in der Philosophie der Gegenwart (Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2004) 
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Relating to his own old age and disclosing his feelings of sorrow and dark 
states of mind1111, the message sent ahead by Nursi is the belief in God, 
which, according to him, is the spring and source of the hopes and lights he 
is going to talk about.1112 Nursi tries to console his elderly readers in several 
ways.  
First of all, he points to the absolute Mercy of God, stating that it is that 
mercy which is sent to those needy for sustenance; in a much greater 
degree even, relative to man‟s weakness and impotence.1113 Thus Nursi 
affirms that God‟s Mercy is therefore the greatest hope and most powerful 
light of the elderly.1114 
Secondly, Nursi points out the feeling of separation, which can be regarded 
as apparent sharr. The fact that death is approaching rapidly, bringing along 
the separation from innumerable friends and loved ones, seems, according 
to Nursi, to be an incurable spiritual wound.1115 As a cure for this apparent 
sharr, Nursi offers the belief in a hereafter, a world to come which is the 
meeting place of friends.1116 A third aspect, states Nursi, is the feeling of 
despairing sorrow and a regretful penitence, caused by the thought of 
having wasted the fruits of one‟s life‟s capital through the giddiness of youth, 
seeing those fruits to consist only of sins and mistakes.1117 Nursi‟s cure for 
these kind of feelings is faith (ῑmān) and submission to God, listening to the 
Qur‟ān and accepting it, and reciting it.1118  
                                        
1111 The Flashes Collection, 287. 
1112 Ibid. 
1113 Ibid. 
1114 Ibid., 288. 
1115 Ibid. 
1116 Ibid. 
1117 Ibid., 289. 
1118 Ibid., 290. 
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Nursi further tries to console the feeling of loneliness, which brings along a 
feeling of estrangement and exile, by reminding the elderly of the existence 
of God.1119 For the existence of a Compassionate Creator, states Nursi, lifts 
the feeling of exile. Since God exists, Nursi affirms, everything exists; with 
Him, the angels exist too and thus the world is not empty.1120 And seen 
through His light and on His account, Nursi continues, every single creature 
in the universe becomes like a very familiar friend.1121 
Nursi goes on thinking of the horrors coming from the thought of the past 
which appears as a vast grave, filled with fathers, forefathers and the 
human race; the future, another grave for himself, his contemporaries and 
future generations; the present day, a coffin bearing his half-dead, suffering 
and desperately struggling corpse.1122 Looking for a remedy, Nursi 
emphasizes the weakness and helplessness of himself as an old man, being 
the possessor of merely a very limited, defective, short, weak freedom of 
choice (juz‟i ikhtiyār) with no ability to create and a small acquisition (kasb) 
as his support and defensive weapon in the face of these horrors. Being 
aware of the fact that his free will was able to silence the sorrows of the 
past and penetrate the future to prevent the fears coming from there, Nursi 
states that he found the remedy in faith “shining in the sky of the Qur‟ān of 
Miraculous Exposition”1123. With this light, Nursi explains, the grave turned 
into a meeting place with friends, a banquet of the Most Merciful One in 
delightful places of bliss. The present time‟s coffin appeared as a place of 
                                        
1119 Ibid., 292. 
1120 Ibid. 
1121 Ibid., 292-3. 
1122 Ibid., 293. 
1123 Ibid., 294. 
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trade for the Hereafter and a glittering guest-house of the All-Merciful 
One.1124  
In conclusion, Nursi tries to explain to the elderly that death should not be 
seen as sharr and that calamities and inflictions that derive from old age can 
be endured with faith in God and faith in the hereafter. 
7.7.3 The Suffering of non-Human Beings 
There is arguably no other scholar in the field of theodicy who has 
considered the suffering of non-human beings as part of the problem of evil: 
Nursi asks the question how the annihilation, the very short life or very hard 
work and labour of non-human beings; their being changed by calamities 
with no one of them being left in peace; their being killed without exception 
(such as trees and plants, flowers and the species of animals) can be 
reconciled with God‟s compassion and kindness. Although, states Nursi, 
these creatures are worthy of existence, lovers of life and desire permanent 
life.1125  
Nursi explains this offering five different answers showing its cause and 
reason and five indications pointing out the aims and benefits. As one 
reason, Nursi states that everything is created to display the perfections of 
God‟s art through the embroideries of His names in form of bodies and 
senses. Here he makes use again of his famous Divine Names Theology. 
Since everything is merely a model, states Nursi, and the possession of God, 
and since everything has been created ex nihilo, they are merely asked to 
offer thanks and praise for the degree of existence they have been given by 
                                        
1124 Ibid. 
1125 The Letters, 336. 
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God.1126 Nursi reminds that any degree that is not given remains merely a 
possibility and possibilities are infinite. Just as a plant cannot complain for 
being a plant – for it has received life as well as existence – an animal also 
cannot complain of not being a human being, since it also has received spirit 
and life and existence. There was always the possibility for them not to exist 
at all. Therefore, Nursi states, they are to offer thanks.1127  
Nursi further explains that he found the second reason in three steps. The 
first step was the thought that every creature was a dominical missive 
studied by conscious beings. The second step of Nursi‟s understanding was 
to know that the most important aims of creatures look to their Maker.1128 
That is, the notion of the other-indicative (manā-i ḥarfῑ),1129 in other words, 
to be mirrors to His beauty and perfections. The third step for Nursi was to 
understand that the constant change, transformation and activity in creation 
was due to the activity of Divine power in the universe. That constant flood 
of beings was so meaningful that through it the All-Wise Maker caused all 
the realms of beings in the universe to speak.1130 
Nursi additionally points out that nothing vanishes into non-existence but 
merely passes from the sphere of power to the sphere of knowledge; from 
the manifest world to the World of the Unseen. Since, the beauty and 
perfection in things pertain to the Divine Names; and since the Names are 
eternal and their manifestations perpetual; it is for sure that their impresses 
will be renewed, refreshed and made beautiful.1131 In the light of the above 
Nursi believes that the creature‟s realities essences and identities which are 
                                        
1126 Ibid., 337. 
1127 Ibid. 
1128 Ibid., 339. 
1129 This notion has been explained in chapter 5. 
1130 The Letters, 339-40. 
1131 Ibid., 340. 
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the means of beauty and loveliness, effulgence and perfection, are 
enduring.1132 Furthermore, although a creature leaves this transient world, 
the meanings it has expressed are preserved and perpetuated.1133 
It becomes apparent again that for the satisfaction of the heart and mind in 
the face of the questions posed above, faith and trust in an absolute 
merciful, compassionate, just and wise, all-powerful God; and faith in a life 
after death is essential. Nursi provides numerous pragmatic solutions in his 
works in regards to how to prevent youngsters from intemperance and 
extremism that may result in sharr and proves and remedies for attributes 
that fell under the semantic field of sharr. 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter formed the heart of the whole study in that it has aimed to 
illustrate the origin of sharr from the perspective of Nursi‟s Risale. It has put 
Nursi and other scholars mentioned before in this study into a discourse on 
issues such as the creation and disobedience of the first human being, the 
notion of Divine Trust (amānah) and how the misuse of the ana can lead to 
sharr, free will (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār), divine predestination (qadar) and their 
reconciliation. It has endeavored to find answers to the following questions: 
What, according to Nursi, is the origin of an „evil will‟ and who created it? 
How did sin enter into the perfect paradisal state of Adam and his wife? Why 
would Adam freely choose to be evil and miserable? Why is man called in 
the Qur‟ān „most unjust‟ (ẓalūman) and „most foolish‟ (jahūla)? How should 
divine determining be understood and how can it be accommodated with the 
notion of free will? Why did God choose to create a being who He knew 
would freely sin? Why could he not create a being who would choose to do 
                                        
1132 Ibid. 
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the right thing at all times? If God creates the murder, why am I called 
murderer? 
While in some aspects it seemed as if Nursi‟s account of the issues 
mentioned above were a verbatim duplication or reproduction of the 
opinions of his predecessors, it has soon proven itself to be an asset to the 
hitherto widely discussed and accepted notions among Muslim intellectuals. 
Albeit, with substantial elaborations and further novel additions based on his 
own examination and interpretation of the Qur‟ān. Some of his views with 
concentration on the novel ones will be recaptured here. 
Considering the Qur‟anic definition of sharr as covering mainly the moral 
aspect of it, Nursi‟s interpretation of the right course, the ṣirāṭ al-mustaqῑm 
in the opening chapter of the Qur‟ān, the Fatiḥa, served as a guide for 
optimal moral behavior. That is, it has illustrated through the examples of 
instinct, intellect and aggression, what is meant by right moral conduct and 
what falls outside of its frame, becoming eligible for the Qur‟anic definition 
of sharr.  
Nursi‟s interpretation on the Qur‟anic narrative of the creation of the first 
human being has shed further light on the origin of sharr. While it has 
opened up a discourse whether sharr might in fact pre-date even Adam as 
the first human being, attributing it (that is, sharr) to the jinns or angels that 
fell into discord and jealousy; it has also established a direct link between 
Adam‟s creation, the Divine Trust and the notion of ana, as well as free will 
and their relation with sharr.  Nursi defended the idea that Adam had a duty 
to fulfill: that is the unfolding of humanities‟ spiritual progress and the 
revealing of mankind‟s potentialities and his essential nature of being a 
comprehensive mirror of all the Divine Names. In this regard, Nursi believed 
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that the sin of Adam was a requirement of his human nature, contrary to 
that of the angels.  
In connection with the wisdom in the creation of human beings, rendering 
them superior to the angels, Nursi interpreted the Qur‟anic narration of the 
Divine Trust that was offered by God to the heavens and the earth and the 
mountains but was refused by all of them in fear. Man, who assumed it, 
Nursi continued, in fact assumed a key to the locked talisman of creation, 
called the ana. This tool, which was attached to the nafs, along with the 
inordinate self-esteem (anā‟iyyah) was perfectly capable of becoming a tool 
for sharr, if it was not used for its true purpose. If the ana, supported by 
anā‟iyyah, used itself as a yardstick and compared everyone and everything 
with itself, it contested the demands of the Glorious maker and started 
dividing God‟s sovereignty between them and other causes. This state, Nursi 
continued which is a state of utter ignorance (jahl muṭlaq), pertained to 
idolatry and disbelief and thus fell into the semantic field of sharr. 
In this respect Nursi distinguished between two currents, that is, two 
different faces of the ana: one being prophethood and religion, the other 
being philosophy. He urged these two currents to fuse, that is, philosophy to 
obey prophethood and religion, so that humanity could experience happiness 
and social life. Otherwise, he warned, in case of their separation, goodness 
and light would be drawn to the side of prophethood and religion whereas 
sharr and misguidance to the side of philosophy. For Nursi pointed out that 
the misuse of the ana was the origin of various claims of philosophy such as 
denying God choice; that His divine knowledge is not concerned with 
insignificant matters; that nature has the power to create; or that there is no 
afterlife and instead that souls are pre-eternal. Through this explanation, 
Nursi is arguably the first scholar establishing a close link between ana as 
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Divine Trust and philosophy without religion as being the „sharr aspect‟ of 
that ana. 
To the famous discussion on the compatibility of free will and divine 
determining, Nursi positioned himself with al-Ghazālῑ and opposed Ibn Sῑnā 
and Ibn Rushd, stating that these two are perfectly reconcilable. However, if 
man is not able to grasp God‟s wisdom and the compatibility of free will and 
divine determining does not mean that they are not compatible. Nursi‟s 
starting point to explain this issue further was the principle that knowledge 
is dependent on the thing known, which Nursi borrowed from the ahl al-
kalām. It was important to tackle this problem for it was going to shed light 
on the question who the responsible was for moral ashrār.  
Another important aspect about Nursi that might be seen as unique is that 
he used the same principle to explain the existence of sharr, ana, and free 
choice (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār): namely that they have no external existence, that they 
serve as a unit of measurement, and in order for them to exist, that there is 
no need for all causes to gather. They have no external reality, but no one 
can claim the non-existence of them either. This point is vital for only in this 
way can they be attributed to human beings. One might say that according 
to Nursi, it is because of this quiddity, that man is held responsible for his 
actions. With this theory was Nursi not only able to provide an answer to 
Augustine‟s unsolvable problem about the continuity with the dispositions, 
inclinations, motivations, aims and intentions of the agent that must be 
present if the act is to count as the agent‟s own and therefore as an instance 
of moral agency; he also answered Mackie‟s critique on the free will defense, 
namely whether God could have made people do choose the right at all 
times.  
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Finally, Nursi offered some practical aspects how man should position 
himself when facing inflicts and calamities that appear like sharr. No matter 
how practical these treatises may be, it became apparent that faith in God 
and faith in a life after death was significant in dealing with apparent ashrār.  
In the light of all that has been said, man is asked to establish his own 
ontological status which he can only accomplish through faith in God and 
faith in a life after death. 
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8 Conclusion 
The study was set out to explore the concept of the problem of evil and 
theodicy in view of the contemporary Muslim theologian Said Nursi and his 
magnum opus, the Risale-i Nur Collection, comprising an approximately six 
thousand pages commentary on the Qur‟ān. The study has identified the 
Qur‟anic understanding of sharr as deviating from the human perception of 
evil and has provided a definition for the nature of sharr in the view of Nursi. 
Additionally, the study claims having completely or partially revealed 
answers to some of the major questions on theodicy that have hitherto 
remained unsolved in theoretical literature.  
This conclusion will establish the context, background and importance of the 
topic at hand. It will then proceed to indicate the problems in the field of 
study in form of research questions as well as the key objectives of the 
study. After having mentioned the methodology used, an outline will be 
given on the challenges that the works of Nursi faced and possible answers 
it gave to various objections to the field of theodicy by various scholars. The 
conclusion will then proceed to outline briefly those views of Nursi that are 
novel and as such, add a new perspective to the problem of evil and the 
field of theodicy. It will then, finally, suggest areas of further research. Some 
of these will be suggestions to develop on Nursi‟s points to bring the 
discourse further to another level; others will suggest areas that this study 
has not been able to cover due to its physical limitations. 
The problem of evil has been discussed thoroughly by many Western and 
Muslim theologians and philosophers and has always remained unsolved. It 
has been one of the biggest challenges of traditional theism and a major 
argument against the existence of God. For the main concern was to 
reconcile God‟s omnipotence, omniscience and absolute mercy and 
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compassion with the existence of evil, without thereby sacrificing their 
absoluteness.    
The general theoretical literature on this subject is inconclusive on several 
vital questions. In this regard, this study has sought to analyze Nursi‟s 
Risale-i Nur which, as this study claims, would shed light and bring a fresh 
and original contribution to the discourse at hand, thus taking the 
discussions further into a new dimension. The works have been examined 
aiming to find possible answers to the following research questions: is evil, 
as it is perceived by human beings, equal to the Qur‟anic narrative of sharr? 
What is the nature of sharr? Does sharr exist? How did sin enter into the 
perfect paradisal state of Adam and his wife? Why does God allow sharr to 
happen? Why does God allow human free will knowing that the possibility 
for sharr also exists? Can God make people do choose the right at all times 
despite their freedom? Why did God create Satan knowing that he will 
misguide human beings? Who or what is the cause of an evil will and who 
created it? Does God create some with the intention to punish them and 
others with the intention to save them? Why did God choose to create a 
human being who He knew would freely sin? 
The methodology of this study is based on Izutsu‟s Ethico-Religious 
Concepts in the Qur‟ān and God and Man in the Koran which have been 
consulted as main reference. First of all it was necessary to see whether the 
notion of evil as understood by man was equal to the Qur‟anic narrative of 
sharr.  To achieve this objective, a semantic analysis of the term has been 
employed to the Qur‟ān, its exegeses as well as to the Prophetic tradition, 
that is, hadῑth, in form of an inductive investigation. The study has shown 
that the notion of „natural evil‟, defined as such by general theoretical 
literature on theodicy, was not conform to the Qur‟anic definitions. In fact, 
according to the Scripture, there was no such thing as „natural evil‟; instead, 
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the Qur‟ān stressed the moral and ethical aspect of sharr.  Consequently, the 
moral terms that served as a definition of sharr were parsimony, going 
astray, disbelief, idolatry, violation (of a covenant or treaty), aversion from 
God, slander and transgression. Further indications were found in hadῑth 
literature, namely the fabrication of lies (bid‟a), hypocrisy (nifāq), cruelty 
(ẓulm) and injustice, and to fail to put the teachings of the Qur‟ān into 
practice. Although it was not possible to find direct definition from the 
exegesis literature, it is noteworthy to state that sharr was understood as 
physical and psychological calamities originating from the distorted will of 
man, rather than from any kind of natural disasters or external calamities. In 
this respect Nursi added that there existed minor (apparent) sharr as a „unit 
of measurement‟; or to be a means to a good end; or to avoid greater 
ashrār; or to manifest the Glory of the Divine. 
The study of the Qur‟ān in regards to sharr has further shown that the term 
is a relative one that can change according to the individual, time and 
circumstance. Something that is considered to be sharr now, can become 
something good (khayr) in a few months. In this way, the Qur‟ān indicated 
that real sharr is the loss of something good. That is, the loss of grace, loss 
of guidance, loss of God‟s resignation, loss of understanding, loss of faith, 
loss of patience, and the loss of hope. This was of utter importance since it 
laid the foundations for Nursi‟s approach to sharr. For the Qur‟anic narrative 
indicated that sharr was the loss of an existent thing and had no external 
existence and nothing which is created (wujūd) could be sharr. 
The methodological approach to Nursi‟s magnum opus has been based on 
twelve principles that have been derived from therein. These principles were 
firstly, that any existence (wujūd) requires an existing cause; secondly, that 
there is no absolute non-existence („adam al-muṭlaq) in the universe; thirdly, 
that existence is pure good (wujūd khayr al-mahdh) whereas non-existence 
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is pure sharr („adam sharr al-mahdh); fourthly, that sharr is non-existential 
in nature and arises from non-existence („adam); fifthly, that there is non 
absolute sharr (sharr al-muṭlaq) in the universe; sixthly, that abondaning a 
minor sharr can lead to greater sharr; seventhly, that sharr has some sort of 
external reality or minor existence; eighthly, that ashrār are the 
manifestation of Divine Glory; ninethly, that all good things are the 
manifestation of Divine Beauty; thenthly, that the creation of sharr is not 
sharr, rather the desire for sharr is sharr; eleventhly, that free will (juz‟ī 
irada) has no actual existence; and finally that destruction is easy. All other 
findings and exploraitions have been based in these principles.  
The study has further shown that Nursi, for whom the Qur‟ān always 
remained the fundamental source of study, treated the concept of sharr in 
the same way as the Qur‟ān. His main emphasis was on „moral ashrār‟, 
whereas the so-called „natural evils‟ remained being called disasters, 
calamities and natural inflictions rather than sharr.  
The Risale-i Nur‟s theodicy has furthermore been explored in the light of 
principles and concepts that have been developed by Nuris‟s predecessors. 
These principles were the notion of dualism, privatio boni, evil as a 
necessary effect of good, the higher good defense (evil as necessary means 
to good), the best of all possible worlds, and the free will defense. Nursi 
incorporated most of these principles into the Risale-i Nur, thereby criticizing 
and ultimately rejecting the notion of dualism. Through the explanation of 
these principles, Nursi tried to provide answers and explanations to 
questions such as whether sharr existed and why God allowed sharr to 
happen.  
This study also sought to put Nursi‟s theodicy into discourse with so called 
„secular‟ theodicy or „anthropodicy,‟ supported by scholars such as Newton, 
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Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Nursi‟s explanations on 
the nature of sharr and his illustrations on the notion and nature of free will 
confuted the assertions of anthropodicy.  
Another theory with which the Risale-i Nur was challenged was the notion of 
„theistic finitism‟ supported by scholars such as Dilley. This assertion was 
quite appealing for it stated that God being finite, at least did the best He 
could to combat evil, but unfortunately was not able to. After all, this was 
better than to say that God could do away evil but chose not to do so. Since 
„theistic finitism‟ emerged out of the seeming failure to reconcile evil and the 
absoluteness of God‟s power, Nursi concentrated on trying to prove God‟s 
Omnipotence through five analogies. Dilley further claimed that what 
happens to matter has never been important for traditional theism. Whereas 
Nursi‟s theodicy showed that the change, tribulations and different states 
matter and creation go through was due to the many different Divine Names 
and Attributes they manifest. Thus, Nursi stressed the transformation of 
matter to be a very important duty of creation. 
Furthermore, Nursi has been set into discourse with Plotinus‟ principle of 
plenitude. This principle asserted that God was not free to create or not. 
Rather, everything that reached its perfection had no other option but to 
come into existence. This happened outside of God‟s will, thus He could not 
be blamed for any evil. Nursi was in contradiction with Plotinus, explaining 
that all existence is the manifestation of God‟s attributes and thus they 
require an endless activity. Activity and change, on the other hand were in 
Nursi‟s teaching nothing else but pure goodness (khayr al-mahdh) whereas 
calm, repose, idleness, monotony and arrest from action were forms of non-
existence („adam), and harm. 
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 Ibn Sῑnā‟s theory of non-existing accidental evil was another point that Nursi 
would not have agreed with. While Inati‟s objection to this theory was that 
the privation of tertiary perfection is not evil with respect to that species, but 
merely with respect to what that species could have additionally had, Nursi 
would have explained that even this could not be considered as sharr for 
God being the owner of everything, is free in giving each creature the 
amount of features He wishes. 
Nursi was in line with al-Māturidῑ that the opposites in this world manifest 
God‟s Divine Wisdom and indicate God‟s Unity. However, while these 
opposites were generally called evils, Nursi called them „unit of measurement‟ 
and explained them to be a means to help human beings understand and 
enjoy the variety of degrees in creation. 
Nursi additionally opposed Ibn Sῑnā and Ibn Rushd, and affirmed al-Ghazālῑ 
by promoting the view that divine determining and free will are compatible 
and can be perfectly reconciled. While Ibn Sῑnā did not blame anyone for 
evils believing that God was – just like human beings – also determined 
(albeit not by external causes but by His own nature); Ibn Rush preferred to 
blame the agent‟s mind. Basing his argument on the premise that 
„knowledge („ilm) is dependent on the thing known (ma‟lūm)‟ he answered 
the question whether God created some with the intention to punish them 
and others with the intention to save them.  
While in some aspects it seemed as if Nursi‟s account of the issues 
mentioned above were a verbatim duplication or reproduction of the 
opinions of his predecessors, it has soon proven itself to be a fresh 
articulation of the hitherto widely discussed and accepted notions among 
Muslim and Western intellectuals. Albeit, with substantial elaborations and 
further novel additions based on his own examination and interpretation of 
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the Qur‟ān. Some of his novel views and contributions to theodicy will be 
recaptured here: 
1.  Nursi established a relation between sharr and worship and thus 
created a new theological concept that he called „negative worship.‟ In 
contrast to „positive worship‟ being supplications and daily prayers, „negative 
worship‟ consisted of illnesses and calamities. They were called by Nursi 
negative forms of worships for they made man realize his impotence and 
weakness. With this awareness, man was supposed to take refuge in God. 
In fact, Nursi believed that this type of worship was sincere and without 
hypocrisy. The introduction of the concept of positive and negative worship 
could be seen as part of Nursi‟s Existential theodicy, in other words the 
practical aspect of theodicy, in which he tried to offer comfort to those 
inflicted with calamities.  
2. Nursi established a whole new Weltanschauung about the Names and 
Attributes of God, employing this conviction in nearly every area of theology 
and philosophy. Nursi is arguably the first scholar to establish a relationship 
between theodicy and the Divine Names of God. According to this concept, 
God‟s Beauteous (jamālῑ) as well as his Glorious (jalālῑ) Names together in 
unity formed a „Divine Mosaic‟, pointing to their Creator. Thus, sharr 
originated from God, however was not caused by Him. According to Nursi, 
this did not entail any contradiction. With this concept, Nursi offered the first 
part of a solution to the question who the cause of an evil will was and who 
it was created by. 
3. Another novel view that has been brought into the discourse by Nursi 
was the link between ana and, if misused, its encouragement for all kinds of 
ashrār. Nursi is arguably the first scholar to interpret the meaning of the 
Qur‟anic „Divine Trust‟ to be ana, describing it as a key to the locked 
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talisman of creation, attached to the „soul‟ (nafs) of man along with the 
inordinate self-esteem (anā‟iyyah). Nursi stated that this ana was perfectly 
capable of becoming a tool for sharr (in this case idolatry and disbelief), if it 
was not used for its true purpose. Nursi explained two faces of ana, one 
being prophethood and religion and the other being philosophy. In order for 
humanity to experience happiness and social life, these two faces had to 
fuse. Nursi warned that the misuse of ana was the origin of various claims of 
philosophy such as denying God choice; that His divine knowledge is not 
concerned with insignificant matters; that nature has the power to create; or 
that there is no afterlife and that souls are pre-eternal.  
4. The notion of Divine Trust was further connected with the creation of 
the first human being and as such offered possible answers to how sin 
entered into the perfect paradisal state of Adam and his wife and why God 
chose of create a human being who He knew would freely sin. In this 
respect, Nursi offered an arguably original interpretation of the Qur‟anic 
verse [2:30] stating that the angel‟s questioning and doubts were not 
related to human beings‟ creation (khāliqun) but rather in regards to them 
being placed on earth (jā‟ilun). The significance in this distinction lied in the 
premise of Nursi that existence was pure good (khayr al-mahdh) and since 
creation was an essential act of God its goodness could not be questioned. 
5. Nursi claimed that sharr, ana and free choice (juz‟ῑ ikhtiyār) consisted 
of the same nature. He believed that all of them had no external existence; 
they served as a unit of measurement; and in order for them to exist, there 
was no need for all causes to gather. Through this explanation, Nursi was 
able to attribute all of the above, namely sharr, ana and free choice, to man 
thus making him responsible for his actions. In this way, Nursi was able to 
provide an answer to Augustine‟s unsolvable problem about the continuity 
with the disposition, inclinations, motivations, aims and intentions of the 
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agent that must be present if the act is to count as the agent‟s own and 
therefore as an instance of moral agency. With the same theory, Nursi 
furthermore answered Mackie‟s critique on the free will defense, namely 
whether God could have made people do choose the right at all times. Nursi 
furthermore was able to provide explanations to the question what the 
nature of sharr was and why God allowed human free will knowing that the 
possibility of sharr also existed. 
6. Additionally, there was arguably no other scholar to add the suffering 
of non-human beings, such as trees and plants, flowers and the species of 
animals, to the field of theodicy. Nursi raised the question how the 
annihilation, in some cases very short life, and in other cases very hard work 
and labor of non-human beings, their being changed by calamities with no 
one of them being left in peace, their being killed without exception, can be 
reconciled with God‟s compassion and kindness.  
Further aspects in regards to Nursi and his writings will be worth mentioning 
here. First of all, as it has been mentioned and clarified before, Nursi‟s 
frequent use of the term „proof‟ cannot be understood in purely philosophical 
and scientific terms. It should be rather understood as raoming around the 
different possibilities with one‟s mind to finally find the one option that is 
closest and most logical to intellect (aql) and to reason (mantiq). In that 
sense, Nursi seems to employ the Qur‟anic method, which is based on the 
principle to open up doors to the one‟s intellect without depriving him from 
free will. Thus, Nursi seems to like to emphasize that one, most logical 
option by claiming it to be a „proof‟. 
Another aspect is in regards to Nursi‟s infallibility. By no means does this 
study imply or indicate that Nursi provides the ultimate answers and 
solutions to the problem of evil. In fact, this study has in many ways shown 
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that despite the approach of this problem from many angles and aspects, 
and despite the depth of knowledge that can be found in Nursi‟s works on 
theodicy, when it comes to actual life and to the existential aspect of it, 
Nursi‟s approach can maybe persuade one‟s intellect, but it cannot control 
one‟s feelings – namely the feelings of utter anger, distress, grief, sorrow, 
and anguish when confronted with calamieties and different kinds of inflicts.  
In conclusion, this study as well as the outline above has shown that the 
debate is very extensive and multifaceted. There are some points that can 
be reevaluated and discussed again in the light of Nursi‟s contributions since 
there have been some issues that could not be examined in detail in this 
study and might be considered as future studies in relation to theodicy. 
For instance, the ontological aspect of the problem of sharr should be 
reexamined in the light of the novel contributions of Nursi and the extent of 
the influence these views will have on the discourse should be examined. 
Secondly, some answers and explanations of Nursi have been included into 
this study only partially; in some instances in very brief outlines, in other 
cases, treatises that went on for pages have been compiled into one page 
only. Some of these treatises can form a whole area of study for their own. 
Since they are related to the problem of evil, it will be worthwhile to take the 
study further in these areas. Some of these might be the Divine Names 
Theology, Divine Names Ontology; and the eschatological aspect of theodicy. 
On a final note, this study has been able to only partially explore the field of 
existential theodicy in the light of Nursi. As theoretical theistic theodicy has 
been criticized for lacking an existential aspect, it might be important to take 
this study further in this area. What kind of answers and solution did Nursi 
offer for those who suffer in specific circumstances? How can, according to 
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Nursi, suffering and apparent ashrār be made manageable or alleviated? 
Furthermore, how should, according to Nursi, believers respond to God while 
suffering? 
 319 
 
Bibliography 
‟Abd al-Bāqī, M. F. Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qur‟ān al-Karīm (Bayrūt, 
Lubnān: Dār ul-Fikr, 1990) 
„Abdul Haq, M. „Mullā Ṣadrā‟s Concept of Man‟ in Islamic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 
4 (Dec., 1972), pp. 281-296 
„Abdullah Yūsuf „Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur‟an, (Maryland: Amana 
Publications, 2004) 
Abu‟l-Hasan „Alī Ibn Ismā‟īl Al-Aš‟arī‟s Al-Ibānah „An Usūl Ad-Diyānah, trans. 
Walter C. Klein, ed. W. Norman Brown, (New Haven, CT: American 
Oriental Society, 1940) 
Abu-Rabi‟, I. M. Islam at the Crossroads (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003) 
__________. (ed.) Theodicy and Justice in Modern Islamic Thought, 
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) 
Abrahamov, B. „Al-Ghazālῑ‟s Supreme Way to Know God‟ in Studia Islamica, 
No. 77 (1993), pp. 141-168 
__________. „Al-Ghazālī‟s Theory of Causality‟ in Studia Islamica, No. 67 
(1988), pp. 75-98 
__________. „A Re-Examination of al-Ash‟arī‟s Theory of “Kasb” According to 
“Kitāb al-Luma”‟ in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain 
and Ireland, No. 2 (1989), pp. 210-221 
__________. „Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Knowability of God‟s Essence and 
Attributes‟ in Arabica, T. 49, Fasc. 2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 204-230 
Ağırman, Ferhat. „Islam Düşüncesinde Irade Problemi‟ in Pamukkale 
Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Sayi 13 (2012), pp. 17-
26 
Aiken, H. D. „God and Evil: A Study of Some Relations Between Faith and 
Morals‟ in Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Jan., 1958), pp. 77-97 
 320 
 
al-Bayyāḍī, Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad. Ishārāt al-Marām min „Ibārāt al Imām 
(Cairo, 1949) 
Akasoy, Anna. „Islamic Attitudes to Disasters in the Middle Ages: A 
Comparison of Earthquakes and Piagues‟ in The Medieval History 
Journal, 10, 1&2 (2007), pp. 387-410 
„Alī, „A. Y. The Meaning of the Holy Qur‟ān, New Edition with Revised 
Translation, Commentary and Newly Compiled Comprehensive Index 
(Maryland: Amana Publications, 2004) 
Alper, Ö. M. „Kaderin Sırrına Dair Risāle: Ibn Sῑna‟ in Istanbul Üniversitesi 
Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 7 (2012), pp. 173-178 
Altinbaş, Ramazan. „Mevlana‟da Irade Hürriyeti‟ in Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi 
Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt VIII/2 (Sivas, December 2004), pp. 1-15 
Ansari, Z. I. „Taftāzānī‟s views on taklīf, ghabr and qadar: A Note of the 
Development of Islamic Theological Doctrines‟ in Arabica, T. 16, Fasc. 
1 (Feb., 1969), pp. 65-78 
Arsenijević, M. „Determinism, Indeterminism and the Flow of Time‟ in 
Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002), pp. 123-150 
Augustine, Saint. The Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 
Averroes‟ commentary on Plato‟s „Republic‟, Hebrew trans., ed. and Eng. tr. 
E. I. J. Rosenthal (Cambridge, 1956) 
Babcock, W. S. „Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency‟ in Journal of Religious 
Ethics, Inc., Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 28-55 
Balaguer, M. „Why There Are No Good Arguments for Any Interesting 
Version of Determinism‟ in Synthese, Vol. 168, No. 1 (May, 2009), pp. 
1-21 
Baumann, R.“Gottes Gerechtigkeit” – Verheiβung und Herausforderung für 
die Welt (Freiburg: Herder Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989) 
 321 
 
Bearman, P.J.; Bianquis, TH.; et al.  The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.  XI 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002) 
Brightman, E. S. A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1940) 
Broekman, J. M. „Justice as Equilibrium‟ in Law and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
Symposium in Memory of Chaim Perelman (Dec., 1986), pp. 369-391 
Brown, F. B. „The Beauty of Hell: Anselm on God‟s Eternal Design‟ in The 
Journal of Religion, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 329-356 
Bulut, Ali. „Kur‟ân‟da Emânet Kavramı‟ (Unpublished Master Thesis, Süleyman 
Demirel University, 2002) 
Burns, J. Patout. „Augustine on the Origin and Progress of Evil‟ in Journal of 
Religious Ethics, Inc., Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 9-27  
Burrell, David B. „The Unknowability of God in al-Ghazali‟ in Religious Studies, 
Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 171-182 
Burton, J. An Introduction to the Hadith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press Ltd., 1994) 
Büyük Türk Filozof ve Tıb Üstadı Ibni Sina, Şasiyeti ve Eserleri Hakkında 
Tetkikler in Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından: VII. Seri – No.1 
(Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1968) 
Canan, I. Kütüb-i Sitte, Vol. 1-18 (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları) 
Cebeci, L. Kur‟an‟da Şer Problemi (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1985) 
Cherniss, H. „The Sources of Evil According to Plato‟ in Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 98, No. 1 (February 15, 1954), 
pp. 23-30. 
Chipman, Leigh N. B. „Mythic Aspects of the Process of Adam‟s Creation in 
Judaism and Islam‟ in Studia Islamica, No. 93 (2001), pp. 5-25 
 322 
 
Chittick, C. W. Sufism: A Beginner‟s Guide (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
2008) 
__________. The Sufi Path of Knowledge (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1989) 
__________. „The Perfect Man as the Prototype of the Self in the Sufism of 
Jāmῑ‟ in Studia Islamica, No. 49, (1979), pp. 135-157 
__________. „The Five Divine Presences: From Al-Qūnawī to Al-Qayṣarī‟ in 
The Muslim World, Vol 72, Issue 2 (Apr., 2007), pp. 107-127 
Çoban, I. „Nursi on Theodicy: A New Theological Perspective‟ in Classic 
Issues in Islamic Philosophy and Theology Today, 2010, Vol.  4, Part 
3 
Cohn-Sherbok, D. Theodicy (Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 1997) 
Conrad, J. Tales of Unrest (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) 
Coşkun, I. „Matürīdī Düşüncede Allah-Insan Ilişkisi‟ in Hikmet Yurdu, Yil 2, No. 
4 (2009), pp. 17-46 
Cragg, K. The Mind of the Qur‟ān: Chapters in Reflection (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973) 
Curran, Ch. E. The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A Synthesis. (Washington 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1999) 
Davudoğlu, A. Kur‟an-ı Kerim ve Izahlı Meali (Istanbul: Çelik Yayın-Dağıtım, 
1981) 
Dedeler, S. „Muhammed Ikbal Düşüncesinde Merkezi Temalarin Analizi (ego-
aşk-tanrı)‟ (Unpublished Master Thesis, Süleyman Demirel University, 
2010) 
Demirci, S. „Varoluş, Aşk, Bakış: Risale-i Nur eksenli bir “estetik teorisi” 
denemesi‟ in Güzellik Felsefesi: Estetik, Vol. 71 (2000) 
 323 
 
Dilley, F. B. „A Finite God Reconsidered‟ in International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, Vol 47, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 29-41 
Dostoyevsky, F. The Brothers Karamazov (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1958, reissued in one volume, 1982) 
Eliaçık, I. Yaşayan Kur‟an, vol. 1-3 (Istanbul: Inşa Yayınları) 
Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, ed. Martin, R. C., vol. 2 
(Michigan: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004) 
Encyclopedia of Judaism, www.answers.com, latest access 10th March 2009 
Engin, S. „Emaneti Yüklenmek„ in Altınoluk Internet Arşivi, No. 238 (Dec., 
2005), 26. 
<http://dergi.altinoluk.com/index.php?sayfa=yazarlar&yazar_no=103
7&MakaleNo=d238s026m1&AdBasHarf=&limit=0-15>, last access 19 
November 2012 
Ewing, A. C. „Indeterminism‟ in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 5, No. 2 
(Dec., 1951), pp. 199-222 
Fakhry, M. An Interpretation of the Qur‟an (New York: New York University 
Press, 2000, 2004) 
Fletcher, W. (trans.), „On the Anger of God‟, chap. 13, in The Writings of the 
Ante-Nicene Fathers (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdman), vol. 
vii, 1951 
Foot, P. „Free Will Involving Determinism‟ in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 
66, No. 4 (Oct, 1957), pp. 439-450 
Fried, C. „Natural Law and the Concept of Justice‟ in Ethics, Vol. 74, No. 4 
(Jul., 1964), pp. 237-254 
Gardner, E. C. „Justice, Virtue and Law‟ in Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 2, 
No. 2 (1984), pp. 393-412 
 324 
 
Al-Ghazālῑ.  The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God – al-Maqṣad al-asnā fῑ 
sharḥ asmā‟ Allāh al-ḥusnā, trans.  David B.  Burrell and Nazih Daher 
(Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1999) 
__________. The Marvels of the Heart (Kitāb sharḥ ‟ajā„ib al-qalb), Book 21 
of the Iḥyā‟ „ulūm al-dῑn (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), trans. 
Walter James Skellie (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2010) 
__________. Al-İqtiṣād fῑ al-İ‟tiqād (Bayrut: Dāru‟l-Qutub al-„İlmiyya, 1983) 
__________. Ihyā Ulūm-id-Dīn, Kitāb at-Tawhīd wa at-Tawakkul, vol. IV, p. 
238-286 
_________. Ihyāu „Ulūmi‟d-Dīn, Kitābu Kavāidi‟l-Akāid, Rub‟u‟l-Ibādāt, trans. 
Ahmed Serdaroğlu, vol. I (Istanbul: Bedir Yayınevi) 
_________. The Precious Pearl, trans. from Kitāb Al-Durra Al-Fākhira fī Kashf 
by Smith, J. I. (Montana: Scholar Press, 1979) 
_________. Über Intention, Reine Absicht und Wahrhaftigkeit. Das 37. Buch 
von Al-Ghazālī‟s Hauptwerk, trans. and notes by Hans Bauer (Halle: 
Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1916 
_________. The Foundations of the Articles of Faith, trans. with notes of 
Kitāb Qawā‟id al-„Aqā‟id of the Ihyā „Ulūm al-Dīn by Nabih Amin Faris 
(Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963) 
Gilchrist, J. Muhammad and the Religion of Islam, <http://www.answering-
islam.org/Gilchrist/Vol1/9a.html>, last access December 16, 2009. 
Gorsuch, R. L.; Smith, C. S. „Attributions of Responsibility to God: An 
Interaction of Religious Beliefs and Outcomes‟ in Journal of the 
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 340-352 
Groff, Peter S. Islamic Philosophy A-Z, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press Ltd., 2007) 
 325 
 
Gündoğar, H. „Mu‟tezile Mezhebinde Insanin Fiilleri Problemi‟ in Cumhuriyet 
Üniversitesi Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt VIII/2 (Sivas, December 
2004) 
Haji, I. „Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck‟ in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 
4, No. 3 (Jul, 2000), pp. 211-235 
Haque, A. „Psychology from Islamic Perspective: Contributions of Early 
Muslim Scholars and Challenges to Contemporary Muslim 
Psychologists‟ in Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Winter, 
2004), pp. 357-377 
Hawi, Sami S. „Ibn Tufayl: On the Existence of God and His Attributes‟ in 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Jan. – Mar., 
1975), pp. 58-67 
Hebblethwaite, B. Evil, Suffering and Religion (London: Sheldon Press, 1976) 
Hick, J. Evil and the God of Love (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007) 
HIKEM Hadis Ilimleri Koordinasyon ve Eğitim Merkezi (Ḥadīth Institute for 
Knowledge and Education and Methodology), 
<http://www.hikem.net/index.html>, last access April 2011 
Horovitz, J. Koranische Untersuchungen (Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 
1926) 
Hourani, George F. „Ibn Sīnā's 'Essay on the Secret of Destiny'‟ in Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 
29, No. 1 (1966), pp. 25-48 
_________. Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985) 
_________.Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam in The Muslim World 50, 
Issue 4 (1960) 
_________. Averroes on Good and Evil in Studia Islamica, No. 16 (1962) 
 326 
 
_________. Ghazali on the Ethics of Action in Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, vol. 96, issue 1 (Jan. – Mar., 1976), p. 69-88 
_________. Ethical Presuppositions of the Qur‟an in The Muslim World, vol. 
70, issue 1 (3 April 2007), p. 1-28  
Ibn „Arabῑ. Al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya (Cairo, 1911), repr. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d. 
Ed. O. Yahia, Cairo: Al-Hay‟at al-Miṣriyyat al-„Āmma li‟l-Kitāb, 1972 
Ibn Kathir, H. Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Darussalam) 
Ibn Sīnā. Risālah: asbāb huduw al-huruwf. A Treatise on Arabic Phonetics. 
Solomon I. Sara, S.J. (München: Lincom, 2009)  
Inati, S. C. The Problem of Evil – Ibn Sina‟s Theodicy, (New York: Global 
Publications, 2000) 
Islamic Philosophy Online, 
<http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ei2/kalam.htm>, last access 
December 16, 2009 
Izutsu, T. Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur‟ān (Montreal&Kingston: 
McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2007) 
__________.God and Man in the Koran (New Hampshire: Ayer Company 
Publishers, Inc., 1987) 
__________. Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical 
Concepts (London: University of California Press, 1983) 
Hick, J. Evil and the God of Love (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007) 
Iqbal, M. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1934) 
Al-Jawziyya, al-Qayyim. Al-Rūḥ, ed. Muḥammad „Ali al-Qutb and Walῑd al-
Dhikrā (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-„Aṣriyya, 2000), pp. 174-221 
Kalın, I. „Mullā Sadrā on Theodicy and the Best of All Possible Worlds‟ in 
Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol 18, No. 2 (2007), pp. 183-201 
 327 
 
Kahraman, F. „Hz. Adem‟in Yasak Ağaca Yaklaşması‟ in Sakarya Üniversitesi 
Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 15, No. 27 (2013) 
Kaya, Mehmet S. The Zaza Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern Minority in a 
Globalized Society (I.B. Tauris, 2011) 
Kaya, Veysel. 'Can the Quran Support Darwin? An Evolutionist Approach by 
Two Turkish Scholars after the Foundation of the Turkish Republic' in 
The Muslim World, Vol. 102, Issue 2 (Apr. 2012), pp. 357-370 
Kazanç, F. K. „Kelami Düşüncede Kötülük Sorununa Kısa Bir Bakış‟ in Kelam 
Araştırmaları, 6:1 (2008), p. 77-106  
Kenneth, S. Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 
1986) 
Khoury, A. T. Der Koran (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1987) 
Kılıç, C. „Muhammed Ikbal‟de Benlik Felsefesi‟ (The Personality Philosophy 
According to Mohammad Iqbal) in Tasavvuf Degisi, I/II (Dec., 1999), 
pp. 49-70 
__________. Büyük Mütefekkir Dr. Muhammed Ikbal: Hayatı, Şahsiyeti ve 
Fikirleri (Ankara: Muradiye Kültür Vakfı Yayınları, 1994) 
Krawulsky, D. Briefe und Reden des Abū Hāmid Muhammad al-Ghazzālī 
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1971) 
Kur‟an-ı Kerῑm Meali, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 
<http://www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/meal/Ahzap.htm>, last access 19 
November 2012 
Kurtubῑ, Al-jāmῑ al-aḥkām al-Qur‟ān (Egytp: Dār al-Kutūb al-Miṣrῑ, 1962) 
Kutub, S. Fī Zilāl „il-Kur‟an Tefsiri, surah Falaq, Online version 
Larrimore, M. The Problem of Evil - A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
Ltd., 2001) 
Leaman, O. Moses Maimonides (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1990) 
 328 
 
__________. Averroes and his Philosophy (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1988) 
Lempp, E; Thaidigsmann, E. Gottes Gerechtigkeit in der Dialektik der 
Aufklärung: Annäherungen an die Theologue Hans Joachim Iwands 
(München: Kaiser Verlag, 1990) 
Lessnoff, M. „Two Justifications of Punishment‟ in The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 21, No. 83 (Apr., 1971), pp. 141-148 
Ling, T. Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
1997) 
Lovejoy, A. The Great Chain of Being (Harvard University Press, 1936) 
MacIntyre, A. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2007) 
Mackie, J. L. Evil and Omnipotence in Mind, New Series, Vol. 64, No. 254 
(Oxford University Press, April 1955) 
Maimonides, M. The Guide of the Perplexed, tr. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press; 1963) 
McCarthy, R. J. The Theology of Al-Ash‟arī (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 
1953) 
McCloskey, H. J. „God and Evil‟ in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 
39 (Apr., 1960), p. 97-114 
Markham, Ian S. Understanding Christian Doctrine (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008) 
__________. The World Religions Reader, sec. ed. (Malden; Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2000) 
el-Māturīdī, Ebū Mansūr. Kitābu‟t-Tevhīd, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu (Ankara: 
Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003) 
 329 
 
Memiş, Murat. „İlahî İradenin Yaratılmışlığı Sorunu‟ in C.Ü. İlahiyat Fakültesi 
Dergisi, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2009), pp. 231-260 
Mevdūdī, Mevlana Seyyid Ebu‟l-A‟la. Tefhimu‟l Kur‟an: Kur‟an‟ın Anlamı ve 
Tefsiri (Soft-Copy) 
Mill, J. S. Three Essays on Religion (London: Longmans, Green, Reader & 
Dyer, 1875) 
Morris, J. W. „The Spiritual Ascension: Ibn „Arabῑ and the Mi‟rāj Part ii‟ in 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 
1988), pp. 63-77 
Murata, S; Chittick, W.C.  The Vision of Islam (London: I.B.Tauris, 1994) 
Murphy, M. C. „Hobbes on the Evil of Death‟ in Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie, Bd. 82, pp. 36-61 
Mutaharri, M. „Understanding the Uniqueness of the Qur‟ān‟ in Al-Tawhīd, 
trans. Mahliqa Qara‟i, Vol. 1, No. 1-3 (1987) 
Namazi, M. „Thematic Approach to the Qur‟an Exegesis in Message of 
Thaqalayn‟ in A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Studies, 10/4 (2010), pp. 
37-56 
Nielsen, K. „God and the Basis of Morality‟ in The Journal of Religious Ethics, 
Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall, 1982), pp. 335-350 
Nursi, S. Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, vol.1 (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Publications, 1996) 
__________. Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, vol.2 (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Publications, 
1996) 
__________. The Words (Istanbul: Sözler Publications, 2004) 
__________. The Words, trans.  Şükran Vahide (Istanbul: Reyhan Ofset, 
2002) 
__________. Hutbe-i Şamiye (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2011) 
__________. The Flashes Collection, trans. Şükran Vahide (Istanbul: Sözler 
Neşriyat, 1995) 
 330 
 
__________. The Rays Collection, trans.  Şükran Vahide (Istanbul: Sözler 
Neşriyat, 2002) 
__________. Letters, trans. Şükran Vahide (Istanbul: Sözler Neşriyat, 2001) 
__________. Mesnevῑ-i Nuriye, trans. Abdülmecid Nursi (Istanbul: Söz Basım 
Yayın, 2006) 
__________. Signs of Miraculousness, trans. Şükran Vahide (Istanbul: Sözler 
Publications, 2007) 
__________. Ilk Dönem Eserleri (Istanbul: Söz Basım Yayın, 2007) 
__________. The Staff of Moses (Istanbul: Sözler Publications, 2006) 
__________. Sikke-i Tasdik-i Gaybī (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaasi, 1960) 
Obermann, J. Der Philosophische und Religiöse Subjektivismus Ghazālīs. Ein 
Beitrag zum Problem der Religion (Wien und Leipzig: Wilhelm 
Braumüller Universitäts- Verlagsbuchhandlung Gesellschaft M.B.H., 
1921) 
O‟Flaherty, W. D. The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1976) 
Ogletree, S. M.; Oberle, C. D. „The Nature, Common Usage, and Implications 
of Free Will and Determinism‟ in Behavior and Philosophy, Vol. 36 
(2008), pp. 97-111 
Okumuş, M. „The Influence of Ibn Sῑnā on al-Ghazzālῑ in Qur‟anic 
Hermeneutics‟ in The Muslim World, Vol. 102, Issue 2 (Jul. 2011), pp. 
390-411 
Ormsby, E. Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over al-Ghazālī‟s „Best 
of All Possible Worlds‟ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 
Özdemir, M. „Kötülük Problemine Eleştirel bir Yaklaşım‟ in Cumhuriyet 
Üniversitesi Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt IV/1 (Sivas, 2000) 
 331 
 
Özervarlı, M. S. „The Authenticity of the Manuscript of Maturīdī‟s Kitāb al-
Tawḥīd: A Re-examination‟ in Islam Araştırmaları Dergisi, Sayı 1 
(1997), pp. 19-29 
Pagels, E. „The Social History of Satan, the “Intimate Enemy”: A Preliminary 
Sketch‟ in The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 
1991), pp. 105-128 
Pak, Z. „Kur‟an‟daki Kelimelerin Türkçe‟ye Geçiş Sürecinde Uğradıkları Anlam 
Değişmeleri‟ in KSÜ. Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 3 (2004), pp. 91-111 
Pessagno, J. M. „The Uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought‟ in Studia Islamica, 
No. 60, (1984), pp. 59-82 
Picken, G. „Tazkiyat al-nafs: The Qur‟anic Paradigm‟ in Journal of Qur‟anic 
Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 101-127 
Pickthall, M. „The Perils of a Propaganda‟ in The New Age, Vol. XXIV, No. 20 
(Thursday, March 20, 1919) 
Plantinga, A. God and Other Minds: Study of the Rational Justification of 
Belief in God (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967) 
Al-Qāḍῑ, Wadād. „”Khalῑfa” in Early Exegetical Literature‟ in Die Welt des 
Islams, New Series, Bd. 28, Nr. ¼ (1988), pp. 392-411 
Qādi, „Abd al-Jabbār. Sharhu‟l-Usūl al-Ḥamsa (Bayrūt, 2001) 
er-Rāzī, F. Tefsīr-i Kebīr Mefātihu‟l-Gayb, trans.  Lutfullah Cebeci, Sadık Kılıç, 
Cafer Sadık (Akçağ Yayınları) 
_____________. Al-Arba‟ῑn fῑ Usūl al-Dῑn, ed. Aḥmad Hijāzῑ al-Sakā, Vol. 1 
(Qāhira: 1986) 
Ruthven, M. Islam in the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) 
Sahiner, N. Bilinmeyen Taraflarıyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Istanbul, 1990) 
 332 
 
Saritoprak, Z. „Esma-i Hüsna ve Yaratıcıyı Kavrama Meselesi‟ in Risale-i Nur‟a 
Doğru, Sayı 49 (1995) 
Schäferdick, K."Satan in the Post-Apostolic Fathers," s.v. " σατανας,” 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 7 (1971) 
Schumacher, Bernard N. Der Tod in der Philosophie der Gegenwart 
(Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004) 
Scoralick, R. Das Drama der Barmherzigkeit Gottes: Studien zur biblischen 
Gottesrede und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte in Judentum und 
Christentum (Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk GmbH, 1999) 
Serhendῑ, Aḥmed-i Fārūkῑ. Müjdeci Mektūblar Tercūmesi (Translation of 
Letters of Good News), trans. Süleyman Sa‟deddῑn, 25th ed. (Istanbul: 
Hakῑkat Kitabevi Yayınları, 2002) 
Shepard, W. E. „Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology‟ in International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1987), pp. 307-335  
Smart, N. Philosophers and Religious Truth (Canterbury Press, 1969) 
Smirnov, A. „Understanding Justice in an Islamic Context: Some Points of 
Contrast with Western Theories‟ in Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, 
No. 3, Seventh East-West Philosophers‟ Conference (Jul., 1996), pp. 
337-350 
Sontag, Frederick.  „Anthropodicy or Theodicy? A Discussion with Becker‟s 
The Structure of Evil‟ in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
vol.  49, No.  2 (June 1981), pp.  267-274 
„Summary (Jami‟) of Aristotle‟s Metaphysics‟ in Rasā‟il Ibn Rushd (Hyderabad, 
1947) 
Surin, K.  „Theodicy?‟ in The Harvard Theological Review, vol.  76, No.  2 
(Apr., 1983), pp.  225-247 
__________. Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 
1986) 
 333 
 
Syamsuddin, A. Preserving the semantic structure of Islamic key terms and 
concepts: Izutsu, al-Attas, and al-Raghib al-Isfahani in Islam and 
Science, 5 (Dec 2007) 
Ṭabāṭabā‟ī, ‟Allāmah Sayyid M. Ḥ. Shi‟ite Islam, trans. Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975) 
et-Taberī, Ebū Cafer Muhammed b. Cerīr. Taberī Tefsīri, trans. Kerim Aytekin, 
Hasan Karakaya (Istanbul: Hisar Yayınevi, 1996) 
Taşpınar, H. Matüridiyye ile Eş‟ariyye Mezhepleri Arasında Ihtilaf mı? Suni 
Dalgalanma mı? in Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 
cilt X/1, p. 214-250 (June 2006) 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. Gibb, H. A. R.; Kramers, J. H.; Lévi-
Provençal, E.; Schacht, J., vol. I (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1986) 
______________________, ed. Lewis, B.; Pellat, Ch.; Schacht, J., vol. II 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991)  
______________________, ed. Lewis, B.; Ménage, V. L.; Pellat, Ch.; 
Schacht, J., vol. III (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986) 
______________________, ed. Donzel, van E.; Lewis, B.; Pellat, Ch., vol. IV 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997) 
______________________, ed., Bosworth, C. E.; Donzel, van E.; Lewis, B.; 
Pellat, Ch., vol. VI (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1991) 
______________________, ed. Bosworth, C. E.; Donzel, van E.; Heinrichs, 
W. P.; Pellat, Ch., vol. VII (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993) 
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chad Meister; Paul 
Copan, (Oxon: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007) 
 334 
 
Tritton, A. S. „Man, nafs, rūḥ, „aql‟ in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), pp. 491-495 
Turner, C. P. (ed.). „The Koran: Critical Concepts‟ in Islamic Studies, Vols. 1-
2 (Oxon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) 
__________. The Qur‟an Revealed: A Critical Analysis of Said Nursi‟s Epistles 
of Light (Gerlach Press, 2013) 
Turner, C. P.; Horkuc, H. Makers of Islamic Civilization: Said Nursi (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2009) 
Türker, Ö. „The Perception of Rational Sciences in the Muqaddimah: Ibn 
Khaldun‟s Individual Aptitudes Theory‟ in Asian Journal of Social 
Science, Vol. 36 (2008), pp. 465-482 
Twersky, I. A Maimonides Reader (New York: Behrman House, Inc., 1972) 
Vahide, Ş. „A Chronology of Said Nursi‟s Life‟ in Islam at the Crossroads, ed. 
Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‟ (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003) 
__________. Islam in Modern Turkey, An Intellectual Biography of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‟ (New York: SUNY 
Press, 2005) 
Van Inwagen, P. „Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do 
Otherwise‟ in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 3, No. 4, The Contribution of 
Harry G. Frankfurt to Moral Responsibility Theory (1999), pp. 341-350 
Von Grunebaum, G. E. „Observations on the Muslim Concept of Evil‟ in Studia 
Islamica, No. 31 (Maisonneuve & Larose, 1970), pp. 117-134 
Yazır, M. H. Hak Dini Kur‟an Dili (Eser Neşriyat ve Dağıtım), Vols. 1-10. 
Yıldırım, S. Kur‟an-ı Hakim‟in Açıklamalı Meali (Istanbul: Işık Yayınları, 2004) 
Wallace, G. The Problems of Moral and Physical Evil in Philosophy, Vol. 46, 
No. 178 (October 1971), pp. 349-351 
 335 
 
Warner, James J. (1998) Karl Rahner and the Option of Grace in Freedom: A 
critical examination of Rahner's understanding of both fundamental 
option and virtue ethics and the link between them in the light of 
their classical antecedents and contemporary developments in moral 
theology, moral philosophy and fundamental theology. Unpublished 
PhD Thesis. Australian Catholic University 
Watson, G. Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
Weaver, D. F. „Taking Sin Seriously‟ in The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 
31, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 45-74 
Wendy Doniger O‟Flaherty, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1976) 
Wensinck, A. J., Raven, W., Witkam, J. J., et al. Al-Mu‟jam al-mufahras li-
alfāẓ al--Ḥadīth al-Nabawī: ‟an al-kutub as-sittah wa ‟an musnad al-
Darmī wa Mawaṭṭa‟ Mālik wa musnad Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (Lidin: Bril, 
1936-1988) 
Wieman, H. N. „How Do We Know God?‟ in The Journal of Religion, Vol. 5, 
No. 2 (March, 1925), pp. 113-129 
Ziff, P. Semantic Analysis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960) 
